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CHAPTER ONE
KARL MARX
Introduction
This dissertation is situated between the modern critique of religion as ideology,
on the one hand, and the postsecular turn to theology in contemporary theory and political philosophy, on the other. If we hope to more clearly define the relation of ideology
critique to political theology in this matrix, it is important to first discuss Karl Marx’s position on the relation of theology to ideology.1 After all, it is Marx who identifies theology as a constructed response to social antagonisms that yield human consciousness,
while simultaneously being produced by the selfsame realities. Marx’s accusation that religion is ideology was instrumental in stimulating the modern suspicion of theology, and
it is the spirit of this position that still animates critical theory’s allergy to it. In this context, it is important to understand Marx’s critique of religion as ideology as a political objection, and so I argue in this chapter against the common position that defines ideology
in Marx

1

In what follows, it is important to clarify the differences between Marx’s own views (‘Marxian’) and
those of his subsequent readers and interpreters (‘Marxism’) who attempt to think in and through his legacy. While there may indeed be some overlap between the Marxist legacy and the Marxian perspective, my
concern in this chapter is strictly limited to how Marx envisioned the relation between theology and ideology, and so can be taken as Marxian analysis. To complicate matters further, the most perspicuous texts
where the concept of ideology is featured hardly use the term at all, and those who do have a complex and
varied scholarly reception.

1

2

2

as “false consciousness.” Marx understood ideology as that which produces ‘false consciousness’ in political subjects. It is the mechanism of socio-political control used by
ruling powers to maintain their dominative and oppressive hold on the social relations of
production. An important question about Marx’s theory of ideology is whether a central
criterion of the Marxian critique is that ideology is made up of false, illusory, mythical,
and distorted accounts about social reality3 — a criterion for ideology that even nonMarxist theorists use.4 Others try to either retain the distorted or illusory character of ideology while avoiding the epistemological issues with the claim that ideology is defined
by ‘falsehood’ or reject the idea that falsehood was a central definition characteristic of
ideology altogether, contending that Marx interpreted as ideological any claim that its
ideas were absolutely and universally valid, a kind of claim usually made in service to

2

The literature that tries to represent Marx’s position is as deep as it is wide. There are numerous examples
of interpretations of Marxian ideology critique that identify “false” or “distorted” thought as a constitutive
element. Prominent among them are Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the
Theory of Ideology (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Christopher Pines, Ideology
and false consciousness: Marx and his historical progenitors (SUNY Press, 1993); David Miller, “Ideology
and the problem of false consciousness,” Political Studies 20.4 (1972): 442-444; and Jorge Larrain, The
Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1979), 40ff. The specific aspect of the position(s) that I am disputing is simply the often-inherent and implicit claim that in identifying theology as ideology, Marx is arguing that theology is false, as in ‘not factually true’, usually assuming some corresponding theory of truth.
Pace this construction, I do not believe that for Marx, ideology is an epistemological matter, but rather a
political one. By this, I simply mean that I do not believe that ideology critique belongs to that analytic
philosophical work committed to questions of belief, truth, and justification; it is not a discourse that determines whether ideas are true or false, but rather how certain ideas function within social reality.
3

For a survey of influential attempts to define and categorize ideology, see Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a
Critical Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 4-25; and Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology: A Critical Essay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
4

Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: K. Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1936), 49-51; Paul Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” in
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), 71-88ff.

5

3

economic interests of specific social class at the expense of another.

I consider the term ‘false consciousness’ to be too epistemological a term and as
such, it misses the political point Marx tried to make in his ideology critique. ‘False consciousness’ typically refers to the idea that political subjects misapprehend their social location and so fail to fully understand or realize their real material interests within social
relations and productive forces of capitalism. ‘False consciousness’ causes politics actors
to fail to recognize themselves in states of inequality, oppression, or exploitation because
the ruling ideas have been naturalized and universalized, and as such, there are little reason and motivation to challenge them. People under ideology prehend social reality in an
illusionary and misleading fashion and so are unable to act on their own behalf against
the dominative and exploitative practices and policies of the ruling powers. Political subjects who live under ideology act out of a ‘false consciousness’ wherein they mistake appearance for reality; this is politically insidious due to the effect that false representation
and distortion of the social reality has on the legitimation of power relations.
This original reading of Marx’s theory of ideology as that of ‘false consciousness’
has become a controversial issue in the theory of ideology, leading many even within the
Marxian framework to abandon ideology critique on account of the many epistemology
problems it appears to present - even to the Marxist critique itself. Indeed, one of the reasons for the eclipse of ideology critique in political theology is that its definition as ‘false
consciousness’ implies that there exists some space ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ ideology, some

5

For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Joe McCarney, The Real World of Ideology
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 95ff; and Bhikhu Parekh, Marx’s Theory of Ideology (Baltimore, MA:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
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objective and scientific gnosis, gained from a privileged, non-ideological vantage point
that becomes the subjective position from which all critique of ideology proceeds. To interpret ideology in this way is to ultimately miss the full force of Marx’s materialist objection to the way that theology malforms subjects by concealing and suturing the economic contradictions that operate with social realities, in service to the political-economic
interests of the ruling classes. In fact, it is the long association with the idea of “false consciousness” that has led to the dismissal of ideology critique as a viable political resource
by contemporary theory. It seems to be dependent on the mind/body dichotomy that produces the appearance/reality confusion endemic to the idea of false consciousness.
This chapter advocates for a reading of Marx that deemphasizes the epistemological focus of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ and opts instead for a more directly political reading that helps clarify not so much the theory of ideology in abstract, but in relation to his critique of religion and theology. To do this, I start with how Marx’s perspective develops in contradistinction to the so-called “Enlightenment” critique of religion,
not in coincidence to it. This way we are able to avoid both overdetermining the role of
Marx’s atheism in his critique of religion and restricting Marx’s critique of religion to his
critique of ideology, which extracts it from broader themes in Marx’s thought, especially
in the so-called “early” periods. Given the enduring effect of Marx’s legacy on critical
theory and ideology critique today, it is crucial that its position on what is wrong with religion and theology is brought into clear relief. These characterizations succeed only in
obscuring the fundamental problem(s) posed by ideology — and theology, for that matter.

5
To avoid this, we must situate Marx’s critique of theology as ideology outside of
the traditional Enlightenment critique of religion, which Marx himself considered to be
insufficiently materialist. The critique of religion is not about theology, but about the socio-political conditions that give rise to religion in the first place and make it possible.6
The critique of religion as ideology is not about exposing its claims to be illusory; it is
about abolishing the social relations and productive forces that prevent political subjects
from prehending their actual situation: “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness
of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions.”7 Marx’s critique of ideology animated his early humanist and materialist objections to the deleterious effect of theology on the political order — and its subjects. He
saw it effectively concealing and suturing the socio-economic contradictions which form
along the class fault-lines in the capitalist social order. When he speaks of religion as ideology, Marx is concerned about what religion does to human social actors and how it interacts with social relations and productive forces, inevitably in support of capitalism.
6

Within our current intellectual climate, we are accustomed to carefully parsing out the complex relation
between religion and theology upon their mention, to what extent is this effort relevant or important for understanding Marx on the relation between theology and ideology? Does Marx distinguish between theology
and religion in his work, and do they function differently in his view? If so, what does he understand each
of these terms to mean? A full answer is way beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that
Marx’s use of terms like religion and theology do not have the technical specificity of contemporary usage.
It is quite clear that he uses these terms quite interchangeably, with little care or consideration for any real
or apparent differences between them. Within Marx’s historical context, the religious traditions of Judaism
and Christianity were dominant, and the theology of the latter was characterized heavily as Lutheran confessionalism by the Prussian state. He did not distinguish between the cognitive, experiential, confessional,
or practical aspects of religious faith, and their corresponding theological beliefs; this illustrates my overall
position that Marx knew and cared little about theological particulars, and was far more interested to critique the way it functioned within capitalist socio-economic dynamics as an ideology.
7

Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in Karl Marx: Selected
Writings, trans. Lawrence Hugh Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 28.

6
The point of ideology critique is not to mark the difference between appearance and reality or to expose the content of particular truth claims to be false per se, but to identify
ideology as a function of ideas as class-driven, bourgeoisie techniques of resistance to the
processes of proletarianization; they make sure that things just keep on running smoothly,
that nothing ultimately changes. Insofar as religion contributes to this, it is ideological.
All too often, the atheist elements of Marx’s objections to religion overshadow his more
political concerns with the way that theology has deleterious impact on social reality.
Marx’s critique of theology as ideology affords him the opportunity to show that “‘the religious sentiment’ is itself a social product”, the humanist thesis at the center of his nascent social theory.8 Ideology is not about ideas being true or false (or how it is that ideas
can be either, both, or neither), but about the material conditions that give rise to political
subjectivity and so determine the materialist practices of human labor.
Marx famously argued that “the ‘criticism of religion’ is the conditional premise
of all criticism”9, the purpose of which is to uncover the material reality of the human
condition, which is often concealed under ‘the illusionary sun’ of theological ‘niceties.’10
Religion, says Marx, is symptomatic of problems within these material conditions and is
paradigmatic of the whole ideological structure. To critique theology as ideology is to explain what theology does to human social actors, not to argue that the content of theology

8

Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The German Ideology (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 19980,
574.
9

Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in Karl Marx: Selected
Writings, trans. Lawrence Hugh Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 28.
10

Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” 28.

11

7

is false. The aim of the critique of religion as ideology is to emancipate the proletariat
from the debilitating effect of ideologies - the masking and concealment of the real contradictions at the base of all relations and forces in capitalist economic life and to clear
the way for political subjectivization.
At first, Marx’s critique of religion itself seems to radicalize the Enlightenment’s
rejection of classical Christian theological beliefs and the legitimacy of religious authority in public life. He was averse to Christianity specifically, which he considered to be
historically complicit in the alienating and reifying effects of capitalism on the working
and producing classes:
For a society of commodity-producers, whose general social relation of production consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, hence as values, and in this material form bring their individual private laborers into relation
with each other as homogeneous human labor. Christianity with its religious cult
of man in the abstract, more particularly in its bourgeois development, i.e. in Protestantism, Deism, etc, is the most fitting form of religion.12
Yet, while it is clear that Marx is not a sort of crypto-theologian, recent studies on his critique of religion complicate his position on the relation of theology to ideology that complicates the Marxist allegation of theology as ideology.13 Despite its structural atheism,

11

Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 9.

12

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol.1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin
Books, 1990), 172.
13

Roland Boer, Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Alberto Toscano,
“Beyond Abstractions: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of Religion,” Historical Materialism 18
(2010): 3-20; Andrew McKinnon, “Reading ‘Opium of the People’: Expression, Protest, and the Dialectics
of Religion,” Critical Sociology 31.1-2 (2005): 15-38.

8
the Marxist legacy finds it quite difficult to discount the formal and normative significance of theology.14 But lest we think that it is possible to extract the moral and ethical
values of Christianity from its more scandalous theological particulars or its economic
moorings, Marx famously resisted the idea that ‘the social principles of Christianity’
could be counted on to promote or generate social liberation or economic justice:
The social principles of Christianity preach the necessity of a ruling and oppressed class, and for the latter all they have to offer is the pious wish that former
may be charitable… The social principles of Christianity are sneaking and hypocritical and the proletariat is revolutionary. So much for the social principles of
Christianity!15
It is also important to note, at the outset, that specifically theological debates
serve as the immediate intellectual and political context for the early stage of Marx’s critique of religion and his concept of ideology. I will reconstruct Marx’s theory of ideology, not exhaustively, but as it concerns the critique of theology, thereby pinpointing its
place within Marx’s theory of ideology at large. Strangely enough, the question of theology is often overlooked in Marx’s concept of ideology; it is usually considered to be a
footnoted example, a specific form of a more general type. While it is widely accepted
that Marx dismisses religion as ideology, one often finds that when reconstructing Marx’s
account of ideology itself, the place of religion in that account is far more than a marginal
or negative one. Religion is indeed the paradigmatic case of ideology for Marx, at least in
his early ‘philosophical’ stage, and becomes the measure for his structural analysis of

14

For differing perspectives, see Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern
Atheism (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1993); Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in
Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
15

Karl Marx, “The Social Principles of Christianity,” in Marx on Religion, ed. John Raines (Philadelphia,
Pa: Temple University Press, 2002), 185-186.

9
capitalism in his later ‘scientific’ stages. Many descriptive forms of relations such as
commodification, fetishization, money, and the value-product are described as and by
theologies in Marx’s ideology critique of the capitalist social order.
Marx and the Critique of the Theological Critique of Religion
What concerned Marx about religion — and how did this concern differ from preceding critiques? My point here is to situate Marx’s early use of the term ‘ideology’ as
contextualized within particular theological debates amongst nineteenth-century interpreters of Hegel. The context has important interpretative implications as it is directly related to Marx’s theories of abstraction and of historical materialism, which have constitutive roles in the articulation of ideology critique in Marx’s early humanism philosophy.
The concept of ideology was germinated in Marx’s critical reception of Hegel in and
through the critical inversion of German idealism in the work of Ludwig Feuerbach, a
turn lodged within the community of ‘Left’ or ‘Young’ Hegelians.16 Feuerbach represented a decisive turn from the traditional critique of religion through epistemology and
metaphysics to a French and British inspired materialist critique of religion that interpreted theology as an inverted anthropology.17

16

Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 73-94. Marx never understood himself to be departing in any
significant way from what he took to be the core intuitions of Hegel himself. Marx never left Hegel. Instead, his breakthrough came as a matter of his departure with the particular Hegelianism that eventually
characterized the theological approach of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, and others. Marx opposed the
‘theological Hegel’ insofar as he was read as such by idealists who were still waging a theoretical attack
against religion, whose theological blows were abstract, superficial, and so woefully ineffective insofar as
they were satisfied with merely exposing “the secular basis” of theology itself.
17

Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 83 and 85-94. Tucker outlines this in his masterful recounting of Feuerbach’s interpretation of Hegel which turns metaphysics into an ‘esoteric psychology.’ Feuerbach’s point was to say that “Hegelianism is the traditional Christian theology spelt by dialectic. Hegel’s

10
In so doing, the ‘ideologists’ were set firmly within the confines of the traditional
Enlightenment critique of religion. In response, Marx takes up the vague term of ‘ideology’ in this context, which at this time had a very short history, and utilized it as a matter
of social scientific critique, directed towards those ‘ideologists’ whose inadequately materialist interrogation of religion uses the ‘transformative method’ of inversion in order to
demonstrate the secular or psychological basis of theological belief. Marx argued that this
approach was fatally flawed for its abstract character that led them to largely misunderstand the relation between being and consciousness and between subject and object. This
resulted in highly abstracted and idealist conception of the relation between the individual
social actor and society, between the state and the civil discourses of social action, all of
which comes back to the overtly theological character of their critique of the inverted
character of religion and its self-alienating effects on the human being.
The immediate context for the relation between theology and ideology is Marx’s
early departure from Hegel along Feuerbachian lines, followed by his subsequent parting
from the Young Hegelians on account of their “idealist” materialism. This is best illustrated in their theological critique of religion, which according to Marx, deals only with
the highest of ‘abstractions’. Their approach takes on religion from the ‘abstract’ theological side, leaving the material conditions uninterrogated as if religion and its theological
content was not itself a social product. As an abstraction, it is neither sufficiently dialectical nor historical (and so not sufficiently ‘Hegelian’), and so leads to contradictions and

picture of a self-alienated God simply brings into focus what was always present in religious consciousness, and in traditional theology as its theological transcript," meaning that in Hegel, we find a ‘rational
mysticism’ that serves as the ‘last rational support of theology.’

11
antagonisms at the social and economic level. Marx defines an abstraction as an undeveloped unity of identical aspects of a representation (‘as if’) of a thing (‘as such’) in isolation from other aspects, whereas concrete applications are a developed unity of the diverse aspects of said representation. Practical abstraction is a contributing factor to social
contradiction. Consider, for example, Marx’s critique of Feuerbach in the sixth and seventh theses:
Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. (sic) But the
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual…Consequently, Feuerback does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social
product, and that the abstract individual which he analyzes belongs in reality to a
particular form of society.18
The early 1840s were the critical period in which Marx was most engaged on the
link between theology, politics, and as such, ideology. Marx approached the question of
ideology and religion in his early years, while distancing himself in the German Ideology
from the ‘critique of religion’ of the “young” or “left” Hegelians, favoring instead a materialist parallelism that formulates its critique of religion as an “immanent critique of antagonism”, or clearer still, the sources of social contradiction itself.19 It is important to
clarify the historical and intellectual context in which Marx first took up the question of
‘religion’ as a theological matter, essentially changing the site, the battleground, upon
which the struggle against religion must be waged. In other words, it is important not to

18
19

Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” 573-574.

Robert J. Antonio, "Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in
Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought,” British Journal of Sociology (1981): 330-345; Jan Rehmann.
“Can Marx's Critique of Religion Be Freed from Its Fetters?” Rethinking Marxism 23.1 (2011): 144-153.

12
parse the referent ‘religion’ in Marx to the point that it becomes abstracted from the discursive context in which Marx takes up the question, a context in which the most important questions for philosophy were indeed explicitly theological.20 The Young Hegelians that Marx criticized in The German Ideology were actively involved in a whole range
of theological debates, not because of their particular interest in theology per se, but because the very theological nature of Hegel’s argument led to that being the primarily battleground. Theology was the discursive site in the political struggle to resolve open dilemmas in German idealism, and so Marx’s nascent theory of ideology emerges within
this crucible. This explains at least in part why the early mentions of ideology always
seem to be in close proximity to this critique of religion.
What motivated Marx’s critique of religion was not his atheist theological commitments, but rather a materialist and humanist objection to ways that religion produced
and sustained the very social contradictions, which causes the real needs that human social actors attempt to resolve in theology. In this way, Marx’s initial analysis of theology
takes the form of a critique of the theological critique of religion as undertaken by the
Young Hegelians, who like Feuerbach, thought the problem of inversion lie with false
ideas about God, and so the critique of religion was a matter of changing consciousness
by demonstrating those ideas to be false, i.e., an affront to nature, freedom, and reason,
even while these arguments lie within the field of theological discourse. The use of anti-

20

Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning
the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

13
theist arguments and rationalist epistemologies would be sufficient to change the consciousness of human persons and so resolve the problems with the political use of religion, or so they thought. Marx thought otherwise. His materialist concept of history as
human work explored the conditions that produce religion, and critique those who were
convinced that changing the world required only the pedagogy of theological inversion:
God as the projected effect of self-alienated ‘essence’ of humanity. These, says Marx,
are the ‘ideologists’: those who fail to interrogate “the secular basis” of religion and fail
to encounter the material ground upon which ideas are formed and so function. Against
Max Stirner, to whom he attributes the idea “that thoughts, which have become independent, objectified thoughts – ghosts – have ruled the world and continue to rule it, and that
all history up to now was the history of theology”21, Marx will argue that ideologists
combat religion on theological terms and so takes on the faults of such a register: inversion, abstraction and contradiction, the marks of ideology.
The real problem with religion is not theological particulars about matters such
God, freedom, or the immortality of the soul. It is, rather, the social reality in which it is
rooted and the material conditions it serves.22 Or to be more precise: it is the contradictions produced within that social reality, the origins of which lie with the division of labor

21
22

Marx, The German Ideology, 173.

Though to be sure, Marx has theological disagreements with the core beliefs of the major religion traditions, namely Judaism and Christianity, the Protestant variety in particular. It is not that Marx did not consider the theological dictates of religion such as the existence of God, the belief in life after death, or the
existence of the human soul to be false or unreasonable. Only that this line of questioning, ‘the critique of
heaven’, left the ‘the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness’ of the materialist base of religion uninterrogated. This was the line of questioning most important for understanding the various forms of political,
and eventually, economic alienation plaguing the workers and producers suffering under capitalist society.

14
and privatization of property which not only produces alienation (in its tripartite form),
but also furthers and endorses class struggle by setting the interests of the individual over
that of the social good. These contradictions give rise to various forms of consciousness.
Ideology is that specific type of consciousness, which attempts to resolve contradictions
through negation or concealment. Whether by design or by effect, it is ideologists such as
those whose critical appraisal of religion served as Marx’s point of departure from the
Feuerbach’s emphasis on critique as inversion, which treated contradictions as something
that could be resolved through a change in thinking. Rather, Marx wants to take on the
different modes of abstraction and contradiction, and so he begins to categorize and analyze various responses to them, the most trenchant of which is ideology.
Taking a stand against the Young Hegelians (Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, and Max
Stirner), Marx contends that the traditional critique of religion is inadequate, in that the
use of a baldly atheist critique of religious authority and the role of religion in legitimating the state only elevates the discursive stature of Christianity. His entrée into the debate
on religion and politics is summarized in his materialist parallelism: Marx wants to abandon the ‘criticism of heaven’ and take up a ‘criticism of earth’ in its place. This requires
that critical philosophy abandon its operation against religion and engage rather a critique
of the fraught relations between the state and civil society as a matter of sociological and
economic analysis. In a letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx writes,
Religion should be criticized in the framework of political conditions [instead of
criticizing] political conditions … in the framework of religion …; for religion in

15
itself is without content, it owes its being not to heaven but to earth, and with the
abolition of distorted reality, of which it is the theory, it will collapse of itself.23
To make this point, that religion is ‘the theory of the world,' Marx must disentangle the
Young Hegelian’s political critique from the traditional critique of religion. To do this,
Marx must enter into the theological fray and as a result, his early diagnosis of ideology
is characterized by its link to theology, both contextually and materially. It was not
enough to unveil theology as an abstraction by showing it to be an inverted project of human self-alienation. Contrary to the traditional critique of religion, Marx, rather than dismissing religion as either a priestly conspiracy to manipulate human persons or a mere
delusion, recognizes religion as a form of consciousness that functions politically to organize and produce collective life, and so must be engaged, not at the level of abolishing
it politically or dismantling it theologically, but critiquing it materially.
To illustrate this, allow me to give two examples: first in the important although
frequently overlooked, early text “The Leading Article”, Marx reprimanded the German
papers who attacked the “religious trend in philosophy” and called for the abolition of
Christianity from the political state.24 Marx disagrees, arguing that this amounts to a politicization of religion, which actually aids the critique of religion, in that the religious legitimation of politics actively “secularizes it”, making it an “object of political discourse
and disputation.” Again in “The Jewish Question," Marx faults Bauer, for whom the

23

Karl Marx, “Marx to Ruge, November 30 1842,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol.
1 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 393-395.
24
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question of religion should be transposed into a question about the secular state. Pace
Bauer who thinks that the State should abolish religion, Marx says this will neither effectively end religion’s hold on social and political life nor will it actually contribute to human emancipation.25 The political emancipation from religion (restricting its political influence by privatizing and confining it to civil society) does little for human social actors
who are struggling to recover their ‘species-being.’ What Marx desired instead was the
establishment of social relations and productive forces that are appropriate to human
species-being and that promote the practical life-activity, of the real individual human actor. The mere political dismissal or theological rejection of religion accomplished very
little in this regard. The register upon which religion is to be dismantled is at the materialist level of history, understood by social actors as the product of their natural freedom and
instinctive creativity. This is not only an early position that Marx eventually sheds, but
rather one that he reiterates in this line in Capital:
The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only when the
practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature,
generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form. The veil is
not removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e., the process of
material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and
stands under their conscious and planned control. This, however, requires that society possess a material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence,
which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tormented historical development.26
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This path Marx took in critiquing the traditional critique of religion as abstract and idealist on account of being overly theological was to amplify the social basis of the religious
forms of abstractions and to remove the material contradictions at their secular basis. This
goes hand in hand with Marx’s departure from Feuerbach, signaled in the fourth ‘Theses’:
His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be
done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in
the clouds an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must be understood in its
contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized.27
To put it rather bluntly, Marx was less interested in defeating religion through a theological critique of its constitutive claims, as the Young Hegelians had attempted, but rather
located the critical-materialist struggle against religion “neither in the “essence of man,
nor in the predicates of God, but in the material world, which each stage of religious development finds in existence.”28 It is not that religion is false and therefore ideological,
but rather that religion functions in collective life in such a way that it engenders and enacts a social logic that alienates humanity from itself and assumes an autonomous character, as if its ‘independent realm’ was somehow beyond, or abstracted from the real life
processes of historical practice. This, says Marx, names theology’s ideological function;
this is why it must be ruthlessly critiqued.
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So it is in the context of theological debate that Marx’s analysis of ideology develops as a part of a sustained critique of the critique of religion that gestured towards
what would eventually become the materialist conception of history in The German Ideology and the Theses on Feuerbach. In the years following 1843, Marx would go from an
‘eliminative materialism’ in The German Ideology to a full-blown historical-materialist
understanding of religion, applied to capitalist economic forms in Capital, where one is
able “to develop, from the actual relations of life, the corresponding celestialised forms of
those relations.” For Marx, the critique of theology as ideology goes beyond simply connecting the autotomizing and divisive activity of theological belief and practice to its
‘secular’ or material basis. Marx thinks that it is essential that the critique of theology uncover the social and historical necessity and rootedness of the ‘phantoms’ and ‘sublimates’ in the specifically theological form of ideology. Ideology is a social-scientific
concept that expresses the economic and political task of critique, and so it names theology not merely as a fantastical psychological illusion or a bourgeois political conspiracy
that is carried out by religious authorities in order to console or trick human social actors.
Theology as ideology is indeed a socio-economic problem because it is integral to the
success and endurance of capitalist forms of political economic that arranges human existence, and social life. This calls for a structural study of its material bases, realities
known in Marxian parlance as the value-product, abstract labor, commodity-fetishism,
and money-relation, to name a few. But first, we must clarify the use and description of
ideology critique as a critical and negative concept in relation to theology, (section two)
in order to better locate the place of ideology within Marx’s general critique of theology
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(section three). This allows us, then, to explore the theological descriptions given to its
more specifically capitalist economic forms (section four).
The Use of Ideology in Marx’s Critique of Religion
David McLellan notes that the term “ideology” was birthed out of historical upheaval: the rise of democratic government, mass political movements, and a society
marked by rapidly developing plurality.29 Tied to the breakdown of the medieval world,
and as such, the hierarchical structures of metaphysics and cosmology that sustained that
world, the term ‘ideology’ was first coined by French revolutionary philosopher Antoine
Destutt de Tracy in 1797, who argued for a “new science of ideas” which would study the
rational and natural origins of all ideas.30 In the beginning, ideology was the positive and
constructive name for this new descriptive field of inquiry. It was given its negative and
critical sharpness when taken up by the European emperor Napoleon, who pejoratively
titled his critics ‘ideologues’: those who “by subtly searching for first causes, wishes to
establish on this basis the legislation of peoples” through a “cloudy metaphysics.”31 The
short history of the term ‘ideology’ and the thin, ad hoc manner in which Marx uses it
makes it difficult to give a thorough reconstruction of the concept, especially in relation
to other more developed themes and trajectories in Marx’s writings. Finally, his theory of
ideology is closely related to his theory of alienation and labor as is his critically appreciative reception of the method of inversion in Feuerbach. It is not easy to stay focused
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on the trimmed down question of the ideology/theology link without getting drawn into
the larger questions.
There were other historical factors that produce misconceptions about Marx’s theory of ideology and complicate its interpretation in relation to theology, especially in the
context of the postwar United States. I mention the context and reception history in the
US in particular because it is important to note that the more humanist writings of the
early Marx are translated relatively late, meaning that Marx has been read in the US as
purveying a strictly ‘scientific socialism’ that was easily (albeit grossly and mistakenly)
transposed into a “Bolshevik” state ideology first, and proto-Soviet Communism, last.32
The anti-Communist bias in Marx scholarship came of age in the US (1950s-1990s)
within anti-Communist political climate and a neotraditionalist return to religion within
the civil and social order. This largely overdetermined how Marx’s concept of ideology
was interpreted, especially in relation to his critique of religion. The correlation between
his atheism and his communism is thus overdrawn and is an effect of the defense of civic
religion in American politics which considers religion to be of significant political value,
if not moral necessity. The emphasis on Marx’s atheism as the constitutive reason for his
critique of religion as ideology overlooks both the ambiguity and ambivalence of Marx’s
assessment of religion and the complexity of his analysis of ideology, especially in later
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more ‘economic’ texts such as Capital and Grundrisse, including its 1859 “Preface.”
It is common to think of Marx’s theory of ideology as a kind of paranoid conspiracy theory, whereby the sinister bourgeois invent or fabricate ideas (say, theological
ones) that are then used in various social and economic forms (e.g., commodities, money,
labor) in order to manipulate and regulate workers and producers under a capitalist economic regime. Contrarily, Marx does not think that ideology is an intentional or purposeful invention by the bourgeois for the expressed intention to manipulate or misrepresent
social reality for the proletariat; ideology is not invented by the ruling class, but rather insists that it has a real materialist base.
Essential Features of Marx’s Concept of Ideology
Despite the many interpretative difficulties and common mistakes, it is important
to clarify exactly what Marx means by ideology, specially as in consort to other difficult
concepts like inversion, contradiction, abstraction, and alienation, and to make clear its
relation to and identification with, theology. Marx does not give a detailed or thick description of ideology, but rather displays what he means by the term in how he uses it. To
say that a particular idea is ideological is to name the way it functions in relation to contradictions in social life, in such a way as to appear to resolve the contradictions while
only distorting and concealing their real material base. For Marx, ideology is defined as
the specific practice of an idea, in the historical context of class struggle, which generates
and reproduces misrepresentations of material social contradictions (from which the ideologies themselves stem) by attempting to resolve them, either by negation or concealment. Marx uses the term ‘ideology’ as a diagnostic assessment of how the formation of

22
ideas interacts with essential contradictions that work within social consciousness to create, but also to conceal, alienating disparities in the social division of labor. This is the
scaffolding that props up the enduring economic power of the bourgeois capitalist. Yet,
for our purposes, this general definition is not enough. It needs to be defined in relation to
theology, which means we must determine the use of theology in and as ideological argument, the purpose of this section. We must also examine exactly what Marx means by religion and theology, and how ideologies forms take on theological descriptions in their
economic capitalist forms, the subject of coming sections.
First, let me condense the position in a few theses, which will be explained further
in the course of the chapter’s argument. First, ideology is a critical and negative concept
for Marx. The term expresses a certain kind of problem that originates from real social
contradictions, the effect of which is alienation in its various forms: religious, political,
and economic. Ideology as inversion responds to and is produced by an ‘inverted world’
that is already acting upon human actors in the form of an ‘inverted consciousness.’ Second, ideology gets its ‘inverted consciousness of the world’ from the ‘inverted world’
itself, the effect of specifically capitalist economic forms and disciplinary mechanisms.
The implication here is that ideology is a secondary concern for Marx, who is far more
interested in interrogating the causes of ‘the inverted world’ than he is in eradicating religion as ‘the theory’ of this world, the alienating effect of which is symptomatic of the defect. Third, ideology as a function of social consciousness gives human persons an inadequate and distorted picture of the contradictions that exist in social reality, either by ignoring them or misrepresenting them, making their effects quite politically problematic.
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Fourth, these social contradictions call for a revolutionary form of material practice to uncover the ways that ideologies misrepresent or otherwise conceal ‘the real relations and
activities’ of human persons. Ideologies are the results and effects of the ‘limited material
mode of activity.’ To critique ideology is to name endemic limitations in the historical
conditions of human life and work. These conditions as products of history can only be
only transformed by putting in motion an alternative material practice that produces an
altogether different future. Fifth, ideologies are a political concern because they necessarily serve the interests of the ruling class, even if that class has not produced them. As
historical products, ideas might come in and out of ideological status, based in large part
on the ruling class and material conditions of history. Ideologies are techniques used by
the ruling classes to suppress and confuse the working and producing classes and to cover
up the material conditions that contribute to their further alienation and oppression. Ideologies are a problem for Marx because they resist the processes of proletarianization.
Their social impact is the primary object of critique.
It is important to identify ideologies as social products of material practice. They
are not inventions or mere illusions to be corrected by persuasive argument or change in
cognitive perspective. Nor are they inert or passive reflections of some external reality
that they have no real role in reproducing. Marx makes his arguments about the character
of ideology along the way to making a much more critical point about the nature of consciousness viz a viz the idealism and materialist polarity. It is interesting to note that it is
at this juncture — the intersection of consciousness and material practice — that ideology
and theology are brought into bold relief. Marx put it this way in The German Ideology:
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The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men — the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this
stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies
to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality,
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definitely
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to
these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can be never anything else than conscious being and the being of men in their actual life-process.33
Ideologies are indeed produced through the material process by the very limitations of
practical activity itself, namely the propensity to reinforce pre-existing social contradictions and create new ones, identified later as the ‘objectifying power’ of alienation in the
division of labor and the privatization of property. In other words, ‘practice’ is the name
that Marx gives to that ‘conscious and sensuous activity’ whereby human actors produce
their own material existence and the constitutive relations of their life within the context
of nature, society, and history. Social reality is dynamically produced by the practical activity of real human actors in history. Rather than being outside or simply a passive reflection of it, ideology is grounded in this social reality and so cannot be dismissed as a
kind of an inverted image of the real thing. It is essentially part and parcel of this social
reality and so an interrogation of its ‘secular basis’ is required in order to undermine and
dismantle its economic reproduction. Human consciousness is neither independent from
nor a passive reflection of the real-life processes in material conditions. Again, Marx in
his own words:
In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth,
here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say not of setting
out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of,
33
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imagined, conceived in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from
real, active men, and on the basis of their real life process demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.34
In the German Ideology, Marx’s social account of consciousness describes the
ideological function of theology by linking it to material practice directly, thereby illustrating both the nature of ideology and what it says about theology’s defects:
The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of
their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material
premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as
the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with
this their actual world, also their thinking, and the products of their thinking. It is
not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.35
One is given the sense, at least from this assemblage of text, that the problem with theology that ideology names does not refer directly to its content, but instead its function, its
effect on and within material practice itself. Theology could be other than ideology, in
other words. In fact if theology were in fact to submit itself to the material life processes,
if it were to abandon their ‘semblance of independence’ and so be altered along with the
actual world, as a product of [human] thinking, perhaps its effect on social life might be
as an alternative to ideology. To get a better sense of whether or not this works in Marx
himself, we will need to investigate further about the place of ideology in Marx’s critique
of theology.
The Place of Ideology in Marx’s Critique of Theology
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So far I have argued that Marx originally developed ‘ideology’ as a negative and
critical response to the ‘young’ Hegelian’s critique of religion, which remained within the
sphere of theological discourse, mistaking the ‘halo’ for ‘the vale of tears’ and neglecting
to interrogate the ‘secular basis’ in the criticism ‘of earth,' ‘of law,' and ‘of politics.’ This
is the set of materialist theses in the early Marx that defines the descriptive relation of
theology as ideology. In this case, ideology works in society to mask or mystify the real
basic origin of social existence from the human being, wrecking havoc on the creative
and reproductive practices of human labor. He sought to reorient the critical direction of
post-Hegelian political thought from ‘a critique of heaven’ to a ‘critique of earth,' that is
to move out of abstract discussions about theology to materialist and historicized explanations of the conditions which constitute the real, life processes of human social actors,
or as Marx would later explain it, ‘the critique of the political economy.’ The question remains: what place does theology have in Marx’s ‘critique of earth’?
Interpretative Difficulties in Marx’s Critique of Religion
The ‘Marx on religion’ discussion has a long and coiled history. For most, it is
simply enough to catalogue the various citations in the 1844 ‘Introduction’, the 1859
‘Preface,' with a smattering of citations from On the Jewish Question, Capital, and of
course, The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach in order to establish the basic parameters of Marx’s analysis of religion as a socially constructed form of consolation. It is
in these citations that we see Marx first agreeing with Feuerbach’s inversion critique of
religion, and then departing from it to a more trenchant political critique, and then finally,
taking up an economic analysis of the faults of religion viz a viz its place in capitalist
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forms. In this account, it is often enough to recount Marx’s apparent identification of
religion as an illusion, a form of false consciousness that aids and abets capitalism, a position that seems cemented by his frequent, though haphazardly scattered, use of metaphors such as ‘opium of the people’, ‘phantoms’, ‘camera obscura’, and the ‘sigh of the
oppressed creature’ to describe the social impact of religion. Marx’s use of theology as
metaphor for the mystifying effect of ideology intimates that he regarded religion as a
false, epistemological construal of socio-economic problems in the sense that they are inverted, illusionary, and do not cohere to reality.
But as I argued in previous sections, this is not the full story. In fact, this account
of Marx is very close to the position that Marx identifies with the ‘ideologists’ who
sought through the traditional Enlightenment critique to abolish religion by defeating the
reasonableness of its theological arguments through various strategies, all of which were
designed to defeat religion as its own theological ambit, while never actually properly interrogating its ‘secular basis.’ My point here is that it is not enough to simply list the metaphors that Marx uses to describe the social comportment of religion if we are to understand the relation between ideology and theology in Marx. Upon careful consideration,
these metaphors appear to be more ambivalent and ambiguous than they appear. So are
the positions and arguments they apparently illustrate. They are not easily reduced to an
analysis of religion's ideological character as a form of false consciousness that is complicit in propping up economic relations that alienate and oppress the human social actor
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through depersonalizing and reifying capitalist economic procedures such as commodification, fetishization, money, labor, value-form, etc.
Common Mistakes in Interpreting Marx’s Critique of Religion
The complexity of Marx’s position(s) on theology can result in many common
mistakes. For example, there were many, especially in the postwar years which were
dominated by anti-Communist suspicion, who thought that Marx’s critique of religion
merely replaced traditional forms of religion with an atheist critique that was nevertheless
religion ‘by-another-name’: “a new dogma.”37 These readers think Marx simply redefines
religion in a humanist vein that explores the basis of the moral commitments of society
with the ultimate goal of realizing a utopian eschatology.38 Even still, other interpreters
contend that despite its structural atheism, Marxian positions retain a “religious” character, keeping intact the central “religious” spirit of the Ultimate, as evinced in the utopian
commitments of his humanism.39 For proponents of this reading, Marx is far from the
vulgar atheist reductionist that wants to abolish religion on theological grounds (e.g.,
"this is all there is"). This perspective emphasizes the role of Marx’s humanism, not its
empiricism or atheism. Marx, contrary to Feuerbach, refuses to allow secular atheism to
be the final word and this point stresses the differences between Feuerbach’s atheist theo-
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logical critique of religion as inversion and Marx’s materialist economic critique of religion as ideology.40
Others will try to emphasize Marx’s apparent, albeit critical, appreciation of the
existential value of religion and its impulses to express and protest suffering and oppression, while also sustaining the search for the purpose of human life and thought beyond
critique and interruption.41 Certainly, they say, Marx’s dialectics kept him open to evolving and progressive forms of religion that were appropriately sensitive to his critiques and
so found ways to transform the contradictions they too often neglected, negated, or concealed as ideologies. As Denys Turner surmised, “A Christianity – indeed any religion —
that itself … is able to transcend the dichotomized Feuerbachian problematic [between
human and divine], would at least evade the indictment that it is a necessarily ideological
mode of thought and practice.”42 These readings are often meant to either draw Marxism
and Christianity closer together, especially during and after the dawn of liberation theology, or to definitively arrange them as diametric opposites, as was the case by most postwar theological readers concerned about the orthodox Marxist legacy of communist and
totalitarian governments.43
I try to avoid these mistakes by describing Marx’s negative and critical position
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on theology as ideology as motivated by its specific relation to and interaction with social
relations and economic forms, not by any of Marx’s (uninformed) theological disagreements. Again, my goal here is not to somehow save religion or theology from Marx’s
ideology critique. Instead, I find it important to say that Marx is rather disinterested in the
Feuerbachian dualism of god/human and heaven/earth, and the whole point of this early
critique of the young Hegelians was that they were too interested in defeating religion
through theological disputations. Marx used his materialist conception of history and the
application of this conception in his late analysis of capitalist economic forms to sidestep
that problematic altogether, and get straight to social contradictions and their economic
points of origin. Clarifying this point helps to contextualize, assemble, and interpret
Marx’s scattered comments about religion, a topic about which he knew little and cared
even less.44 The theological content of religion per se is not the fundamental object of
Marx's ideology critique. Instead, Marx takes up the specifically contradictory forms of
reality that are responsible for the conditions in which religion happens. How religion
acts — in other words, its social impact — in relation to these forms of reality is what
makes Marx identify religion as ideology, which again, is not the same thing as arguing
that religion is false, which Marx does do but is not the significant trajectory of his ideology critique of religion.

Essential Features of Marx’s Critique of Religion
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I have been arguing Marx’s ideology critique of religion centers on his materialist
and humanist objections to religion’s effects, not a theological critique of religious beliefs
themselves. Marx is less concerned with indicting religious authorities, much less religious believers, with political conspiracy or sinister intentions than he is with showing
how religion negates or conceals the economic and social contradictions, to great detriment to the human social actor. This is made clear in the opening words of the ‘Introduction,' which orients the object of Marxian criticism away from theology. For Marx,
The profane existence of error is compromised as soon as its heavenly oratio pro
aris et focis [“speech for the altars and hearths”] has been refuted. Man, who has
found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he
sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere appearance of
himself, the non-man [“Unmensch”], where he seeks and must seek his true reality.45
As such, Marx allows for no confusion as to what position the historical materialist must
take on religion, when viewed through the lens of ideology critique. Marx is only interesting in taking up religion as an ideological problem insofar as it contains within itself
helpful and illustrative elements that clarify the essential features of ideology and its social impact, most notably on alienation and labor. Ideology critique identifies religion,
not as the cause of alienation (that he saves for capitalist social relations) but as a form of
it. The task of criticism then, as a means of political denunciation, must first unmask human self-alienation in its holy form (i.e., religion) – and then proceeds through criticism
to take it up via material force in unholy, or ‘earthly’ forms (i.e., political and eventually,
economic). Marx makes this point again in the ‘Introduction’ when speaking about why
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ideology critique gets more to the historical point of what is materially wrong with religion than theological critique does:
It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-worldly truth has disappeared, to
establish the truth of this world. The immediate task of philosophy, which is in the
service of history is to unmask human self-alienation in its unholy forms once it
has been unmasked in its holy form. Thus, the criticism of heaven turns into the
criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.46
The critique of ideology as a “criticism of heaven” is unsatisfactory to Marx. This stays
well within the ambit of theological talk and so misses the point. The critique of religion
and theology as ideology fails unless it pushes itself further to that of law and politics, rather than conceding the site of struggle. Marx’s critique of theology as ideology is far
more socio-political and economic, which Marx considered to be the decisive factor in
social life; it concerns the social impact of theology on human social actors, namely as a
potentially alienating and dehumanizing force that imprisons human persons to their reproductive activity, rather than liberating them to revolutionary practice. To illustrate
this, I will continue with the 1844 ‘Introduction’:
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not
make man … Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but
so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower.47
Marx’s ideology critique levies a materialist and humanist objection to the way religion
mystifies the human from itself, alienating it from its spontaneous creativity and external-
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izing its productive power (‘bearing that chain’), so that the world and its historical circumstances confront the human social actor as a strange and distant entity, rather than as
the natural result of its reproductive practice. Marx’s ideology critique of religion is
meant to clear a way forward for a revolutionary humanity to come to greater knowledge
of itself as a creative and productive force, liberating it from the oppressive effects of
economic contradictions forced upon it by a capitalist economic system: to ‘throw off the
chain and pluck the living flower.’ The point of ideology critique is to cease and reverse
is the negative effect that religion and theology has on the process of proletarianization of
the working classes, the perquisite for any revolutionary praxis, aimed at undermining the
bourgeoisie economic system. Ideology critique is never about truth or falsehood, but always about the formation of the political subject. Theology is a problem only because it
is deemed an obstacle to this endeavor rather than an ally. The goal of ideology critique is
to lay bare these effects (‘the imaginary flowers’) as they are found in the cracks in the
social system: the contradictions enacted by the various division and separations in labor,
value, class, et cetera that imprison the human person and preclude her/his full realization
in history. Marx names religion directly as an object of this critique in the next few lines,
putting his humanism in clear display:
The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion
his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so
that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory
Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.48
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Since ideologies, as Marx describes them, are ‘theories’ with a basis in the real social
world, the condition that gives rise to these ‘theories’ call for further materialist consideration. This question produced the major argument of The German Ideology, which seeks
to clarify the idea of inversion through an analysis of history as produced by human attempts to respond to their material needs, with recourse to the natural world, which is
transformed by human work. For Marx, it is important to unveil the character of labor, for
it is in rediscovering the true nature of human work that humanity recognizes itself as the
‘sun’ around which history revolves, and as such bears responsible for the pathological
contradictions that manifest themselves in oppressive and exploitative ways in the on-going class struggle. As such, alienation and labor are at the forefront of Marx’s metaphorical link between ideology and theology, in that the experience of alienation is caused by
the very economic contradictions that ideology by definition attempts to conceal and negate, a matter of practical concern given Marx’s humanist account of labor and practice.
At the center of this humanist critique lies religion, which as ‘fantasy or consolation’, has precluded humanity from freeing itself from the circumstantial determinations
that once produced by reproductive practice of social actors, end up antagonizing and enslaving them. as the material practice that constitutes social economic orders, instead accepting their estranged state as the natural state of things that cannot be otherwise. The
critique of religion is a humanist objection to how religion mystifies human social actors
from the real, life power of their collective material strivings in and though nature and
history, particularly in the form of labor, a thesis still important for Marx to reiterate in
the first volume of Capital:
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Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate,
and in which man of his own accord, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. … By thus acting on the external world and
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.49
Combine this humanism with Marx’s basic premises of his materialist concept of history:
“the real individuals, their activity, and the material conditions of their life … which can
be verified in a purely empirical way”50, and you get the basic structural parameters for
the link between alienation, theology, and ideology. For “all human history is, of course,
the existence of living human individuals” who “distinguish themselves from animals as
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by
their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence, men are indirectly
producing their material life.”51 In this way, “what they are," says Marx “therefore coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.
Hence, what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.”52
The product of this human striving in history through nature is society itself. Indeed, the labor process, otherwise known in Marxian vernacular as ‘material practice" is
the basic activity proper to the creativity of the human being, and as such, is the site of
where contradictions happens, the very ‘stuff’ from which ideologies both emerge and
simultaneously conceal. A study of ideology then is the study of contradiction, and to
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study religion as ideology is indeed to study the dialectical ways in which theology interacts and responds to contradictions and the problems they produce for material existence,
the most central of which, in Marx anyway, is alienation.
Theology and its Social Impact
In “the Introduction”, Marx famously describes religion, in properly materialist
form, as ideology in terms of its negative, social impact, particularly on human subjects.
The textual context of the ‘Introduction’ proves helpful here. Marx wrote these remarks
in an introduction to a planned work on Hegel’s political philosophy, and so the ‘Introduction’ also includes extensive commentary on the current state of Germany’s political
struggle, and what must now be done, given that the criticism of religion has been “essentially completed” by the materialist concept of history, which shows to the human social
actor ‘his true identity’, rather than “the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of
heaven where he sought a supernatural being.” Marx goes on to say that in light of these
humanist gains,
The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world
whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is the expression of real suffering and at the same time the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh
of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people.53
Marx never wrote a full treatise on religion as did so many of its 19th century critics. Rather he approaches religion in a rather oblique and indirect manner, with a scattering of
references, allusions, and metaphors, the most notable and infamous are present in the citation above: religion as the expression of, and protest against, suffering is the ‘sigh of
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the oppressed creature’ and the ‘opium of the people.’ It is not entirely clear how they
are to be read, either separately as oppositional statements, or together as the dialectic at
the core Marx’s take on religion and its social impact as ideology. Theological readers of
Marx often rush to the these explicit statements about religion as an opening within
Marx’s analysis for a more charitable take on the social value of religion as a prophetic
witness to human misery, exploitation, and abuse at the hand of ruling and oppressive
classes, while critics of religion will site the negative and critical aspects of opium as an
expression of religion’s illusory and medicinal effects on humanity. Yet, the way that religion interacts with suffering is directly tied to its social impact as an ideology.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for
their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism
of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.54
These metaphors help us recognize the ambivalence and ambiguity at the heart of
Marx’s understanding of religion, and helps set the stage for the way the critique of religion as ideology turns into a critique of fetishism as idolatry. To critique religion, then, is
to critique that which religion sacralizes, or as Marx will tell us later, fetishizes; it is to
critique religion as idolatry. For Marx, religion works in consort with “a vale of tears” by
concealing or denying the oppressive economic conditions that give rise to suffering,
thereby sanctifying these conditions of real suffering through its claims to afford human
persons forms of illusory and/or ‘otherworldly’ happiness. In Marx’s hands, ideology cri-
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tique interprets religion as a response to appropriately identified antagonisms and contradictions in social reality. It is however a ‘false’ reaction, not in it mistakes appearance for
reality, but insofar as it prevents the emancipatory subjectivation that precedes the subject
and so composes the revolutionary possibility of change.55
In the ‘Introduction’ quote cited above, Marx calls religion the “opium of the people”, but he also recognizes the polyvalence of religion by saying it is both the “expression of ”, and the “protest against” suffering, It attests to and arises from a complex set of
material realities that conditions economic exchange that produces ‘real suffering’. Religion represents (‘as if’) the oppressed creature whose struggle against the spiritless conditions of the heartless world attests to “that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.”
These references suggest that Marx considers religion to be a testament to the human person’s resilience in the face of miserable conditions and economic exploitation, the material basis for all criticism, as a means of denunciation of that “condition that requires illusions.”
My point here is that Marx makes it clear that in his ideology critique, his struggle
is not with religion per se, but with “that world” which not only gives rise to religion, but
“that world” for which religion seems to be responding to, albeit with adverse social impact. Emphasizing the social dimension within which religion is always producing and
being produced, Marx interprets religion as the testimony of the proletariat’s experience
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of economic oppression, the consequence of various contradictions at the core of the productive forces and social relations, operative in the economic base of human experience.
So since religion is both the ‘expression’ and ‘protest’ of a certain social situation,
it attests to and arises from a complex set of material realities that condition the patterns
of economic exchange that produce ‘real suffering,' but also exists in an ideological relation to these conditions, namely that it attempts to sublate and conceal their inherent contradictions. When Marx critiques religion in order to explain the material conditions that
give rise to the need for religion as well as its specific forms, he nevertheless recognizes
that religion does in fact arise out of real, actual need. Even though religion is an illusion,
it nevertheless does have a real social basis. As such, the critical question for Marx is
why must people have illusions, and more specifically, why do people need religious illusions? How do religious illusions operate in response to these needs, and how might a
materialist critique of political economy better satisfy these needs, doing away with the
need for religion altogether?
The opiate analogy is the well-known attempt by Marx to answer this question.
Interpreting Marx’s use of this analogy is complicated as this ambiguous and polyvalent
opiate metaphor makes it difficult to argue, as it is customary, that religion is merely the
medicinal remedy for those who are unable to handle the harsh realities of their material
existence, or as a mechanism by the ruling classes to dull the senses of the working classes to avoid insurrectionary activity. For in Marx’s day, the use of opium was conterminous with both the protest and suffering of the working class under capitalist conditions.
Andrew McKinnon says it rather well,
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In the nineteenth century, opium expressed the immiserization of the people.
Opium use increased with declining conditions for the working class: more health
problems, and the outbreaks of epidemics such as cholera. As Engels, for example, pointed out in The Condition of the English Working Classes (1845), declining health was directly related to the ravages of capitalist relations. Opium thus
‘expressed’ in an indirect way the ravages of capitalism on the health and well being of the population, but most particularly the workers.56
Most will suggest that the opium analogy is Marx’s way of saying that while religion
console and comfort those who suffer, it nevertheless is false and imaginary, and actually
paralyzes human social actors from actively resisting those who exploit and oppress
them. So, yes, while as an atheist Marx clearly considered religious belief to be false, it is
nevertheless important to draw a distinction between Marx the atheist (who claims that
religions are false) and Marx the materialist and the humanist (who claims that religions
are ideologies), the latter of which makes the most theologically (and I will argue, politically) important point. Religion is the medium of social illusions, but the need for these
illusions is real. Religion has a clear social basis in reality. The fact that ruling classes
benefit from religion is not enough to explain its pervasiveness among the oppressed. The
explanation must be rooted in an investigation of the needs of the oppressed themselves.
Religion is constantly referring to the real world that arises out of it, even if that way is
indeed still illusory.
Religion is ideological because, while it expresses real human needs, it greatly
misconstrues those needs, misrepresenting through its beliefs, the real basis from which it
comes. Take, for example, its appeal to divine transcendence, understood in nineteenth
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century metaphysical terms as being opposed to the immanent sphere of material concern. The problem with this is not, as some suggest, that religion causes human persons to
live in an alternative world that is purely imaginary, a false ‘fairy-tale’, but rather that the
primary effect of religion that causes it to rightly be identified as ideological is that it
causes human person to relate to the real world falsely, so much so that it leads human
actors to relate to their needs in the real world through the prism of that misconstrual,
which in turn, leads them away from the historical register of their material conditions as
they seek solutions to their alienation and misery in an illusionary world beyond matter.
Denys Turner calls this the ‘recursive nature’ of religion, namely that it feeds
back to the selfsame social basis from which it arose, causing human actors to live their
lives in the real world in distorted form.57 Religion does not promote a distorted world,
but instead a distorted life in the real world. If religion as ideology is to be considered
‘false’, it is due to the fact that it both conceals and reinscribes a series of contradictions
between social-practical activity and the material conditions that serve as the context for
that activity; instead of exposing the antagonisms in a critique of the contradictions in
material conditions, it leaves these conditions unchanged. These conditions give rise to
social and economic forces that aid and incite religion in its ideological efficacy.
But why must religion always be ideological? Why is it proper to the structure and
function of religion to be ideology? Religion is ideological because it alienates, and once
it ceases to do so, it also ceases to be religion. Marx assumes that the most basic theologi-
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cal thesis necessarily places God in direct opposition to the human being. For all his critical talk about the danger of the dualities insisted on by the Idealists, Marx himself affirms
a rather strong antimony between the human and divine, the materiality of this world and
‘other-worldly’ transcendence, metaphysics and history. In Marx’s judgment, this division, organized loosely as a dichotomy between sacred and secular, is essential to Christian theology and plays directly into its ideological character.58 The oppositional logic on
display here fractures the individual human person and her interests from those of the collective Subject, resulting in a politics of retreat and a blind economic endorsement of capitalist society.
The incompatibility between revolutionary practice and religion in Marx’s view
of critique is stark. Revolutionary practice seeks to disclosure and overthrow the very realities that religion as ideology conceals, sutures, and ratifies. The theological essence of
religion is such that it cannot be otherwise. But as I argued in section 1, Marx is not so
quick as to rubber-stamp Feuerbach’s critique of religion as a kind of atheist theological
reversal, as he thought it makes the same structurally ideological mistake as religion
does:
Since the real existence of man and nature – since man has become for man as the
being of nature, and nature for man, the being of man has become practical, sensuous, perceptible – the question about an alien being, about a being above nature
and man – has become impossible in practice. Atheism as the denial of this unreality has no longer any meaning, for atheism is the negation of God and postulates
the existence of man through this negation, but socialism as socialism no longer
stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the practically and theoretically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is
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man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the annulment of
religion.59
The world as envisioned by socialist revolution is not one wherein human actors are compelled to accept the antimonies of thought, which are essential to religion, and decide for
one side of the duality or the other. In the distancing himself from Feuerbach, Marx
wants to avoid thinking and acting in the world as mediated through the problematic of
religion altogether. Theological ideas are ideological, not because of their religious content (e.g., theories about the divine, the sacred, the transcendent or other classically ‘religious’ ideas such the life after death, the existence of the soul), but because its content
conceals within material practice the true reality of the human as the creative force.
The argument I have been making up to now is that Marx critiques religion for
being ideological, and at the same moment, leaves it behind, as if to say that Feuerbach’s
critique has allowed us to see what religion does, and so we should forward to take up
‘the secular basis’ on which religion stands, the capitalist social relations characterized by
alienation, commodification, and fetishization. To critique religion, then, is to dismantle
that which religion as ideology sacralizes, usually by exposing the banal materiality of its
idols. Ultimately, Marx’s critique of ideology is a materialist critique of theology as fetishism, which as I will argue, has strong ties both a biblical critique of idolatry, which
Marx uses to critique commodity-fetishism as a theological practice of idolatry. What this
apparent connection between ideology and idolatry in Marx means for interpreting what
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difference the relation between ideology and theology makes for the task of political theology today has yet to be seen.
The Place of Theology in the Critique of Capitalist Ideologies
I have been arguing that Marx’s critique of religion as ideology is paradigmatic for his
critique of ideology in general. Marx makes analogical use of theology as he progressively develops a more ‘scientific socialist’ analysis of capitalist economics and bourgeois social relations. As such, we see substantial references to theology in several
places: his critique of money, of law, of the modern state, of the alienation of labor, and
finally, of the “fetishism of the commodity.” I hope to illustrate the centrality of theological metaphors in Marx’s theory of ideology, not only as its paradigmatic example, but as
a structural metaphor for how ideologies function politically.
Alienation
We start first with Marx’s critique of theology as alienation, closely linked to his
critique of theology as ideology. This concept runs throughout Marx’s political and economic thought, and is central to his analysis of what economics does to social relations
and productive forces in the context of human struggle, especially when practiced in capitalist conditions.60 In “Estranged Labor”, Marx’s analysis of the self-alienation of human
social agents within and by the political economy points straight to the relation of labor
and labor-product itself. The human laborer invests herself into her products only to have
60
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those products turn against her, threatening the creative power of her life activity and
confronting the human person as an alien and independent objective power that stands
external to the human worker outside her creative and productive control. Marx says it
this way: “the more the worker by his labor appropriates the external world, sensuous nature, the more he deprives himself of means of life … the worker becomes a slave of his
object.”61 This dichotomization of the human person whereby her consciousness is separated and divided from its proper source, origin, and condition by the antagonistic material conditions in which she works. Labor becomes individuated work rather than collective practice, turning the agent against her fellow worker in a relation of competition and
self-preservation, and commodifying the products of their collective work through the
fetishistic process of transferral.
The existential trauma of alienation is highlighted all the more when one remembers the basic materialist premise is that “what [humans] are therefore coincides with
their production both what they produce and with how they produce.”62 In alienated production then, something has gone terribly wrong with humanity itself. The human worker
is not only herself, but is an-other altogether:
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes
an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently as
something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him;
it means that the life which he has conferred on the objects confronts him as hostile and alien.63
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Furthermore, not only does estranged labor turn the worker’s relation to the products of
her labor (her very identity) against her, but also alienates her from her own productive
activity, the very materialist practice that makes her life human. Production itself is alienation whereby labor becomes external to the worker, acting ‘as if it belongs to another.’
Marx explains the ideology within this externalizing effect of labor-product with an analogical use of theology so as to clarify the way that labor acts upon, rather than acts on
behalf of, the worker:
The external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his
own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not
to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently
of the individual – that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity
– in the same way the worker’s activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs
to another; it is the loss of his self.64
For Marx, the ‘commodity-fetish’, a direct labor-product of economic alienation, is the
primary culprit of the social contradictions that religion as ideology is charged with trying to conceal, negate, and abet. And so, alienation is the object-cause of the “inner strife
and inner contradictoriness” of political systems that Marx says Feuerbach’s critique of
religion left untouched.65 The economic base analysis of alienation reveals a “fundamental cleavage” perpetuated by the dualism apotheosized in religious claims (e.g.,
heaven/earth, law/grace, individual/society, god/human), a non-dialectic polarity that is
same in structure and function as that instituted by capitalist economic forms between labor and capital, mental and manual labor, creativity and production, even between human
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actor and human actor, and especially between the human actor and the spontaneity and
sensuousness of her creative and social nature. Alienation, while perpetuated by economic forms of relations, and abetted by religious ideas about transcendence, is essentially political. It can only be resolved by recapturing the integral character of the active
subject, the condition of possibility for human emancipation itself.66
But how is all this relevant to properly locating the place of religion in Marx’s
ideology critique? Alienation is the social impact of religion as ideology, a point which is
clarified in the description of ‘estranged labor’, theology/religion is used as the paradigmatic example of ideological impact on human labor. It stems from the ‘more/less’ formula at the heart of both inversion and alienation, both of which Marx identified as the
specific ideological effects of theology in relation to contradictions operating within social reality. He explains his dynamic through a host of metaphors and analogies, not only
in order to explain the social impact of religion, but as using theology as a descriptor for
economic procedures in capitalist society.
The theory of alienation is birthed from an analysis of what happens to labor, production, and distribution of power under capitalist economic relations. Marx explores the
anatomy of alienation by employing an analogy between human work and religion. He
articulates the basis structure here, and when read in light of Feuerbach’s theory of religion, the resemblance is made clear:
The worker becomes all the more poorer, the more wealth he produces, the more
his production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an every
cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value
of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world
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of men…The product of labor is labor which has been congealed in an object,
which has become material; it is an objectification of labor. Labor’s realization is
in its objectification…So much does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that the more objects the worker produces the fewer can he possess
and the more he falls under the dominion of his product, his capital.67
Throughout Marx’s writing, it is expressed in a kind of ‘more/less’ formula, which expresses the humanist core of Marx’s critique of alienation in religion, specifically as it relates to ideology. As ideology, religion acts not only to conceal capitalist contradictions ,
but also directly alienates human social actors in much the same way as labor. Marx describes this ‘more/less formula’ here again in the early “Manuscripts”:
The laws of political economy express the estrangement of the worker in his object thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless the more unworthy he becomes, the better
formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker, the more civilized
his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the mightier labor becomes
the more powerless becomes the worker, the more ingenious the labor becomes,
the duller becomes the worker, and the more he becomes nature’s bondsman.68
This ‘more/less’ account of alienation originates in Feuerbach’s theory of religion, which
argues that religion alienates the human being from itself through its acts of psychological projection. For Feuerbach, religion is a problem because it alienates deprives human
actors of their true nature, and so precludes them from actualizing their fullest creative
and productive potential. The object of Christian theological inquiry, the biblical God, is
nothing but as an imaginative construal of human ideals and aspirations, projected outward into a transcendent sphere. But how does this result in self-alienation of the human
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person? The answer lies in the creation of a ‘Being above beings’ that is made in the image of the ideal human perfections. This effect of this false ‘creation’ is that by investing
‘god’ with human attribute, it inverts the human relation to nature and to itself, which impoverishes it, estranging it from what properly is its own powers, attributes, and possibilities, and further diminishes itself by worshiping its own creation, to its detriment. This
externalization and projection of the human into the divine (this is the theological act of
religion tout court) fabricates what is properly human into an ‘objective power’ that lays
outside of itself. Unlike Feuerbach, the alienation of religious projection lead Marx to argue that ‘religion’ has no content of its own, but is indeed only a social act, whereby human persons divest their species-being of those crucial elements and characteristics that
most properly and constitutively human: love, goodness, wisdom, creativity, and power,
and thus depriving it of the ability to actualize its ‘life-activity.’ Take, for example, how
Marx compares the alienation of labor to the self-divestment accomplished by theology in
religious projection:
The worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. From this
premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the
alien objective world become which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he
himself — his inner world — becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is
the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself.
The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him
but to the object. Hence the greater this activity, the greater is the worker’s lack of
objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this
product, the less he is himself.69
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This appears to be modeled precisely on Feuerbach’s structural account of the theological essence of religion. Marx follows Feuerbach in arguing that theology, in an irrational reversal, externally projects what is properly and immanently human and abstracts
it into a transcendent sphere apart form the material reality of human life. Theology performs this same operation: alienating human from its immanent properties by displaying
them as belonging to transcendent being and named as the divine life. Marx uses this
theo-logic to explain the capitalist process whereby the product of labor gets alienated
from human workers, not only in the production, but also in the market forces of distribution and consumption. Like in religion, wages, rent, and capital alienate the human being
from labor as her life-activity, instituting money and value as the ‘gods’ of the religion of
everyday life. Marx’s critique of religion as ideology becomes a critique of capitalism as
religion, rendering capitalism as a religion, structured as ideology. More specifically, the
place of religion in the critique of ideology is as a critique of fetishism as idolatry, illustrating the quasi-religious structure of ideology in general.
To claim, as Marx does, that religion is ideology is to say that religion acts, that it
functions, in a certain way with a particular kind of social impact. More specifically, to
critique religion for its effects, namely human self-alienation, is to name it as a symptom
of the base problem of economic alienation, and these effects are ideological in the sense
that they mistake the historical with the natural, the contingent with the primordial.
Drawing a parallel between the political economists and the theologians, Marx insists:
Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition as the political economist
does, when he tries to explain. Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it
merely pushes the question away into a gray nebulous distance … theology in the
same way explains the origin of evil by the fall of man, that it assumes as a fact,
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in historical, what has to be explained. We proceed from an actual economic
fact.70
For Marx, religion, by projecting what is properly human outside of itself, damages human self-relation and self-knowledge, while also establishing conditions of privatization and competition that set the interests of the individual over and against those of
the concrete social whole. One can see why this has significant implications on the development of a working class consciousness, or an emancipatory political subjectivity, specially in the mid 1840s at the rise of revolutionary organization and mass political movements, most of which sought to topple monarchial governments (who had long used oppressive conditions of labor as instruments of oppression) for the sake of liberal and constitutional democracies, or in the case of Marx/Engels, a communist society. Religion is
ideology because of the way it conceals contradictory social relations by concealing and
incubating patterns of alienation. It is symptomatic of what revolutionary practice must
overcome in the course of proletarian struggle, but it is not a primary target.
While Marx adopts loosely with Feuerbach’s “religion as human self-alienation”
thesis, he disagrees that a critique that produces the abolition of religion will produce the
(conditions for the) emancipatory subject. As Marx/Engels makes clear in The Communist Manifesto, even as it seeks an end to “eternal truth, to abolish religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis”, nothing can be accomplished without
the “total disappearance of class antagonisms” where “the free development of each is the
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For Feuerbach, the solution was a theologi-

cal liberation of humanity from religion whereas for Marx, the problem lie with how the
political economy occludes the self-realization of the human as a collective social actor:
Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself…Human emancipation will only be complete when the real,
individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, has become a
species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces
propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from
himself as political power.72
Commodity-Fetishism
The concept of the fetish appears as a key element in Marx’s critique of the economic structure of capitalism. Accounts of fetishism vary greatly, but in Marx, it is directly connected to the deleterious and oppressive effect that the capitalist economic system has on the subject. Strictly speaking, fetishism is the procedure that attributes or
transfers an improper or artificial value (often categorized as mythical or ‘religious’) to
inanimate, manmade objects. It is a truly affective relationship to an object; that is, fetishism is usually associated with extreme or excessive forms of value: obsession, mania, obsession, and irrational fixation are all common cognates. In Marx, fetishism refers to a
particular ordering or structuring of desire that affords us insight and analysis of central
economic processes, many of which he critiqued under the general rubric of ideology.
Fetishism explains how it is that capitalism is able to evoke and sustain patterns of desire
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and consumption so effectively. It produces a desire for an object that is based on an excessive or disproportionate attribution of value, the larger and more politically salient effect of which is synecdochic — the part is taken as the whole. Capitalist social processes
— accumulation, privatization, rent, wealth disparity, the rise of wage labor, etc — are all
contingent upon human workers being transposed into consumers whose excessive desire
for objects turns them and their relations into commodities. Fetishism converts the artificial power of the commodity into the logic of exchange-value, which cyclically produces
the surplus-enjoyment experienced by the consumer that gets invested back into the object itself.
This is accomplished through a transferral process that Marx calls “fetishism," a
term with a complex religious genealogy and political history. In his late analysis of capitalist ideologies, Marx turns to the value-form of commodity-fetishism and elaborates its
theological structure. As described in that well-worn section in Capital, entitled “The fetishism of the commodity”, the commodity-form is an inverse relation between human
workers and the products of their labor, structurally analogous to that relation in religion
between human beings and their self-alienation in the theology of God.73 As a theological
product, fetishism alienates human persons through techniques of externalization and reification, taking what is properly their own (as the direct products of their labor) and then
deploying them as ways so that they function as instruments of their domination and oppression. In the state of labor within capitalist social relations, human workers are alienated from their products as they become ‘reified’ by economic processes that invests
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these products with an enchanted and inverted value that makes them “appear as autonomous figures endowed with the life of their own.”74 Fetishization transforms both the
products of labor and their constitutive social relations, both of which belong naturally to
the human worker as part of their life-activity, into ‘things’ that are then exchanged and
transacted in the market as commodities, “whose movements within society has for them
the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them.”75
Fetishization as the commodifying procedure is described by Marx as an economic practice whereby the creative and productive powers of the human actor are transferred to an object, whose materiality and banality is overlooked and undermined, even
while the human person is diminished and deprived, alienated from itself and others
through this inverting transferal. In fetishization, human person’s social relationships, and
the products created out of this life-activity, are objectified and reified as something vulgarly transacted and mediated through money-relations. This conceals the fetishized
product’s intrinsic use-value (e.g., that which meets human needs directly) and replaces it
with an inflated exchange-value (e.g., what the commodity is worth in relation to other
commodities). It takes away the sensuousness and the spontaneity essential to the creative
productivity that is proper to human life and its material activity; this is its real transgression.
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In commodity-fetishism, products of human labor and human beings have inverted roles. It switches the qualities of human social relations with that of objects, conferring upon them a transcendent, enchanted value, a mystification that finds its ultimate
site in capital itself. Commodity-fetishes oppose and antagonize their producers ‘as if’
they stand external to them, beyond the control of their creative powers. It reverses the
natural mode of production of objects, the positive relational connection the producer naturally has with that which she creates for her own use, to meet her own needs. It does this
by reifying the social relations of labor and transferring them to the products of labor ‘as
if’ the relations exist between the products of labor, as commodities, and not between social agents, as is the case in nature: “the social character of men’s labor appears to them
as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of
the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation,
existing not between themselves but between the products of their labor.”76
Marx took up the concept of fetishism as a term replete with theological meaning,
especially in the post Enlightenment studies of the history of religion and sociology of religion in the 18th and early 19th centuries, subjects that Marx studied thoroughly, but published little on. Marx seems to have discovered this definition of fetishism during his research on the history of religion and Christian art, wherein he came across the work of
Charles de Brosses, one of many researchers in the late 18th century whose interest in the
religion of colonialized peoples was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to understand
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their resistance to early capitalist mercantilism. The ‘Fetish’ provided the colonialist
with the conceptual vernacular to express that which the more classical term of idolatry
could not, namely as Roland Boer describes it, “an account of the direct material effects
of the fetish in terms of physical and psychological well-being. It also was seen to play a
central role in social ordering.”78 The ‘Fetish’ described for the Portuguese colonialists
the unique role that certain objects and practices around those objects played in the economic and social life of indigenous people. Seen through this history of colonialism, the
concept of fetishism takes on new political meaning. For many in Marx’s context, religion was analyzed within a historical scheme of progression where anthropological studies of ‘primitive cultures’ designate religion as an element of more savage, less developed
human life. So fetishism as a descriptive category of indigenous communities, interpreted
through a European colonialist perspective, expressed the ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ character of the indigenous people in terms of their relationship to their material environment.
Marx’s reception of this account is evident in his “Ethnological Notebooks”
where he describes the various stages of religious development á la John Lubbock, who
argues that rather than narrating history of religion as being progressively more atheist
and less religion, the earliest human societies were atheists, namely because they were
not yet mature enough to understand or develop religious ideas.79 The stage of idolatry is
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an intermediate and more developed, yet still savage and primitive, stage of religious experience and expression. Marx seems to agree with Luddock’s conclusion, but interprets
its critical significance differently: the onset of religion late in the process of human social development explained, not by the failure to understand religion, but by the presence
of social and moral system of repression which developed the conditions upon which religion became a necessary result. While the modern European considers himself to more
developed and mature than the primitive savage, it is indeed the savage who shows us
how indeed primitive we are: how far we have regressed because of capitalist social relations. The indigenous societies, said Marx, are indeed better off, and so are more ‘modern.’ Indeed their atheism illustrates the lack of a need for religious consolation for and
expression of suffering, and the presence of religion illustrates the endurance of such conditions, pointing out the fact that what one would expect would have fallen off with the
advance of history, the savage or primitive aspects of indigenous life, are indeed still
alive and well us, despite our narrative of progress.
For Marx, a fetish is a specific mode of commodity, “abounding in metaphysical
subtleties and theological niceties”80 and as such, the (religious) problem with fetishization is comparable to that the inverted structure inherent and operative in the alienation
and reification of labor and capital. As such, fetishization is ideological in the same way
as theology because it inverts the relation between the human laborer and the object of
her labor, somehow making the object of labor more powerful and valuable than the hu-
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man laborer herself, and also conceals the more fundamental problem: the way that capitalist social relations enact this contradictory reversal in social reality for the benefit of
ruling class power. Although it is described as an economic procedure, it has a deep theological structure, further illustrating the complex relation between theology and ideology,
specifically in the context of capitalist ideology.
Through the economic act of fetishization, where human attributes and social relations are externalized and reified to the products of human labor (which is itself an effect
of capitalist ownership of the modes of production themselves, including religion), human social actors are left emaciated, powerless, and hallow. But for Marx, fetishization is
also a theological practice, even when performed within the economic sphere; this suggests a political link between economics and theology in Marx’s concept of ideology. For
example, in “the Leading Article”, Marx remarks that “Fetishism is so far from raising
man above his sensuous desires that, on the contrary, it is the ‘religion of sensuous desire.’ The fantasy of the appetites tricks the fetish worshipper into believing that an ‘inanimate object’ will give up its natural character to gratify its desires.”81 Here he is suggesting that the logic of ‘sacralization by inversion’ which lies at the theological core of religion is also inherent to the transferral act of fetishism. This ties fetishism most closely to
the transferral definition of idolatry as the fantastical attribution of divine powers to an
object, the transgression typically associated with the cultic practices that biblical critique
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of idolatry singles out. This suggests a theological-political connection between idolatry
82

and ideology that not often associated with Marx’s use of the concept of fetishism.
What is interesting for me is the way that Marx’s sources incorporated this within
a theological critique of idolatry as fetishism, complete with a host of biblical references
and allusions that describe and illustrate examples of fetishes and fetishistic practice.
Marx defined the concept of fetishism in much same way as de Brosses did (e.g., a sacralizing process of inversion and whereby certain magical powers and enchanted attributes are transferred to objects with negative economic and social effects), as evinced in
The Ethnological Notebooks whose references to fetishism tie it closely to religion
through a host of biblical citations, even as he prepared to the concept for use in his political and economic polemics on all forms of capital itself: modes of production, valueproduct, the nature of money, machinery, and technology.83
A number of recent studies have reminded us of the theological origins of Marx’s
analysis of fetishism.84 For example, Roland Boer argues that the idea that Marx’s concept of fetishism is theological (at least in history and structure) is supported by its frequent mention in his unpublished notebooks and his study of world religions, replete with
biblical quotations and theological allusions.85 The concept of fetishism comes to appear
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in Marx after a long history, whereby the term was used to describe most primitive stage
of religious belief and experience, most closely associated with colonialist assessments of
religious life and experience of indigenous peoples. The primitive believers, due to their
primitive beliefs about the magical, the mystical, and enchantment of natural objects, invested transcendental meaning into banal objects that were fabricated, often by their own
hands (Latin facticium, or facere, “made”), but gained power over their creators through
the act of sacral worship. In this way, fetishism names that transferral process whereby
human beings becomes unduly subordinated to objects of their own creation through the
attribution of transcendent value or divine power. Fetishism is ideological because it follows the similar theological script. It functions within economic and political relations in
similar ways to theology: concealing and suturing economic contradictions within capitalism through alienation and reification. But Boer goes even further to suggest that
Marx’s ideology critique of fetishism is derived from a biblical critique of idolatry. He
qualifies this by saying that “the category of fetishism was initially developed over
against the long theological elaboration of idolatry, which turned out to be ill-suited for
dealing with the amulets and objects that Portuguese encountered in Africa. However,
once the new category of the fetish had gained ground…it then subsumed idolatry within
itself.”86 The critique of idolatry is sublated into the ideology critique of fetishism. Prefiguring my argument in chapter 4 on the relation between ideology and the biblical critique of idolatry, this way of relating the two critiques does not take the social origins of
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biblical aniconism into account, misconstruing the similarities and presumed alliances between the critique of ideology and that of idolatry.
In Marx, fetishism is not explained as idolatry; rather idolatry is seen as a specific
form or example of fetishism. For example, in regards to another fascinating reference to
the Ethnological Notebooks, Boer shows how Marx’s interchangeable use of the term fetishism and idolatry illustrates their functional, if not analytical, equivalency: he refers
specifically to biblical examples of idolatrous sacrifice and described them as instances of
‘eating the fetish.’87 Perhaps Boer overstates the extent to which Marx takes up this relation in his own use of fetishism, but the point which is interesting and important for us, is
that Marx seems to follow his sources (i.e., de Brosses and Lubbock) in interpreting the
concept of fetish as an economic category through the biblical theology of idolatry, which
explains in part the consistent analogical references to religion and theology in and
through his analysis of alienation, money, and capital. This modifies both fetishism and
idolatry, moving the latter beyond the rather restrictive ‘religious’ meaning as the worship of gods in and through material objects, to include a more critical and negative analysis of how idolatry as fetishism both diminishes human beings and elevates everyday
material objects, an inversion that directly effects social and economic orders. Perhaps
this can be interpreted as a latent, albeit critical, theological materialism within Marx
himself.
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Nevertheless, the essential point here is that in truly materialist fashion, Marx’s
analysis of fetishism as idolatry points out how basic, ordinary, and everyday the fetishized idol is, regardless of whether or not it is natural or fabricated by human hands.
But it is important to emphasize that Marx is not simply interested in debunking the idolatrous beliefs of fetishism as false, but instead seeks to disclose and explain its social impact as it alienates and diminishes human beings, a political pattern quite familiar in his
ideology critique of theology. In this way, Marx seems to use the theology of idolatry as a
way into ideological critique of theology’s negative social impact. When it functions like
a fetish, the idol is not innocuous and powerless, but indeed is profoundly destructive not because it is false, but because of how it acts against the political subject and the conditions of possibility for radical and collective proletarian politics.88
Capitalist Economics and Theology
If Marx may be read as using fetishism to link ideology to idolatry, he also seems
to link theology to economics through ideology critique. This illustrates the pattern of inversion and transferral that is key to understanding the fetishism internal to theology that
renders it ideological. This bears out upon close examination of Marx’s mature texts, especially in Capital, where his descriptions of capital, labor, money, and value are laden
with references to theological and religious analogies. In light of what I have argued so
far, while some might dismiss these mentions as merely ad hoc references, I find them essential to understanding the relation of theology to ideology.
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For example, in Capital Vol. 1, Marx explains the transferral characteristic of fetishism operative in commodification that inverts the relation between the worker and the
product and establishes a kenotic relation between them. To do so, Marx turns to a religious analogy to link the economic effects of commodity-form with its theological structure:
As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labor within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing
but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for
them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find
an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products
of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their
own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So
it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the
fetishism, which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.89
Here, Marx shows us how theology often is performed as a fetishistic exercise. The relation that he draws here between ‘the misty realm of religion’ and ‘the world of commodities’ is sharpened by the direct analogy between capitalist political economists and theologians: both attempt to explain the materiality of the social world with recourse to a similar ideologic that happens to be theological. In another text, Marx plays on this analogical relation between theology and capitalist economics in order to expose its negative social impact and the various ideological strategies of capitalism, all of which share a common theological structure:
Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. … In this they resemble the theologians
who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is
89
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an invention of men, while their own is an emanation from God. When the economists say that present-day religions – the relations of bourgeois production – are
natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and
productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations
therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They
are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history,
but there no longer any. There has been history, since there were the institutions
of feudalism, and in these institutions of feudalism we find quite different relations of production from those of bourgeois society, which the economists try to
pass off as natural, and as such, eternal.90
From these texts, it is clear that Marx favors a strong analogy between capitalist economics and theology in that they both act as ideologies to naturalize, conceal, and de-historize
social reality and economic processes. This clearly benefits the bourgeois political economists who have the upper hand in the labor process, and benefit from maintaining systematic dynamics that estrange the human worker from the productive process and the
value of products. Theology is not only a phenomenal form of capitalist ideology, but
also a social actor within it, fetishized by capitalism and deployed in favor of sustaining
the very contradictions from which it comes, usually by emphasizing itself as central to
the natural, universal, or self-evident social order. We see this again in Capital, where
Marx criticizes the reversal of labor and value relations, comparing it to the supersessionist theologies of Christianity:
Political economy has indeed analyzed value and its magnitude, however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has
never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form,
that is to say, why labor is expressed in value. And why the measurement of labor
by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product. These
formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation
in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite,
appear to the political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self
evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labor itself. Hence the pre90
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bourgeois forms of the social organization of production are treated by political
economy in much the same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian
religions.91
One final theological example used by Marx to describe the religious structure of capitalist economic forms (identifying it therefore as ideological tout court) is the famous analogy between money and Christology. Here we can see the theological structure of
Marx’s theory of money. He models his critique of money on his critique of theology,
both of which are animated by his materialist premise that money, like god, is a ‘social
product’ of alienation and reification. Real human freedom depends on large scale, collective emancipation from the logic of ‘abstract labor’ which is responsible for both ‘the
division of labor’ and the ‘labor-product’. Marx continues to use theological analogies in
his critique of James Mill, whereby he portrays money, like theology, as the representation or illustration of the domination of things over people.92 Money acts upon the political subject, so as to alienate, in the act of labor, the worker from her product, effectively
reducing social relations to property relations.
Marx describes money and the power of its social function (which is more important and interesting to Marx politically then its economic one) as a particular kind of
mediating relation proper to theology. The more specific argument is that money func-
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tions in economics the way that Christ functions in theology: as a mediator that both alienates and obscures what ought to be a direct and unmediated relation.93 Money, like religion, has no direct and immediate content of its own, but is constructed purely for the
benefit of perpetuating capitalist relations, particularly through wages, capital, and labor.94 Likewise, Christ, like money, alienates human persons from themselves through
his mediating relation. For Marx, in theology, Christ ‘represents originally’, and thus is
seen as the “ideal mediator.”95 The unique identity of Jesus Christ as “the divine and human natures united in one person” means that Christ represents human persons before
God, represents God before human persons, but also, due to the Incarnation, also represents human persons to human persons.96 God only has value insofar as God is represented by and also itself represents Christ and the human person only has value to the extent that s/he represents Christ.
For Marx, money operates the same way. The very essence of money is its mediating activity which self-alienates the human person, making her an Other to herself and
making a god out of commodity.97 Money operates in capitalist society as a mediator of
religious value. It is actively fetishized by its use in exchange relations, reifies social relations as a set of things moved about in transactions, and has turned productive forces into
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rigid, given ‘things’ whose overly determined exchange-value, inflated and enchanted by
its involvement in the ethereality of money, actively undermines the use value of products. This self-alienation actively dehumanizes the human person as a worker by externalizing that which is properly her own and setting it against her. Her own will, the product of her labor, and those to whom she is constitutively related confront and threaten her
in the mediating activity of the money-relation.
This assemblage of examples instructs us that Marx is not simply referring to theology as an example of ideology, but rather using theology as an operational metaphor
that structures what Marx thinks ideology does and why it is politically problematic,
namely that it obfuscates and precludes the emergence of the emancipated political subject. Ideology is not a marker of truth or falsehood, or appearance and reality, but rather it
designates a particular function of an idea within material conditions of possibility for
collective action.
Conclusion
Myriad open questions await us here. Keeping the matter of ‘political theology’ in
view, how ought theology respond to the Marxian critique of ideology? Beyond the accusation of religion as ideology, what are the consequences of this Marxian critique of ideology for theology? Certainly, theology can and should object to how Marx depicts and
portrays theology, for it is widely acknowledged that Marx knew little about theological
particulars and so often caricatures religion for the sake of his critical position. But the
self-defense of theology against Marx’s portrayal of it misses the more crucial point that I
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think remains, even if Christian theology was able to convincingly dispute the validity of
Marx’s depiction of religion.
The Marxist critique of religion is broadly interpreted as calling for ‘the end of
theology’, a consequence of overdetermining the epistemological aspects of ideology critique. This merging of Marxian critique of ideology with broader secularizing and atheistic critiques of religion does a significant disservice, not only to theology, but also to secularization and atheism. On the other hand, if theology seeks to take the Marxian critique
of ideology seriously, there are no want of options for how best to do so.98 Over the last
thirty years, the “Marxism” question has repeated itself within theology with dubious effect. Prompted in large part by the onset of liberation theology, much of which was at
least broadly informed by Marxian social analysis, even if that relation is wreaked with
complexity99, the theological debate between theology and Marxism produced a series of
98
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responses to Marx’s critique of religion that attempt to align theological studies with its
materialist and humanist proposals.100 How might theology meet these Marxist demands?
Liberation theology, especially the Latin American variant, presents itself as an
attempt, in turning to Marx’s critique of capitalism, to develop a critical distance between
theology’s liberative roots in its biblical faith and its complicity with oppressive and exploitative economic and political systems. Liberation theology attempts rethink theology
so as to produce or generate theological ideas that are considered revolutionary and liberative, ridding theology of its ideological and oppressive aspects. In so doing, it positions
Christianity in a critical relation to material conditions, governed by liberating praxis.
The impetus for this is decisively Marxist in that it follows his critique of capitalism
based on theories of class struggle and surplus value respectively, but not the critique of
ideology as applied to religion.101
simply “baptizing” its theory so as to fit its peculiar theological concerns and political aims. See Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger, Instruction on Certain Aspects of Liberation Theology (Vatican City: Vatican Press,
1984), and Alister Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990).
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The responses to this challenge are often broad-based attempts to reform and reinterpret theology according to broadly Marxian standards, whether it meant critiquing
Christianity’s alignment with capitalism, acknowledging the centrality of class struggle,
or implementing various versions of materialism (most of which rarely were truly Marxist forms).102 It was acknowledged that if theology were to respond to Marx’s critique of
ideology, it would have to do so by securing its “oppositional status” in relation to its determining pressures and material locations, rather than mooring itself as a “countering”
discourse that seeks to intervene into social reality as a ready alternative.103
And yet, let us remind ourselves of the ideological function and role that religion
and theology plays in frustrating and obstructing the formation of the emancipatory political subject. The critique of ideology is not about the epistemological status of specific
theological claims, but rather affords us an appropriate method for the political assessment of religion and theology’s effects on social reality. The critique of religion as ideol-
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ogy is not a resource that frees theology to realize itself socially, politically, and otherwise (now liberated from ideology), but rather is the immanent stricture to which political
theology must be respond, should it hope to be more a false response to the antagonism
and contradiction at the core of social reality. This turns the attention away from the ‘end
of religion’ interpretation of ideology critique. Ideology critique of religion is not, as
Marx will say, about investigating religion to see if it is possible to detect its internal fissures or contradictions. This misses the critical point, which is to identify the particular
types of economics and social relations upheld and supported by religion and theology,
and to chart out alternative materialist possibilities, not only theological, but also political
and economic. The ideologico-critical analysis of religion begins with material life and so
rather than offer theological responses to the critique of religion, so as to secure the nonideological status of theology, the critique of ideology must direct and complete the critical, theological approaches to political life. What is required is not a direct theological response to Marx’s critique of religion, but rather a critical-theoretical approach to political
theology to be sketched out in proceeding chapters.
This 'critical theology’, developed in response to Marx’s critique of ideology,
takes up political theology as its object in order to modify the immanent relation of theory and praxis that prescribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theological commitments or political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones. Marx’s
critique of ideology shapes the relation of theory and praxis in political theology, leading
to a critical theology which chastens and subdues the way that Christianity uses the major themes of justice, freedom, liberation, solidarity as the basis for political theology.
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Constructively speaking, one must start with the recognition that active political
interests that are always already present and invested in theology and its use in various
publics. The slogan “all theology is political” may be as cliche as it is nebulous, but so
much theology remains seemingly absent of any self-conscious, critical perspective on
the politics embedded within itself as a discursive practice. But how exactly does theology come to this awareness? Undoubtedly, it becomes important to rethink theology
against the critique of ideology that understands itself to be a certain kind of critical political project, not an epistemological one.
I do believe that the identity and relevance of political theology is at stake in the
Marxian critique of ideology. I am with Peter Scott when he says that “the Christian
claim to speak of a God of freedom is systematically undermined if the claim is productive, not of the knowledge of social structures and relations, but rather ideological strategies whose effect is precisely to obscure such structures and relations.”104 And so, is
Christian theology ideological, and if so, how might it become non-ideological? What are
the criteria we use to assure ourselves that Christianity is not ideological - that is, that
ideology critique immanent to theology has worked? Disagreements and confusion about
what constitutes “political theology” notwithstanding, the legitimacy of political theology
depends on recognizing its ideological elements and eliminating them. I do not wish the
weight of my argument here to fall on the construction of a non-ideological theology; I
have no intention of trying to develop such a project. But if the argument of the disserta-
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tion is that a sustained engagement with the critique of ideology is needed in order to secure the identity and relevance of political theology as a critical theory, how ought theology proceed with such an endeavor? In what way can political theology be thought as a
Marxist theology? What might political theology mean, if interpreted as a Marxist practice? As Leonardo Boff reminds us, “it is absolutely insufficient to claim not to be ideological, or to wish not to be, in order actually not to be.”105
Marx’s critique of religion as ideology expresses a concern that is still relevant for
much of western Christianity and its theologies as they are expressed and treated as a
commodity-fetish in our contemporary culture. Theology and its ‘priestly’ practitioners
economically benefit from the transferral procedure whereby religion is enchanted with a
sort of transcendent and abstracted magic that increases its own marketability and its viability as a commodity. Its exchange-value in relations of commodity-exchange, or as we
would say today, its brand is constructed as an ideology.106 Fetishization is that exact
transferal procedure whereby theology is transformed into ideology, and in this way, heology is problematized as an economic product of the capitalist political economy. Theodor Adorno describes the problem this way: “Religion is on sale as it were. It is cheaply
marketed in order to provide one more so-called irrational stimulus among many others
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To prefigure an argument from Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School, part of the economic problem
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by which the members of a calculating society are calculatingly made to forget the calculation under which they suffer.”107
When theology gives attention to Marx’s critique of ideology, it raises the question of whether theology can be de-fetishized as a question of immanent critique; this is
often expressed by theology in the biblical and prophetic critique of idolatry, discussed at
length in chapter four. The idol reoccurs as the ideological form that theology represents
to itself, making the Marxian analysis of the fetish all the more politically and theoretically relevant. How might it avoid inadvertently colluding with the forces of domination,
exploitation, and oppression by becoming truly critical, or what Geuss describes as, “a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation”?108 How does theology avoid ideology? Is it through idolatry
critique?
This constructive perspective notes the interesting resonances between the ruptural and inaugural mode of the Marxian critique and that the immanent critique by biblical prophets like Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, whose condemnation and indictment of Israel’s unfaithfulness challenges its complicity, hypocrisy, and reticence in regard to the
concrete realities of social and political conditions in the processes of ‘real, active life.’
My point is that Marx is not as interested in abolishing religion per se (because of theological aspects he finds objectionable tout court) as he is in exposing and critiquing its ma-
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terialist base, surpassing the abstractions of theological Idealism, and refocusing the attention of true criticism on the oppressive and dominating dynamics of social world. By
advocating that religion interrogate its materialist base, Marx joins his voice with this Hebrew prophetic tradition, a link not made explicitly by Marx himself, but one that can be
helpful in providing a theological reading of Marx’s ideology critique that make sense of
his critique of religion without glossing over its ambiguity and ambivalence.
To do this, political theology must attain and secure its identity and relevance
through a self-reflexive critique that affirms the material nature of theology itself and introduces a critical posture that resists the immediacy of practical activities in the name of
the liberating praxis of heteronomous acts, the conditions of which cannot be thought or
known in advance; this is a politics ex nihilio which emerges from the contingent gaps in
which the subject discovers the wounded core of her political subjectivity.109 Further discussion of this awaits us in future chapters, but we leave this chapter on Marx with a
clearer sense of the effect that ideology critique has on theology: the recognition of the
raw political interests always already invested in the theological, making the need to interpret these interests critically all the more the urgent and pressing, even if, at this juncture, what function critique may have in political theology is uncertain.
In this chapter, I have tried to suggest that the Marxian critique of religion had
less to do with its substantive or material theological claims, and more to do with its deleterious function and impact on social and political life, specifically its fetishistic, alienating, and capitalist modes. “False consciousness” is inadequate for describing what Marx
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finds objectionable about theology. To accuse theology of ideology is not the same as accusing it of being false. What is important to note is that while Marx defined religion
through a critique of ideology, he is most interested in developing a materialist parallelism that takes on the state and society that produces the conditions of and for religion itself as a site where social contradictions emerge and take root. While I am not suggesting
that Marx is a sort of crypto-theologian, or that there is a religious remainder in Marxism
itself, I do think it is important to state the extent to which the admittedly complex relation between theology and ideology is complicated by the fact that ideology is not an
epistemological category in Marx, but a social-scientific concept. Sure, Marx’s critique of
religion is an ideology-critique, but that is not the entire story of their relation, or even the
most important part of it.
If much of modern philosophy after Marx has proceeded to cast aspersions on theology in light of Marxist critique that it is ideological, that it contributes to ‘false consciousness’ of human beings and so occludes their potential formation as emancipatory
political subjects liberated into forms of life and ways of being commensurate with their
flourishing and well-being, then it is truly surprising that the turn to theology and religion
in philosophy has been motivated by an eagerness to use theology to think and act towards the ethical and political imperatives of our day. The so-called “new visibility” of
religion, then, has to do with the immanent relation of praxis to theory in political theology; that is, it comes as a result of philosophy’s immanent critique which recommends
religion and theology as an agent of ideology critique, rather than its object. This has as
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much to do with concrete changes in the composition and arrangement of our social
world as it does with challenges within philosophy and theology.
As such, it is less surprising than one might expect that political philosophers, indeed even Marxist ones, find themselves turning to theology as ideology critique and are
doing so for mainly political reasons. Two prominent examples, British literary critic
Terry Eagleton and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, both turn to theology at precisely that moment in their respective projects where one might expect them to eschew it:
the intersectional nexus of theory, ideology critique, and politics. This leaves open the
possibility of interpreting and deploying theology in non-ideological or anti-ideological
ways, all within a Marxist conception of the idea. What is gained by theology in this surprising turn to Christianity by ideology critique? It presents an opportunity for theology
itself to return to the question of whether a non-ideological theology is possible. Such a
version would afford political theology with the critique necessary to regulate its immanent relation of theory to praxis, resisting the temptation of complicity while also directing how best to relate its theological commitments to material political realities. This possibility surfaces in political philosophy on the contemporary left in a variation of the “the
return to religion” within contemporary theory. The following two chapters of the dissertation look at two differing contemporary treatments of theology as ideology critique,
both of which do so in critical appreciation of the Marxist rubric.

CHAPTER TWO
TERRY EAGLETON
Introduction
This chapter interprets Terry Eagleton’s theory of ideology’s critique in relation
to his critically appreciative turn to theology. It situates Eagleton within two predominant
trends: the theological or religious turn in political philosophy and critical theory, and the
political turn in theology and critical research on religion. It is within this crucible that
political theology is best interpreted, and so is the best conceptual space in which ideology critique is understood and practiced. Insofar as the overall purpose of the dissertation
is to inquire about the relation between ideology critique and theology, it is also important to take up the surprising reemergence of the use of theology in contemporary
Marxist political philosophy. When speaking a broad-based ‘theological
turn’ in general1, it is imperative to clarify both the nature of and the reasons for this
‘turn’ in Marxist politics, represented by Terry Eagleton and - in the proceeding chapter 1
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by Slavoj Žižek. What kinds of theology are being taken up here and for what reasons?
What difference does their respective use of theology make for their employment of ideology critique and its political role in social and political change? Put differently, how
might we characterize their use of theology as ideology critique? In an attempt to answer
these questions, the present chapter examines how the Marxist literary critic Terry Eagleton uses theology as ideology critique for the sake of radical politics. We find that the
consistent appeal to theology immanent to their Marxist politics has to do with the critique of ideology, for theology is seen as the decisive catalyst for achieving human emancipation, and so is called upon to inform, animate, and direct ideology critique itself. If
the primary question that guides this research is “in the case of Eagleton, why is theology
important for Marxist philosophy – especially given the Marxist legacy of religion as ideology?”2 The chapter argues that Eagleton discerns within theology a particularly radical
element that promises to challenge prevalent trends in contemporary political theory. The
surprising answer is that the operative feature of this element is ideology critique. Eagleton, I argue, uses theology as ideology critique, an intriguing development within Marxist
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political philosophy given the aforementioned critique of religion as ideology in Marx
presented in chapter 1.
Perhaps Eagleton furthers Marx’s point by affording us an alternative way of
looking at the relation between ideology and theology. This helps us imagine a different
kind of procedure, not in order to save theology or religion from the critique of ideology,
but for the sake of a critical theological procedure that is better prepared to take on the
negative dialectics of critical theory more thoroughly than it has up to this point. More
explanation of that last point is required, but at this juncture, I am only interested in what
Eagleton says about the role of critique in theology (and the form that theology must take
as a result) and what he says about the role of theology in critique. Put simply, I aim to
identify the critical form of political theology as it exists in Eagleton’s use of theology as
and for ideology critique. While this appears to be a reversal of Marx’s critique, Eagleton
shows it to be endemic to the Marxist position itself, bringing Marx (and us) into the contemporary debate itself.
Eagleton indicates a theologico-political way of relating ideology and theology
that differs significantly from more standard views on ideology critique which do not include theology. He does so by critiquing postmodernism, secularity, and cultural studies the approaches most commonly used to help rethink the relation of ethics, religion, and
political practices in light of the contemporary critique of the secular.3 But what does Eagleton mean by “radical politics”? The term “radical” has undergone considerable usage
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by those eager to differentiate their perspective from other exiting alternatives, whether it
be the post-Marxist agonist politics of ‘radical democracy’4 or readings of Continental
philosophy of religion as ‘radical political theology.’5 By ‘radical’ politics, Eagleton
means something else. Eagleton considers ‘radical’ politics to offer an ‘third way’, an alternative to both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ types of political thinking. The ‘radical’ has
something to do with the formalistic constraints of the nature of the critical itself, bearing
important resemblances to the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno. Eagleton
describes it this way: “a radical politics can describe what must be done in order for this
to occur, but it cannot prescribe the content of what must then be lived, for the content, as
Marx says, goes beyond the phrase. All radical politics are thus in a profound sense formalistic.”6 For Eagleton, radical political thought is less about a social movement or a
(set of) position(s) (e.g., Marxism, anti-colonialism, feminism, etc) but rather a critical
sensibility that seeks to break with the established order in pursuit of the altogether new.
It matters little then, for radical theory, to make determinate political prescriptions, and
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instead, it seeks to demonstrate the contingency of the actual - that the world can and
must be thought otherwise. The aim of radical theory is not to provide alternatives to social reality, but to rigorously establish the possibility that things can be different: it is to
imagine the world otherwise. Radical politics is always essentially critical. It identifies
and combats oppressive structures, but falls short of any prescriptive work. This is important because it is due to its radical character that Eagleton discovers something politically powerful about theology which contributes directly to the project of ideology critique in contemporary thought. Put differently, he considers theology to be radical only
insofar as it is practiced critically. Whether the theology he offers is up to the task remains to be seen.
It is notable at the outset that Eagleton opposes that idea that ideology critique
somehow assumes or promotes a secular critique of religion, as if the materialist thesis of
ideology critique (its affirmation of worldly immanence) is restricted or limited to an opposition to religion tout court. This is problematic for a number of reasons, the strongest
of which is the developing thesis that the secular is indeed a religious invention and does
not fully escape the ambit of theology. The idea of the secular itself remains tethered to
and mediated through the idea of religion as the foil against which Christianity and the
category of religion both establishes itself.7 To appropriately understand the challenges
7
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facing the secular today, we must not think it as detached or emancipated from religion or
theology. I will return to the ongoing debate on the relation of religion to the secular, including a due consideration of the so-called ‘postsecular condition’ in later sections of
this chapter. First, however, it is important to make a case for how Eagleton takes up a
Marxist style of ideology critique but interprets it theologically, while also insisting that
this is not a departure from materialist or socialist commitments. This amounts to a “critical political theology” for the sake of radical politics, a characterization that situates critical questions about the secular/postsecular in a particular way.
Eagleton and the Political Use of Theology
The idea behind moving so quickly from the nineteenth century Marx to the
twenty-first century Eagleton (and Slavoj Žižek, in the next chapter) is not to avoid the
unenviable task of making sense of the complex reception history of Marx’s thought in
the twentieth century, especially as it relates to the meaning of theology as ideology. Rather, I am interested in a new assessment of the relation between theology and politics
within ideology critique. The question of religion and theology was not abandoned by
Marxist thought after Marx. Later Marxists like Gramsci, Lukacs, even Lenin, grappled
with the challenge that religion (when interpreted as an ideology) posed for revolutionary
politics and the development of the working class consciousness. It was clear to many
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twienth century post-war Western Marxists (or, arguably, post-Marxists) like Theodor
Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Jacques Ellul, and Erich Fromm that religion was not going away,
at least not at the accelerated rate that early modern critics once expected. Theology in all
its messy conceptual and political particulars needed to be included within their social
theory. Genuine critical social theory, they said, needs to explain theology, not just explain it away. As I have already discussed, this idea is central to the ideology critique of
religion in Marx himself. Theology, Marx insisted, was a result, not a cause, of alienated
social life that had a negative material impact as a fetishized and fetishizing ideology.
Ideology was a detrimental obstacle to revolutionary practice because it got in the way of
a working class consciousness, only benefiting those whose economic and political interests are the commodification of work, accumulation of capital, and controlling modes of
production.
Eagleton follows Marx this far. His early theoretical work on literary criticism
displays its Marxist inflection insofar as it is centered on working from the concept of
ideology. His early bibliography lists titles such as Marxism and Literary Criticism, Criticism and Ideology, and Ideology: An Introduction, as well as a pair of books on Marx.8
When paired with more recent texts such as On Evil, Holy Terror, Reason, Faith, and
Revolution, and Trouble With Strangers, it is clear that both Eagleton’s early theology
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and his latest ‘full circle’ are motivated by broadly Marxist political concerns, as is his
adaption of ideology critique for the sake of a political literary criticism.10 Likewise, Eagleton’s critique of ideology is decisively Marxist in both its political and materialist elements, but he drops the ‘false consciousness’ label from ideology critique. He links ideology critique thoroughly to the discursive practice of criticism, a unifying theme in his disparate oeuvre.11 He firmly believes that what we need most today is a recovery of working-class resistance against identitarian nationalism, finance capitalism, and exploitative
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labor practices. Eagleton is actively engaged in an intellectual effort to highlight the enduring significance of Marx himself for contemporary political action and debate, over
against the reception history of Marx in the tradition of Marxism.12 His consistent rehabilitation of Marx goes hand in hand with his reproach of Western liberal politics, whose
bourgeois multiculturalism and beguiled postmodernism, he claims, lifts up a virtueless
and vacuous world.13 Eagleton laments the state of critical theory today: it has failed to
foster social emancipation and the intellectual and theoretical practices that should be
counted on to help generate this are distracted by, complicit in, and otherwise rendered

literary criticism’ (Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, 98) that is materialist in content, negative in form, but
rooted in its ‘substantial social function’ as an immanent investigation of theory as it presents itself within
“the symbolic process of social life.” (Eagleton, Function of Criticism, 124)
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impotent by anti-theoretical cultural trends that have worked their way into everyday political life: anti-foundationalism, relativism14, and a post-political allergy for morality.15
Eagleton’s answer is to return to a theory after theology, animated by a critique of ideology. The task of this theory is to return to serious philosophical questions about morality,
foundations, social cohesion, and virtue. He actively promotes (or more precisely, defends) theology as a kind of “vanishing mediator” between this kind of critical theory and
radical politics, one that he finds uniquely capable of generating the kind of political subjects needed for oppositional and emancipatory movements.
Responding to those who deride his ‘theological turn’, Eagleton writes: “I would
point out to my friends on the left that the politics implicit in the rather exotic talk [of theology] are more, not less, radical than much that is to be found in the more orthodox discourses of the left today.”16 For Eagleton, “there is something here which is in a certain
interpretation far more radical than most of the mainstream political discourses that we
hear at the moment.” Theology is “a science of discontent” that sheds lights on the materialist narrative of human struggle - the sickness of evil, terror, oppression - but he also
highlights “the capacity of religion to unite theory and practice, elite and populace, spirit
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and senses, a capacity which culture was never quite able to emulate.” The radical poli17

tics of theology are of a different sort: rather than striving to vacate political space so as
to fill it with alternative forms of thought, theology is at its radical best when it is critical:
that is, when it calls for “a traumatic breaking down and remaking, for which the Christian term is conversion.”18 Theology also affords certain elements that have been missing
in contemporary theory since postmodernism: a rational basis for moral judgements and a
materialist account of universality, based on the love of strangers, solidarity, dependence,
and equality, all of which provide the “vital precondition of human flourishing”, and the
basis of genuinely critical self-reflexive spirit.19
Eagleton’s Critique of Ideology
Terry Eagleton has generated a new wave of interest in his work, mostly in critical response to his ‘theological turn’20 a phrase that Eagleton uses himself to describe his
political and ethical writings.21 I do not offer a thorough assessment of his theology here,
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as I restrict myself to the nature of Eagleton’s critical appeal to theology on ethical and
political grounds.22 Eagleton’s critical theory brings ideology critique and theology together cooperatively in order to face down and disassemble the political brinkmanship
caused, in part, by the lack of sufficiently radical ideas circulating in contemporary political thought and practice. Eagleton’s patently eclectic style, his unapologetic socialism,
and his reuse of theological ideas from his early work as a “Left Catholic” theologian, all
converge to afford us a theology for radical politics. I will chart out the points of nexus
between ideology critique and theology, exploring how it is that Eagleton draws up the
relation between theology and politics. My aim is to clarify both the use of ideology critique in Eagleton’s political theology and the use of theology in his distinctive version of
ideology critique.
Eagleton’s General Concept of Ideology
At this point, I want to outline his own distinctive concept of ideology, to explain
its function in and relation to political theology, and clarify why both are so important for
radical politics. First, why has the concept of ideology fallen away as an instructive and
effective mode of critique? Eagleton blames the “end of ideology” on certain developments within postmodern theory, namely its critique of absolute claims to knowledge as
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well as its dismantling of truth, objectivity, and morality, all of which are deemed “ideological” because they presuppose some privileged standpoint, some outside vantage. This
seemingly advances the post-Kantian point that human beings as subjects are trapped, in
a way, within the limits of knowledge, and thus only access the real as phenomenal. “Reality” is always interpreted and as such, there is no direct knowledge of reality per se outside of subjectivity. Eagleton does not counter this familiar line, but rather disagrees that
it means that ideology and its critique is obsolete or politically pointless. He hazards a
post-critical and anti-foundationalist concept of ideology that is based on a theological
perspective on human rationality, embodiment, and social interdependence. The predominant role of ideology in Eagleton’s model of critique (whether it to be political, social, or
literary) may appear to be quite prosaic, outdated, or atavistic - if only because much of
contemporary critical thinking has left the concept of ideology behind altogether, influenced by the anti-Marxist sentiments of poststructuralist and postmodern theory.23 In his
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classic witty form, Eagleton writes that “If postmodernism is right, than Marxism is
wrong – pace those brands of postmodern Marxism which bear about the same relation to
classical tradition as guitar-toting vicars do to the Desert Fathers.”24 Certainly, the predominant culture of cynicism causes us to consider ourselves to be fully aware of what it
is going on around us. We do not experience ourselves as deceived and fooled anymore
by the forces at play in our social and political order. The idea inherent to ideology critique, that we are nevertheless experiencing a distorted or illusionary sense of being conscious in the world, seems quite out of place. There is no need for an “enlightened” point
of view if there is no ideological state or subject from which one needs to be emancipated; postmodern theory has already accomplished this with deconstruction. Additionally, postmodern theory has convincingly argued that there is not an ‘outside’ position,
there is no external point from which we are able to interrogate any standpoint - cultural,
political, anthropological, etc. Any unique purchase that a critique of ideology might
claim on the current situation seems itself to be rather naive, if not politically suspect.

value and links them to the mundane aspects of everyday life. (Eagleton, After Theory, 99)
In Ideology, he enumerates his concerns with postmodernity as they affect ideology critique specifically: (1) the dismissal of ‘representation’, (2) the idea that ‘all thought is ideological’ (Eagleton, Ideology, 165) means that all critiques are tantamount to absolutist claims to truth: “we cannot brand Pol Pot a
Stalinist bigot since this would imply some metaphysical certitude about what not being a Stalinist bigot
would involve.” (Eagleton, Ideology, xxi) Finally, (Eagleton, Ideology, 3) all rationality is insidiously invested with interests and power, and so “everything is a matter of rhetoric and power…talk of ‘facts’ or
‘objectivity’ is merely a specious front for the promotion of specific interest”disqualifies the critique of ideology as “redundant.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 165) This does little more than “consecrate the political status
quo.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 167) Eagleton routinely faults poststructuralism for “this stoicism in the face of
an apparently all-pervasive power or inescapable metaphysical closure.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 146)
24

Eagleton, ‘Introduction: Part 1’ in Marxist Literary Theory: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 15.

92
The idea that the critique of ideology is thought to be outdated and out of place is precisely why Eagleton believes it to be so important and relevant for our time. We need the
critique of ideology all more as we have become blind to the ways in which ideology prevents us from identifying its everyday role in our lives.
As such, it is possible to speak of ideology critique as “a continuous, if still rather
anonymous resistance” that is made available to political subjects in and through their
very embodiment. All human life and thought is linked in and through the body. This is
politically important because without ideology critique, we have no ability to identify
what is wrong within our social reality, and more importantly, why it is wrong, and what
we ought to do about it. There must a position from which to identify the difference between what is real and what is not, between ideology and non-ideology, for if we lacked
this position, we would not be able to tell the significant differences between “loving God
and loving Gorgonzola”25, nor would we be able to articulate why torture and terrorism is
objectionable, or why defeating cancer is (or ought to be) a higher human priority than
Manchester United winning the Premier League.26 The question, for Eagleton, is not
whether this position exists, but rather how best to theorize and actualize it materially
within the embodied conditions of human life. We must believe that political subjects and
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social institutions can be transformed, that there are alternative possibilities within society that can animate the resistance necessary for thinking and making the world otherwise. Althusser’s perspective on ideology is too resigned, bleak, pessimistic, and takes all
the critical power and analytic strength out of ideology critique; this has drastic and dramatic negative implications for radical politics. It concedes the day to ideology, allowing
it to both naturalize and universalize the alienated state of human life for the benefit of
ruling interests without the annoying and noisy objections of critique. Indeed, it is exactly
because Christianity is so annoying and noisy that Eagleton considers it to be promising and potentially revolutionary - for ideology critique itself.
Ideology and Literary Critique
While Eagleton’s early theology illustrates a rather exuberant Marxist humanism,
Eagleton’s early literary work displays the deep and abiding intuition that reading and
studying literature is always already a political activity, one that must always be properly
oriented towards understanding what forces and interests are involved in the formation,
redaction, and reception of literature.27 Literature is always a social and political act, and
so literary criticism must always take shape in dialogue with political theories designed to
help surface those aspects and elements. To read literature, one must be aware of the
text’s place within a wider matrix of history, politics, and economic interests, and for this
task, Eagleton wrote Criticism and Ideology wherein developed a Marxist literary theory,
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so as to chart and organize the various levels and elements using a more “scientific” theory of ideology critique.28 This signaled a decisive shift wherein Marxist critical theory is
applied to literary studies, but it did not include theories of ideology specifically until
Criticism and Ideology. The point of literary criticism is to surface the myriad ‘categorical structures’ operative within a single literary text so as to explain their origin, source,
and genetic conditions. The study of literature can have actual political impact by uncovering the various political structures at play, identifying what these structures mean for
overall aesthetic judgments about the relative merits or demerits of any given literary
work.
Criticism and Ideology offers a “Marxist science of the text” that attends more
specifically to ideologies in literature, not just genetic categorical structures. It is important to understand what goes into the textual production of literature in history. To put
it differently, what are the various levels of ideology present in and active on the text, and
how should we think about the relationship between any given text and its ideological
status? For Eagleton, history enters into the textual production as history. Instead of
thinking of the text as an expression of ideology, “the text, rather, is a certain production
of ideology.”29 From a critical-materialist standpoint, literary texts matter for human life
because they form us, they act upon us, “they make us think” and so we need to be aware
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of the complex layers in the ideological matrix operative in both interpretation and production. The purpose of ideologico-critical reading of a text is not to identify those places
in a text where it leads to and facilitates ‘false consciousness’ in the reader, or where ideologies work to cover up or conceal disarray, incoherence, and contradictions in a text,
but instead to analyze complex, dialectical relations between the ideological factors and
influences on the textual production of literature in its wide historical context and economic circumstances.
Eagleton would eventually sharpen the political tone of this style of ideology critique, not by doubling down on narrow analytic or methodological attempts to design a
complete theory of ideologies in textual production, but by moving towards an unique,
pragmatic strategy whereby the search for strict argumentative rhetorical and polemical
modes gave way to a more diffuse and pluralistic approach. The basic criterion for his
radical critical pluralism is the ability to engender revolutionary modes of socialist thinking and acting, and so his initial interest in Marxism gave way to new attention to poststructuralist, psychoanalytic, and feminist ideas; that is, “towards a revolutionary criticism.”30 At this point, Eagleton became very interested in the role and function of criticism in general, wondering aloud if ideology critique can contribute to the priorities of
socialist politics in the context of postmodernism, cultural studies, and deconstruction. He
concluded that a new critical practice was required in a context where most of what
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called itself ‘criticism’ was merely liberal-humanism reworked in trendy conceptual garb.
He found in the figure of Walter Benjamin a tradition of Western Marxism that prefigured this concern and so provided resources for a style of ideology critique that was capable of bringing together the emancipatory impulses of poststructuralism and the radical
political aspirations of socialism without falling prey to the the anarchic seductions of the
Derrida fete of deconstruction.
Given that Eagleton’s major concern shifted to how the literary critic could expand her work into new modes of political engagement, Literary Theory is notable for its
concern with linking political concerns with the study of literature. How and what literature is studied is mutually constitutive to the ideologies of the academy. The task of politically responsible criticism is to establish notions of literature and modes of analysis that
both uncover the ways that literary theory reinforces these ideologies as “part of the ideological apparatus of the modern capitalist state.”31 But what did Eagleton suggest as an
alternative? Surprisingly, he refused to offer a full-throated Marxist theory, opting instead
to advocate for a eclectic approach of “using whatever one can.” The goal of literary theory determines its methods, and so its goals, say Eagleton, afford us the opportunity to
take up a radically pluralistic, pragmatic, and ultimately rhetorical, strategy of taking up
and using whatever resources, ideas, and discourses will produce results that contribute to
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“the strategic goal of human emancipation, the production of ‘better people; through the
socialist transformation of society.”32
The various interests of Literary Theory are consolidated into a broad political
thesis that the study of literature must consider how it is itself directly implicated in and
responsible for the function of ideology in social modes of power and dominance; it is, in
this way, a critical discourse33 that resists political complicity in ideology by struggling
to see how “repressed needs, interests, and desires may assume the cultural forms which
could weld them into a collective political force.”34 But apart from some broad pointing
and generic allusions to Althusser, it is not altogether clear what exactly Eagleton has in
mind when referring to ideology in this early stage, other than that he does follow Althusser’s rejection of George Lukács’ thesis who defined ideology as “false consciousness” that functions as a cultural hegemonic power, which can and must be escaped if one
is to apprehend the historical ‘Real’ upon which any truly effective revolutionary politics
must be based. While in Criticism and Ideology, ideology seemed synonymous with the
myriad cultural, political, and economic factors and forces that influence textual production and reception in history, this very broad and unspecified sense in Literary Theory becomes more specifically politicized as Eagleton deepens his critique against postmodern
theory.
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His groundbreaking text Ideology takes up this argument at this intersection between postmodern theory and poststructuralist critique and highlights the relevance of
ideology and foregrounds its relation to theology. Eagleton attempts in Ideology to reassert the usefulness and political power of the concept of ideology, and to explain the historical development of the idea. He argues that ideology is vital if we are to understand
and properly analyze the varied, competing interests in an increasingly fractured, pluralized, and global geopolitical context, all the while also resisting the temptations of postmodern theory to conflate ideology with something resembling ‘discourse’, turning politics into hermeneutics. True to form, Eagleton does not offer a unified theory of ideology
here, but rather provides both a historical account of the term’s development and a helpful listing of six definitions. This strategy affords Eagleton the opportunity to illustrate
and apply his critically aggregating approach. It must take a strategically pluralist approach in order to be successful: “all these perspectives contain a kernel of truth, but
taken in isolation they show up as partial and flawed.”35
However, in contrast to his earlier generic definition, ideologies are “something”
in particular in that they describe a specific formation, a definite function. The critique of
ideology is mounted in defense of the “objective interest” which allows us all to distinguish between what is most important, whose interests are most pressing, and whether or
not certain material conditions and social relations are desirable. Eagleton argues that the
radical potential of ideology critique rests understanding the dialectics of the oppressive
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and emancipatory elements (and their historical context). In this way, Ideology is a study
of the term and the concept that establishes ideology critique as a positive basis for a political solidarity in strong contrast to the identitarian approaches that use multiculturalism
and globalized plurality as reasons and rallying points for sectarian and localist formations for whom the goal of politics has gone from consensus and ‘the common’ to the
airing of grievance and the continuance of conflict and dissensus, or a communitarian
‘tribalism.’
Eagleton insists that his theoretical preface for ideology critique is intended to directly counter the cultural theory which “has been shamefaced about morality and metaphysics, embarrassed about love, biology, religion, and revolution, largely silent about
evil, reticent about death and suffering, dogmatic about essences, universals and foundations, and superficial about truth, objectivity, and disinterestedness.”36 Eagleton believes
the most important reasons why we need to revitalize critique itself include the various
shortcomings of the Marxist-Structuralist ideas about ideological interpellation37, the
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“end of ideology” declarations made by liberal politics and the prevailing culture of
cynicism, promoted by predominant trends in “critical” theory itself.39 This “pervasive
political faltering” is just as much the responsibility of ideology critique (and its ‘wouldbe’ leftist defenders) itself as it is the end-of-ideology theorists: “If the end of ideology
theorists viewed all ideology as inherently closed, dogmatic, and inflexible, postmodernist thought tends to see all ideology as teleological, ‘totalitarian and metaphysically
grounded. Grossly travestied in this way, the concept of ideology obediently writes itself
off.”40 For Eagleton, the problem is that contemporary theory ignores or marginalizes
concerns about ideology, not by pretending it is not there, but by turning its presence in
our lives into a natural, generic fact of subjective experience; in fact, it actively generalizes ideology so that it appears to be so ubiquitous and inescapable part of the subject’s
landscape, to the point that it absolutely saturates the subject and her world. She is unable
(or not thought to be able) to evade or resist its deleterious effects on her knowledge and
action. The idea that one cannot escape ideology makes ideology critique appear to be rather pointless.
Eagleton’s conception of ideology acts in critical response to these problematic
trends and is precipitated by the acutely oppressive and alienating realities facing political
subjects today, many of whom “continue to invest in their own unhappiness.” Even
though they show that they are indeed aware of their situation, they consistently fail to act
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in ways that will rupture the normal flow and so inaugurate something new altogether.
The value of ideology critique lies in the fact that “the critique of ideology, then, presumes that nobody is ever wholly mystified.”41 Eagleton faults theory (especially the cultural and linguistic turns within postmodern and post-structuralist varieties) for the failure
of criticism itself. Its suspicion of truth, virtue, objectivity, and reason has resulted in a
spineless relativism that precludes the necessary conflict, struggle, and judgment required
for any real emancipation from oppressive material conditions.42 Eagleton finds the theory of ideology, and incidentally theology, to be helpful for thinking the world otherwise,
highlighting those particular aspects of human existence (i.e., its embodied life, the relation of nature to culture, its rationality) that have been eclipsed by major aspects of theory. Of course, we must be able to properly identify the common elements of human
flourishing and discover how to actualize them materially. But is this not fully obfuscated
by ideology itself? What must we do to get out from underneath the ideological mechanisms that lead us to act in ways detrimental to our proper ends as human beings; in other
words, on what basis do we hope to practice the critique of ideology? It is at this exact
juncture that Eagleton turns to Christian theological ideas, and in so doing, comes back
full-circle to his earliest days as a Leftist Catholic. The point now, the same as it was
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then, is political. Returning to the classical theory of ideology, albeit in a new and updated way, helps radical politics rediscover its critical spirit, and Eagleton finds in theology a critical hermeneutic through which to do exactly this.
To overcome postmodern objections, Eagleton must give an account of ideology
critique that differs substantially from the common understanding of ideology as “false
consciousness.” Eagleton insists that human subjectivity is not completely illusionary and
that “its moderately rational character” makes the critique of ideology possible. We are
able to identify, for example, ourselves as existing in a state of oppression and also imagine the world otherwise. While insisting that there is indeed no ‘external standpoint’ from
which to offer an absolutized critique, it must still be possible, Eagleton maintains, to discern critically what is good for human flourishing and what it is not - the difference between emancipation and oppression. This illustrates the “moderately rational character”
of human nature, which is indeed “perfected” by culture, rather than corrupted by it.43 No
subject is so completely trapped within ideology that she is unable to discern and prehend
herself as such and also be able to imagine and identify the possibilities of being untapped and how to actualize that possibility. That is, in Eagleton’s favored Aristotelian
terms, she is able to imagine herself “happy” - living unto that end proper to her nature as
an embodied human being - and to actively invest (or not) in that happiness in an efficacious manner due to the “moderately rational nature of human beings.”44 The critique of
43
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ideology is made possible by the universality afforded us by our bodily conditions. If the
subject is neither completely alienated by ideology, nor is the subject always in or under
ideology, it is human embodiment that generates the practical reasoning form which we
are able to develop a critical view of our situation - and so distinguish between ideology
and non-ideology. Countering the postmodern dismissal of ideology critique as obsolete
given our awareness of the mystification of the subject, Eagleton defends the concept of
ideology on the basis of the bodily conditions of human existence45, a political theme that
Eagleton explicitly interprets in theological terms.46
It is certainly always possible for us to be wrong, to be deluded about our existence, our social conditions, or the character of our acts and our beliefs. This is not necessarily true to ideology, however. There is indeed a difference between illusion, mystification, error, and ideology. For Eagleton, ideology is that specific political instance
whereby the systemic distortion of knowledge forecloses real, authentic action, but nevertheless still exists as a constitutive part of political subjects and their lived relations: beliefs, assumptions about reality, and actions in and towards that reality. It is both an existential position and an intellectual perspective, which means that ideology can be false,
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but this does not mean that the subject who is shaped by ideology is indeed deceived
about everything she believes that she knows about her social reality. Ideology can also
be true in the descriptive sense, but still be “mistaken” or “erroneous” insofar as it functions or relates to the current status of affairs in a certain kind of way. Ideology is this
“certain kind of way” in that it animates and leads subjects to consistently “invest in their
own unhappiness” despite their clear and demonstrated ability to do otherwise.47
This last point, “despite their ability to do otherwise”, is where Eagleton tries to
overcome the culture of cynicism. The possibility of critique - not to mention even politics itself - depends on the fact that the human subject - and her cultural environs - is not
ideological ‘all the way down.’ Otherwise, the subject can only be tragically passive and
has no real recourse in the face of an objective social and political system that acts upon
her. The moment we believe that ideology is inescapable is the moment that we have acquiesced to it - and all emancipatory politics and ethics are foreclosed. Ideology works to
conceal the possibility of the alternative. The belief in real, actionable alternatives to injustice, oppression, and the like is opened up by the patient practice of ideology critique,
the aim of which is not to set the facts straight about reality, but to shift the coordinates of
possibility within the material conditions that give rise to social thought itself.
In returning to ideology critique, which Eagleton insists is required if we are to
have any hope for emancipatory kinds of political radicalism, we are not pitting value-
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systems against each other (i.e., the ‘West’ vs. the ‘Islamic extremists’) nor are we leveling all cultural perspectives as relative to any other. To return to the critique of ideology
is “to expose the material pre-conditions of such values and ideas and thus to defeat the
most deadly brands of them by transforming the conditions which give rise to them.”48
This sheds further light on where Eagleton thinks ideology resides and is generated: it is
not, as Marx argued, at the level of the individual whose consciousness lead her to believe in certain ideas about the world or practice certain styles of ‘lived-relations.’ In this
way, Eagleton departs in instructive ways from the structuralist Louis Althusser by refusing to concede that ideology so completely saturates social institutions that interpellate
the subject into being that it is utterly inescapable and cannot be overcome. For Eagleton,
ideology exists and acts neither in consciousness nor social institutions, but rather between them.49 It is instead within the “complex systemic operations” between social institutions and the subject that are the sites where ideologies shape human existence. Instead
of giving up on institutions as the location of ideology itself, Eagleton finds it important
to revitalize these selfsame institutions for the work of ideology critique as sites of resistance - including religious communities.
Theology, ‘After Theory’?
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And with this, the stage has been set for Eagleton’s “full circle” back to theology.50 He is motivated by a strikingly similar set of political concerns that animates his
original interests in Left Catholicism: the defense of a radical theological project and an
eagerness to think theologically both with and against leftist politics. Theology has always been about more than the ‘gods.’ In fact, Eagleton finds in Christianity something
deeply akin to socialism. Theology is interesting to Eagleton because it expands the range
and scope of radical political thought. He faults contemporary leftist politics for dismissing theology out of a “politically crippling shyness” and “an embarrassed silence.”51
Quite the contrary, Eagleton quips
In a world in which theology is increasingly part of the problem…it is also fostering the kind of critical reflection which might contribute to some of the answers. These are the lessons which the secular left can learn from religion, for all
its atrocities and absurdities, and the left is not so flush with ideas that it can afford to look such gift horse in the mouth.52
However, Eagleton does not provide a distinctive, original, or constructive position on
theology. Eagleton’s broad thesis is that Christian theology specifies an egalitarian ethic
of love and justice for strangers and enemies alike that is indispensable for a socialist resistance that combats the ideologies of capitalism and humanism at work within the late
modern social order. He argues that the politics of Christianity are more radical than
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other present options, even those coming from committed materialists or progressive politicos. Rather than dismissing theology as ideological, political radicalism needs sophisticated engagements with theological ethics and political theology, so as to learn from the
virtues and rhetorics that Christian theology promises will overcome the evil and terror of
modern life. The ethical vision of socialism has an inherently theological spirit, Eagleton
argues, that mirrors in some ways that of Catholic liberation theology.53 Eagleton more or
less adopts as axiomatic for this politics the Catholic “preferential option for the poor,”
interpreting it as a political truth that is espoused in ethical terms by the figure of Jesus
Christ in the biblical gospels54, but also echoed in the socialist imperative to enact a revolution for the sake of “the wretched of the earth.”55 This revolutionary spirit has been betrayed on both sides: by an “ideological kind of Christian faith”56 which is “horrified by
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the sight of a female breast, but considerably less appalled by the obscene inequalities between rich and poor”57 and a rationalist “New Atheism” that knows as little about emancipatory politics as it does about Christian theology, and unwittingly opposes them both
for the same reasons.58
The secular left, by clinging to their orthodoxy, have kept themselves sealed off
from ideas that are far more radical than anything currently circulating amongst themselves: prosaic, boring, and throwback ideas like sacrifice, love, morality and the suffering of the anawim. At this juncture, we should keep in mind that for Eagleton, theology is
ideology critique insofar as it is always already a way of speaking about the human predicament today that challenges the present configurations of power and profit. Here, I
will focus on Eagleton’s utilization of theological ideas as and for critiques of ideology,
namely in how they work to explain how and why it is that human persons consistently
invest in their own unhappiness, misery - why it is that they continually work towards
their own downfall, and seemingly consent to their own oppression and domination.
Why Theology?
Eagleton believes that theology, politics, and literature are linked by their ability to
afford us a thick description of what it means to be a good human and to be good at being
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human together, or what Eagleton calls ‘the political.’ All three function as theoretical
59

reference points for Eagleton, and so a socialist-humanist account of human existence
cannot foreclose the possibility that each mode of discourse is indeed correct – or at least
politically useful. Terry Eagleton’s self-identified ‘theological turn’ emphasizes a series
of concerns present throughout his work in its various stages; it is not something isolated
to his late work or detached from his established literary and political commitments. His
work on ideology critique and theology are motivated by the same political aspirations of
socialism: namely the defeat of advanced capitalism through a systemic critique of the injustices and pathologies generated and perpetuated by ‘free-market’ economies. Insofar
as Eagleton’s interest in theology is an important feature of that agenda, it is important to
analyze closely how Eagleton is using theology, specifically in relation to his theory of
ideology and ideology critique.
The use of theology in “critical theory” on political grounds is not a late development for Eagleton. His early theoretical and political early work was under the tutelage of
radical Dominican Catholic theologians such as Herbert McCabe and Laurence Bright;
resonant with the birth of “the Catholic New Left” in the wake of optimism surrounding
Vatican II, Eagleton penned several articles for the theological journals Slant60 and later
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New Blackfriars, many of which were later collected into The New Left Church , and his
61

full length monograph Body as Language.62 The theology in Slant is overtly Marxist, eager to make the case to fellow leftists that socialism, theology, and the church can work
together toward common materialist goals, even while he actively critiques the structures
and patterns in Catholicism that he deemed to be antithetical or obstacles to a Marxist political agenda. This trajectory was expanded in the New Left Church, where he again
takes up the themes of community, literature, and religion so as to establish an alliance
between New Left ideas (British Marxist Raymond Williams, literary critic F.R. Leavis),
contemporary philosophy (Sartre, Wittgenstein), and traditional Catholic theology
(Thomas Aquinas). His major proposal was that community is the key to resolving the alienation that plagues human existence, and that this requires an “existentialist” Christology that sees Jesus Christ as “a ‘here-everywhere’, the constitutive unity of the
group…the centre of the subjectivity of the other, and as the centre of their own subjectivity.” Here we see Eagleton drawing on his Marxist predilections for human community

through the philosophy of Marx and Wittgenstein. The Dominican theologian Herbert McCabe was involved in this project and remains a central figure for Eagleton’s understanding of theology. See Terry Eagleton, "The Roots of the Christian Crisis," in "Slant Manifesto": Catholics and the Left, ed. Adrian Cunningham, Terry Eagleton, Brian Wicker, Martin Redfern and Lawrence Bright OP. London: Sheed & Ward,
1966.; Eagleton, "The Slant Symposium," Slant 3, no. 5 (1967): 8-9; Eagleton, "Why We Are Still in the
Church," Slant 3, no. 2 (1967): 25-8; Eagleton, "Language, Reality and the Eucharist (1)," Slant 4, no. 3
(1968): 18-23; Eagleton, "Politics and the Sacred," Slant 4, no. 2 (1968): 18-23; Eagleton, "Language, Reality and the Eucharist (2)," Slant 4, no. 4 (1968): 26-31; Eagleton, "Priesthood and Leninism," Slant 5, no.
4 (1969): 12-17.
61
62

Terry Eagleton, The New Left Church (London: Sheed and Ward, 1966).

Terry Eagleton, The Body as Language: Outline of a 'New Left' Theology (London: Sheed and Ward,
1970).

111
as the solution to the “fall into language” which is both creative and destructive for humanity. The latter of which is more dominant in late modernity, where the turn to the subject manufactured the fateful division between individual and social interests, operative in
the reification, alienation and commodification so prevalent in “what the Christian calls
sin and the Socialist calls capitalism.” Again, the community of the Church can be a catalyst for a counter way of life that privileged interdependency, care, and integration of the
anawim into political life, but more importantly, Eagleton sees in Christology a political
reversal.
Although Eagleton’s early theology makes little mention of ideology, it is important for a number of reasons. First, the major concern in Eagleton’s early work in left
theology is to show the radical potentials of Christian theology for in and socialist politics
of the New Left.63 He sensed a common interest between them: to construct and establish
an alternative kind of human community, an altogether different pattern for human life.
He sought to leverage this link for thinking radical Christianity and Marxism with and
against each other in order to display the ways that they can complement each other in the
revolutionary effort to heal the social fractures and resolve economic contradictions that
give rise to the conditions of human suffering.64 The key idea here is that in his early theological work, Eagleton displays a hope and belief in the radically emancipatory potential
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of Christian theology, in consort with socialist change, to reform western Catholicism.65
When comparing, for example, the early Body in Language to more recent texts such as
After Theory, Sweet Violence, and Trouble with Strangers, the themes are resonant, if not
directly repetitive: the late interest in tragedy, sacrifice, the preferential option for the anawim, and the revolutionary potential of virtue for reforming culture into a fully participative community, all make embryonic appearances in the early work, and are expanded
and deployed politically in what Eagleton himself calls a “full circle” to more ‘metaphysical or theological’ interests: morality, evil, sacrifice, ‘non-being’, and virtue.
Eagleton wants to see the political Left move past its postmodern obsession with
culture and identity and turn to metaphysical and theological themes such as evil, tragedy, sacrifice, violence, and love, topics that Eagleton believes will generate authentically
revolutionary acts of protest, resistance, and change. This adds a critical density - an ontological depth - to what the political left says about how and why the current ideological
system has emaciated individual and collective human life within an advanced capitalist
society. Theology gives radical politics the sort of ethical sobriety that has been lost with
the anti-metaphysical wanderings of an ethically empty postmodernism. This revolutionary trajectory of theology is an intrinsic critique of ideology because it, like socialism,
has the rhetorical strength and ethical vibrancy to resist and disarm the ideologies of humanism and capitalism. Certainly, there are religious practices and theological beliefs
that are themselves ideological, but Eagleton is interested in recuperating their political
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core and encouraging the political left to engage a radical Christianity and not wholly deride and dismiss it as the secularist “new atheists” insist.66 To clarify how Eagleton uses
theology, I turn here to some of the major theological and religious themes he politically
develops: sin, Christology, the body, and the defense of God. The goal here is not to discuss or dispute theological specifics, but to show how Eagleton’s materialist theology
fuels his ideology critique.
Sin and Evil
Eagleton links his politics to his theology through his firm belief in the fundamental brokenness of humanity, a political concept that he explains with recourse to the theological concept of sin. Eagleton turns to evil in order to explain why human persons
demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to attend justly and responsibly to each other in
ways that prioritizes those who are suffering or are oppressed, those who are cast out at
the margins, and that care for those who are assigned the highest levels of vulnerability
and fragility. Eagleton makes the relation between sin and ideology clear: “original sin
means that we are built for truth and happiness but have no spontaneous access to what
they mean or how to attain them.”67 Sin explains what is wrong with human beings and
how politics must be thought so as to ameliorate, rather than play into, the inherent flaws
in the human condition: recalcitrant flaws like individual interest, self-regard, pride, disorder, corruption, and alienated desire. A theology of sin functions as ideology critique;
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that is, rather than teasing out the disaffected relations between an angry God and human
depravity, it is a way of speaking about why we human beings are at odds with ourselves
and each other, cut off from that which most makes us human - our embodied social relations with others. But Eagleton’s theology of sin is decisively materialist and so it has to
do with the mundane, ordinary aspects of human intersubjective life - not with humanity’s abstract relation to ‘god.’68 “What the christian calls sin and the socialist calls capitalism”69 are united in their joint concern to identify situations and conditions of injustice,
idolatry, and domination; both are based on the tragic interpretation of human nature.70
Eagleton highlights “self-centeredness” as a key political aspect of sin and so, of
capitalism.71 To give an Augustinian spin to it (as Eagleton himself often does), there is
something inherent to the structural constitution of human beings that leave them prone
to disordered desires, leading them “to invest in their own unhappiness” in narcissistic
pursuit of our ego-centric interests; in other words, to get entrenched in ideology. The resultant effect is alienation, isolation, and misery, all of which frustrates and precludes the
human person from recognizing and actualizing her relationality. It is social interdependency, not autarchic freedom, that is the foundation of the human political subject, and the
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modern quest for autonomy has had grave existential and political consequences, namely
as ideology, insofar as it has contributed to the tendency of human persons to choose egocentricity at their own peril.
For Eagleton, sin is not only a theological concept, but is a way of speaking about
the human predicament that makes political sense. It goes hand in hand with ideology critique insofar as it sheds light on the correlation between human self-understanding and
on-going political investment in misery and alienation, all the while trying to explain how
and why it is that human persons consistently work against themselves, making decisions
and acting in ways contrary to their essential interests, their free, full flourishing. The
devastating and destructive effect of sin comes from the fact that we are created in “pure
liberty” and as such, are in fact “built for truth and happiness.” Eagleton’s Catholicity
shines through here: depravity and perversity do not go ‘all the way down’, clearing the
way for a redemptive (read: revolutionary) process of metanoia, which may be the closest
theological analogue to ideology critique.72
Sin is hardly a matter of individual actors, but has to do with the “depth of the
sickness that has to be cured.”73 It carries into the social world in which they live. Human
persons demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to attend justly and responsibly to each
other in ways that prioritizes those who are suffering or are oppressed, those cast out at
the margins, and to care for those who are assigned the highest levels of vulnerability and
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fragility. This is fundamentally a theological position that, as Sigurdson rightly points
out, is closely linked to Eagleton’s belief that human persons are “moderately rational”
and so are not wholly mystified by ideology. It is also how Eagleton tries to explain why
we find ourselves investing in our own misery and calling it “free” acts of “self-interest.”74 The ideologico-critical response to sin generated both in Eagleton’s theological
reading of the poor as the biblical anawim, “the wretched of the earth”, on one hand, and
the tragic vision of self-sacrifice in his theology of atonement on the other, both of which
are refashioned as ideology critique. The goal of both is to restore to the political foreground, commitments to solidarity, justice, and collective responsibility, all of which Eagleton believes are at the critical core of both theology and ideology critique.
Perhaps it appears heterodox for a Marxist like Eagleton to speak of archaic moral
categories like “sin”75, but his point is precisely that it is not, or at least that it should not
be.76 Eagleton clearly discerns in Marx not only a secularization of eschatology (‘worldrevolution’) but also a politicization of morality that unites history, reason, ethics, and human flourishing. Socialists - at least the radical sort - must embrace moral (as distinct
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from moralism ) thought, even if cultural theory has developed an ill-advised allergy to
77

it, says Eagleton.78 To understand evil is to understand how and why it is that “people invest in their own unhappiness.” As it turns out, the most adequate response to evil is ideology critique - and for this, Eagleton finds theology to be the best recourse. Towards this
end, Eagleton takes up the topic of evil as a political question, explored within a distinctly theological perspective because it has an unique way of facing into evil, even if
evil presents the most daunting challenge to traditional theism.79 The issue of evil is of
great critical importance insofar as it allows us to diagnosis the on-going material reality
of injustice, domination, and alienation that befalls the human condition - and to address
it critically without falling into the common traps of conservative or liberal tropes.
According to Eagleton, theology understands evil as privation, “not as something
existent, but as a kind of deficiency of being.”80 Evil is the vacuity at the core of reality
itself that suffers from “an incapacity for life rather than an abundance of it.”81 This does
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not make evil mysterious or extraordinary , but insofar as it is “an attitude towards be82

83

ing”84, evil is a metaphysical force marked by its pointlessness85 and its ‘brute senselessness.’86 When it comes to social reality, “evil would actually prefer that there was nothing
at all.”87 Evil is about bringing death, and so is marked by “its uncanniness, its appalling
unreality, its surprisingly superficial nature, its assault on meaning, the fact that it lacks
some vital dimension, the way it is trapped in the mind-numbing monotony of an eternal
recurrence.”88 In this way, evil is not independent of social conditions, but is a ‘malfunctioning’ within human history that cannot be separated from its material realities. The
goal of evil is to annihilate all being, an outgrowth of being unable to sublimate the
deeply embedded desire to be pure nothingness that ushers from the terrifying non-being
at your own core.89 Evil originates from the traumatic realization of human beings that at
their core lies their own non-being. This abyssal haunting triggers the death drive and so
surfaces in the ideological workings of “fetishes, moral ideals, fantasies of purity, the
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manic will, the absolute state, the phallic figure of the Further” and the like. Evil responds by defying all this, attempting to stave off this truth by eradicating all being as an
extreme form of self-assertion that is simultaneously creative and destructive.91 Evil fuels
the death drive’s “orgiastic revolt against interest, value, meaning, and rationality”92
which in the end is not so dramatic as it is banal, ‘mind-numbingly monotonous’, ‘lifeless’, and ‘without real substance.’93
This is not to underestimate the horrific force of evil in history, but rather to more
precisely pinpoint how and why it acts so destructively, even out of its deficiency, its
lack, to effect such horrifying results, such as death. There is nothing more evil (and also
more banal) than death, for death is all around us; its introduction of nullity into vitality is
terrifying in both its forcefulness and its vacuity.94 Paying attention to evil (as a theological idea, if not a theological problem) is the ideologico-critical thing to do because we
need a full, thick description of the metaphysical and theological aspects of evil in order
to make sense of how it works within our material aspects of our social world to generate
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ideology. To understand the nature of evil is to confront its ideological effects on political
subjects, many of whom seem unable to avoid investing in their own happiness. A theological account of evil, then, is conceived by Eagleton as an ideologico-critical way to explicate its persistence of evil, and its role in ideology, a matter that must be resolved if we
hope to field a viable radical politics that counters the predominance of capitalism, terrorism, and death-dealing ways of oppression.
Christology
What appears at first glance to be a rather traditional Catholic “preferential option
for the poor” turns into a more “radical” Christology, centered around a political-literary
reading of tragedy that feeds a politics of self-sacrifice.95 This politics is geared towards
critiquing what Eagleton calls the ‘Satanic’ image of God á la the “New Atheists” (whose
understanding of theology is so lazy and misinformed that it is not worth rejecting). It
counters this by establishing the ‘ontological depth’ of divine solidarity with the biblical
anawim, the outcasted and exilic poor, who are tossed out of the social order because
their "destitute and dispossessed”presence96 issues a damning indictment of idolatrous
theologies of God that are consistent with and complicit in the “pragmatic needs and interests of the status quo.”97
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Eagleton’s theological turn is animated by his political rehabilitation of tragedy as
an ideologico-critical concept that directs radical politics to acts of self-sacrifice - the exemplary model of which is Jesus Christ. Sacrifice is the key category for his political theology of tragedy - but not in the typical profane sense of sacrifice as the attempt to appease and gain favor with angry and vengeful gods. The true political meaning of sacrifice is found in the tragic acts of Christ, whose life and death is interpreted in line with
the biblical anawim, who as the poor and destitute “scum of the earth”, are seen as the ancient pharmakoi or scapegoats - who are banished outside the walls of the community because their unseemly appearance evokes a challenge to the injustice and alienation perpetuated by the existing flow of things. The early theological Eagleton describes them
this way: “These men -- the anawim of the old testament whom Christ speaks of in the
beatitudes -- are the "dirt" which falls outside the carefully wrought political structures of
society, those whom society cannot accommodate; as such they stand as a living challenge to its institutions, a potent and sacred revolutionary force.”98
The self-sacrifice of the scapegoat (of which Christ is the paragon) is tragedy in
its purest form; it takes upon itself the products of the social order and wanders in the
wilderness of dispossession, displacement, and exile; their very existence serves as a living testament to social failure, human brokenness. and political oppression. In the present
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conditions of capitalism, the marginalized anawim are the majority, more like the lumpenproletariat than the ‘multitude.’99 Their self-sacrifices are not supererogatory acts of
heroism, but by their very existence, they condemn the normal, smooth running of things
that establishes this divide between what ought to be (and was created to be) an egalitarian community of persons. Eagleton interprets anawim as pharmakoi and presents Christ
as the exemplary figure whose ideology-critical acts of torture and crucifixion tie the theology and political together in order to highlight the political point that radicals must go
through the most hopeless and wretched conditions of human life if we hope to be able to
imagine the world otherwise, before any political redemption is possible for the rejected,
repressed, and banished anawim. Eagleton underscores the ideologico-critical character
of the tragic sacrifice of Jesus Christ as anawim by concluding that “the destitute condition of humanity, if it was to be fully restored, had to be lived all the way through,
pressed to the extreme limit of a descent into the hell of meaninglessness and desolation,
rather than disavowed, patched up, or short-circuited.” Or, as Sigurdson aptly puts it: “the
crucifixion is a kind of tragedy but not the kind of tragedy that ends in destruction but in

99

While Eagleton himself ties the anawim to Marx's proletariat (Eagleton, Body as Language, 68 and Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 288), he intentionally democratizes it in order to highlight the fact that the majority
of the world are dispossessed by a capitalist system which has always been based on the exploitation of
whole populations by a relative few. (Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 296) In this way, Eagleton’s reading of anawim differs significantly from other political readings of emancipatory masses such as Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s “multitude”, in that it more closely resembles the mocked lumpenproletariat described by
Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 1852, ch. 5: “the vagabonds, discharged soldiers,
discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters,
gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders,
tinkers, beggars — in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the
French call la bohème.”

the sense that one must learn how to really die to be able to really live.”

100

123
Eagleton inter-

prets the anawim as theological figures of ideology critique without aggrandizing or valorizing their destitute, poor or or tortured state. The condition of the anawim performs
critique in that their sheer existence (and the hideous nature of this existence) brings ideologies to light which would otherwise likely remain hidden in the darkness. The anawim
are symbols and sites of ideology at work and it is the theological interpretation of their
condition (“it is with them that Yahweh identifies”) that generates the critical dimension
of radical politics that Eagleton finds promising.
The dereliction of anawim as scapegoats is not directly redemptive in the traditional substitutionary sense that immunizes the community through its suffering, but it
can have liberating effect insofar as its self-sacrificial acts (martyrdom as the primary example) afford us a model of what it looks like to give up ones life for the sake of a something more valuable - not just a Cause, or a Party, but in order to bring the present condition and its falseness into clear focus - to expose the extent of alienation and exploitation
in our midst. The desperate struggle of the anawim just to survive, to persist in a sociopolitical world not of their own making serves as an incessant condemnation of the community’s failures to include and care for the most poor, oppressed, and vulnerable of its
members. The anawim are not heroes whose self-sacrificial yet tragic suffering is valorized for saving the collective, but rather are “the dispossessed or shit of the earth who
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have no stake in the present set-up, and who thus symbolize the possibility of new life in
their very dissolution.”101 In the early Body as Language, Eagleton insists that:
The anawim are the embodied negativity of each status quo, and as such focus its
breaking-point; they are thus, themselves, a kind of contradiction: an expressive
sign of human failure and limitation which yet, by pinpointing so exactly the limits of a social order, the points where it tails off into chaos, offers a positive symbol for the future. . . . The anawim -- the scum and refuse of society -- have, like
all dung, a contradictory status: the more they reveal dissolution and decay, the
more politically fertile they become.102
Their very existence is a living testament to socio-political failure, “they illustrate what
misery those powers must wreak in order to secure their sway.” They exist as starving,
dying, and raging indictments of the community’s inability or unwillingness to adopt inclusive forms of life. Their atoning power does not come from the tragic nature of their
suffering, or their self-sacrificial acts. It comes from the fact that they are “the useless,
vulnerable, and discarded in whom the approaching kingdom is most powerfully prefigured.”103 The anawim are not politically safe, they are undesirable, unpredictable, made
unstable by their utmost abjection and desolation. It is because they are as potentially explosive and destructive as they are redemptive and liberating that Eagleton interprets the
life and death of Christ as acts of identification with them - not merely with their plight,
but with their identity and their critical function in relation to the powers: “In Christian
terms, this is Christ's descent into hell after his scapegoating on the cross, the solidarity
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Only in

this way can the self-sacrificial suffering (modeled after the political example of Jesus as
the crucified God) be atoning: as an act of political solidarity that simultaneously is a theological disclosure of God’s identification with the the anawim (who are seen as scapegoats only insofar as it is in their suffering that we are able to prehend just how desperate
the situation is): “Christ’s descent into hell [is a] sign of his solidarity with torment and
despair.”105
What are we to make of the political significance of tragedy in the crucified God,
as it pertains to ideology critique? Solidarity with the anawim is Eagleton’s way of understanding Christ’s life and work as politically redemptive while avoiding theological dangers of atonement. “It is the tragic which both Marxism and Christianity seek to redeem,
but they can only do so by installing themselves at the heart of it.”106 The passion and
death of Christ - his crucifixion and decent into hell - are interpreted - with recourse to
the tragic - as an immanent critique of class society which dialectically “reclaims” the social order107 by model itself after “Christ's descent into hell after his scapegoating on the
cross, the solidarity with human despair and destitution by which he 'becomes sin' for our
sake.”108 This brings together the destructive and redemptive forces of revolution in the
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person of Jesus Christ whose act of sacrificial love unites the deepest suffering and the
highest exaltation in the same moment, which is typical of the paradox of the tragic itself.109 And so in this way, the sacrifice of Jesus is tragically atoning, not so much by reconciling or redeeming humanity, but rather that it affords us all a reason for hope, the
possibility of that something entirely new and liberative might still develop, but it is also
a sobering reminder that there is the equal possibility of destruction and catastrophe.
Writing about the relation of God to the anawim, Eagleton echoes his early comments in
Body in Language:
St. Paul refers to them rather colourfully as "the shit of the earth." The anawim
are the dregs and refuse of society, its tragic scapegoats. They are the flotsam and
jetsam of history who do not need to abandon themselves to be remade, since they
are lost to themselves already. And it is with them that Yahweh identifies. He will
be known for what he is, in the words of Luke 1:53, when you see the mighty cast
down and the lower orders exalted, the hungry filled with good things and the rich
sent away empty. The true sacrificial figure, the one which like the burnt offering
will pass from profane to powerful, loss of life to fullness of it, is the propertyless
and oppressed.110
“And it is with them that Yahweh identifies.” Through the person of Jesus Christ, the anawim and the biblical god share the common trait of “non-being” which affords them the
opportunity to expose ideological conditions: to be critical forces that identify the immanent forces at work in social relations that malform and oppress political subjects. The
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anawim are the ideal models for ideology critique; far from being valorized or romanticized, their suffering does not have a juridically redemptive effect on the community.111
Suffering that is tragic insofar as it is self-sacrificial is neither heroic nor aggrandizing. It
is evil without qualification112, theologically expressed by the fact that in the biblical gospels, Jesus is terrified and reluctant in his suffering and utterly abandoned at his death.113
“Jesus plainly does not welcome his own impending torture and death, even though he
seems impelled by an obscure conviction that such failure will prove the only way in
which his mission will succeed”, Eagleton writes, underscoring the fact that “once suffering is conceived in this instrumental or consequentialist way, it ceases to be redemptive,
rather as a gift class to be truly a gift when one is thinking of a return.”114 Far from a being “a cheap conjuring trick”, Christ’s passion and death are redemptive only to extent
that it shows all of us the way out of our present failures.
The meaning of atonement is refashioned as ideology critique insofar as atonement is really about the iconoclastic posture immanent to theology: it is through Christ’s
self-sacrificial death and harrowed descent that he shows the dramatic extent of God’s
identification with the anawim, shattering ideas of God as guaranteer of the powers or as
“august metaphysical principle.” If we are looking for what the God of Christianity really
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means for the radical politics involved in ideology critique, we should look no further
than the image of ‘Christ-crucified’:
The only authentic image of this violently loving God is a tortured and executed
political criminal who dies in an act of solidarity with what the Bible calls the anawim, meaning the destitute and dispossessed. The shit of the earth, the scum and
refuse of society, who constitute the cornerstone of the new form of human life
known as the kingdom of God, Jesus Himself is constantly presented as their representative. His death and descent into Hell is a voyage into madness, terror, absurdity and self-dispossession, since only a revolution that cuts that deep can answer to our dismal condition. What is at stake here is not a prudently reformist
project, but an epiphany of the absolutely new - of a regime so revolutionary as
to surpass all image and utterance, a reign of justice and fellowship which for the
Gospel writers is even now sticking into this bankrupt, depose, washed up
world.115
This ‘tortured and executed’ body that inaugurates the politics of ‘the absolutely new’ is
not the self-proclaimed institutional body of Christ that is the church, but rather the
Christological body of the anawim, cast out and despised by power, privilege, and posturing. The ‘everyday’ body of the human person takes on this form under the ubiquitous
oppression of capitalist forces, and so if the ‘suffering, mortal, needy, desiring body’ is
indeed the site of politics and of critique, it is also the basis for a political solidarity. They
are the constant testament to the fact that things are not as they should be. They establish
the basis for critique itself as immanent critique of a theopolitical order in which nothing
like this should ever happen.

The Body and a Theology of Creation
Eagleton critiques postmodernism for being politically vacuous and for clearing
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the way for new reiterations of the same flawed liberal-humanism that is responsible for
the problems caused by late advanced capitalism and the modern state that supports it.
With these two concerns, the critical agenda of discrediting postmodernism and the positive agenda of revitalizing Marxist critical theory by suggesting it (and its politics!) as the
only suitable alternative to postmodern theory, Eagleton returns to two thematic areas
that were central to his early theological work and become even more prominent in his
later political theology: ideology and the body. More specifically, he contends that a return to the body as a materialist site that reconnects the symbolic to the political is necessary, and that this is only possible in and after a revitalization of ideology critique. Eagleton contends that what was desperately needed in contemporary critical theory is to conceptualize and mobilize political subjects to create and practice new modes of solidarity,
while also revitalizing older Marxist ones left behind.
His two main themes in this materialist specification of ideology are aesthetics
and politics, both of which were centered on the body. In Ideology and the Aesthetic, Eagleton identifies the origin of the ideologies of bourgeois society with the creation of aesthetics. He identifies reasons behind the contemporary obsession with the aesthetic by exploring its susceptibility to ideology.116 In his narrative, aesthetics enacts a distinction between the corporeal and the immaterial, between objects and senses, and between the
happenings of our creaturely life and that which belongs to the mind. When one speaks of
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aesthetics in the historical moment of its inception and use, one is referring to the sentient, affective, and sensuous aspects of somatic life: the sometimes banal ways our bodies prehend and interact with the biological and natural aspects of fleshly being. It originated with the rise of the bourgeois society, argued Eagleton, who required a binding
force to resist the trenchant fracturing of social life into individual interests, especially after the fall of the absolutist state: “The ultimate binding force of the bourgeois social order in contrast to the coercive apparatus of absolutism will be habits, pieties, sentiments,
and affections”117, a mode of social control that functioned by “inserting social power
more deeply into the bodies of those it subjugates.”118 The aesthetic was deployed as a
new mode of political power that used “the discourse of the body” (i.e., that particularly
embodied way that human beings as political persons live, labor, produce, and struggle in
socio-political life) to direct human persons towards specific forms of social control and
disciplinary tactics, performing a “gradual modulation of the psyche” that guides the
body back to cooperation.
Eagleton’s concern is that in aesthetics, the body becomes suppressed in its political use, that its materialist character is overwritten, in many ways, by its aesthetic function in the modern social world. He notes how “a certain style of meditation on the body,
on pleasures and surfaces, zones, and techniques, has acted among other things, as convenient displacement of less immediately corporal politics.”119 The postmodern, while it
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seems obsessed with everything that has to do with the body, misses the body altogether
because it has effectively anesthetized the body, rendering it both politically voiceless
and socially peripheral by its ‘fetishism of style and surface’ and its ‘abandonment of critique and commitment.’ In this same gesture, in its quick announcement of the end of
metaphysics, it has also declared that “truth is a lie; morality stinks; beauty is shit.” But
just as the body can be decentered for the sake of the postmodern aesthetic, it can also be
revitalized as the materialist ground of the politically Real that rises above and beyond
the register of the ideological matrix: “all human beings are frail, mortal and needy, vulnerable to suffering and death. The fact that these transhistorical truths are always culturally specific, always variably instantiated, is no argument against their transhistoricality.
For the materialist, it is these particularly biologically determined facts, which have
bulked largest in the course of human history.”120
In Idea of Culture, Eagleton problematizes the priority of difference both within
post-Marxist shifts (e.g., agnostic politics) and other forms of identity politics as ideological. When critical theory embraces pluralism to the point that it loses any basis for a
common culture, it loses the ground upon which political solidarity is possible, a necessary condition for any kind of revolutionary political action. It turns the human body in a
site of division and conflict, rather than that “the suffering, mortal, needy and desiring
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body, which links us fundamentally with our historical ancestors, as well as with our fellow beings from other cultures.”121 He goes on to admit that, “Of course, human bodies
differ, in their history, gender, ethnicity, physical capacities, and the like. But they do not
different in those capacities – language, labor, sexuality – which enable them to enter into
potentially universal relationships with one another in the first place.”122
The body is not just a theoretical site, but also has theological meaning for Eagleton. A distinct feature of Eagleton’s theology (as refashioned into ideology critique) is his
firm belief in the centrality of the bodily condition of human beings for critique. It stems
from his literary appropriation of Marx whereby the most fundamental aspect of human
being is its bodily conditions - its individuated existence as an embodied being and all
this entails for its life and struggle. It should be clear that Eagleton is not interested in
“discourses on the body” as taken up by postmodern theory and aesthetics, which Eagleton directly faults for its ‘culturalism’ - its obsession with emphasizing the body’s constructedness. We must take up the body as it is, as it is present before us in social reality,
and as it shapes and directs our place in the world as real, concrete, fleshly, vulnerable,
and virile. It is the body that makes our social lives precarious, and that positions us in interdependent relations with others. But it is also our bodies that connect and link us together, establishing symbiotic lives that are both the core of our hope and our trepidation.
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Eagleton maintains that the body must be understood within a theology of creation that incorporates the power of religious belief with the communal vision of socialist
politics.123 What is important for Eagleton about this theology of creation is its distinct
social effect: democratization. A theology of creation is radically democratic: it makes
the most important thing about human beings that which all human beings share: all human beings are created within the image of God, “placing each person in direct communion with the ontological ground that renders existence, life, intelligible.”124 The meaning
of this life - and how to make life meaningful for those persons whose bodies have been
made redundant and disposable by a capitalist order - is the theological question at the
heart of Eagleton’s politics..
A theology of creation need not depend on a traditional theism that sees God who,
as the sovereign maker of the natural world, holds a ultimate monolog on freedom and
creative agency. Eagleton turns to the doctrine of the imago Dei: the key idea of the creation of humanity in the image of the Creator. Eagleton finds creation useful because it is
concerned with the ground of the possibility of both the existence and the interrogation of
things, that is, answers to ‘questions such as why there is anything in the first place, or
why what we do have is actually intelligible to us.’ Eagleton finds in theology of creation
that political quality within all truly critical discourse: that it has something to say about
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human flourishing and is universally applied to all human beings, irrespective of who
they are. The beauty of human createdness is that being human is essentially pointless.
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo illustrates how it is that God creates out of freedom, not
necessity125 and so graciously extends that radical liberty to creation: “to say of the world
that it is ‘created’ is for classical theology to say that it is pointless. Like God, and like
humanity, it exists for purely for its own delight…Creation is a scandal to the sharp-faced
stockbrokers for home everything must have a point.”126 A God who creates ex nihilo is
“pure liberty”, and so if all human beings (actually - all of creation) are thought to be created in the divine image, they must share in and participate constitutively in that liberty.
That the world is created “out of nothing, rather than out of grim necessity” says something about the way human beings are and the way they ought to be. This is the condition
of possibility for critique, but also liberation and oppression, and Eagleton consistently
finds theology to be on the side of the former: “All authentic theology is liberation theology.”127 The important political aspect of this insight is that God is not transcendent to
the material realities of human bodily concerns (the idolatrous God that is “out there”).
Eagleton argues that if you are looking for the truth about God, “you shall know him for
whom he is when you see the hungry being filled with good things and the rich being sent
away.”
As it turns out, it is the bodily way of Christianity - the “all rather disappointedly
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materialist, unglamorous, and prosaic” political way set forth and modeled by the biblical
figure of Jesus Christ - that is most ideologico-critical precisely in the way that it perpetually challenges attempts to suture or reconcile the social fissures and lacerations that exist in our social fabric due to the bodily conditions of our existence. Because we are bodies, human persons experience profound and enduring limitations, dependencies, and fragilities, and in Eagleton’s judgement, Christianity (or, at least the radical interpretation he
prefers) is particular helpful in putting this forward.
Theology gives radical politics the language and categories to think and act in
ways for which, at this point, it lacks the resources. Indeed, he argues in After Theory that
“cultural theory as we have it promises to grapple with some fundamental problems, but
on the whole fails to deliver. It has been shame-faced about morality and metaphysics,
embarrassed about love, biology, religion and revolution, largely silent about evil, reticent about death and suffering, dogmatic about essences, universals, and foundations, and
superficial about truth, objectivity and disinterestedness. This, on any estimate, is rather a
huge slice of human existence to fall down on.”128 The task of ideology-critique, then, is
theological, in that the goal of Marxist theory and analysis - to reestablish a basis from
which to approach questions of beauty, truth, morality, evil, etc., - are ideas that are difficult to think through adequately without some recourse to the theological. A critique of
postmodern ideology is a rather constructive enterprise; it calls for a retheorization of the
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body, one that accounts properly for the messy and historical particularities of human embodiment, and to think about what solidaristic practices are necessary to care for and represent this body in light of the common openness to both truth and morality, but also
death, evil, and ‘non-being.’ But what is even more intriguing (and infuriating for others)
is Eagleton’s defense of God as an ideologico-critical concept. And it is here - from a
Marxist perspective - that he takes up a defense of Christianity against its most vocal and
public critics: the “New” Atheists.
In Defense of God
The question of God becomes an important topic in which Eagleton wrestles theology away from its critics, both “the gnostic Left” and the “fundamentalist right” - both
of which he faults for their arrogant, ignorant, and prejudiced harangues which are usually little more than “a worthless caricature of the real thing”: “it is as though one were to
dismiss feminism on the basis of Clint Eastwood’s opinions of it.”129 Eagleton promotes
instead a certain “radical” version of Christianity: the reading of it that makes the most
“urgent human and political sense.” Many commentators will point out the Christocentrism in Eagleton’s theology, a feature that allows Eagleton to focus on the lessons that
the political left (and all of us, really) should learn from Jesus Christ and the ethical and
political conception of love, forgiveness, sacrifice, and freedom found in the New Testament gospels. However, Eagleton is just as interested in the question of God; it is here
that Eagleton finds theology to be at its most material - and as such, its most ideologico-
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critical. Eagleton is not interested in promoting Christianity for its own sake. The impetus
for taking up the question of God as he does is apologetic and critical; he is eager to oppose the rise of the New Atheists, contesting their theology, their atheism, and their politics.130 He does so by revising some of the dominant themes of his earlier theological
work, marshaling Thomas Aquinas and Herbert McCabe together in defense of a Christianity “worth rejecting.” He defends Christianity against “the enormous condescension”
against it by those like “Ditchkins”131 who, due to their collective ignorance, arrogance,
and sloppiness132, “fail to grasp the nature of a theological claim.”133
This is not a nostalgic turn for Eagleton; it bears directly on the core of his critical
work. It mirrors the approach he has taken repeatedly in reference to radical politics: the
work of critical theory is to reclaim ideas, concepts, and terms as valid and relevant for
political radicals in and through ideology-critique. Eagleton has longed criticized leftist
theory for its political weakness and its critical reticence, caused in large part by its obsession with identity politics, preoccupation with categories of minority (class, race, gender), and its unreasonable shyness about things that matter.
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He faults the New Atheists like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam
Harris, for making a key ‘category mistake’ about the kind of thing Christian belief is.
Contrary to the New Atheist’s mischaracterizations, Christianity is not ‘a pseudo-science’
that ‘dismisses with evidence’, but rather “Christianity was never meant to be an explanation of anything in the first place.”134 He finds in Dawkins, Hitchens, and the like, an account of religion, Christianity specifically, that is grossly misinformed, poorly researched, and narrowly interpreted: that is, a reading of religion as “false consciousness.”
For Eagleton, “it is entirely logical that those who see religion as nothing but false consciousness so often get it wrong since what profit is to be reaped from the meticulous
study of a belief system that you hold to be as pernicious as it is foolish?”135 In their rush
to dismiss ‘faith’ as the opposite of ‘reason’, Ditchkins entirely miss the point of faith:
“faith is a commitment and allegiance - faith in something which might might a difference to the frightful situation you find yourself in… Christianity… is not primarily a matter of signing up for the proposition that there exists a Supreme being, but the kind of
commitment made manifest by a human being at the end of his tether, foundering in darkness, pain, and bewilderment, who nevertheless remains faithful to the promise of transformative love.”136 Eagleton is eager to convince both fundamentalists and their liberal/rationalist opponents of this interpretation - and its political implications.
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Of course, what liberals, secularists, fundamentalists and rationalists have in common is that they routinely ignore this and turn a blind eye to the critical role that Christianity has played in formation of liberal and secular society.137 In fact, the replacement of
religion by culture is part of a broader attempt to suppress this dirty little secret138, complicated by the fact that western postmodernism has at its root an extreme history of failure and loss that it has not yet come to terms with.139 The flip side of this “culturalism” is
the attempt to replace politics with religion140 out of its own disillusionment with the former: “If politics has failed to emancipate you, perhaps religion will fare better.”141 It is
this ‘sacred resonance to culture’ that authorized it as “the new absolutely, bottom-line,
conceptual end-stop, or transcendental signifier.”142 But it has proven itself to be inadequate as a replacement for politics or religion143 and so there is space for theology to reassert itself, not as a legitimation of culture or politics, but as an immanent critique of culture. It is clear that not all is right with religion, least of all theology: “what is distinctive
about our age when it comes to religion, then, is not just that it is everywhere on the
rise…it is also that this resurgence often seems to take a political form. Yet this reflects a
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failure of politics proper rather than a reinvigoration of it…This is a religion that is once
more prepared to agitate and kill.”144
And yet, not only does Eagleton defend theology, but also uses it as ideology critique. This has everything to do with Eagleton’s Marxism and his unmistakable disappointment in its failures. The promise of Marxism, Eagleton says, has faced a “staggering
political rebuff; and one of the places to which those radical impulses have migrated is of all things - theology.”145 Eagleton finds the latest form of technological and finance
capitalisms to be “inherently atheist. It is godless in its actual material practices…A society of packaged fulfillment, administered desire, managerialized politics, and consumerist
economics is unlikely to cut to the kind of depth where theological questions can even be
properly raised, just as it rules out political and moral questions of a certain profundity.”146 And so, the task of raising theological questions in such an economic and social
context, “which tends to be secular, relativist, pragmatic, and materialistic”,147 turns out
in itself to be both critical and ultimately materialist. Eagleton, in other words, understands theology to be at its political best when it is fundamentally concerned with naming
human conditions, which is precisely what Marx considered it unable to do – or at least
not in the politically and economically proper way. For Marx, as for Eagleton, religion is
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ideology precisely because it is the only kind of heart and soul that a heartless and soulless world can come up with: “it offers a refuge from the world, not a mission to transform it.”148 As a “sigh”, religion is “a pathological symptom of what is awry with
us…and expresses a thwarted desire which it simultaneously displaces…it therefore represents a protest against a spiritual bankruptcy with which it remains thoroughly complicit.”149 The function of theology as immanent critique is sharpened into a political vision when it comes to the negative aspect of critique:
The problem that theology confronts is the idea that the social order is “pretty
well self-sufficient”, as being more or less as good as it gets, or at least as a spectacular advance on what went before. It is hard to see what role faith could play,
other than sheerly ideological one, in a Western world which some of its inhabitants see it as nothing less than the very consummation of human history, lacking
nothing but more of the same. How could such a form of life accept that there is
something profoundly amiss with our condition - that it simply does not add up,
that it is in several respects intolerable and that one of the chief signs of this incoherence and intolerability is the plight of the poor?150
And so, coming back to Eagleton’s defense of theology as ideology critique, “the trouble
with the Dawkins of this world, however, is that they do not find themselves in a frightening situation at all…it is natural then that they have no use for such embarrassingly
old-fashioned ideas as depravity and redemption.”151 The theology of Christianity, Eagleton maintains, “represents a view of the human conditions which is far more radical than
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anything Richard Dawkins is likely to countenance.” This “more radical” view is that of
tragic humanism, which is another way of saying that “our experience of the world is a
function of our bodily engagement with it”152, which turns out to be both profoundly
Christian and radically materialist in that it believes that “only by confronting the very
worst”, “only by a process of self-dispossession and radical remaking can humanity come
into its own.”153
Eagleton rejects what he calls here the “Satantic” image of God proliferated by
Dawkins, Hitchens, and their fellow critics: “a way of seeing God as a great bully”154 or a
‘super-egoic’ image of God in Jesus.155 God is not a “mega-manufacturer or cosmic chief
executive officer” and considers any “notion of God as a very large and powerful creature”, to be a “idolatrous” betrayal. Contrary to this, Eagleton presents God, in a thoroughly traditional fashion, as “the reason why there is something rather than nothing, the
condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever. God is not a sort of entity, a being itself. God is rather non-being, a non-entity.”156 If one is to say that “God exists”, it displays a serious ontological misunderstanding both about the nature of God and existence.
God is not that transcendental force that enslaves humanity but is the “the connection of
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“God is glori-

ously pointless, a kind of perpetual critique of instrumental reason.”159 Eagleton goes on:
“For orthodox Christian doctrine, it is our dependence on God that allows us to be selfdetermining….God, for Thomas Aquinas, is the power that allows us to be ourselves…”160 Again, what is of interest to Eagleton here is the political point that this theology makes: “if we are God’s creatures, it is in the first place because, like him, we exist
(or should exist) purely for the pleasure of it. The question raised by…Karl Marx, is that
of what political transformation would be necessary for this to become possible in practice.”161
When it comes to Jesus Christ, Eagleton argues that “Ditchkins rejects him for
reasons which are both boring and politically disreputable.”162 Of course, what is most
worth defending about Christian theology is its politics - and nowhere is this displayed
more clearly than in the exemplary figure of Jesus Christ, whose “tortured and murdered
body” tells the tragic story about the depravity of human persons and the cost of political
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“Which is to say that those who are faithful to God’s law of justice and compas-

sion will be done away with by the state. If you don’t love, you’re dead, and if you do,
they’ll kill you. Here then is your pie in the sky or opium of the people, your soft-eyed
consolation and pale-cheeked piety.”164 Contrary to those who find Christian teaching innocuous and atavistic, Eagleton insists that “God’s love and forgiveness are ruthlessly
unforgiving powers which break violently into our protective self-rationalizing little
spheres, smashing our sentimental illusions and turning our word brutally upside
down.”165 Christianity is not to be mocked or scorned: it is in the serious political business of critique.
Contrary to those who claim that the Christian ‘god’ has little to do with the materialist realities of the everyday, Eagleton underscores the primary thesis of liberation orthopraxis, which he considers to be the only authentic theological claim available to us:
things are that God’s include working for justice, welcoming the immigrants, and
humbling the high-and-mighty. the whole cumbersome paraphernalia of religion
is to be replaced by another kind of temple, that of the murdered, transfigured
body of Jesus….this body is dedicated in particular to those losers, deadbeats,
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riffraff, and colonial collaborators, who are not righteous but flamboyantly unrighteous-who either live in chronic transgression of Mosaic law or like the Gentiles, fall outside its sway altogether.166
Against the liberal and rationalist critics who see Christianity (and all religion, actually)
as a threat to the autonomous workings of modern State, Eagleton agrees and so asserts
Christianity’s ideologico-critical credentials: “The New Testament is a brutal destroyer of
human illusions. If you follow Jesus and don’t end up dead, it appears you have some explaining to do. The stark signifier of the human condition is one who spoke up for love
and justice and was done to death for this pains. the traumatic truth of human history is a
mutilated body.”167 This is what the God of Christianity really means, and “Ditchkins” is
simply unable to see it. Eagleton goes on: “The difference between Ditchkins and radicals
like myself also hinges on whether it is true that the ultimate signifier of the human conditions is the tortured and murdered body of a political criminal and what the implications
of this are for living.”168
So what are the “implications of this for living” and for ideology critique? As I
have shown, radical thought must start with the “lamentable state of humanity”, and of
course, Christian theology is good for this as it points out the “the prevalence of greed,
idolatry, and delusion, the depth of our instinct to dominate and possess, the dull persistence of injustice and exploitation, the chronic anxiety which leads us to hate, maim, and
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exploit, along with the sickness suffering and desire which Jesus associates with evil. All
this is what Christianity knows as sin.”169 Of course, religion and its institutions have
been and continues to be a significant factor in the persistence of these problems - Eagleton is the first to admit this - and “yet it is from the standpoint of values which spring,
among other places, from the Judeo-Christian legacy itself that we identify these failings
in the churches - just as liberal civilization is, so to speak, its own immanent critique, as a
culture which allows us to castigate its shortcomings by reference to its own commendably high standards.”170 In this way, Christian beliefs about the fallenness of human nature
are an immanent critique of the predominant social order, acting as a sort of negative image for the kind of political arrangements and affective attachments befitting the freedom
and full-flourishing of human persons. “The Christian faith is absurdly, outrageously
more hopeful than liberal rationalism, with its apparently unhinged belief that not only is
salvation of the human species possible but…it has already taken place.”171 But here
again, redemption looks a lot more like social justice than legal justification, a whole lot
more like materialist transformation than spirituality:
Salvation…turns out not to be a matter of cult, law and ritual of special observance and conformity to a moral code, of slaughtering animals for sacrifice or
even being splendidly virtuous. It is a question of feeding the hungry, welcoming
the immigrant, visiting the sick, and protecting the poor, orphaned and widowed
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from the violence of the rich. Astonishingly, we are saved not by a special apparatus known as religion, but by the quality of our everyday relations with one another.172
The resonance with ideology critique and Eagleton’s (selective interpretation of) Christianity is made clearer here. Theology is shown to be rather materialist and materialism as
rather theological, insofar as it is fundamentally concerned about the everyday workings
of human social life and is eager to redirect and orient social relations and productive
forces by “placing love at the center of its vision of the world”, which is also “the ethical
basis for socialism.”173 While this is a liberation theology, Eagleton also considers it to be
“thoroughly orthodox, scriptural and traditional”174: “one can be a fan of the New Testament but not of the Vatican.”175 The political benefit of theology is that it is “a lot more
realistic about humanity…it takes the full measure of human depravity and perversity…at
the same time, it is good deal bolder than the liberal humanists and rationalists about the
chances of this dire condition being repaired.”176 Here, the materialism driving its critique
comes into play: “It also believes that the very frailty of humanity can become a redemptive power. In this, it is one with socialism, for which the harbingers of a future social order are those who have little to lose in the present.”177 Eagleton assures us that many of
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the theological claims of Christianity are undoubtedly not true, but even if that is so, “it
may serve as an allegory of our political and historical situation.” He rigorously maintains “a distinction between a scriptural and an ideological kind of Christianity”, the primary criterion being that “any preaching of the Gospel which fails to constitute a scandal
and affront to the political state is in my view effectively worthless.”178 It is in this way
that theology can be critical rather than ideological, for even “the Enlightenment was
deeply shaped by values which stemmed from the Christian tradition…it inherited its
brave campaign against superstition partly from Christianity itself, with its rejection of all
false gods and prophets, all idols, fetishes, magical rituals, and powers of darkness, in the
name of human flesh and blood.”179
Conclusion
In the final chapter of Eagleton’s Literary Theory, he zeroes in what he considered to be the enduring contribution of the volume: the need to rethink the task of reading
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literature as political criticism. This means, Eagleton proposes that it functions as a critique of ideology based in concrete political interests: radical human freedom, appreciation for the bodily conditions of human social life, and the need for developing solidaristic relations and affective attachments, based on said conditions.180 He called this task
“political criticism”, something that was already taking place in many disciplinary forms
because he wanted it to be installed at the core of what we all think we are doing when
we read, when we interpret, when we try to make sense of text, reference, meaning, and
significance. To read, or to interpret, is to be political - and so, it is to be critical. It is to
directly consider fundamental questions about freedom, truth, and subjectivity. We must
recognize that all that is written - indeed all that is - is not merely contextualized (that is,
that has a context), but is indebted to all the messy particulars of that situation and all that
this means for concrete human goals. The term ‘political criticism’ has to do with undoing the pretense of disinterestedness, of impartiality, of neutrality, of relativism - of exposing all this as idolatry. It is surprising that Eagleton includes the theological as the
way of thinking most well suited to expanding this task beyond the literary. To do ‘political criticism’ is to do ideology critique, and for Eagleton, to do ideology critique is to do
theology. But what does it mean to do theology as ideology critique?
The purpose of this chapter is to use Terry Eagleton’s perspective to explore one
possibility for how to link between theology and ideology critique. His use of theology
for radical politics is good example for how to start a new beginning for the the question
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how ideology critique can and should be related to theology. I wanted to shed light on the
political use of theology in philosophical versions of ideology critique, specifically those
that are indebted to and are located within a Marxist legacy. If we are able to get a better
sense for why Eagleton turn to theology in the name of its radical and emancipatory political for critique, we are in a better position to understand the Marxist legacy of ideology
critique as it relates to political theology. For Eagleton, his desire to articulate a materialist basis for universal solidarity and common culture leads him to adopt a critical strategy
of ‘using what one can’, both to critique the ways things are and to articulate revolutionary possibilities for a different social future. The strength of Eagleton’s eclectic and strategic approach is that he is most concerned with how to pragmatically use theological
ideas to critique ideology. This rings true to the Marxist critical tradition in which ideology critique is about how ideas function in relation to both historical circumstances and
relevant political concerns: ideology critique is really about politics and not so much
about truth.
Eagleton insists that Christianity can indeed function as ideology critique. Refusing to dismiss theology as “false consciousness”, Eagleton celebrates its purported stress
on and ethical commitments to the anawim and demonstrates how classical theological
ideas are indeed compatible with Marxist theory and politics and so deserves to be taken
more seriously by what he sees as an anaemic political left. It outlines in detail how Eagleton develops and reinterprets traditional theological themes of sin, Christology, evil,
the body, God, and salvation as ideology critique. For Eagleton, ideology refers to that
specific political status of ideas in that are formed and deployed in ways that lose sight of
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the various arrangements and practical positions of the human body, particularly in relation to other bodies, all of whom are connected by patterns of interdependency, and so effectively keeps human persons silent, reticent, and complicit in their own unhappiness.
Eagleton finds in theology some ideas about love, evil, meaning of life, suffering, and
community that do not conceal or cover that which is most important and crucial for human flourishing, but instead names it all in ways far more critical, radical and materialist
than critical theory does today. Theology in this way sharpens the critical posture of theory in relation to praxis.
And yet, Eagleton is deftly aware that one cannot simply appeal to these critical
theological ideas (love, justice, redemption, solidarity, community) as if it protects or
screens praxis itself from the self-reflexivity of critique. These ideas have such uniquely
transformative power insofar as they are immanently critical; that is, they engage and respond to their own activity, their own usage, as vigorously as they critique their function
in social and political life. When love, Christology, or justice, for example, are put to
work, not just in reference to how political theology is actively shaping the social world
according to “the emancipatory goals of transformative praxis” but as critical terms in the
immanent relation of theory and praxis within political itself, what is the effect on political theology itself?
And yet, political theology, in order to avoid betraying its revolutionary center,
must itself turn to critique of ideology and to immanent critique in order to avoid betraying its radical, revolutionary potential. In this way, Eagleton takes the Marxist point about
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the critique of religion as ideology (that self-reflexive critique is necessary to truly understand the “truth” of theology as its social impact in material realities) that was discussed
in the preceding chapter, and so serves as an important example of what political theology can learn from political philosophers who are turning to theology at the same time
they reach for ideology critique. In the next chapter, we will explore yet another possibility in the work of Slavoj Žižek, who also argues that Christianity has enormous political
potential as ideology critique, albeit when reconfigured as an atheistic theology of the
‘death of God.’

CHAPTER THREE
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
Introduction
The present chapter analyzes Žižek’s theory of ideology as a political-theological
perspective. It is curious why Christian theology plays in his critique of ideology and his
political thought in general, and so I try to clarify the general parameters of Žižek’s political theology of critique and then explore in implications for the relation of theory to
praxis. Žižek’s critical engagement with Christianity plays a unique role in his philosophical and political work, which is made to appear even more strange by who acts as his primary theological guides: a unholy mix of Hegel, G. K. Chesterton, and St. Paul. Žižek
discovers in Christian theology certain key elements that inform modes of critique, the
Act, and social change, elements that usher forth critiques, not only of current political
institutions and systems, but also of the failure of Christianity to be its critical self.
Namely, he finds in Christianity an exemplary form of ideology critique, but does so
through certain interpretation of the “death of God” theology that presents it as the ‘theologico-political suspension of the ethical’, the core of the Christian position.
With this in hand, Žižek presents a negative politics of active refusal, an approach
that differs considerably from Karl Marx and Terry Eagleton, but which presents theological and political problems of its own. To address these, I will begin by discussing the
way that Žižek rethinks the Marxist theory of ideology (discussed in chapter one)
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along Lacanian lines. I pay particular attention to the place of the notion of the Big Other,
cynicism, and belief, especially in terms of the role they each play in Žižek’s theory of
ideology critique. I argue that what lies at the heart of Žižek’s attention to theology as
ideology critique is the negative political effect of ideology critique itself. While Žižek
claims that this negativity about praxis opens up material conditions of possibility and
clears the way for truly political Act, it is not clear that Žižek’s position fully explains the
relation between critique and the practical demands to respond actively to the order we
live in or why theology, even the radical revolutionary impulse of “its perverse core”, is
absolutely necessary to address them. These problems notwithstanding, it is important to
bring Žižek’s argument to the surface, and so I will reserve critical comments for the end,
after first following his interpretation of Christianity as ideology critique as it relates to
subjectivity and the political.
Žižek’s Theory of Ideology
The relation between theology and ideology in Žižek’s critical theory is organized
around three major ideas: his psychoanalytic critique of the big Other, his critique of cynicism through unbelief, and his political understanding of the Act. While Žižek’s politics
lack doctrines, he is motivated by a desire to provoke the authentic political Act and to
explain its relation to the political subject.1 Žižek is responding to what he sees as the primary ideological trap of liberalism, multiculturalism, toleration, and so on, all of which
tries to convince subjects of the inevitable success of capitalism and the impossibility of
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radical social change. This means that “the cadence of change” must be thoroughly pragmatic and gradual - that large scale shifts in the prevailing order are simply not necessary
or desirable.2 The whole point of Žižek’s theory is to inquire forcefully about the conditions of possibility for revolutionary subjectivity, despite the current coordinates that define political life today incessantly repressing and stifling it. Thus, for Žižek, “ideology is
always a field of struggle.”3
Žižek’s ideology critique is a ‘philosophy under the condition of the political’,
and so is an attempt to produce and establish the kind of subject necessary for this work;
in this way, Žižek’s theory of ideology is always a philosophy of the subject. An early introduction to Žižek identifies three central areas of Žižek’s work (which has grown considerably since, in both volume and breadth), the last of which was the defense of ‘the
subject’4, and more specifically, the Cartesian cogito.5 Since the advent of postmodernity,
the cogito has fallen on hard times and has more than its fair share of critics, most of
whom are eager to decenter and disintegrate the subject, holding it responsible for “damaged human life” caused by the instrumentalization of reason with modern society. That
said, the Cartesian cogito has also been very important for nearly all post-Enlightenment
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emancipatory movements, Marxism included, and so Žižek finds it to be more worthwhile to rehabilitate the cogito rather than try to do away with it all together.6 And so,
Žižek turns to Jacques Lacan, enlisting him in the effort to reactivate the more materialist
and political aspects of modern subjectivity, as found within Kant and Descartes, and to
save the Subject from the postmodernists and the left-liberal academy who are all too eager to announce its premature death.7 How Žižek interprets Lacan’s views on the subject
is central to the relationship between the Event of the political act, ideology critique, and
Christianity. Žižek is led by Lacan to argue that the prospect of critique starts and ends
with the subject, since ideologies reside in how political subjects repetitively enact social
reality. Ideology, then, acts within and as the fundamental contradiction, the Gap, between what the subject believes and how the subject acts. The aim of critique is not to resolve this antagonism or to uncover or reveal its true nature, but to own up to it, to
acknowledge its inescapability, and to strive forward by struggling to think and establish
new, unforeseen forms of collective life in spite of its brute facticity,
But how does this explain the importance that Žižek places on theology? Žižek’s
aim in ideology critique is to identify the traumatic Gaps, the ‘non-All’ in reality where
its utmost, fundamental antagonisms reside, in order to negatively clear an ‘empty’
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space, free from “any positively determined reality.” This is politically important because it is only when these spaces are cleared, when the gaps are negated, that subjectivity is made possible again, and with it, the authentic political acts which do not exist
within the coordinates of currently available options. This means that critique must hold
open the space of the pre-ideological kernel, which, as the traumatic gap that engenders
subjectivity, is nothing less than ‘True Openness’ of revolutionary politics. This calls for
a kind of apocalyptic thinking, such as that which Žižek finds in the structure of the
Event.9 As it turns out, one of the foremost theorists of the Event, Alain Badiou, is also
fascinated with the political import of St. Paul’s theology for rethinking revolutionary
subjectivity.10 Žižek follows him there and in so doing, finds in Christianity, a “subversive kernel” of materialist theology that lies at its “perverse core.”11 For Žižek, “what is
revealed in Christianity is not just the entire content, but more specifically that there is
nothing – no secret – behind to be revealed… what God reveals is not His hidden power,
only His impotence as such.”12
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To prefigure the chapter a bit, Žižek’s argument is that Christian theology is ideology critique at its best, most specifically in those places where one least expects it,
places like the book of Job and the crucified Christ’s ‘cry of dereliction’, both of which
express the single most important – and revolutionary – moment of theological truth: divine abandonment. “Insofar as we conceive of ideology as the imaginary mitigating of a
traumatic Real”, says Žižek, “the Book of Job provides what is perhaps the first exemplary case of the critique of ideology in human history, laying bare the basic discursive
strategies of legitimizing suffering: Job’s properly ethical dignity lies in the way he persistently rejects the notion that his suffering can have any meaning…and surprisingly,
God takes his side at the end, claiming that every word that Job spoke was true.”13 This
admission by God to God’s own impotence is the theological moment of ideology critique par excellence, leading Žižek to pursue its theoretical and political lessons.
From Althusser to Lacan
To this point, I have been concerned with the newer philosophical interest in political theology coinciding with the resurgence of a heretofore submerged element within
the Marxist legacy: the critique of ideology. But what is most unusual about this convergence is not the theological interest, but rather the turn to ideology, especially in the wake
of post-politics of the contemporary Left. It is not at all clear why the theory of ideology
is so important, especially in light of the near universal consensus that our social, political, and economic problems are not about ideology, but instead about discourse, power,
narratives, bodies, and micro-politics - to name a few of the most common candidates.
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For Žižek, the relevance of ideology critique for radical and emancipatory politics is in
the way in which it exposes, in a traumatic and rupturing way, the uncontainable and unbearable gap between social reality and social possibility, or put differently, the way its
opens up a “materialism without ‘materialism.’”14 For Žižek, “an ideology is really ‘holding us’ only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality, that is, when the
ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself.”15 To push back against the “post-ideological” and “post-political” spirit of the
age16, Žižek employs key Lacanian concepts to explain the relevance of Marxist theory of

14

Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso,
2014), 5; Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London:
Verso, 2012), 157.
15

Slavoj Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 49.

16

For Žižek, this announcement of the end of ideology by critical sociology in the 1950-60s and then again
by political theorists in the late 1980s (after the downfall of Soviet communism in Europe) signaled a new
‘post-political’ era against which rationality. deliberation, and the processes of consensus-building were
privileged, all in service to a global concord that accepted both the capitalist free market and the liberal
state. This “post-political” era is also marked, in Žižek’s mind, by its claim to be “post-ideological” in the
sense that it believes that the major political questions had more or less been resolved or had become irrelevant under the new modern agreement around western, liberal values and the rise of technocratic
knowledge as the primary way of solving social and political problems. See R. Aron, “The end of the ideological age?,” in The end of ideology debate, C.I. Waxman, ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 2748; Daniel Bell, The end of ideology (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Edward Shils, “The end of ideology?,” in The end of ideology debate, C.I. Waxman, ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 49-63.; Edward Shils, “The concept of ideology,” in International encyclopedia of the social sciences, D. Sills, eds
(New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), 66-75. For a critical examination for this literature, J.T. Jost,
“The end of the end of ideology,” American Psychologist 61 (2006): 651–670.
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ideology for contemporary questions and to advance its development by making serious
updates to the Althusserian reading of Marx’s views on ideology and critique.
First, we must address the role of Lacanian psychoanalytic categories in Žižek’s
ideology theory. Žižek’s theory of ideology is driven by his political interest in applying
Lacanian terms to classical philosophical questions. From the beginning, Žižek identified
ideology critique as his main philosophical interest for political reasons.17 At first, Žižek
was eager to reassert the psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan as a philosopher, arguing
that he belongs in the same conversation with Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, and has been
grossly overlooked in recent debates.18 Žižek connects the dots between Hegel and Lacan, primarily through Marx, which partly explains the significance of the theory of ideology for his early philosophical project. This objective of this triangulation was to rehabilitate Lacan’s usefulness for radical Leftist politics during a time of significant upheaval and uncertainty after the significant defeats in the late 1980s. The shift from the
‘New Left’ to the ‘post-political’ Left19 culminated in the early 1990s with the downfall
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161
of the USSR, and was promptly followed by giddy announcements by western liberals of
the “end of history”, who promised “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”20 Žižek, who came of academic age in the backdrop of the revolutions of 1989
(the year that The Sublime Object of Ideology was published in English), believed it to be
crucial that radical politics take center stage in theory, even if the vision of the Left
seemed inconceivable within the established coordinates of contemporary political life.
Situated in the shadow of the resistance to the Yugoslavic communist regime,
Žižek justifies the turn to Louis Althusser precisely because so many in academic circles
considered him to be anemic and passé.21 To Žižek, their rejection showed that Althusser
posed a threat to their political dominance. Althusser broadened the standard Marxist understanding of ideology (as described in chapter 1) to include not only how certain ideas
are used to mislead political subjects in favor of the dominant economic system, as imposed by the ruling classes, but also how ideology resides within the concrete institutions
and practices that give rise to these ideas: families, schools, and religious communities, as
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the key examples. In turning his attention to “the soft power” of these ‘Ideological State
22

Apparatuses’ (‘ISAs’), Althusser argues that ideology is not directly based on the economic system, but lives primarily within the concrete practices and habits of everyday
life; it has a “material existence.”23 These practices are doubly ideological in the sense
that they reinforce the “imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
experience”, but also are the very form in which the ideological system maintains the
hold of this ‘imaginary relationship’ on the subject itself. This happens in the “interpellation”, the call whereby the subject’s dependence on ideology is naturalized and universalized as “the way things just are.” To make matters more troubling, this interpellation is
the founding gesture of subjectivity itself; it is made clear to the subject that, as a subject
tout court, she is subjugated to the ideological demands. It cannot be any other way. C’est
la vie, or as Žižek says, “like love, ideology is blind, even if the people caught up in it are
not.”24 The transition from Althusser to Lacan comes down to a cynical acceptance of
ideology’s ubiquity rather than a relentless critique of it, based on the conviction that a
state beyond or outside ideology is possible, necessary, even for effective political
change. Once you follow Althusser, Žižek maintains, there becomes little reason to directly oppose ideology, and so critique becomes neutral rather than negative, strategic rather than suspicious.
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Žižek is clearly concerned about the political ramifications of a cynical theory of
ideology that abdicates to the post-political milieu by thinking that it can so easily dispense with the critique of ideology, as if it has no active political purpose, and so is not
longer required. If we all know that we are duped by the ideological system, the critique
of ideology (which purports to expose us to this fact) seems redundant and unnecessary –
it simply tells us what we already know. But for Žižek, it is at this point that ideology is
most dangerous and effective, for “an ideology really succeeds when even the facts which
at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favor.”25 The strongest case,
in Žižek’s mind, for the urgent need to rehabilitate the theory of ideology for contemporary political concerns, is the neutralization of ideology critique by admitting to ideology’s pervasive ubiquity: “this denial of ideology only provides the ultimate proof that
we are more than ever embedded in ideology.”26 It is when we claim to be most fully
aware of ideology (but cynically enact it nevertheless through our social practices) and
therefore no longer see the need for ideology critique, that we are at our most ideological
point: “the stepping out of ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it.”27
For Žižek, Althusser’s mistake is that he fails to theorize ideology beyond the
“critique of cynical reason”, whereby subjects are thought to be enlightened to their own
false consciousness, even if that consciousness takes concrete form via the very practices
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that produce it. Traditional views of ideology are mistaken about where ideology hap28

pens and what it looks like, and as such, misdirects its critique. Ideology, for Žižek, happens not at the level of knowledge (pace Althusser and the cynics who dismiss the ideology critique as passé), but at the level of social reality itself: “what the individuals are doing, and not only what they think or know they are doing.”29 To correct this mistake,
Žižek argues, we must turn to Lacan, whose understanding of the traumatic and unbearable gap between the Symbolic system and the order of the Real, clarifies precisely how
and why ideology is so effective. Žižek relies deeply on Lacan’s work throughout his philosophy, but the most important concepts have to do with the traumatic relations of the
Symbolic and the Real, the ‘big Other’, and the role of all three in subjectivity. Žižek explores these connections through the interplay between cynicism, belief, and fantasy in
reference to ideology and social reality, to which we will now turn.
Ideology: the Symbolic Order and the ‘big Other’
Žižek finds Laconian psychoanalysis to be indispensable for understanding the
constraints of human behavior under ideological conditions, which is itself necessary for
any attempt to rethink and rework political possibilities under the present system we live
in. Among the most important of these concepts is the now infamous Lacanian triad: the
relation between the orders of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.30 For Lacan
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(and so, Žižek), it is the interaction between the Symbolic and the Real, or more precisely, the traumatic rupture or gap produced by the failure between them, that yields the
insubstantial space of the subject. For Žižek it comes down to the way the subject ‘learns’
to respond to the founding Cut, the wound at the core of the subject, that stands in for its
failed state: its non-identity. This non-identity is then written into the socio-structural fabric of how and why political subjects act the way they do, or in other words, ideology and
its alliance with the big Other.31 .
Ideology originates from the traumatic gap between the Real and social reality, as
structured by the Symbolic order. The Real is the unbearable, abyssal “leftover” that the
Symbolic cannot express or enclose within its system of signification. Žižek describes it
this way: “the Real is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible and
the obstacle that prevents this direct access; the Thing that eludes our grasp and the distorting screen that makes us miss the Thing.”32 In this way, we must say that “the Real is
not external to the Symbolic: the Real is the Symbolic itself in the modality of ‘nonAll’…and to step into the Real does not entail abandoning language, throwing oneself
into the abyss of the chaotic Real, but on the contrary, dropping the very allusion to some
external point of reference, which eludes the Symbolic.”33 But, since ideology belongs to
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the Symbolic, it cannot be said that ideology critique frees the subject to grasp of the
Real, namely because it cannot close the gap between the Symbolic and the Real, the
deadlock is that the traumatic remainder of non-representation itself. The Symbolic order
uses social reality to try shield us from the unbearable trauma of this, our founding gap.
Subjectivity owes its incomplete and contingency, its Wound, to this primordial, founding trauma.34 This abyssal Lack, this wound/cut has traumatic effects on the subject insofar as it is produced by the failure of the Symbolic to account for the whole of the Real, to
contain its unpredictability of the Void’s ontological multiplicity and incompleteness.
Žižek cautions us not to reify the Real, thereby glossing over its negativity: “the
Lacanian Real is not another Center, a ‘deeper’, ‘truer’, focal point or ‘black hole’ around
which symbolic formulations fluctuate; rather it is the obstacle on account of which every
Center is always displaced, missed.”35 Speaking of the Real, “there is nothing outside it,
no external limits, yet it is not all, it can break down.”36 Only when we come to terms
with the ‘non-All’ character of the Real (and the traumatic impact of this on the subject)
are we able to see how ideology emerges. The Real is both traumatic and unbearable to
the subject because it wreaks havoc on the gentrifying and censoring gestures of symbolization that constitute and stabilize the subject’s concrete acts in the world: “the Lacanian
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Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert presence that ‘curves’ the symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, the effect of these gaps and inconsistencies.”37 There is always an apocalyptic remainder, the harrowing kernel of the Real
which is always missed by the Symbolic order, the inconsistency that haunts the subject,
despite our repeated attempts to neutralize, sublate, and integrate it into the symbolic order.38
Žižek uses Lacan’s description of the Symbolic order which is based on the essentially structuralist insight that language is a differential system of signifiers and as such,
is self-reflexive, rather than referring directly to that which stands external to them, what
is commonly referred to as ‘the real world.’ Ordering and stabilizing this chain of signification is ‘the Big Other’, which, due to its tautological and auto-referential character, is
useless as a signifier,39 despite operating as one. As the Transcendental master-signifier,
the big Other justifies its place in the order by structuring the open-ended void of multiple ‘floating signifiers’ into an united field with itself as “the nodal point”, that ‘pure signifying’40 force that creates and sustains the identity of the ideological field41 by holding
together its differential and antagonistic elements.42 This point contains them and ‘quilts’
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them together , so as to keep them from sliding out of place as part of this structure net43

work of meaning; in doing so, the big Other ‘fixes’ their meaning, however artificially,
effectively holding off, if only for a time, the unbearable fact that the Void, the space that
the big Other holds close, will eventually show itself again. This is, in fact, the ruptural
Event sought by ideology critique: to hold up on the Void, the ‘non-All’ of social reality,
long enough so as to produce and generate political subjects.
As the subject is thrown into the Symbolic order, this ‘nodal point’ takes up the
role of the big Other as “the unquestionable authority which can impose limits”44, the
master-signifier in the symbolic system that claims its authoritative function only insofar
as subjects activate it by assuming its place and role as the guarantor of that virtual symbolic order that structures social reality for us. For Žižek, the big Other is not a single
subject, but rather a function of ideology filed under a plurality of names (i.e., God, the
Party, Freedom, the People), all of which share the basic structure as the assumed guarantee of the accepted social order, as the “rules of the game” that regulate the established
field of possibilities for thinking and acting, and holds its all together in some semblance
of intelligibility.45
Žižek will turn repeatedly to the function of big Other as the underwriter for the
ideological fantasy, as that which promises to stabilizes the subject as it emerges from the
traumatic experience in between the Real and the Symbolic orders, but at great cost: that
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it must exist with ideology, “as if he had already chosen.” The results of the Real working
underneath the big Other so as to topple and expose the ideological fantasies at work
within social reality can be devastating for the subject, which is why the Big Other is installed and reinforced, so that it can resist the antagonistic Real trying to break through
the Symbolic façade of the currently existing social bond. The big Other works to install
peace, order, and coherence to what will otherwise be chaos, contradiction, violence, and
upheaval. Politically speaking, the big Other, as the master signifier, imposes itself upon
social reality in an effort to forestall the traumatic irruption of the Real and so produces
ideology as such, making it appear to the subject as if it is inexorable as a ‘given’ characteristic that governs and structures the field of (currently available) political options. This
is why Žižek is so eager to topple the big Other, using ideology critique as a political tool
of instigation, to bring this original condition, the pure multiplicity of the negative Void,
back to the foreground of politics, as scary as this sounds. His primary reason, as we shall
see, is to expand the field of currently existing political choices and options by reopening
“the Communist hypothesis”46, the condition of possibility for political Acts themselves,
acts that issue forth from the Real.
The big Other performs as ideology by totalizing the symbolic order, effectively
screening the subject off from the radical multiplicity of the pre-ideological kernel of

46

As will be explained later, Žižek borrows this phrase from Badiou, but explores it more thoroughly with
other Leftist thinkers in Slavoj Žižek. ed., The Idea of Communism (London: Verso, 2010) and Slavoj
Žižek, ed., The Idea of Communism. Volume 2 (London: Verso, 2013; Also, see Alain Badiou,, The Communist Hypothesis (London: Verso, 2010).

170
Symbolic surplus, that traumatic gap from which subjectivity emerges that bares the unbearable truth of our contingency, our groundlessness, the arbitrary spontaneity with
which we enter and exit the world. The big Other tries to objectify and occupy “the
empty space”, the uncontainable remainder, after symbolization. Žižek describes it in ideological terms as the point de capiton which reassures the subject of the veracity and reliability of the Symbolic order, even while the symbolic order is itself dependent on the
concrete practices of the subject: “The point de capiton is rather the word which, as a
word, on the level of the signifier itself unified a given field, constitutes its identity: it is,
so to speak, the word to which ‘things’ themselves refer to recognize themselves to their
unity.”47 It is here that the ideological function of the big Other is most clear. It is not “a
point of supreme density of Meaning, the kind of Guarantee which by, being itself, excepted from the differential interplay of elements, would serve as a stable and fixed point
of reference.”48 It is quite the contrary, actually. It is indeed, nothing but “‘pure difference’: its role is purely structural, its nature is purely performative – its signification coincides with the its own act of enunciation; in short, it is a ‘signifier without the signified.’”49 Žižek writes that “this dimension of the ‘big Other’ is that of the constitutive alienation of the subject in the symbolic order: the big Other pulls the strings, the subject
doesn't speak, he "is spoken" by the symbolic structure.”50 The cunning of the big Other
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is that it is rarely questioned; it is highly invisible, naturalized, and universalized, not because everyone actually believes in it and is committed to its continuance, but rather because “nobody really knows what it means, but each of them somehow presupposes that
others know, that it has to mean ‘the real thing’, so they use it all time.”51 Nevertheless, it
is “the element, which represents within the field of Meaning, the agency of pure signifier… as the point which ‘gives meaning’ to all the others and thus totalizes the field of
(ideological) meaning.”52
The danger of the big Other is precisely the same in psychoanalysis as it is in politics: “as kind of a transcendent guarantee, [it is] the element which only holds the place
of a certain lack, which is in its bodily presence nothing but an embodiment of a certain
lack which is perceived as a point of supreme plentitude.”53 It allows the subject to avoid
the full interrogation of her conditions; it keeps the “error of perspective” alive, allowing
us to think that there is really something there, some real kernel of truth about ourselves
and the world to be found, if we can free ourselves from our fantasies and illusions. It
keeps the subject from encountering herself as such; it precludes the subject from experiencing the void of multiplicity and contingency, through which the subject must navigate,
if she hopes to live authentically. It is in owning up to the groundlessness of her language, the failure of her attempts to identify with herself, that actual freedom, rather the
forced choices of “mindfulness” or “democracy”, is made possible again.
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The big Other is the truly ideological fantasy, not because it hides the truth from
the subject, but because it is truth, and as such, effectively screens the subject off from
her constitutive Lack. Žižek’s modification of the critique of ideology procedure is specifically designed to counter the big Other without at the same time replacing it. The ideologico-critical project of “traversing the fantasy” of the big Other is not to restore to the
subject her immediate access to reality “outside of fantasy”, but as Žižek says, “to fully
identify oneself with the fantasy, to bring the fantasy out…Once we do this, its hold over
us is suspended - why?”54 It is only by ‘over-identifying’ with the fantasy, being brought
into an deeply intimate relation with it, to be claimed by it more than ever, that we are
able to disable it. It possesses operative strength only when it is able to act as the transparent background to the subject’s experience of self and world.55
Cynicism and Belief
What is missing at this juncture is the link between fantasy and the act, especially
as that relation is structured through ideology. This connection is provided, at least provisionally, by how Žižek theorizes the critical function of belief in the midst of cynical reason. This sets the stage for the crucial role that religion, and ‘Pauline’ Christianity in particular, plays in elevating the place of ideology critique in Žižek’s political thought. The
problem, as Žižek sees it, with ideology critique today is not that no one believes in it anymore, but that we are all too certain that we are aware of and awakened to, their ideological state. It is cynicism about ideology - the sense that we know we are being duped, but
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do little about it - that troubles Žižek: “the very concept of ideology implies a kind of
constitutive naiveté, the misrecognition of its own presuppositions, of its own effective
conditions, a distance, a divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted representations, our false consciousness of it.”56 It is our knowledge of and belief in ideology
that will prove to be most ensnaring. Peter Sloterdijk argues for the end of ‘ideology’ talk
by theorizing the contemporary mood of cynicism which problematizes the procedure of
critique itself.57 Cynical reason, or “enlightened false consciousness” refers to how the
contemporary subject can be quite aware that the ideological mask she wears conceals or
obscures social reality, but nevertheless still wears the mask, even though she knows that
it is obfuscating, distorting, and hiding the truth.58 She also knows that every subject
around her also knows this (both that she is living in ideology, but is doing nothing differently, and that they are too). They too know that she knows, but they all nevertheless
opt to not behave differently, to act as if they do not know that they know what they are
doing. The formula for ideology is no longer, “they do not know what they are doing”,
but rather “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.” In the
traditional view, ideology depends on naiveté in order to be effective, but as it turns out,
ideology actually thrives on knowledge, on an ‘enlightened consciousness’ that is aware
of its spuriosity, but rather than getting rid of it, actually maintains it. Cynical reason does
not denounce ideology even though it is aware of it and its effects on the subject. Rather,
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cynicism actively sustains it, reinscribing it willfully into the everyday acts and practices
that shape human life. Indeed, for Žižek, cynicism is “an exact inversion of Marx’s formula: today, we only imagine that we do not ‘really believe’ in our ideology – in spite of
this imaginary distance, we continue to practice it.”59
Cynical reason apparently challenges the necessity of ideology critique in a situation where we consider ourselves to be fully aware of ideology and the effects of its hold
on us. Everyone knows that ideology is in place, that it is acting upon their knowing, their
way of being, but they act as if they do not. How ideology acts - and the form it takes - in
our world today is not as the shadowy specter who is present precisely in its absence,
whose purveyors try to maintain its power on the subject by avoiding its detection, keeping it and its effects hidden. In this cynical time, ideology has become bold and audacious; it protects itself by not hiding at all. We all see it, we all know it, we all perceive
ourselves acting and living into it, but its presence is so mundane and boring; it has become naturalized. What good will ideology critique do if we are already disabused of ideology’s presence and action in our social order? We do not need to be told ideology is all
around us; we know that already. Everyone is aware that the ideas that support and legitimate the social system that we participate in are ideological, and so ideology critique
seems redundant in a situation where everyone is conscious of it. But Žižek argues that
cynicism, rather than spelling the end of ideology, does not understand how ideology actually works in its current form. Ideology is not a matter of holding false beliefs, but is
“an illusion, an error, a distortion which is already at work in the social reality itself, at
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the level of what individuals are doing, and not only what they think or know they are doing.”60 For Žižek, cynicism does not render the critique of ideology pointless, but rather
helps us clarify how ideology is functioning, namely that subjects never fully go ‘all in’,
that there remains some traumatic leftover, a point Althusser missed, but that Lacan made
clear.
In response to cynicism, the early (and more Marxist) Žižek departs from the traditional view of ideology critique that “the ideological is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence, the social effectivity, the preproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do not know what they are
doing.’”61 The way to respond is to replace the binary of reality and appearance (which
the culture of cynicism itself maintains) and reconnect critique with action instead of
knowledge or belief. Rather than trying to convince the political subject that the reality
that she accepts as real is actually false, ideology critique is about identifying “a certain
fissure asymmetry, a certain pathological, imbalance…which subverts its own universal
foundation, a species subverting its own genus.”62
The political subject cannot escape, or somehow suspend, ideology or its effects.
But critique is misguided if it considers its primary objective to be to show the truth of
something, as if it it must reveal that one what believes to be true is actually not. The
problem of ideology, as Žižek sees it, is a more fundamental and dialectical contradiction
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between knowing and acting that always already precedes both. Since, for Žižek, “the
fundamental level of ideology, however, is not that of an illusion masking the real state of
things, but that of an unconscious fantasy structuring our social reality itself”63, the task
of the critique of ideology, then, is to “[detect] a point of breakdown heterogeneous to a
given ideological field and at the same time necessary for that field to achieve its closure,
its accomplished form.”64 This ‘point of breakdown’ is synonymous with the reality itself, that aspect ‘in-itself’ whereby it simply dissolves, changes, and causes a shift in desire, residing in yet another objet petit a, provided by ideology.
The paradox is that ideology “can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecognized and overlooked.’”65 Once we “see reality as it is”, it is no longer real. The misrecognition of social reality is part of this reality itself. The constitution of social reality requires ideological distortion, and so it relies upon fetishes, language, fantasies, and symbols to sustain itself. However, the ideology of social reality does not require subjects to
believe in it for it to exist, only that subjects act ‘as if’ they do. Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape an insupportable realty; it is a fantasy-construction
which serves as a support for reality itself, an illusion that sutures the fundamental antagonistic gap enforced the insupportable, impossible kernel of the Real, “the traumatic so-
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cial divisions that cannot be symbolized, that cannot be contained in the system of signification.”66 Žižek contends that cynicism only helps to illustrate that ideology happens at
“the level of what the individuals are doing”, their real social activity, rather than at the
register of knowledge: “What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality,
but the illusion which is structuring their reality.”67 This “illusion” is the fundamental antagonism that exists between belief and action, a contradiction that is thoroughly political
in form and psychological in structure, insofar as it resides within the subject itself.
For Žižek, the political question becomes “why?” Why do even “cynically enlightened” subjects not act any differently, despite their awareness of ideology? What
structures and supports this illusion of social reality, and how must the critique of ideology shift itself, so as to encounter ideology more productively? Why do people, who as
political agents are “the subjects who are supposed to know”68, consistently act directly
counter to their own interests?69 We are no longer unaware that what we see, that what
we are told is true, what we act in and towards, is not “that-which-is”; we know perfectly
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well that the chimera presented to us as “the thing in itself” is indeed a fallacious representation, full of manipulation, deceit, and caricature. The place of illusion proper to ideology, then, is in the reality of activity, so that “they know that, in their activity, they are
following an illusion, but still they are doing it.”70 This ‘enlightenment does not seem to
lead to a different way of life, even when armed with the knowledge that things are not as
the media or the market suggest them to be. In this culture of cynicism, ideology acts as
the foundation to “belief before belief” that shapes the very activity that exhibits our adhesion to the social order even as we are aware that it is neither natural, universal, or
given.71 Žižek exaggerates when he writes: “nobody takes democracy or justice seriously,
we are all aware of their corrupted nature, but we participate in them, we display our belief in them, because we assume that they work, even if we do not believe in them.”72 Indeed, it is obvious that Žižek is incorrect when he argues that “nobody takes democracy
or justice seriously”, but I take his point being that the ideological state of political subjects make it very difficult for them to really take upon themselves the radical demands of
democracy or justice, or solidarity, love, and compassion, for that mater.
If the traditional critique of ideology is the unveiling or exposure of the ‘false
consciousness of a (social) being’, which illuminates to the subject the truth of her situation, and so makes authentic revolutionary praxis possible, the cynical critique of ideology is to point out that the traditional critique of ideology is indeed ideological itself,
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namely that its view of critique as ‘deideologization’ of the social order is naive, considering how savvy we all are about knowing what it is we do not know. The pedagogical
aim of this critique to teach subjects how to, in fact, act in the world otherwise; that is, to
act like in light of what they know to be true. However, in Žižek’s mind, both the traditional and ‘cynical’ critique of ideology are inadequate because they do not understand
the critical structure of belief: the way it traverses fantasy, through ironic stages of its
own negation73, or what Žižek terms elsewhere its “fetishistic disavowal.”74 This is the
position of cynical compliance or conformity in full knowledge and recognition that the
particular order is false, absurd, or otherwise not credible. How does this work in ideology? Žižek’s critical theory of belief is best described as an ‘over-identification’ with belief that actively unveils the structure of critical disavowal itself. It renders clear “the way
that a belief is a reflexive attitude: it is never a case of simply believing - one has to believe in belief itself.”75 It works in either direction: by believing and acting as if I do not,
or by not believing, but sincerely acting as if I do.76 Either way, the ideologico-critical effect of this un/belief is the same: it “objectifies” and externalizes it, bringing to the surface the precise manner in which belief is way of acting, and that we act into social real-
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ity ‘as if’ we believe in it. It is only by over-identifying with belief, by acting in our belief, and doing so sincerely, that we are able to see what we believe in and why we believe, and thus able to get rid of our beliefs.77 The idea of belief as a strategy for unbelief
explains why “those who actively try to prevent themselves from getting caught in ideology by way of knowledge, who continue to doubt rather than believe, are the ones most
likely to get wrapped up in ideology.”78 Put differently, “a cynic who ‘believes only his
eyes’ misses the efficiency of the symbolic fiction, the way this fiction structures our experience of reality.”79
Žižek’s Critique of Ideology
With this in mind, what does ideology critique achieve for the subject, and what
are its political implications? Žižek turns to psychoanalysis as a model for its critically
negative procedure. It “transverses the fantasy”, rather than uncovers the Real, and as
such, it lays bare the fundamental Lack that accompanies the symbolic order - without
covering it up again. It allows the subject to face into, to confront, the ‘Non-All’ of reality without trying to explain it, contain it, or symbolize it in any way. Ideology critique
frees the subject, not to see the way things really are, but to recognize this misses the
point - and is ideological itself. To critique ideology is to renounce all attempts at filling
out the void, or explaining it away; it is to admit that the Lack which establishes the coordinates of desire and so is the origin, source, and condition of the subject, must remain
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‘empty’. But this emptiness is not vacancy but negation, provided of course by the Hegelian dialectical process: it is a “materialism without matter.” The spirit of the ‘antimony
of critic-ideological reason’ protects the Voided ‘empty place’, the gap or lack of the
Other, through a dialectical movement that has no final closure, that offers no hope of being fully explained or completed. This surely wrecks havoc on the subject, eventually dividing it, leaving it destitute due to the unbearable pressure that comes with being thrown
without choice into the contingency, openness, and sheer unpredictability of the primordially repressed fact that ‘there is no Big Other.’
The goal of ideology critique is to to lay bare this empty place, this Nothing that
undergirds subjectivity, and that renders reality incomplete, insubstantial, and truly open
the possibility of the New. Critique itself is possible because of this primordial antagonism of social reality itself, that fact that reality can never be whole, that it can never be
identified with itself. It is never “there” for the taking. So, the critical perspective on ideology is not about acquiring the truth about reality, but to surface the repressed Real of
the fundamental antagonism that social reality itself represses in service to the Symbolic
order. The point here is not to point out and then resolve this antagonism, but to own up
to it as the essential human condition. Like fantasy, what we are to do when faced with it
is not to try to expose it, so that it can be erased, but rather to “over-identify” with it, for
when we ‘pretend to pretend to believe’ in it, it disarms its effect on the subject.80 What is
left to do after the critique of ideology is not to return that primordial kernel of the truth
or the Real upon which we establish new norms, a better Law, a more adequate political
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order, but rather to actively resist any and all efforts, no matter their aims or label,
thereby objectifying this emptiness as the very act of exposure; it is to say “there is nothing, but this nothing itself, the nothing that is the subject.”81
Indeed, Žižek interprets all politics to be attempts to harmonize this inconsistency,
to heal the rupture, to fill in the gaps with one suturing strategy or the other, so as to abolish and eradicate this tension, and so secure the subject.82 The search for the original purity of the harmonious order, so as to recover or return to some original, non-alienated
state, is not possible – there is no ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ ideology. Social reality itself is
not possible without it. What the critique of ideology tries to get at, then, is not the liberation of human knowers from false representation, erroneous beliefs, or a transformation
of social practices and institutions whereby we are returned to an original condition, free
of antagonism or repression. Rather, ideology critique concerns the material conditions
under which the authentic political act is made possible. Put differently, ideology critique
in Žižek’s vision is a theory of Event, a project in which theology plays a major role.
By attempting to “to detect beyond the dazzling splendor of the element which
holds it together, this self preferential, tautological, performative operation”83, critique
takes up the big Other as “the ideological edifice, as this phallic, erected Guarantee of
Meaning” and “recognizes in it the embodiment of lack, the chasm of non-sense gaping
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in the midst of ideological meaning.” Politically speaking, Žižek’s critique of ideology
84

hopes to lay bare how ideology is our (experience of) reality; like Marx and Eagleton, he
does not claim to strip from the subject all instances of its “false consciousness”. What
we get “on the other side” of ideology critique is not an innermost, authentic self, but a
traumatic Void of multiplicity whose negativity renders us entirely bereft of all guarantees, all external limits. Ideology critique is not necessarily good news for the subject; by
and large, the subject much prefers fantasy - and for good reason. Politics, theology, and
psychoanalysis share a family resemblance as instances of ideology critique - they are all
interested in showing the subject that “the big Other does not exist.” What the critique of
ideology does when faced with the fantastical operations of the big Other is to reassert
the fundamental antagonism between the Symbolic and Real, reminding social reality
(and political subjects, for that matter) of its traumatic origins. Only here can ideology
critique hope to make a political difference. It does this by demonstrating the failure of
social reality to heal or cope with this trauma, and so serves as a kind of Socratic psychoanalyst, whose midwifery brings forth that apocalyptic “zero point”, the condition of absolute freedom, which helps the subjects eschew “the forced choices”85 of merely ‘formal’ freedom, opting instead for something altogether different, albeit New and as of yet,
unseen.\
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The ‘Eventfulness’ of the Act
In the essay, “St. Paul and the Truth-Event”, Žižek turns to St. Paul (through
Badiou) in order to suggest that when “short-circuited”, both authors together present
Truth as an Event that perverts the structure of Being and belongs to a wholly other register, ‘the pure Multiplicity of Nothing.’86 “A true Event emerges out of the ‘Void’ of the
situation”87, and so its radically undecidable and spontaneous activity has neither an ontological guarantee nor a hidden content or agency.88 It attaches itself to that localized Void
inherent in the inconsistencies and transgressions of every situation, making a new Subject visible and intelligible ex nihilo: it ushers in the Subject from the empty Void. This
“Void” is the ontological incompleteness of reality itself, a point that Christianity makes
particularly well (as we shall see). It is not the nihilist ‘nothing that is still something’,
but rather the materialist ‘something that is nothing’, that truly terrifying and abyssal
truth that is always already the site where consistent subjectivity is borne. While Žižek
links the Event to subjectivity itself, “In this precise sense, an Event involves subjectivity; the engaged “subjective perspective” on the Event is part of the Event itself”89, the

Christianity provides the political logic of ‘concrete universality’ where all actors have direct access to reality that transgresses the ‘big Other’ of ordered hierarchy. Its critique instigates a withdrawal whereby the
social actor experiences herself as fully responsible.
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Event-structure of ideology critique is not good news for the Subject, for “the Event necessarily appears as standalone, as an undesirable, chaotic intrusion that has no place in the
state of the situation.”90 Žižek is clear that “what defines the subject is his or her fidelity
to the Event: the subject comes after the Event and persists in discerning its traces within
his and her situation.” If this is true, the Subject is clearly not good news either, not only
for itself, but for the socio-symbolic order. It is imbued with all the Event’s characteristics; its contingency, its partiality, its instability. It is here that Žižek describes ideology
critique and subject formation in the same terms: “the truth-Event is simply a radically
new beginning: it designates the violent, traumatic and contingent, intrusion of another
dimension not ‘mediated’ by the domain of terrestrial finitude and corruption.”91 The
question is what role does theology have in instigating this “new beginning” in a way that
does not devolve into another ideology, but rather keeps the pure multiplicity of Void
open? In what way does Žižek see Christianity as the Event?
Žižek acknowledges that there are close similarities between Badiou’s notion of
the subject viz a viz the Event and Althusser’s notion of ideological interpretation, noting
in particular the central place that theology has in calling subjectivity forth from individuals. For Žižek, as for Badiou, the biblical Paul is uniquely helpful for identifying this, in
that he argues that Christ’s death clears the way for a subjectivity that eschews the marks

90

Žižek, “Paul and the Truth Event,” 85.

91

Žižek, “Paul and the Truth Event,” 93.

186
and conditions of individual and is based instead on “universal singularity.” Žižek follows Badiou in arguing that Christianity houses the paradigmatic truth Event in its attestation to divine death and crucifixion92, in the way that “the truth Event is truth in itself
for its agents themselves, not for external observers”, and so “truth is discernible only for
the potential members of the new community of believers, for their engaged gaze.”93 It
invokes the ultimate Impossibility (love, miracle, resurrection, and so on) that resets the
parameters of what counts in the situation; it “unplugs” itself from the dictates of the accepted, putting into motion an universal power, a political work that mocks and shatters
the predominant patterns, the stylized and scripted “quiet rooms”94 where the actual political decisions are made.95 As an Event, the death of God becomes a truth-Event ‘after the
fact’, “that is, when it leads to the constitution of the group of believers, of the engaged
community held together by the fidelity to the Event: the traumatic encounter with the
Real in Christ’s death.”96 Christ’s death prepares the site for the Event by identifying God
as humanity,97 but identifying oneself with Christ’s death and abandonment by God
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means that one opts out of the ethical turn to real political decisions and the legislative
and judicial arena of polices and policing, suspending its “stubborn attachments”, and
choosing instead the liminal domain of the ‘Holy Spirit’, the social bond of love that links
the revolutionary collective together amidst the radical absence of the big Other.98
Speaking of the ‘eventfulness’ of Christianity, Žižek writes: “Christian revelation
is thus an example (although probably the example) of how we, human beings, are not
constrained to the positivity of being; of how, from time to time, in a contingent and unpredictable way, a truth-Event can occur that opens up the possibility of participating in
another life by remaining faithful to the truth-Event.”99 This is how theology is ideology
critique. Structured as a truth-Event, it is the procedure that clears the way for political
subjects who are capable of acting within this life. This “magical break” is accomplished
by what Žižek terms the “theologico-political suspension of the ethical.”100 Here, Christianity is thought to have dismissed the hold of the law on the subject, breaking the vicious
cycle of law and transgression by instigating the death of the big Other, that quilting
“nodal point” that dominates and regulates the subject’s life within the symbolic order:
“there is no experience of the divine without such a suspension of the Ethical.”101 This
marks the new beginning of and for the subject, who in the absence of the deadlock of
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fantasy (rendered by Žižek as the ideological demands of the Ethical universal), is given
the opportunity, in absolute freedom, to intervene into authentic political acts that generate Events, rather than Orders.
Here we can see more clearly that, in Žižek’s view, ideology critique is guided by
psychoanalysis, but is rerouted through Christianity. The proper relation to the “empty
space” of the Void – that “true openness” which is leftover after ideology critique – is not
to maintain our distance, but rather to view it as that through which we must tarry in order for the subject to materialize. But the effect of the Void on the subject is not creative,
but dialectic in that it empties the gap – rips open the sutures of social reality – with a
negative force that assumes positive existence only as it is left open. Ideology critique
clears the way for authentic political subjects by bringing out “the acceptance of the very
fact that our lives involve a traumatic kernel, beyond redemption, that there is a dimension of our being which forever resists redemption-deliverance.”102 This “entails the acceptance and admission that all our discursive formations are forever haunted”, but that
life must go on. “Christian materialism” seems uniquely positioned to disseminate this
message, and to unfold its unrealized political implications, precisely because it models
how best to “unplug” from the social order and confess the very antagonisms that the
Symbolic order have been designed to resist and repress. Žižek’s interest in theology is
clarified when one looks at its political utility in critiquing ideology, and not the political
utility of theological ‘content’ itself, which is not operative for Žižek. The political significance of Christian theology is second-order and derivative; it gains its political import
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through its work as a negatively dialectical force that sets in motion a form of ideology
critique that is both properly negative and materialist. It is a thought-form, a critical form
of rationality that is unique in its enduring negativity, and so in theology, Žižek finds a
political ‘kernel’ capable of setting the political subject free, not from ideology, but from
the ideologico-critical fantasy itself. Only then is the Act possible.
Žižek’s Theology as Ideology Critique
But is not theology yet another iteration of ideology? How is it not another, albeit
more politically radical, fantasy that protects the Subject from its traumatic origins, from
the pure negativity of the Lack at its heart? Even if one concedes to Žižek the ideologicocritical dimension of theology, it is not altogether clear how it is that theology does not
eventually “fold over” the ideological Gap, suturing the very openness and instability
upon which Žižek’s materialist ontology (and so, his theory of the Act) is built. Žižek,
however, seems quite convinced that there is something unique about the “perverse core”
of Christian materialism that is worth fighting for.103 Žižek accounts for this unique contribution through a Hegelian “death of God theology”, tied to the theology of divine suffering and abandonment, and signaled in the crucified God’s “cry of dereliction” at his
death. This event results in the formation of the ‘Spirit’ of love, the collective and democ-
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ratized social bond that lives and acts in the radical absence of the big Other, finally disabused of and ‘subtracted’ from the “forced choices” of currently available political options.104 This clears the way for the authentic Acts of political subjects, acts that emerge
from “absolute freedom” that makes real intervention and apocalyptic possible, acts that
are discontinuous and transgressive of established political coordinates.
This kind of “unplugged” politics is made possible only by theology105, says
Žižek, for its uniquely apocalyptic message is capable to instigating the conditions of
possibility for revolutionary subjectivity without ceding to the sutures of ideology. The
Christian declaration is the confrontation of the horrifying truth of the Lack: God has become human, died, and was given new life in the new beginning of the collective, who
must nevertheless strive forward, but are no longer beholden to “this” life. The Christian
life is the political life of the liminal “undead.”106 In this way, Žižek interprets the cruci-
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fied Christ as the “vanishing mediator” between the law of the divine Father and the absolute freedom of the Holy Spirit, and so in doing, narrates ‘the passage’ from Judaism to
Christianity as one from “law to love.”107 This amounts to a ‘Christian materialism’ (the
dialectical successor to current orthodoxy, which is itself a betrayal of Christianity’s revolutionary Truth) that Žižek endorses as essential to the critique of ideology and the authentic political Acts that follow.
The Death of God Theology and the ‘Negation of Negation’
Key to understanding how and why Žižek reconfigures political theology as ideology critique is his interpretation and use of the negation of negation, a key element of his
engagement with dialectical materialism, which he believes, is best found in the work of
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Žižek is eager to defend the political usefulness of the Hegelian dialectical pro-

cess, specifically related to the confusing phrase, the “negation of negation.”109 For him,
Hegelian dialectics is not a “vulgar evolutionism” whereby one finds the ultimate answers by reconciling apparent opposites through a totalizing and harmonizing process of
synthesis and resolution. Instead, the negativity of this dialectic, with all its disruptive
power, “has a positive function” of coming upon the truth, and so requires a series of errors – one must first make the wrong choice110 – but this wrong choice is not merely discarded, but is sublated into the final truth (which not the same as a reconciliation or grand
synthesis of with the prior error).111
The ‘negation of negation’ is not ancillary to the essential nature of Spirit (which
otherwise works to progressively raise something to a higher level), but is the core of dialectics. Dialectics is the critical act which shows that the negation (the first move, ‘… of
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the negation’) is indeed still entangled in the master-signifier, the ‘big Other’, and so it
calls for a secondary move (‘the negation …’) that acts upon the first one. The effect of
this procedure is the realization that nothing is beyond or outside the big Other and that as
the master-signifier, the ideology of the big Other only serves to fill in the space of the
‘non-All’ of social reality, so as to make the scripted life in social reality bearable. This
“negation of negation”, while being purely negative (in the sense that it shows the Void
to be void without replacing it), nevertheless becomes the basis of all authentic political
acts insofar as it is the “loss of loss”: it is a “negation without a filling.”112 This negativity
opens up the act itself so that it does not obey or submit itself to any pre-existing coordinates of social consensus or political options, but rather actively mocks the symbolic order by its self-enunciation as the “exception” to the big Other.
Žižek does not turn to Christian theology because of its present fashionable status
in (some corners of) philosophy, but because he thinks it does something, namely that it
represents a critical and dialectical ‘thought-form’ of negativity that clears the way for
“authentic political acts.” For Žižek, Christianity is the properly materialist vector for any
authentically political Act. Critical materialist thinking is as theological as theology is
critically materialist. He affirms the “direct lineage from Christianity to Marxism” in order to marshal its resources to combat “the onslaught of new spiritualisms”: “the authentic Christian legacy is much too precious to be left to the fundamentalist freaks.”113 While
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he finds the “return of religion” to be “deplorable”, (he is as critical of Derrida’s “religion
without religion” as he is of New Age spiritualisms)114, Žižek nevertheless finds in Christianity a unique kernel of truth, a ‘perverse core’ that incubates a political legacy and
emancipatory logic that betrays its creedal repression.115 This, he is convinced, is essential for revitalizing truly dialectical critique in the Hegelian vein, so much so that “this
kernel is accessible only to a materialist approach – vice versa: to become a dialectical
materialist, one should go through the Christian experience.”116 This plays itself out in a
number of ways in Žižek’s theological interpretation of Christianity, most distinctly in his
elaboration of the death of God theology, of God’s response to Job’s suffering, the passage from Judaism to Christianity, and finally, the Spirit as a theology of the collective.
Žižek interprets Christian theology as ideology critique through the prism of a
“death of God” theology. He does not claims to draw on the actual tradition of the death
of God in Christianity, whether its instantiation in the 1960’s “radical theology” or its
more classical, patristic, or biblical roots. Žižek casts his theology as a part of the “new”
reading of Hegel117 as well as role that Hegel is playing in the reconsideration of Radical
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and Secular currents in theology.
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These theologies, which originated in Paul Tillich’s

theology of culture, gained some currency first in the 1960s ‘death of god’ theology and
then reemerged in the 1980s ‘postmodern’ theology, but eventually faded in large part
due to the success of the narrative and post-liberal trends in the 1990s and 2000s. The sobering geo-political events of the early 2000s and 2010s, as well as the return of religion
in academic discourse more broadly, has caused many to question the localist, ecclesiocentric, and sectarian aspects of those theologies, however. Radical theologies are wellsuited as alternative candidates because they are post-metaphysical and rely on social vocabularies and cultural categories. Žižek’s atheistic theology perhaps best fits as a continuation and elaboration of this tradition, something that he himself has readily admitted,
even though Žižek has only minimally engaged this work.119
Instead, Žižek turns to the kenotic elements of Protestant theologia crucis, where
God empties Itself into the divine Son through a traumatic death that, in Žižek’s reconstruction, represents the death of the Big Other, performed expertly by Christianity. This
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establishes a homological relationship between theology and ideology critique, between
the Christian death of God and what Žižek stylizes as a Hegelian “negation of negation.”120 The death of God displays “the epochal political achievement” of Christianity
itself, wherein the dialectics of the Incarnation, we discover the materialist immanence of
theology ‘In itself’: “God Himself is Man, ‘one of us’”, meaning that “there is no mystery, no hidden true content behind the mask (deceptive surface) of the other.”121 Žižek
argues that “if, as Hegel emphasizes, what dies on the Christ is the God of beyond itself,
the radical Other, then the identification with Christ (“life in Christ”) means precisely the
suspension of Otherness.”122
Christianity testifies to the content of this experience in the crucified Christ’s “cry
of dereliction”: ‘My god, my god, why have you forsaken me?’ Here we find God admitting that God has abandoned God’s self and as such, left humanity to itself – incapable of
serving as its ontological guarantee, the ground of its acts.123 By admitting to God’s selfabandonment, and by virtue of the logic of the incarnation, the abandonment of humanity,
Christianity “traverses the fantasy” and divulges itself as ideology critique by denouncing
the big Other. This makes Christianity, says Žižek, the “first religion without the sacred”;
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it does not long for an external or transcendental limit and instigates the ruptural, practical stance that follows.124 This is why Žižek insists that “the longing for a new external/transcendent limit, for a divine agent who imposes such a limit, is profoundly nonChristian.”125 Christianity, rather, possesses a kind of revolutionary courage, the courage
of Christ’s ‘empty sacrifice’126, wherein ”it was God Himself who made a Pascalian wager: by dying on the Cross, He made a risky gesture with no guaranteed final outcome,
that is, He provided us—humanity—with the empty S1, Master-Signifier.”127 The incarnation is revelatory, but not in the sense that God shows himself to humanity as what God
is to Godsself, but that God shows Godsself to God as what God is to humanity.128
And so, when Žižek says that “what dies on the Cross is not God’s earthly representative-incarnation, but God of beyond itself”129, it is clear that the incarnation is cannot be unambiguously good news for humanity, especially since it ends with God’s
death.130 Christ’s death reveals God to Godsself, and that revelation is traumatic for God
as God finds Godsself utterly abandoned, alienated from itself, which mirrors the human
experience of the same. To take the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ seriously is to
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know “Christ as the God who, in His act of Incarnation, freely identified Himself with
His own shit.”131 And so, it is in the death of God that Christ is shown to be most human
and where God is shown to be most divine, whereby “the radical gap that separates God
from man is transposed into God himself.”132 It is here that shows us that “we are one
with God only when God is no longer one with himself, but abandons Himself, ‘internalizes’ the radical distance with separates us from Him. Our radical experience of separation from God is the very feature which unites us with Him.”133
Recalling the earlier discussion on belief as critique, this confession by God is
God’s own ‘fetishistic disavowal’ of belief134; The critical structure of belief is tied directly to the ‘negation of negation’, whereby we see that
the properly Hegelian negation of negation is not the return to direct belief, but
the self-relating fake: ‘I fake to fake to believe,’ which means: ‘I really believe
without being aware of it.’ Is, then, irony not the ultimate form of the critique of
ideology today - [the] irony …. of taking the statements more seriously than the
subjects who utter them themselves?135
In short, this illustrates how and why Christian theology of God (namely, of
God’s death) is indeed a critique of ideology. Christianity is at its critical best when it
confesses, while talking about God, that ‘I pretend to pretend to believe’ (rather than ‘I
do not believe’). Žižek explains theological structure of this ironic unbelief this way:
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“When Christ dies, what dies with him is the secret hope discernible in ‘Father, why hast
thou forsaken me?’, the hope that there is a Father who abandoned me.”136 This is the
moment of ultimate irony where God attests to God’s own atheism, not by denying or negating claims to God’s existence, but by calling out to Godsself in the moment of God’s
non-identity.137 This stunning admission is the political ‘calling card’ of Christianity, and
so becomes the key to thinking through the triangulation of theology, materialism, and
ideology critique.138
The political meaning of Christianity is not Jesus’ benevolent ministry, social vision in the synoptic gospels, solidarity with human suffering in death, or purported victory over death in resurrection, but rather is found in how Christian theology admits to
the “negation of negation” that most clearly visible in the death of God in the crucified
body of Jesus Christ. The theologic of the incarnation, which is then reinterpreted in the
Event of divine death, shifts the perspective on the divine-human relationship. As such,
Žižek’s thesis is that Christian materialism betrays its ‘orthodoxy’ by performing this negation as negation as ideology critique: namely, a critique of the ideology of big Other as
the divine guarantee, the transcendental signifier that affords meaning, coherence, and
sense to the world and human experience. Theology participates in “the same matrix of
Hegelian paradoxical self-negating reversal” that is “also the fundamental procedure of
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that enacts “the radically negative break, rupture, with

the old substantive order as the condition of a new universality.”140
And so, for Žižek, Christianity is ideologico-critical because it is “far from boring, humdrum, or safe”; it is indeed, “perilous”, “daring”, “subversive, even revolutionary”141, characteristics given to it by its most orthodox, but also ‘heretical’ aspects, most
notably the doctrine of the Incarnation.142 For Žižek, “religion has two possible roles:
therapeutic or critical. It either helps individuals to function better in the existing order,
or it tries to assert itself as a critical agency articulating what is wrong with this order as
such, a space for the voices of discontent—in this second case, religion as such tends toward assuming the role of a heresy.”143
Considering the ‘classic’ Marxist position on ideology, this appears as a startling
reversal. For Žižek, “the point of Christianity as the religion of atheism is not the vulgar
humanist one that the becoming man of God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuerbach), rather it attacks the religious hard core that surfaces even in humanism, even up to
Stalinism, with its believe in history as the “big Other” that decides on the objective
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Žižek finds the theological structure of ideology critique to be

politically important because it is negatively critical, not because the content of Christian
theology is any way true. He does not think that even Christianity believes its declarations about God to be true! Its own teachings are ironic disavowal, not by abandoning itself, but in clinging to itself evermore. That is to say, “what if one kneels down and prays
not so much to regain one's own belief but, on the opposite, to GET RID of one's belief,
of its over-proximity, to acquire a breathing space of a minimal distance towards it?”145
And so, here we can see more clearly than before that the political thesis of
Žižek’s ideology critique is that the lesson of Christian theology and Lacanian psychoanalysis turns out to be the same: “the big Other does not exist.”146 Through this, the analysand (as the subject) accepts the absence of a guarantee and as such is able to access the
obscenity of its core in the traumatic Void. The point is not to say how “truth” is defined
as knowledge of the real state of things, but rather that it is the Real of the antagonism itself: “the fundamental feature of today’s society is the irreconcilable antagonism…it is
that which prevents us from accessing the Thing directly is the Thing itself.”147 Put differently, “If we can think our knowledge of reality (the way reality appears to us) as having radically failed, as radically different from the Absolute, then this gap (between Forus and In-itself) must be part of the Absolute itself, so that the very feature that seemed
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forever to keep us away from the Absolute is the only feature which directly unites us
with the absolute.”148
The practice of ideology critique teaches the political subject, not only about the
failure that conditions our knowledge, but also about the Absolute freedom that comes
from recognizing that the traumatic Gap gives rise to political subjectivity in the first
place. If, as Žižek claims, this is the lesson of ideology critique, “does not exactly the
same shift happen at the very core of the Christian experience?”149 For Christianity, “it is
the radical separation of man from God which unites us with God, since, in the figure of
Christ, God is thoroughly separated from itself - the point is not to ‘overcome’ the gap
that separates us from God, but to take note of how this gap is internal to God Himself.”150 This is accomplished in the person of Jesus Christ, in which the original negation
(‘the Fall’) is shown via a subsequent negation (‘the death of Christ’) to be, in a startling
reversal, “the emergence of freedom.”151 Žižek describes the fall as ‘redemption’ and
‘freedom’ this way: “The explosion of freedom, the breaking out from which we fall, that
is, it is in the very movement of the Fall that creates, opens up, what is lost in it.”152 Ideology critique then is the “breaking out” whereby the shift in perspective activates the
subject from the position of ultimate failure. Žižek puts it theologically this way: “this is
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the key ‘Hegelian’ point of Christianity: the resurrection of the dead is not the ‘real
event’ which will take place sometime in the future, but something that is already
here.”153 That ‘something’ is God’s own fall from grace, God's kenotic admission to impotence, illustrated in the book of Job and performed by the crucified Christ, and it is this
divine Fall is at at the very same time, our human redemption.
Job, Jesus, and Divine Weakness
Job is the central theological figure that guides Žižek’s reading of Christianity
through the death of God.154 Not coincidently in my opinion, the book of Job is also an
extraordinary and exemplary case of ideology critique for Žižek.155 In Žižek’s telling of
the biblical narrative, Job experiences immense suffering, and as the story plays out,
struggles to understand and explain this suffering in various ways.156 Job’s three friends –
the theologians! – eventually show up and spew “standard ideological sophistry” about
divine justice and the harmony of history.157 Against them, Job asserts strongly “the apparent meaninglessness” of this suffering158, and in a radical reversal of what one might
expect to hear from God on the matter, Žižek argues, “God takes his side at the end,
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God shows God’s true self to Job, con-

trary to the witness of his theological friends, as “a God who acts like someone caught in
a moment of impotence.”160 It is through the narrative of Job that we can properly interpret the Crucifixion as a instance of ideology critique. Like Christ, Job instigates the
death of the Big Other by calling attention to the facticity of divine impotence and abandonment. Job interrogates God and finds God to be powerless, unable to do much of anything in the face of Job’s struggles - and God agrees. God is impotent, subject to the same
radical contingency and openness that conditions human thought and action. God’s
highly defensive and overcompensating reaction is shameful, as it only underscores the
scandalous truth embedded (not so subtly) within the Hebrew narrative.161 Job's silent response to God is one of embarrassment and solidarity: Job realizes that God stands in the
same relation to the world as Job does, and when faced with divine flaccidity, Job rests
his case against divine injustice.162
By Žižek’s reading, the book of Job displays the approach of the Jewish law’s
“stubborn attachments” to the traumatic truth of divine impotence.163 Whereas Judaism
repressed this truth and “refused to give up their ghost, to cut off the link to their secret,
disavowed tradition,” says Žižek, seen most directly in the prohibition of graven images,
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Christianity is the radical religion of revelation, in that it brings it all out in the open - it
admits to its most guarded secret, or, what Žižek is fond of calling, “the matter most dark
and awful.” In Christ’s crucifixion, God takes Job’s place in the narrative of revelation.164
As the crucified Jesus, God has Job’s experience and encounters his own impotence, and
confesses to it in the divine cry of dereliction: “My God, why have you forsaken me?”
Žižek writes: “since we are dealing here not with the gap between man and God, but the
split between God Himself, the solution cannot be for God to appear in all His majesty…it is rather like a child who, having believed in his father’s powerfulness, discovers
with horror that his father cannot help him.”165
It is here that Christianity divulges its own heretical core as ‘the religion of atheism’166 wherein the disclosure of divine powerlessness amounts to the death of God, the
admission that ‘the Big Other does not exist.’167 Žižek elaborates on this, saying
The point of Christianity as the religion of atheism is not the vulgar humanist one
that the becoming-man-of-God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuerbach
et al.); rather, it attacks the religious hard core that survives even in humanism,
even up to Stalinism, with its belief in History as the “big Other” that decides on
the “objective meaning” of our deeds.168
What happens to God in Christ’s death is that God is finally shown to be ‘just one
of us’, is included in “the series of ordinary creatures’169, and so ‘traverses the fantasy’,
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thereby linking the theological gesture of divine death to the political procedure of ideology critique. This incarnational logic disavows the ideological fantasy of the big Other
through the Event of the cross, thereby opening up new space, not to be filled up again by
some substitute, but with excessive negativity that refuses suturing up the central void of
our desire. God admits to being human in Christ, to being impotent in the face of suffering: how do you come back from that?
This is how ‘the Christian breakthrough’ is, after all, ideology critique. The principal theological lesson that Žižek learns from Christ's death is the fact that “the function
of the obscene superego supplement of the (divine) Law is to mask this impotence of the
Big Other.” In the crucified Christ, Christianity reveals this impotence and so “it is quite
logically the first and only religion radically to leave behind the split between the official
and public text and its obscene initiatory supplement; there is no hidden, untold story in
it. In this precise sense, Christianity is the religion of Revelation: everything is revealed
in it, no obscene superego supplement accompanies its public message…what is revealed
in Christianity is not just the entire content, but, more specifically, that there is nothing no secret - behind it to be revealed.”170
In their attestation to divine impotence, Job and Christ teach us how to ask “do we
need God?” in new political ways. Put differently, it interjects into the political situation
the properly Christian declaration that ‘the big Other does not exist.’ This means that
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“there is no one to turn to, to address, to bear witness to, no one to receive our plea, or lament.”171 This is Christianity’s gospel, its ‘good news’: “the miracle of faith is that it IS
possible to traverse the fantasy, to undo the founding decision, to start one’s life over
again, from the zero-point…”172 This is what Job’s narrative teaches us, by telling us that
God in God’s self admits that Job is right, that there is no meaning to suffering, that there
is no transcendent God pulling the strings, no big Other guaranteeing the coherence of the
socio-symbolic order, and as such, “we, humans, are left with no higher Power watching
over us, just with with the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the face of divine creation, and thus of God himself.”173 It is through Job that we understand Christ’s
suffering as equally meaningless, if “meaning” is that coded language for something that
lies beyond or outside us that promises some stability and harmony as a part of the
Whole. It is through Christ’s death that God “falls into” materiality, subjects Itself to the
incompleteness, the Truly Open character of the Real, and shows itself to be “one of us”,
rather the grand Master-Signifier: the big Other.174 And, while this is certainly a kind of
atheism, Žižek maintains it is a distinctively Christian atheism, which is better named a
‘materialist theology.’175
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This unlocks Christianity’s essential political truth: the perversality of Christ's
death. A ‘materialist theology’, says Žižek “is a position that accepts the ultimate void of
reality – the consequence of its central thesis on the primordial multiplicity is that there is
no ‘substantial reality’, that the only ‘substance’ of the multiplicity is void.”176 But for
Christianity to realize this materialist core, “it has to sacrifice itself – like Christ who had
to die so that Christianity could emerge.”177 For Žižek, “the ‘death of God theology’
marks the moment when the only way to keep its truth alive was through a materialist
heresy split from its main corpse.”178 This Christian materialism is the dialectical successor to Christianity insofar as it owned up to what the immanence of God as humanity, the
transubstantiation of the divine as the human, tells us that, when it comes to reality, all
we can say is that there IS only Nothing: that reality is in itself, non-All.”179 As a theological position, it is ideology critique in that it teaches us that “the only true belief is belief
without any support in the authority of some presupposed figure of the Big Other.”180
Theology as critique of ideology, then, is shown to be “a kind of infinite negation, not so
much “I believe in un-God” but rather something “unbelief”, the pure form of belief deprived of its substantialization – “unbelief” is still the form of belief, like the undead
who, as the living dead, remain dead.”181
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What makes Christianity politically instructive is the way it inaugurates the apocalyptic explosiveness of the Event; it makes no claims to the big Other, but quite the opposite. It puts it to rest, quite literally, in the Christ-Event whereby God dies as a purely
negative matter of immanent critique. As such, “the ultimate horizon of Christianity” is
that “there is no mystery, no hidden true content, behind the mask (deceptive surface) of
the Other. The ultimate idolatry is not the idolizing of the mask, of the image, itself, but
the belief that there is some hidden positive context beyond the mask.”182 Indeed, as
Žižek continues elsewhere, “Christ’s death on the cross is the death of this God, it repeats
Job’s stance, it refuses any “deeper meaning” that obfuscates the brutal reality of historical catastrophe.”183 This homology between Job and Christ is expressed in a “double kenosis”: God’s self-alienation and the alienation of God from human persons overlaps at
God's death, where “the distance of man from God is thus the distance of God from himself.”184 But what makes this kenotic self-emptying of God so politically important is that
it allows political subjectivity to emerge:
In order for (human) subjectivity to emerge out of the substantial personality of
the human animal,…as the self-relating negativity of an empty singularity, God
himself, the universal Substance, has to “humiliate” himself, to fall into his own
creation, “objectivize” himself, to appear as the singular miserable human individual, in all its abjection, i.e., abandoned by God.185
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The alienation of God from Godsself, evinced in both the death of Christ and the divine
cry of dereliction, produces “the split, negativity, particularization, self-alienation” between God and humanity “must be posited as something that takes place in the very heart
of the divine Substance, i.e., the move from Substance to Subject must occur within God
himself.”186 This effects the situation of absolute freedom deemed necessary for the political subject to take form in a political world, emptied of ‘the big Other.’187 This ideologico-critical clearing leaves room for the subject to act authentically, unconstrained by the
‘forced choices' inherent to the dictates of ‘formal’ freedom.188
The ‘Passage’ from Judaism to Christianity
Another theological area of interest to Žižek’s ideology critique is what he perceives as Christianity’s radical “break” from Judaism.189 The origin-point of Christianity
is in its dialectical sublation of law and its self-grounding in the democratization of political love, which it cannot do without reference to Jewish law. Again, with law as with fantasy, belief, trauma, and (as we are seeing) ideology, the proper stance is not to resist or
supplement, nor to abolish or strike against it, but rather to accomplish, actualize, and re-
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alize it in full, even to excess, for the ‘Fall into law is precisely that which brings freedom.190 As Lacan points out in reference to the big Other, “one can get rid of it (ignore it:
sen passer) on condition that one makes use of it.”191
Whereas pagan religion posits divinity as the “given spiritual essence”192, Jewish
theology effectively “abolished any reference to the unapproachable, transcendent God,
the absolute Master”193 through its iconoclastic prohibition.194 There is within Judaism,
Žižek argues, a founding traumatic experience expressed in the “excessive violent nature
of the very gesture of repressing the pagan universe and imposing the universal rule of
the One of Law.”195 Judaism externalizes this haunting truth through the Law as a way of
repressing this core, but even “as nonexistent, it continues to persist, that is, its spectral
presence continues to haunt the living.”196 This gnaws at Judaism, and at times it threatens to break out and to pierce the surface. Judaism is founded by its “stubborn attachments to the unacknowledged violent founding gesture that haunts the public legal order
as its spectral supplement.”197 Far from being anemic and banal, the power of Judaism
stems from its disciplined response to this trauma: “this ‘repressed’ status of the Event is

190

Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 117-121.

191

Jacque Lacan, “Seminar XXIII”, as quoted by Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 102.

192

Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 201.

193

Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 201.

194

Žižek, On Belief, 127-134.

195

Žižek, Fragile Absolute, 63.

196

Žižek, Fragile Absolute, 59.

197

Žižek, Fragile Absolute, 97.

212
what gives Judaism its unprecedented vitality…. They refused to give up the ghost, to cut
off the link to their secret disavowed tradition.”198 Nevertheless, the pressure of maintaining the appearance of the radical nómos is unbearable, not because of its transgressive
presence, but because of its excessive absence: it cannot be accounted for. Its truth, its
identification with itself, is unattainable since its own transgression, ‘the crime’, is written into the ethico-legal aspect of law.
The political problem is in how the trauma of this theological truth acts upon the
subject as “the indivisible remainder, the spectral ‘rest’ that resists ‘confession’, that can
never be redeemed-delivered, laid to rest, pacified/gentrified.”199 Christianity enters the
scene as the Event that finally accounts for this Lack (which is actively repressed by the
very Law it transgresses) and so makes its enunciation finally possible. This frees the
subject to finally come to grips with the horrifying secret; it follows Judaism’s example,
in its ideologico-critical gesture of ‘unplugging’, by articulating the baselessness of
Christianity: it lacks roots, is unbeholden to the dictates of the social order, and is able to
be itself in an unmediated and universal way.200 This is the apocalyptic character of
Christianity, not the sense that it brings out the “end of days”, but instead, through its violent revelation of what was previously spectral and absent within the Jewish penchant for
Law. Žižek is fond of saying that “the secret to which the Jews remain faithful is the horror of the divine impotence – and it is this secret that is ‘revealed’ in Christianity. This is
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why Christianity could occur only after Judaism: it reveals the horror first confronted by
the Jews.”201 Christianity becomes ideology critique insofar as “[it] is the religion of confession… they are ready to confess the primordial crime (in the displaced form of murdering not the Father but the Christ, the son of God) and thereby betray its traumatic impact/weight.”202 Furthermore, “it is the Jewish religion which remains an ‘abstract/immediate’ negation of anthropomorphism, and as such, attached to it, determined by it in its
very direct negation, whereas it is only Christianity that actually sublates paganism.”203
It is in the way that the political love in “Christianity” unplugs the political subject from the vicious cycle of Law and transgression in “Judaism” that Žižek finds the
materialist principle guiding his political theology: “Christianity then goes a step further
by asserting not only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in the figure of
Christ: ‘no matter man looks like God, since the man (Christ) is God.’”204 The Incarnation acts upon theology so as to show that “man directly is part of the Divine life, that is,
because it is only man, in human history, that God fully realizes Himself, that He becomes an actual living God.”205 The materialist kernel that is so critically productive is
the “direct identity of God and man” in the doctrine of the incarnation, which is precisely
that repressed core that Judaism sought to repress, but Christianity - in the death of God -
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admits to. Christianity brings divinity and humanity together through the doctrine of divine Incarnation which teaches that “in the figure of Christ, God himself becomes
man.”206 For Žižek, the distinctiveness of Christian theology lies in how it freely admits
to “the very same perverse core”, that “spectral history” that Judaism is consistently
working to anxiously repress and suture.
The point here is not that Christianity tells Judaism’s repressed truth for it, but
that “in contrast to the Jewish religion of anxiety, Christianity is a religion of love.”207
Lest we think Žižek to be turning sentimental on us, love is understood “in its dimension
of fundamental deception: we try to fill out the unbearable gap of ‘che vuoi’, the opening
of the Other’s desire, by offering ourselves to the Other as the object of its desire.”208 In
this way, “Christianity is therefore to be conceived as an attempt to gentrify the Jewish
‘che vuoi’ through the act of love and sacrifice.”209 The most notable example of this is
how Christ sublates himself into love through his death, serving as the ‘vanishing mediator’ between the Law of the divine-Father and the Holy Spirit, interpreted politically by
Žižek as the social bond of love that holds the revolutionary collective together, so that
they are able to live and work after the death of the big Other is exposed. The real ideologico-critical move made by Christianity in its passage from Judaism lies in how it faces
up to its traumatic Origins through the intervention of agape, which, as it turns out, is
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“the unheard of gesture of leaving behind the domain of the law itself, of ‘dying to the
law.’ Christian redemption is not the rectification of its traumatic origins. It is in the antinomian refusal to support the spectral power of the “vicious cycle of the Law and its
founding Transgression.”210 Christianity is “a religion of Love”, because in love, one singles out and focuses on a finite temporal object, which means more than anything else,
and chooses it as the universal, yet singular. For Žižek, this “universal singularity” marks
the political space made possible through Christian theology’s unique willingness to confess that which other religions ideologically suppress: “Christianity, far from claiming
fully realization of the promise, accomplishes something far more uncanny; the Messiah
is here, he has arrived, the final Event has already taken place, yet the gap (the gap which
sustained the messianic promise) remains …”211
It remains highly questionable whether Žižek is as theologically supported in this
argument by the dark trajectory of Christianity as he seems to think, especially since
Christianity is stubborn in its commitment to the idea that redemption comes through pattern of both life and death, that death only makes sense in life, and that death itself cannot
be redemptive, for God, for humanity, or for the social world. Žižek argues that the death
of God is a prime theological example of the ‘negation of negation’ central to any ideology critique, and that it models the kind of thinking necessary for ideology critique to be
effective in confronting the predominant ideologies of our time. In this way, the death of
God is a “theologico-political suspension of the ethical”; that is, that it suspends actions
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that are undertaken with the assumption of any ontological coherence, guarantee, or order, and instead takes up critique as the effort to undercover the antagonisms, the contradictions, the empty places between critique, action, and political change.
How, then, is this “death of God” theology operationalized as a critique of ideology? Christianity’s supposed renunciation of the big Other in the theological form of the
death of God generates what Žižek has termed (idiosyncratically borrowing from Kierkegaard) “the theologico-political suspension of the ethical”212 or, as Žižek is fond of saying, “if God does not exist, than everything is prohibited.”213 This opens up the political
space for a new kind of collective, a new social bond, that relies not on some final guarantee, but is capable of matching the cruel world with an equally brutal realism, what he
describes as “an ethics without morality”, but what might better be called, “a politics
without ethics”, made possible in the negation of negation of ‘transcendence’ (which
Žižek interprets as the ‘big Other’) by the double kenosis of incarnation and crucifixion.
Žižek describes the interplay between ideology critique and the sublating ‘negation of negation’ as that which gives way to the revolutionary community of believers, whose kenotic acts of love, sacrifice, conversion, and yes, even death, give rise to a new kind of
subject, a new political community whose unique founding moment promises to bring
something altogether different to the political landscape: “what is sublated in the move
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from the Son to the Holy Spirit is thus God Himself; after the Crucifixion, the death of
God incarnate, the universal God returns as a Spirit of the community of believers.”214
“The Spirit”: A Theology of the Collective
So far, I have argued that, for Žižek, ideology critique accomplishes politically
what psychoanalysis works to bring to the forefront for the subject: to disrupt the fantasy
of the big Other. In this way, the power of Christianity lies in its Event-structure, its
apocalyptic ‘revealing.’ But this is anything but good news systems and institutions, for
“Christianity is the miraculous Event that disturbs the balance of the One-All; it is the violent intrusion of Difference that precisely throws the balanced circuit of the universe off
the rails.”215 The death of God does not inaugurate a political nihilism or a celebration of
the Nothing of the Void left after the death of God, but it is Christ’s death, says Žižek,
that “designates a rupture with the circular movement of death and rebirth, the passage to
a wholly different dimension of the Holy Spirit.”216 In so doing, Christian theology clears
the way for a revolutionary kind of community that gains its revolutionary political character as “the community deprived of its support in the Big Other.”217
The ‘negation of negation’ of Christ’s death that clears the way for this collective
subjectivity is internal to the very kenotic act of God in the Incarnation. God dies as the
crucified Christ and “what emerges in its place is the Holy Spirit, which is not Other, but
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the community (or, rather, collective) of believers”

218
, all of whom are “persisting only in

and through their activity.”219 They are organized around the unconditional and brutal
dictates of political agape.220 The political act of ‘God-becoming-human’ brings forth a
new kind of subject, a new political community whose unique founding moment promises to bring something altogether different to the political landscape. The political payoff
of Žižek’s use of Hegelian death of God theology is found in this collective social body:
“with Christ’s incarnation, the externalization/self-alienation of divinity, the passage
from the transcendent God to finite/mortal individuals is a fait accompli, there is no way
back, all there is, all that “really exists”, from now on are individuals.”221 That “the finite
existence of moral humans is the only site of the Spirit, the site where the Spirit achieves
its actuality”222 is certified in Christ’s own manifestation of itself as love “In-itself”, the
social bond present when “two or three are gathered in my name.”223
Made possible by theology's ideology critique, the subjectivity of the Spirit
thrives in ‘the empty space’ of the Real, the leftover after Christ’s death, for “the Incarnation is the birth of Christ, and after his death, there is neither Father nor Son, but ‘only’
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the Holy Spirit, the spiritual substance of the religious community.”

224

219
The death of God

is negative, indeed, but as, Žižek insists, “the divine Substance itself (God as a Thing-inItself) which is sublated, negated (what dies on the Cross is the substantial figure of the
transcendent God), is simultaneously maintained in the transubstantiated form of the
Holy Spirit, the community of believers which exists only as the virtual presupposition of
the activity of finite individuals.”225 What is particularly unique about the Holy Spirit, the
social bond that makes emancipatory political acts possible, is that “it is the ‘spiritual
substance’ of the individuals who recognizes themselves in it, the ground of their entire
existence, the point of reference which provides the ultimate horizon of meaning to their
lives, something for which these individuals are ready to give their lives.”226 Žižek discerns in the Holy Spirit “a collective not held together by a Master-Signifier, but by a fidelity to a Cause, by the effort to draw a new line of separation that runs ‘beyond Good
and Evil’ that is to say, that runs across and suspends the distinctions of the existing social body.”227
Žižek finds immense political potential in love, which he identifies as the “elementary Christian gesture” because of the way it directs the subject outside the established bounds of political coordinates. When put to use in the right (or left) way, Christianity is uniquely valuable because it gets the violent and subtractive character of love
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right. This love opts for the sword over peace, the division of family orders and social
structures, and the hatred and abandonment of one’s family; it is the love that acts not
through submissive non-resistance, but through “fire, sword, [and] war.”228 Love is that
political force that acts indiscriminately and unconditionally towards the neighbor, not for
sentimental or self-interested reasons, but for the brutal and crude fact that the neighbors
are.229
For Žižek, this is a radical break with the logic of the world at present, challenging the limits of what counts as politically possible. Pauline agape is as thoroughly political as it is violent because it “enjoins us to unplug from the organic community into
which we were born.”230 “Agape as political love means that an unconditional egalitarian
love for Neighbor can serve as the foundation for a New Order. Love is the force of this
universal link which, in an emancipatory collective, connects people directly, in their singularity, bypassing their particular hierarchical determinations.”231 Its break with the
world takes the form of an “unplugging”, an opting out from “the very vicious cycle”232
of prohibition and transgression that generates the social game, a refusal to follow the
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chimeric Big Other, and the Law which serves as its “implicit spectral obscene supplement.”233 Love also rejects the standing and accepted the coordinates of identity and belonging that assign established levels and orders of disposability and desire, and invites
us to withdraw from the hierarchy of the global social order through the “gesture of separation, of drawing the line, of clinging to an element that disturbs the balance of all.”234
This suspension is not roughly anarchic, nor it is a ‘state of exemption’. Rather, it
is negatively constructive in that it establishes a new kind of community, a new social
bond, but this time as “a collective of outcasts, the antidote to any established ‘organic’
group.”235 This Christoformic “uncoupling” is the direct expression of radically political
love, and so redefines the parameters of collective belonging and social attachment by
providing the pathway to opt out of the socio-political game, to own up to the fact that we
all know that ‘the Big Other does not exist’, and that the only thing left to do is lean into
“the terrifying violence at work in this ‘uncoupling’, that of the death drive, of the ‘radical wiping the slate clean’, as the condition of the New Beginning.”236 We are led to do
this by the radical demands made by love “to disengage ourselves from the inertia that
constrains us to identify with the particular order we were born into.”237 This requires that
“one should first renounce the transgressive fantastic supplement that attaches us to it.”238
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This is best accomplished through the radical gesture of striking at one’s self, “at what it
most precious to himself”, what God does to Godsself in the incarnation, suffering, and
death of God in Jesus Christ. This is the condition of subjectivity itself, actually, and so
also sin qua non of authentic political acts, the most apropos model of which is provided
by Christianity itself, namely in the divine abandonment of Jesus Christ upon the moment
of God’s own death.
Another key political aspect of the Holy Spirit, says Žižek, is that it displays how
the ‘negation of negation’ works to produce a charged negativity within the traumatic
Gap left over from ideology critique without replacing with another form of positivity,
another ‘big Other.’ Describing the connection between ‘the negation of negation’ and
the Holy Spirit, Žižek suggests that
the Spirit’s negativity is not relativized, subsumed under an all encompassing positivity, it is on the contrary the “simple negation” which remains attached to the
presupposed positivity it negated, the presupposed Otherness for which it alienates itself, and the negation of negation is nothing but the negation of the substantial character of this Otherness itself, the full acceptance of the abyss of the
Spirit’s self-relating.239
No longer stuck within “the force choice” of the particular coordinates of political possibility, “we catch a glimpse of Another Space which can no longer be dismissed as a fantastic supplement to social reality.”240 This is the Christian legacy of ideology critique
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that Žižek finds so important. There is a thought-form, a critical rationality, a ‘short circuit’ within Christianity that promises to bring forth “the brief apparition of a future Utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling.”241
The Limits of Žižek’s Christianity
Before moving on, a few closing interpretive notes are in order. Žižek’s theoretical apparatus presents the theologian with a difficult challenge. The earlier chapters proceeded with Marx in hand asked both of Eagleton and now Žižek how they maintain both
their theological turn on political grounds and their unique Marxist
readings of ideology critique. Žižek accomplishes this through an idiosyncratic and certainly questionable reading of Christianity as the dialectical materialist core of ideology
critique because of how it deals with the void, the negativity of Real, the incompleteness
of ontological reality, and the revolutionary collective, all of which are theologically interpreted as flowing from, and a consequence of, the “death of God.”
Žižek does this without suggesting that theology is ‘deideological’ or that ideology is
merely a broad, neutralizing account of how the structures of knowledge and beliefs are
produced and determined by social context or location. Christianity is a negative and materialist form of thinking and acting that exemplifies an open and eventful form of criticality.
However, the notion of critique itself is unclear. A thick description of what it
means to be critical gets lost as it is suspended into other concepts like ‘pure difference’,
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parallax gap, the interpassivity of the subject, and so on. Insofar as Žižek considers ideologies to be the fundamental antagonisms of the symbolic order that social reality, it is the
actions of political subjects which generate the sutures of ideology, actions that directly
contradict their beliefs and not the beliefs themselves, that are ideological. The “way out
of” ideology is the ‘eventfulness’ of the authentic political act: it introduces negativity,
dissensus, and non-contemporaneity, the vicissitudes offered by critical politics, into a
situation rife with reasoned and careful acceptance of the global coordinates of capitalist
and technocratic oppression. And so, while the meaning of critique itself in such a scenario is hard to pin down, Žižek turns to Christianity an an example of such an ideology
critique. The ‘death of God’ theology that Žižek lifts up to make his case is problematic,
or at least in need of serious revision, from a strictly theological perspective, leaving us to
wonder whether it is up to the task that Žižek assigns it. His case is selective, uneven, and
often times so overwrought with ironic cleverness and disarming comedic allusions that it
is hard to see its value as an analytic proposal. What precisely constitutes the moment of
critique gets lost, even with all the examples, jokes, stories, and illustrations that Žižek
gives us along the way.
This is due in large part to the fact that Žižek’s ‘Christianity’ is decidedly superficial, and based largely on oblique readings of readings, rather than direct engagements
with the gamut of its polyphonic and multilayered tradition. This leaves it incomplete and
selective; in the sense that one can certainly say that what Žižek offers is a ‘christianity’,
but certainly this cannot be said of Christianity in general, much less what it looks like
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for Christianity (and Christian theology) to become critical, not just political. For example, there are many reasons to be skeptical of his narrative of how critique was bestowed
to Christian theology as it came out through the passage of Judaism, an account that is
unjust to both religions. In The Fragile Absolute, Žižek describes the ‘repressed’ within
Judaism as the “disavowed excessive nature of its own fundamental gesture”, “its own
‘anthropomorphization’/‘personalization’ of God”, which leads to its iconoclastic ban on
images.242 Christianity departs from Judaism, not by disagreeing with this repressed truth
and exposing its fallacy, but by ‘over-identifying’ with its spectral fantasy, “asserting not
only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in the figure of Christ.”243 This
brute honesty, the willingness to declare “that God is NOTHING BUT the excess of
man” is the theological model for ideology critique because it lacks the superego supplement expressed in Judaism iconoclasm. As such, there exists no tension between law and
crime, between transgression and guilt, and so “it is possible to step out…into the Real of
an act.”244 In trying to articulate what transpired in the ‘Paulinist' move from Judaism to
Christianity, Žižek stumbles, unable to depart from the not-so-subtle anti-Judaism that
has haunted psychoanalytic understandings of religion since Freud’s Moses and Monotheism.
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Žižek is erratic, confusing, and at times, it is hard not to accuse of being disingenuous. His theory is hardly systematic and so any attempt to give a structured, plotted account of his work on any given subject is troublesome. As interested as Žižek is in interpreting Christianity as a material religion ‘without the sacred’, he gives us precious little
in terms of understanding the impact of critique on political theology. Aside from confirming the Lacanian psychoanalytic thesis that “the big Other does not exist” through its
affirmation of the death of God, what exactly does critique mean for the material and substantive claims of theology, specifically those that concern the immanent relation between theory and praxis? What impact does the negativity of critique have on theological
relationship to authentic political action or to transformative praxis?
Admittedly, the best we can do at times is gather fragments and piece them together, which always requires a level of strategic thematization. By trying to schematize
the relationship that Žižek posits between ideology and theology, I have lifted out of
Žižek a critical thread: a series of links between fantasy, belief, the act, and Job, the death
of Christ, and the collective Spirit. The benefit of such a project is that we are able to then
test this schematic against his theory of political activity, to see where it gets us in terms
of further understanding the relationship between ideology and theology, and most importantly, the impact of this relationship on practical reasoning, political practices, and
social arrangements. The result of such a project may well be that conceptual analysis
ideology as a category is increasingly unhelpful. I believe that ultimately what Žižek clar-
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ifies for us is that the best way to prehend the relationship is through the notion of critique itself. This is illustrated by how Žižek applies what he has found about the relation
of ideology and theology to ideas about the political, and the political Act itself.
Žižek and Political Theology after Ideology Critique
In this closing section, I return to one of the haunting questions of the dissertation,
namely how political theology shapes the relation of theory and practice, especially when
configured by ideology critique. I discuss Žižek’s controversial “I prefer not to” perspective here, but will take up the question of theory and praxis (as it concerns the relation of
political theology and critical theology) in more detail in the final chapter of the dissertation. There I will explain my position, in conversation with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, that is informed by Žižek’s concerns about the complicity of political practice in ideology, but hopefully sidesteps the many problems with Žižek’s troublesome position.
I have argued that, for Žižek, ideology is politically important because of its deleterious effect on the viability of an emancipatory subjectivity, most notably in the way it
naturalizes the current state of affairs as the only possibility, even while all the alarm
bells are going off, signaling the upcoming apocalyptic ‘zero-point.’245 It is increasingly
rare that one would dare to dream that a possible alternative to the present social order
was possible, much less conceivable. Certainly, such a notion may not fit well within the
parameters of what options are currently available, but is this not the political burden of
ideology critique? Indeed, the primary obstacle facing a ‘critical political theology’ is that
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politics is often restricted to what is “realistic”, to what is thought to be possible to
achieve within the coordinates of political options currently available to us.246
It is precisely at this juncture that Christianity bursts forth with negative political
promise. “At the very core of Christianity”, says Žižek, “there is a radically different project: that of a destructive negativity which ends not in a chaotic void, but reverts (organizes itself) into a new Order, imposing itself on reality.”247 Christian theology offers a
uniquely emancipatory ideologico-critical logic because it “madly insists on the impossible.”248 It is adept at thinking the world apocalyptically249, which we so badly need if we
have any hope of reaching political actors and transforming them into revolutionary subjects in a context where emergency, crisis, fear, panic, and threat are the basic coordinates
for the functioning of contemporary ideology.250 Žižek makes his point very clear: “the
authentic Christian apocalyptic tradition rejects the wisdom according to which some
kind of hierarchical order is our fate, which means that any attempt to change it or create
an alternative egalitarian order will necessarily end in destructive horror.”251 It is theology’s truth, says Žižek, not its content, that politically matters; its truth is measured in
politics like it is in psychoanalysis: “‘it is only true insomuch as it is followed’…the ‘test’
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As we

have already seen, the self-emptying of content for the sake of political truth reflects
Christianity’s own theological Event of divine self-kenosis whereby God empties God’s
self in death and pours its new life as the Holy Spirit.253 It is a form of collective belief in
the impossible and absurd that refuses to give in to the suturing impulses of politics. Theology is akin to the Hegelian ‘weaving of the spirit’: “that underground work of changing
the ideological coordinates, most invisible to the public eye, which then suddenly explodes into view, taking everyone by surprise.”254 It is theology, at least in its atheist, heterodox, and materialist form, that keeps politics both critical and negative.
So what kind of politics does Žižek’s political theology support and produce? For
Marx, ideology critique was requisite for the formation of the proletarian and for their
acts of revolutionary praxis. It cleared the way for political subjects to see their material
conditions as they actually were, rather than how the ideas of the ruling class made them
appear. For Eagleton, ideology critique was important for ‘thinking the world otherwise’.
It diagnosed situations of oppression as evil, giving us all the chance to argue for a different world. It was the condition of possibility for radical politics. Žižek’s views on ideology are quite different, but it is important to him for some of the same reasons. If the cri-
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tique of ideology is constitutive for Žižek’s “theologico-political suspension of the ethical”, what is left for the human subject to do? How is the subject to act in praxis? Is there
not some kind of deadlock here, and does theology become complicit in it?
We see Žižek turn to theology (as ideology critique) here, not out of necessity, but
because his intention is intentionally subversive, like that of a psychoanalyst. He is eager
to lead the analysand to a “Christian” position whereby she recognizes that her reliance
on the big Other is faulty and that the authenticity and efficacy of her political acts are
dependent on the fetishistic disavowal of her belief. John Caputo describes it this way:
His whole point, as he says elsewhere, is subversive: to build a Trojan-horse theology, to slip the nose of a more radical materialism under the Pauline tent of theology in order to announce the death of God…"Christ" for him is a nickname for
a way to contract the void, and the Passion story is an allegory or Vorstellung of a
philosophical point he can make in any number of ways.255
That “point” is the effect that ideology critique can have on establishing the conditions of
possibility for authentic political acts. In psychoanalytic terms, it insists that until we
come to grips with this terrifying fact and confront the truth that we are on our own in
this world, ‘that everything has already happened’, we will never have the actual freedom
required for ‘Acts’ that are both ruptural and inaugurative. Rather than chaining us to
some deflated sense of catastrophic fear and anarchic inevitability, this death of the Big
Other resists the tyranny of forced choices and institutes actual freedom. We are not
caught in the endless relay between hope and misery, but must insist that:
the arrangement that has persisted since Antiquity—is not inevitable; it can be
overcome… that a different collective organization is practicable, one that will
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eliminate the inequality of wealth and even the division of labour... In fact, what
we ascribe as a philosophical task, we could even say a duty, is to help a new modality of existence of the hypothesis to come into being.256
From this, it is clear why no ordinary politics will do. As a Marxist, Žižek lives in constant awareness that “the actual history that we live is itself a kind of realized alternative
history, the reality we have to live in because, in the past, we failed to seize the moment
and act.”257 That said, Žižek is equally critical of the anemic left whose “fetishistic” proclivity towards populism produces an truly ideological passage á l’acte, where people cry
out with frustration, “This cannot go on! It must stop!”, but it never ends. Nothing actually changes. All action ends up being nothing more than a “depoliticized pseudo-activity
(new life-styles, etc.), the very form of social passivity”258 that put on full display a reactive and impatient refusal to confront the complexity of the situation.
What, then, is an “authentic political act”? Speaking about Julian Assuage, Chelsea (Brandon) Manning, ‘Wikileaks’, and its relationship to, and role in, the case of Edward Snowden, Žižek cites his Slovenian colleague Alenka Zupančič:
Even if Snowden were to sell his informations discreetly to another intelligence
service, this act would still count as part of the ‘patriotic games’, and if needed
he would have been liquidated as a ‘traitor’. However, in Snowden's case, we are
dealing with something entirely different. We are dealing with a gesture which
questions the very logic, the very status quo, which for quite some time serves as
the only foundation of all ‘Western’ (non)politics. With a gesture which as it
were risks everything, with no consideration of profit and without its own stakes:
it takes the risk because it is based on the conclusion that what is going on is
simply wrong. Snowden didn't propose any alternative. Snowden, or, rather, the
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logic of his gesture, like, say, before him, the gesture of Bradley Manning – is the
alternative.259
For theology to fulfill its function as ideology critique, it must take part in a politics that, rather than proposes alternatives, actually is the alternative, one that simply
works to amend the status quo of politics, but rather an alternative to the way that praxis
often plays into and supports the the status quo despite its subversive and provocative aspirations. An authentic political act is always ‘the event’: “the successful imposition of a
new narrative which makes a historical situation readable again to those caught in it”; it is
an interruption of the normal flow that brings forth a qualitatively different set or possibilities. This political reality is full of equivocation and ambiguity; its unpredictability
hardly endears it those for whom the universal demands of ethical judgement and political praxis are the instruments of social change and political hope.
Žižek’s alternative is a “subtractive politics” that expresses its negativity in the
Bartlebyian phrase, “I would prefer not to”, rather than the ethical demand, “I must.”260
The best course is a committed stance of aggressive passivity until the condition of possibilities have shifted, to refuse to allow one’s acts to be co-opted by the parameters of currently existing options. The substantive point of this aggressive passivity is that while
acts of commitment, resistance, protest and action may seem to be interrupting, subversive, or emancipatory, they may well be protecting the grounding antagonisms of social
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reality that are the underneath our experiences of injustice, violence, and social inequality. These acts become the very sutures that ideology critique tears open. The only thing,
given the established coordinates of political possibility, to do is to do nothing, to institute a politics of active refusal, with the hope this ‘short-circuits’ the system and instigates an apocalyptic Event.
For Žižek, this is the political goal of theology as ideology critique: to keep thinking openly about an altogether different world, one where the big Other is no longer present, and where the field of possibility for political action is interminably open and undetermined. The hope of such a world is for the political mobilization of “the Excluded”
who presently suffer personal disrespect, social discrimination, and denial of rights that
make their equal and just participation in our social, legal, and political sphere of global
life appear impossible. Žižek interprets the “death of God” Christianity as ideology critique because they both share, in his view, a joint goal to keep open this “empty space”,
the traumatic gap that is continually sutured by the ideologies of the Symbolic, so that
something like a “different collective organization” can emerge from within the Void as
an unexpected alternative. This eschatological hope for the genuinely New, promised in
the Event, is best sustained by the theological vision of Christianity’s “perverse core.”
This position is not without its strident critics. Does Žižek overcome the objection
that this unplugging, this opting out, slides into an apolitical quietism, or worse, a nihilistic and cynical indifference? It is entirely unclear whether his call for a political theology
that acts as ideology critique that suspends the ethical for the sake of the political Event
actually opposes ideology or merely allows it to continue. Simon Critchley identifies
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what he calls, the “obsessional fantasy”, at the core of Žižek’s ideas, which infects both
his critical politics and its link to theology.261 Žižek seems caught in “a fearful and fateful
deadlock” between the materialist paralysis of the “(not) to do” and his dreams for an
amoral ethic of the exception, the sovereign deed of brutal cruelty that radically ruptures
the ideological sutures and dismantles the very coordinates that cover up our original
trauma.262 The result: at best “endless postponement and over-production”263 and worst,
“a nostalgia-which is macho and finally manneristic- for dictatorship, political violence,
and ruthlessness.”264 The negativity within Žižek’s posture of ‘aggressive passivity’ leads
him to a political paralysis that just ends up in a cynical and implicit endorsement of the
status quo because, in the end, nothing really changes.
Žižek reminds us that what makes his politics of ‘aggressive passivity’ so dangerous to the current bourgeoise obsession with acting urgently and immediately in the face
of global crisis is that “Bartleby couldn’t even hurt a fly - that’s what makes his presence
so unbearable.”265 What Critchley sees as ‘an internal deadlock’ is really just Žižek’s patience with history: his openness to the unforeseeable inevitability of change mixed his
stubborn unwillingness to allow praxis to be mistaken for the Act. The fetishistic disavowal of commitment is not the crude abandonment of belief or action, but rather the
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subtle preparations of authentic political act, an “politics of love” that Žižek interprets as
‘divine violence’266 which counters the more insidious ‘systemic violence’: “forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation.”267 Žižek clarifies the meaning of this term when he says that “authentic revolutionary liberation is much more directly identified with violence – it is violence as such (the violent gesture of discarding,
of establishing a difference, of drawing a line of separation) which liberates. Freedom is
not a blissfully neutral state of harmony and balance, but the very violent act which disturbs this balance.”268
Žižek’s position is also not without its theological predecessors. It can be linked
with a relatively prominent tradition in Protestant ethics that gives theological reasons to
“opt out” from political acts, even as a form of protest or resistance. Published in the context of the Sino-Japanese War, H. Richard Niebuhr’s essay, “The Grace of Doing Nothing” advocated for a political theology that called for an “active inactivity.”269 Niebuhr
recognized that “unplugging” from immediate demands for political activity brought
more attention to that which lay ahead: the weight of the future. Whatever the present
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conflict may be, it served as an indictment of policy as such, helping to prepare the
groundwork for a more radical transformation of the future, one that requires something
else altogether. Niebuhr recognizes that the politics of active refusal, to choice to do nothing, the “I chose not to” of political inactivity was actually an ascesis.270 It taught us how
to open ourselves up to the invisible, the unexpected, the impossible, to prepare ourselves
for future action that promises to provide basis for an authentic political act of the Event,
not unlike the radically emancipatory shift demanded by critical theory and for which
ideology critique prepares political subjects. Niebuhr argues that “the inactivity of radical
Christianity is not the inactivity of those who call evil good…It is not the inactivity of a
resigned patience, but of a patience that is full of hope and is based on faith. It is not the
inactivity of the non-combatant, for it knows that there are no non-combatants…”271 This
inactivity is not the indifferent abdication of sitting on one’s hands, the cynical indifference too the world because one does not really believe that change is possible. What it
does involve, however, is an immanent critique that analyzes why we feel so drawn to intervene and why we find political immediate action so compelling and seductive, and
wonders aloud whose interests are served by that action.
Conclusion
One of the many questions we are left with after exploring Žižek’s understanding
of political theology as ideology critique is the way it impacts the relation of theory and
praxis immanent to political theology. Ideology critique directly concerns how political
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theology takes up the question of how are we able to keep the political-theological efforts
of love, struggle, resistance, protest, solidarity or advocacy from becoming inevitably
swallowed up by ideology, sublated and absorbed into its logic?
Žižek wants to imagine the possibility of acting in the world, against the order we
live in and are formed by, in ways that cannot be absorbed, sublated, or recycled into the
inner contradictions, whether it be of global capital, the deadlocks of liberal democracy,
or the identitarian problems of multiculturalism. Žižek sets out to articulate a radical political vision that is capable of thinking towards such a project, and for this he finds
Christianity and ideology critique to be politically indispensable because of the unique
way it presents the inescapable truth about the death of God and its implications for political activity. Christianity is not merely pragmatically useful in Žižek’s vision, but politically necessary because it affords us the critical distance between theory and action that
Žižek considers to be essential for any “really existing change”: namely, the authentic political Event proleptically announced in the theological figure of the crucified God.
Serious problems arise, however, when it comes to the relation of critique and
practice in Žižek’s political Christianity. First, theologians ought to be wary of how Žižek
uses Christianity; is the choice to deploy Christianity more than just a convenient opportunity to ironically use that which is otherwise utterly pointless and vacate, (especially
when one discovers that the theological idea that Žižek finds to be the most ideologicocritical is the death of God in the crucified Christ), or is an arbitrary choice that can just
as easily be substituted or replaced? Žižek is apparently convinced that the gift that Chris-
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tianity gives to ideology critique is its suspension of the ethical for the sake of ‘the authentic political Act’; this “suspension” is most clearly discerned in the traditional theological scenes of creation, incarnation, crucifixion, namely that these theologies are exemplary sites of ideology critique whose political importance is often overlooked, and so
indeed possess a critical political legacy worth fighting for? But what is this legacy? And
does it produce a world that is actually more livable, more suitable to human freedom and
happiness, one that actually makes sense of and is able to reverse the dark trajectory that
Žižek is so skilled at bringing into the light: the crises (many of which were produced by
the very emancipatory politics promised by liberal democracy): economic meltdown,
ecological disaster, a financial techno-capitalism whose thirst for profit and power is insatiable, and the seductive dogmas of neo-liberalism that not even an anemic left seems
able to escape?
Žižek seems content to argue that we ought to suspend normal activity of political
action for the sake of the Act, which is itself is made possible by the event, that sui generis experience of apocalyptic disturbance that forces ‘really existing change’ since things
simply cannot go on as before. He makes this argument by turning to Christianity and to
ideology critique, insisting that within the latter is the exemplary case of the former: with
the announcement of the death of God, Christianity waives its claims to orthodoxy and so
adopts a ‘dialectical materialism’ that repeatedly makes the case, like psychoanalysis,
that “the big Other does not exist.”
This ‘revelation’ is of the apocalyptic kind, and this figures directly into how
Žižek theorizes critique, specially in relation to how critique is supposed to relate to, and
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generate, forms of praxis, in relation to our socio-symbolic order. Žižek works this out, at
least in word, as a politics of aggressive passivity, the first task of which is to consider
whether political activity is sublated by the Order we live in, whether it is global capitalism, Euro-American neoliberalism, or liberal multiculturalism, among other systems and
orders, all of which determine the conditions of human being and acting. What is far from
clear, however, is whether, as theologically grounded argument, this makes sense of the
Christian framework as expressed by its political theology: the possibility for the world’s
redemption rests in forms of revenant action (i.e., love, compassion, accompaniment,
recognition, advocacy) that is grounded and motivated by divine solidarity with the excluded: the poor, the suffering, and the dead. It appears in the end that Žižek gets neither
his theology or politics quite right.
In what follows, I argue that it is the function of immanent critique to disrupt the
circumscriptions of praxis by the politics of the possible, to get theory involved in a more
thorough-going break with the way state agencies, capitalist economies, and complex cultural mechanisms control and regulate human being and acting; the extent to which political theology can effectively contribute to this work as ideology critique is an open question, one that draws us directly into theology and idolatry critique. We turn to idolatry
critique in the next chapter precisely because it is often thought of as the properly theological form of immanent critique and so shares a certain homological relationship to ideology critique in philosophy.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE CRITIQUE OF IDOLATRY
Introduction
In this chapter, the dissertation takes a decisively theological turn. It takes up the
question of idolatry and its critique. Why the turn to idolatry? The critique of ideology is
not only a lesson that philosophy teaches to theology; theology has within itself its own
version. But when theologians take up ideology, they do through the critique of idolatry
as if these concepts are terminologically interchangeable, or at least cognate. In my view,
they are neither and in fact, name very different problems. This problem also touches on
continued misunderstandings of the Marxian position as stated in the first chapter, a mistake that repeatedly takes political theology out of its critical position. And so, after first
identifying the ambiguous relation of ideology to its theological cognate, ‘idolatry,' I set
out to clarify the meaning of idolatry in terms of its contemporary usage and significance
for thinking about the meaning and place of ideology critique within political theology as
a version of the Bilderverbot. To do so, I need to retrieve the historical emergence of the
concept of idolatry before moving on to think about the meaning and place of ideology
critique within political theology, given that the latter frequently links ideology to idolatry.
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This chapter explores the concept of idolatry in theology, starting first with the
development of aniconistic theology in the Hebrew bible, which originated in the Decalogue’s first two commandments. I want to clarify the meaning of idolatry from a theological perspective, taking its usage in the biblical material as the point of departure and
then proceed to its reception history in modern theologies. Any theological perspective
on idolatry must take up its social origins in the Hebrew biblical material, and when we
do so, we encounter a number of factors, most of which complicate the picture rather than
clarify it. It shows that idolatry is not solely a theological question (about how best to
worship the right god), but has significant political and philosophical aspects as well. Despite the complexity of the biblical critique of idolatry, we are better prepared to contextualize idolatry critique as a question about the nature of the political in modern theology
itself with it in hand. This sheds light on the reception history of the Marxist theory of
ideology as ideology critique in political theology, and sets the stage for the work on ‘critique’ in the final chapter.
It also carries forward a thread from the first chapter on Marx where we saw him
turn to a critique of idolatry as fetishism as an analogue to ideology critique of alienated
social conditions. From the beginning it seems there has been an ostensible kinship of
sorts between ideology critique and idolatry critique. And yet, in this chapter, we search
further for the immanent critical force with Christianity, and in turning to idolatry critique
as the theological version of immanent critique, we find that the theology of idolatry critique is too tightly linked to an ethnocratic, identitiarian politics and so reinforces, rather
than critiques, ideology.
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Also, the political character of the relation of ideology to idolatry is not immediately clear. In what follows, I try to make sense of idolatry through the politics of Israelite
aniconism as well as its iconoclastic theology, explaining the significance of the social
origins of aniconic theologies as key indicators of major political and theological shifts to
solidify social cohesion and collective identity during the exilic and post-exilic periods of
early Judaism. This clarifies the meaning of idolatry as a political gesture, used to both
explain Israelite/Judaic civil/social divisions, as well as a rallying cry after their defeat,
occupation, and enslavement during ‘the Babylonian captivity.’ I will argue that the construction and deployment of “idolatry” as ‘perverse or strange worship’ was designed as a
distinguishing rhetorical ploy to generate and enforce a whole series of social and political relations of otherness, establishing ‘self’/'other’ alignments as constitutive of religious
identities of fidelity, obedience, and allegiance to one god over the other gods. An account of idolatry as a political polemic used to generate social and religious relations of
otherness and foreignness resonates with major and ongoing debates about the construction of politico-religious identity. To counter idolatry critique within theology (as an example of the ‘theologization’ of politics), a further account is needed of the ideologicocritical potential of the prophetic traditions which criticize the theology of idolatry, interpreted here as an immanent critique of identity politics.
Idolatry and its Critics
I will argue three things in this section: that the problem that idolatry critique
names is as political as it is theological, that its origins are distinctly material, and finally
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that the problem it names is different from that of ideology. The term ‘idolatry’ is a critical concept; it is always essentially defined by its opponents. “Idolatry” typically refers to
a negative and pejorative critique of a certain set of religious beliefs or practices, usually
associated, in some form, with image-veneration or ‘false or strange worship’ (e.g., its
rabbinic term, avodah zarah). I want to argue that ‘idolatry' has persistent value as philosophical and political idea, a characteristic that comes from its early social origins in the
religion of the biblical Israelites. Idolatry is not simply a critique of ‘false representation,'
‘bad worship,' or ‘wrong theology.’ I follow Jan Assmann in arguing that idolatry critique
may end up being a “theologization” of political relations that is engineered to be, at the
same time, a “discourse of othering” and a political invention. That is, idolatry critique is
not only or even primarily a claim about how best to speak of God but also an attempt to
organize and arrange collective attachments. The critique of ideology may not lead us to
a critique of idolatry, but perhaps to an argument that questions the strong synonymous or
interchangeable relation between idolatry and ideology in much of theological studies today.
The General Concept of Idolatry
What is the exact nature of the problem that is named in and by idolatry? A standard view of idolatry is that it describes the oppositional relation between monotheism and
polytheism. Halbertal and Margalit’s classic Idolatry is one such example.1 Halbertal and
Margalit’s ‘history of ideas’ approach to the study of idolatry examines the different conceptualizations of idolatry in Jewish, Christian, and secular discourses in modernity. This
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conceptual analysis acknowledges its polemical and contested character, as there are multiple understandings of idolatry with no universal or common character. Halbertal and
Margalit typologize the philosophy of idolatry into five different conceptual perspectives:
idolatry as betrayal, idolatry as rebellion, idolatry as false representation, idolatry as error, and idolatry as strange, or alien, worship.2 For Halbertal and Margalit, the essence of
idolatry critique is the way it marks out the space of the strange, the foreign, and the pagan. They delineate the various modes that communities, again self-defined as non-idolatrous, define their opponents as idolatrous: bad belief (betrayal), wrong belief (error), bad
worship (mistaking an intermediary for the the real thing), and wrong worship (false representation). When speaking from the perspective of the Hebrew Bible, this position is
derived from the Decalogue’s first and second commandments. From its inception, idolatry has been a site of an on-going debate about representation, or put differently: what a
sign is thought to stand for in the minds of those who use the sign. In this way, images
are false representations and as such, are idols. Idolatry, as an anxiety about false or
failed images, is based on a set of theological positions about how god and/or the gods
can and should be be properly represented. But this is only one aspect.
As a proscription of images, idolatry is a ban on the worship of other gods, which
presumably involves the use of images, and on certain ways of representing the right god.
It declares what ways of worship are permitted and which ones are forbidden. Halbertal
and Margalit define idolatry as an opposition to the use of images as forbidden depictions
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of deity, based on a specific theory of representation that uses this as a fault line for the
self-definition of a specific and peculiar community.3 That said, it is a way of identifying
and correcting improper understandings of god while also critiquing the culture in which
idolatry was allowed to develop. Whether idolatry is defined as betrayal, error, falsehood,
or strange, or alien, worship, “the ban is an attempt to dictate exclusivity, to map the
unique territory of the one god.”4
The critique of idolatry is often linked to ideology critique. In this view, its aim is
to correct false theologies, or to name improper concepts of God evinced in the context of
worship. Halbertal and Margalit link them in precisely this way:
The critical and liberating role of philosophy is the uncovering of deep illusions.
Philosophy, by its nature, or at its best, is iconoclastic, in the sense of removing
ideological masks or breaking idols…The way against idolatry has the same role
of liberation from error and the attempt to break the bonds of our imagination.5
Halbertal and Margalit, rather than assume some essence of idolatry, acknowledge
that this ‘powerful category that aspires to establish a firm boundary between God and
the strange gods’ is marked by ‘astonishing fluidity’6. Yet, it is clear that the practitioners
of idolatry are defined negatively: they are the non-idolatrous, the non-alien, or the nonpagan. As Jay Geller notes, “this naming procedure reflects their recognition of the code-
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pendence of any notion of idolatry on the corresponding one of the right and true religion”, a position that reflects the central point of this chapter, that idolatry negotiates the
boundary between the other and the self.7 The ascription of idolatry is used to determine
the boundaries between one community and another community, but is also an immanent
critique; that it is, it determines boundaries within a presumably singular community, as
is the case with its biblical form, as I will argue below.
Idolatry in the Hebrew Bible is represented by social, sexual, and filial metaphors
that are employed by texts to describe the relations between a cultic community, its God,
and the god/religion of its ‘enemy’. The work of these metaphors is to generate a politicoreligious identity by operationalizing cultic difference and externalizing its internal nonconformity into that place that serves as the boundary where identity and difference are
bound together: ‘the other within’. The point is here is that idolatry critique is not so
much about naming the beliefs and practices of the other as idolatrous as it is about identifying the one’s own positions as ‘non-idolatrous’. Namely, idolatry is an essential
mechanism through which communities will determine the borders of inclusion and exclusion, what and who counts as the other. And yet, Halbertal and Margalit contend that
the significance of idolatry (and its critique) is not in its theological meaning, but rather
the way that it negotiates the boundaries between self and other within and between communities. It is naturally a thoroughly political boundary, one that draws the lines of collective belonging and social attachment. This generic definition of how idolatry works
helps specify its more particular rhetorical, polemical, and historical forms, particularly
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given the challenging ambiguities of iconographic and polytheistic context that gave rise
to biblical idolatry critique.
The Biblical Critique of Idolatry
It is difficult to speak of the biblical critique of idolatry, mostly because it is difficult to speak of a consistent biblical theology (as if there was only one). The multiple
sources, forms, and agenda of the biblical material and the interwoven layers and threads
of authorship, redaction, and editions present significant obstacles to any sort of harmonization or singularity. Without going into each of the sources and redactional schools, it is
difficult to say much more with any clarity about the specific origin of idolatry critique,
especially in relations to any specific politics therein. In what follows, I simply want to
report on the consensus within Hebrew Bible scholarship on the nature and origins of Israelite aniconism, the role that ideology critique appears to have played in the development of this characteristic, and the political-theological implications of both the emergence of biblical monotheism and iconoclastic politics. The benefit of reviewing the biblical critique of idolatry thematically is that we are able to get a sense for how the biblical
concept is used and received in later systematic and political theologies, rather than how
it developed textually or historically. The point here is simply to hazard a provisional understanding of the biblical critique of idolatry that helps us identify the problems with
modern treatments by much of recent theology that link it too tightly (and in the wrong
way) to ideology critique.
Idolatry critique in the Hebrew bible is ambiguous, but a few generalizations are
helpful. It has to do with the role of divine images in the biblical world, and so it shapes
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understandings of the ‘orthodox’ representation of the divine life and continues to organize and regulate doctrines of creation, theological anthropology, the nature of God, and
faithful theological language. Idolatry is the critical, negative concept that emerges from
the aniconistic theology of Israelite religion. The biblical material is polyphonic on the
subject, offering multiple and fluid accounts, but consistently presents idolatry in a critical fashion. In the most basis sense, idolatry is a critical and pejorative term, used by its
opponents to describe a certain misuse of images as representations of the divine in religious practices, broadly defined as ‘false, or strange worship.’8 These images are described as ‘eidölay’, a term which conveys the conceit of things that appear to be something they are not. It expresses falsity, illusion, and deception, and this is given a more
full, political meaning in iconoclasm. If idolatry (as the worship of strange or ‘foreign’
gods) is structurally distinct to iconolatry (as the use of images in worship), the emergence of idolatry critique in the monolatrous rhetoric of exilic and post-exilic biblical
writings effectively links them together as expressed violations of the Sinaic pact.9 The
critique of idolatry certainly regulated Israelite worship to the one God, but rather than
reflecting an inherent and self-conscious monotheism, it reinforced the unique covenantal
(read: political/cultic) bond between Israel and their god, YHWH.10
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But what precisely was being critiqued in the biblical critique of idolatry - and
why? The critique of idolatry originates in the prohibition of divine images in the Torah,
most notably in the second commandment of the First and Second commandments in the
Decalogue.11 The second, “You shall not make for yourself an idol” is a form of observing the first, “You shall have no other gods before me.”12 Prima facie, the problem of
idolatry is ‘false worship’. When one commits idolatry, one is either worshipping a false
god in an apostate fashion, or worshipping the true God incorrectly. It, broadly speaking,
opposes the use of cultic images in the worship of Yahweh on the basis that such a practice undermines and misrepresents the uniqueness of Yahweh in relation to other rival,
cultic gods and so fails to do justice to who God is.
The biblical critique of idolatry is frequently communicated through two primary
metaphors: the marital metaphor in which the primary offense is sexual infidelity and betrayal13 and the political metaphor stepped in the monarchial systems of the day, in which
the primary offense is shifting ones allegiance out of lack of trust, obedience, and loyalty.14 The practice of idolatry contradicted the religio-political identity of Israel, as it illustrated a fundamental rift in the covenant between Yahweh and the people of Israel. As
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This model is more prevalent in the Historical books, where God is interpreted as “king," and the people
of Israel, “his” subjects. As “king," God demands trust, loyalty, and obedience. Both by worshipping other
gods or worshiping Yahweh incorrectly, the people of Israel demonstrate that they do not believe God’s
power is capable of protecting and providing for them. The request for a king in 1 Samuel 8 is seen as an
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such, the consequence of idolatry was severe and unrelenting punishment (including the
15

fall of the temple, and subsequent exile, diaspora, and finally, displacement from Jerusalem) on account of divine anger and jealousy.16 In a phrase, idolatry hurt God’s feelings
and the response was often swift and severely violent retribution.17 Idolatry was critiqued
for being both uselessness and counterproductive, in that it proved to be ineffective in
terms of procuring divine favor, protection, provision of crops, military victory, and so on
(Is. 41:23-24; 44:6-21; Jer. 10:15), and often brought with it divine retribution as a dire
consequence. (Dt. 11:13-18; 18)
As such, a predominant characteristic of early Israel’s ban on images is its link to
the ban on the worship of foreign gods on ethical political grounds, a theme we repeated
in Hosea, but most notably the post-exilic prophets, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.18 The
general social critique of the prophets tries to show the links between idolatry and poverty, social injustice, and economic struggle.19 Social injustice and the plight of the poor
is tied to, and is a consequence of, idolatry. The anti-image rhetoric in Hosea (8:4-8) has
largely to do with the betrayal of God and God’s ways that is signified in idol-worship,

affront to God’s divine kingship. Treaties with Assyria and Egypt are seen by the prophetic texts (Isaiah 30,
31:57, Jeremiah 2, and Ezekiel 16) as examples of Israel’s lack of trust and belief, and akin to the betrayal
of loyalty enacted in idol worship.
15
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issuing a critique of the broken ethical culture that gave rise to idolatry, rather than a censure of the practices themselves. In Jeremiah (2:26-27), the prophet insists that poverty
and other social ills have been caused by the ideology of the monarchial establishment.
The actions of the ruling elite run contrary to the ethical way of life set forth by Yahweh,
and as a result, injustice, inequality, and exploitation dominate the social landscape rather
than that peace, abundance, and prosperity promised upon the completion of the rebuilding program. It was God’s moral outrage against the ideology of elite that caused God to
depart from their midst. Ezekiel (14:1-11; 14:5; 16:6-9, 15-29) echoes the ways that the
betrayal of God through image worship violates the covenantal pact and so has led to an
estrangement from God, which has resulted in decline, poverty, and infighting amongst
the Israelites, further weakening them.
In the politico-theological context of early Judaism, anti-pagan and anti-idol rhetoric are closely linked.20 Idolatry critique pejoratively aligns the accused (unfaithful Israelites) with the false worship of the non-Israelite, who are viewed as “alien” and “pagan,"
and as such, are subjects of divine wrath and violence. Idolatry was a vice of the “heathens," those who did not possess the truth about Yahweh and did not know the covenantal promises. Idols were unclean vices because they were used by pagans. For Ezekiel,
the worship of idols is linked to alliances with foreign nations and their gods (11:22-33),
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a point echoed in Ezra’s critique of intermarriage (Ezra 7-10) as an idolatrous abandonment both of God and of their distinctiveness as a people.21 The rebuilding of the temple
and the restoration of the holy land require the absolute commitment of the people of
God. Marriages, treaties, and other forms of affective attachment outside the Israelite
community sullies and dilutes its unique, exclusive link to God, and as such, are interpreted as idolatry.22 The anti-idol rhetoric plays a particular role in shaping the moral and
political concerns of exilic and post-exilic Israel, in that it provides significant impetus
for social cohesion and the maintenance of a distinctively Jewish community, in light of
the collective social experience of occupation, forced migration, and resettlement. This is
true, not only of Ezekiel and Ezra/Nehemiah, but also Jeremiah and Isaiah, as Walter
Brueggemann has persuasively argued.23
Idolatry critique and its origin was not solely ethical and political, but had a theological impetus as well. In the Hebrew-biblical perspective, idolatry is a theological issue
because it rejects ideas about God that are essential to the particularity of Israelite worship. Usually associated with practices involving images, items, and statutes involving or
evoking anthropomorphic representations of god/gods, the problem of idolatry is the mistake of an image for the real thing, or claiming to represent that which cannot be presented. The prohibition of the use of images in worship is meant to avoid this error. To
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attempt to represent god with items composed of everyday, ordinary materials and constructed by human hands is to completely misunderstand your place in relation to the
god/gods - with dramatic consequences.
As the unnameable and ineffable god, ‘YHWH’ is radically mysterious and so beyond human comprehensibility and conventional speech. All images fail to tell the truth
about divine invisibility and god’s metaphysical otherness because they represent god as
possessing a body, immanently present, and so accessible to human thought and speech.
And so, to venerate an image thought to be represent God that was fabricated by the work
of human hands is to elevate a product of human labor as equal and proper to the divine
nature. The corporeal or material is simply not suitable to properly represent that which is
always beyond the laws of bodies, motion, and force. In their use of images, idolaters
demonstrate how little they know of the true nature of god/gods, and so their worship is
considered to be illegitimate acts of infidelity and betrayal. The biblical argument against
idolatry insist that true worship is about commitment, loyalty, and fidelity to one’s god
and the practice of idolatry misconstrues it, shifting its focus from that of commitment to
representation. The politics of the image then rests on whether the truth about God can be
accessed, represented, and so experienced, or if it is indeed beyond knowledge, and so
demands something else, something unbearably demanding from the human being: faith.
One way of demarcating true worship (that is, of the god of the Israelites) from
false worship was by forbidding image-veneration altogether. The prohibition seems to
suggest that the use of images to represent God for worship (or the ascription of divinity
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to images) is the practice of rival religions and so would be considered an affront to Yahweh’s claims to uniqueness and particularity. Biblical narratives that critique sculptures
or objects are very polemical and are intended to undermine the plausibility of the gods
of Israel’s political adversaries.24 This theme, which bases the critique of idolatry on the
basis of Yahweh’s distinctive and unique particularity which calls for a special fidelity
and loyalty in return, is dominant in the prophetic literature, most notably in Second
Isaiah where Yahweh is consistently and repeatedly compared to other deities so as to
highlight their useless, impotent, and empty character.25 Yahweh’s words and deeds are
incomparable to other deities; they are sui generis, and so the practices and beliefs proper
to worship of these other gods are simply not acceptable when it comes to Yahweh, specifically the veneration of images, objects, items, etc, made graven by ritualized consecration. How can the unnameable ‘Yhwh' be properly represented in an image?26 The critique of idolatry refuses to recognize any authentic divine presence in idols; it dismisses
them as worthless and mundane objects with no power. The condemnation of images, ob-
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jects, statues, etc. is based on the fact that they are constructed by human hands from natural, ordinary, and inanimate materials; this can hardly be considered suitable representation of the one, true and living God.27
Biblical scholars have been typically assumed that such a prohibition was an extraordinary case in the ancient near east, a context of vapid polytheistic and iconographic
belief and practice where the worship of gods other than the God of Israel involved veneration of the images, objects, and icons that represented these deities.28 This claim to
distinctiveness has been reconsidered as of late by scholars of Israelite aniconism who
see a continuity in the belief and practice of early Israel with its ancient near eastern
27
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neighbors, with a notable difference in exilic and post-exilic periods that coincide with
shifts in monarchial attitudes.29 Aniconism, it turns out, is not a uniquely Israelite religious feature: it appears in neighboring near eastern cults and seems to have coexisted
with iconic sensibilities, given the absence of any expressed veto or proscription of images, like what we see developing in early Israel, dating back roughly to redactions taking
place around sixth century BCE30, but perhaps starting in response to Hoseanic criticism
of divine images.31 On the related questions whether or not Israelite cult was always aniconistic, and whether the prohibition of images was always programmatic or if it was preceded by a de facto form (an unreflective absence of images), Mettinger32, T.J. Lewis33,
Hendel34, and others have argued that although Israelite ‘programmatic aniconism’ was
rather late, there is consistent and sustained evidence of an absence of images in cultic
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worship of Yahweh by the Israelites. And yet, Mettinger carefully distinguishes between a late ‘programmatic aniconism’ (a consciously negative attitude that produces an
expressed proscription and repudiation of images) and an early ‘de facto aniconism’
(which lacks a negative attitude, but still shows evidence of an absence of images without
antagonism).36 The latter form was a response to the anthropomorphic religions of Israel’s neighbors, a sensibility that intensified in exilic conditions, which put the people of
Israel in much closer contact with iconic cults.37 Hendel surmises that idolatry critique
became a ‘subject of theological reflection’ whereas before it has simply been a ‘conventional observance’, and was part of a process of reconfiguring the relationship between
God and humanity after a harrowing experience of radical displacement, collective alienation, and painful exile.38 In its programmatic form, idolatry was defined as the violation
of the expressed proscription of images; this is the form we find in Exodus and Deuteronomy. T. Mettinger argues that this programmatic aniconism, which is a “fairly late literary formulation”, points to its origins within the late-exilic or early post-exilic circumstances of the sixth century BCE.39 What, then, is the reason for this development? What
might motivate early Israelite religion to deepen and codify their prohibition on divine
images?
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At this juncture, I want to close by make a few points: first, idolatry critique was
not only a theological critique of false worship practices, but was also a political way of
distinguishing between Israelite identity and that of other competitors. The use of images
as a practice belongs to the worship of other gods, and so cannot be used in the worship
or representation of Yahweh. The proscription on images issued from idolatry critique
was used in order to distinguish the God of Israel (for whom images are not necessary
and are inadequate) from those other foreign divinities who “constituted a clear and present danger and therefore were objects of abhorrence and calculated derision.”40 As Israelite religion developed into early Judaism, this critique was increasing applied, not only
to the images used in worship, but also to the gods they were thought to represent and the
‘nations’ they patronize. Indeed, anti-image rhetoric and polemic against idolatry become
a common-place marker of Israelite identity, namely “their imageless worship and stubborn refusal to revere or even acknowledge the existence of other gods.”41 Rebuking and
disavowing the legitimacy of cultic images as idols became an effective strategy to attack
the the foreign religious cults themselves for their theological failure. By this, the worshipping community of Yahweh demonstrates to itself, not only the superiority of their
god (the One whose greatness cannot be adequately worshiped using material and human-made cultic images), but of the rightness of their own cultic-nationalist identity. I
have suggested that aniconistic opposition to idolatry was “an exercise in redrawing

40

Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” 108.

41

Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” 110.

259
group boundaries for the people of God” , especially at significant points in their history:
42

the years and periods proceeding or preceding military or political defeat.
Its aniconistic position is often identified as one of the distinctive and unique theological traits of the Israelite religion and served as an indication of its missional identity
and agency in sharp contrast to its other cults in their immediate context. But any programmatic aniconism appears to be a rather late development in the history of Israelite
religion, even if a ‘de facto aniconism’ preceded it. This means that prior to the sixth century BCE, Israelite worship may have looked much more like its neighbors, in both its
polytheism and use of images in worship. The emergence of idolatry critique, then, signals a theological shift, but also a political one, grounded in the exilic and post-exilic circumstances that Israelite community found itself in during this period. In the next section,
I want to explore the political origins of idolatry critique in the interest of clarifying what
is meant within theology by idolatry. It is important to show that idolatry and ideology
have different functions, both politically and theologically. For this, I want to ask a few
questions: was the aniconism that materialized into idolatry critique a distinctive and
unique feature of Israelite religion in contrast to its neighbors in the ancient near east?
What were the key political implications of the development of idolatry as a critical concept in early Judaism?
The Political Origins of Idolatry Critique
It should be clear that idolatry is not only about a theological critique about false
worship. In this section, I want to explore the origins and motivations of idolatry critique,
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not the practices themselves. In particular, I am interested in the connection between the
politics of iconoclast theology and the rise of early Judaic monotheism. What was the
character of Israelite aniconism - and how is it linked to its monotheism? In what ways
did the iconoclasm of idolatry critique define the political-theological identity of ancient
Israel, specifically in relation to its development as a monotheist religion? My hope is
that we are able to clarify the relation between idolatry and ideology by exploring in
more detail their respective political-theological significance.
It is important to carefully distinguish between idolatry as an actual religious
practice and idolatry as a theological polemic in monotheist discourse. For me, this helps
us discern in the origins of the critique of idolatry a theopolitical “discourse of othering.”
For me, this would make the critique of idolatry suspect in itself and would question the
presumed parallelism between ideology and idolatry that operates prevalently in modern
political theology. Such a suspicion belongs to ideology critique, and so one must be
careful not to wholly dispense with the ad intra critique of idolatry for this reason, as if
the ethical way of life it promotes (an ethics of fidelity and faithfulness to the covenantal
way of social life called for by those who claim to love and belong to God) loses its inherent value once it is shown to have been used ideologically. The iconoclastic tendency
within Israelite religion is no doubt a theological politics enforced and enacted by its
idolatry critique. To understand this, we must consider the social origins of these newly
iconoclastic theologies, rather than looking to their theological assertions alone. There
were distinct polemical formulations in which the development of idolatry critique as a
biblical political theology were embedded; this departs in some important ways from the

261
idea that religions like Judaism are natively disposed to reject images, a “myth of aniconism” that art historian David Freedberg once called “wholly untenable.”

43

Instead, we

find that idolatry critique emerges on the cultural and political scene in early Judaism at
an exilic and post-exilic time when Israel is desperately in need of social cohesion and a
politically distinct Jewish life. Idolatry critique is all about establishing and repairing the
distinctiveness of Israel’s identity amidst the challenging politics of exile.
The biblical critique of idolatry has a complicated historical, rhetorical, and polemical context in ancient Near East religious practice. The ancient Near East was
marked by near universal polytheism that was expressed commonly through many different iconographic cultic practices. Israelite religious critique of these practices as “idolatry” has long been identified as one of the essential unique features of its theology, a result of its remarkable commitment to monotheism. It is widely assumed that Judaism and
its religious genealogical antecedents has always been aniconic, and that its monotheism
left it theologically inclined to reject all use of images in reference to god/gods, making
its uniquely aniconistic theology a religious and political outliner in the ancient near eastern context. Of course, the aforementioned multiplicity within the biblical material makes
it difficult to make universal claims one way or the other: that the Israelite cult was fully
aniconic or that it made full use of images, or that it was either universally monotheist or
frequently worshiped many different gods. There is historical and archaeological evi-
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dence that points to both the significant use of cultic images and the prevalence of polytheist belief in the history of Israelite religion, most prevalent in the pre-exilic period of
the first temple. In fact, there might not have been much difference between Israel/Judah
and its neighbors in the first temple period in terms of their aniconism or use of images.44
The use of anthropomorphic cult-images in First Temple period Israelite religious
practices appears to be much more widespread, making it clear that aniconism did not demarcate Israelite religious belief as much as previously thought. Instead it is shown to be
something that developed and became prevalent in the years between the exilic and postexilic period and the building of the Second Temple.45 Scholars note that the significant
rise of anti-image rhetoric during these periods suggest not that the cessation of imageuse was widespread, but instead argues in favor of it continuing to some way and form, at
least to the extent that it was considered necessary to continually oppose it.46 The simultaneous presence of both the anti-image polemic of idolatry critique and the rather persistent, wide-spread use of these forbidden images within Israelite communities challenges
us to better understand the motivations for the anti-image polemic, especially if a de facto
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aniconism and iconic cultic practices seemed to have co-existed without too much struggle in pre-exilic, First Temple period.47
The specific context for the rise of anti-image rhetoric within Israelite political
theology was decidedly “post-exilic”. This material appears to have linked the critique of
cultic images with other rhetorical assertions so as to accomplish specific political goals
related to the new situation that Israel found itself in after the Babylonian captivity that
followed the fall of the first temple. And so, why the turn to aniconism and its iconoclastic theologies in Israelite religion during the exilic and post-exilic periods? What is clear
is that Israel’s theological position(s) on images shift, following political patterns that coincide with their experiences of exile and diaspora, return and rebuilding. The condemnation of image-veneration as idolatry emerged from within a particular historical and polemical context which the people of Israel were forced to give an account both of their
political and cultic failures and to rally their communities together after long periods of
exile, displacement, and diaspora. The years leading up to the Second Temple period left
Israel very vulnerable and exposed, and so the rise of anti-image rhetoric and iconoclastic
theology seems connected to the need to reassert Israelite group boundaries as an political
act of community formation after periods of displacement and disconnection from the
‘homeland.’ Idolatry critique did not produce anti-image rhetoric itself, but rather deployed it in a distinctly political way to justify specific acts of image-destruction and subsequent punishment for those who used images in worship of Yahweh and other gods,
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practices that been actively a part of Israelite cultic and religious life in years and periods
past.
Whereas R. Hendel and others proffer mostly theological reasons for Israel’s aniconism - and there is little doubt such ideas played a major role,48 I want to highlight the
predominant place that politics had in the rise of the anti-image polemic of idolatry critique: specifically the use of idolatry critique for the sake of a particular kind of identity
politics. Hendel makes a similar argument by noting that, “in my view, the prohibition of
divine images was, in origin, a natural extension of the early Israelite bias against kingship in its social and religious dimensions.”49 Hendel elaborates, using the aforementioned Mettinger and Carroll, but quoting the work of O. Keel: “many Israelites under the
influence of their nomadic heritage, rejected the excessive richness of the graphic images
as strange or evil, in the same way that they rejected kingship and other institutions of the
settled people. In this way, socio-cultural, political, and theological motives are mixed.”50
To see how and why it is that the aniconic tradition morphed in the exilic and post-exilic
period, Hendel insists, we must pursue the “principle of patterning” whereby idolatry critique is seen “as an integral expression of religious and political principles on which the
universe of early Israel was constructed.”51 The primary principle at work was Israel’s
opposition to the institution of kingship, based largely on the early covenantal position
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that Yahweh alone was king, which left no need for early monarchy and posed an antagonism between monarchial orders and the early Israel’s theological commitments. The
theme is repeated frequently in prophets like Hosea (8:4-6) whose anti-kingship sentiments are located in close proximity to its critique of idolatry, which makes sense given
the close link between royal and divine iconography in the ancient near east.52 But, of
course, Israelite aniconism remains in effect long after the establishment of the monarchy
and the effect that this aniconism had on the theology of early Israel was significant: the
relation between Yahweh and the monarchy was covenantal, not iconographic, namely
because the very unnamable name of ‘Yhwh’ itself had become iconoclastic, and a programatic aniconism became the constitutive difference between Israel and its foreign
‘others.’
The purposes of idolatry critique were undeniably political: it was a strategic way
of solidifying Israelite politico-religious identity while identifying its neighbors as somehow foreign or alien threats to the vitality of the cultic covenant. It was the fault of these
neighbors, their gods, and the iconic cults that surrounded them that were to be blamed
for Israelite exile; intermarriage, military alliances, and image veneration were all types
of idolatry that lead jeopardized divine protection and provision. As such, the demand for
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iconoclastic reform that characterized Israelite programmatic aniconism was a way to explain the condition of defeat and exile, and thus to generate the relationships of difference
that secured the cohesion and distinctiveness requisite for strong notions of identity. This
gesture organized associations and alignments through systems of boundaries, and positions relationships within the semiotics of inside/outside, truth/falsehood, one/many:
one’s own identity and the identity of the other. The partition of politics in this way establishes (and seeks to normalize) a political logic that emphasizes politics as a matter of
policing boundaries of identity. Idolatry critique is not primarily a theological critique of
other religions and their practices or of the use of cultic images within the Israelite religion(s), but instead came into common use within early Judaism as rhetorical and polemic leverage that was intended to solidify the collective identity of the Israelite people
in the aftermath of their defeat, occupation, and captivity.
I am arguing that Hebrew ‘programmatic aniconism’ is a political theology
whereby exilic and post-exilic voices align themselves with an iconoclastic rhetoric that
is a product of a historical period where the northern kingdom found itself under enormous political and economic pressure from its Assyrian neighbors, which resulted in the
migration of Yahwehists into Judah.53 In response, they enacted what Jan Assmann has
called a ‘theologization’ of politics: the idea that the exclusive worship of one god would
result in political victory and freedom for the people of Israel, and all those who worship
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other gods (and who worship and represent Yahweh through images, icons, idols, etc)
risk igniting divine anger and retribution. For since Yahweh is indeed the only god with
real, lasting power, Yahweh would indeed reward their exclusive fidelity with an largescale intervention in Israel’s favor. When the exilic prophets invoke Israel’s unfaithfulness to Yahweh as a reason for their on-going oppressive and exilic state of affairs, they
are calling upon the rhetorical power of idolatry critique to link conditions of social injustice and inequality to idol worship, thus blaming elements within Israel, defined as foreign or alien. for their downfall, defeat, and displacement. Israel as a people must worship only Yahweh if Israel expects to experience the kind of freedom and prosperity
promised to them in the covenantal commitments of monolatry. One of the many purposes of and motives for idolatry critique was to establish a firm boundary between Israel
(who does not use images in Yahweh-alone worship) and its foreign neighbors, who do
use images in its polytheistic worship, much like Israel in previous periods prior to fall of
the first Temple and the exilic Babylonian captivity.
For me, the critical point here is this: the critique of idolatry was as thoroughly
political in motivation and consequence as it was theological in substance. To clarify
these points is to demarcate its differences, then, with ideology, making it very difficult
to presume that they are as concepts or terms interchangeable within theology. While
idolatry critique can come from a genuine theological desire to properly represent God, it
is also necessary to understand idolatry critique as a polemical tactic of the identitarian
politics within Israel’s developing monotheist theology. One effect of the Decalogue’s
disavowal of images is iconoclastic politics, produced by the link between monotheism
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(‘you shall have no other gods before me’) and aniconism (‘you shall not make yourself a
graven image or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven, or that is in the earth below,
or that is in the water under the earth’). What idolatry critique tries to maintain as a first
principle is that images fail to tell the truth when it comes to speaking of or representing
god/gods - especially when it comes to Yahweh, but this claim was deployed with thoroughly political purposes of differencing the theological identity of the Israelite cult from
that of its iconic and iconophilic neighbors. The critique of idolatry became an Israelite
theopolitical strategy that used its iconoclasm to justify both the opposition to image-veneration and to generate acts of image-destruction. It presumes a recognizable distinction
between truth and falsehood; that is, there are right and wrong ways of representing, believing, and worshipping god/gods, justifying the iconoclastic politics and the aniconistic
theology that solidified exilic and post-exilic Israelite religion. This link provides the
‘othering' logic necessary to establish a group community organized around exclusivity
and singularity, a theo-logic and iconoclastic rhetoric not familiar to the ancient near east
context prior to its development and usage by certain strands to re-establish early Jewish
identity after defeat, diaspora, and exile. The iconoclastic purpose of idolatry critique
employs iconoclasm is to produce the other against which it operates; without the
strange, foreign, or alien ‘other’ over against which ‘true’ worship is established, a critical position on idolatry makes little sense.
With this understanding ready at hand, it become more difficult to use ideology
and idolatry interchangeably, as it is clear that they have distinct theological meanings
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and political functions. This aspect of the difference between idolatry and ideology critique goes largely unrecognized by theologians who often too quickly mediate the relation of theology to ideology through idolatry without recognizing the specific function of
its theopolitical logic as distinct from each other.
Theologies of Idolatry Critique
This section looks at how theologians have treated the subject of ideology in relation to theology as idolatry. This is not an exhaustive, comprehensive or complete account, but merely a sampling to give us a sense of the trends on the issue. All too often,
theologians take up the concept of ideology as if it was more or less interchangeable or
cognate with idolatry, as if their theological meaning or political function were the same,
or at least, of minimal difference. This attitude usually comes from a rather thin and superficial understanding of ideology critique, but also a over-theologized interpretation of
idolatry. I question this relationship, arguing instead that idolatry and ideology are essentially different - and their critiques amount to very different political stances. Theologians
cannot simply respond to a call for critique within political theology by pointing to internal traditions of idolatry critique within theology; they must first come to terms with the
politics of idolatry critique as separate from and subject to the critique of ideology as an
immanent manner. As will be clear in the next chapter, such a critique is necessary for
political theology to address the dual negativity of its own immanent critique: a negativity directed towards the present dynamics of the social conditions and the ideological
self-sufficiency of its own theological concepts for transformative praxis.
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This analysis calls upon a major theme in modern political theology, namely the
implications of the theology of sin and human action for ethics and politics, as proposed
by political, liberation, and feminist theologians, many of whom take on the questions of
sin, estrangement, and idolatry in the context of Marxist politics, religious symbols, and
the ideologies of power undergird patriarchal and heteronormative theological attitudes
about sexuality and gender identity. These theologians attempted to surface and highlight
the theological category of sin, perhaps even to the extent of fashioning theology as a
kind of critical hamartiology. They frequently deploy the critique of idolatry as a theological strategy to oppose instances of rebellion, distortion, and false representation, interpreting them as idolatry, and as such, as sin, as a way of offering an immanent critique of
ideology in theological terms. This kind of use of idolatry critique risks overlooking important political dimensions in the negative reading of the relationship between idolatry
and ideology critique; more specifically, we will find that these theologians do not attend
to the tension within the biblical concept between the prophetic understanding and the
critical understanding of the biblical theology of idolatry, nor do they do not turn to the
problematic of identity politics. in large part due to the ongoing nature of the biblical
scholarship on the relation of biblical aniconism and its iconoclastic politics
Paul Tillich: Religious Socialism and ‘the Protestant Principle’
The American reception of Paul Tillich has centered on his tripartite Systematic
Theology, where there are scant mentions of Marx, ideology, or other socialist ideas or
themes. As such, it is typical to see him primarily as an existentialist theologian, making
it difficult to fully appreciate his Marxist political and theoretical leanings. However, in
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the years between 1912-1933, before his removal from Frankfurt by the National Socialists and his subsequent arrival in New York City, Paul Tillich was an active socialist
committed to critically reinterpreting Marxist ideas with the help of religion, which affords socialism with “theonomous” reason. Following the failure of the 1918-19 Revolution in Munich, Germany, the reinterpretation of Marxist ideas became imperative, and
Tillich was among those at the periphery at the Frankfurt School who were hard at work
at this.54 Tillich shared many of these commitments, but did so by arguing that if religion
itself could be reinterpreted, it may provide the key to overcoming the limitations of
Marxist philosophy and its socialist politics: the remnants of liberal, bourgeois positivity,
its ‘vulgar’ materialism, its mechanized understandings of history, progress, and change,
as well as its stubborn refusal of the Unconditional.
Paul Tillich understood religion, if and when interpreted through a theology of
culture, to be a critique of idolatry within socialism and for the sake of what he called
‘the proletarian situation’. Rather than the abstract use of ideology either as an critical
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category (Marx) or a general, sociological description of ‘knowledge’ (Mannheim), Tillich concretizes his concerns within a critical view of ‘religious socialism’ that functioned
immanently within both religion and socialism to critique and correct what he saw as the
failure to properly understand human nature: the constitutive essence that links ideology
to idolatry together. Both religion and socialism sought to ground its critical rationalities
autonomously. Attempts to do so overlooked the limitations placed on humanity by the
irreducible and inescapable tension between freedom and finitude. The failure to
acknowledge these limitations produced by the estrangement and dehumanization that
marks the modern era.
Idolatry is Tillich’s way of speaking of the philosophical and political problem of
ideology - but in specifically theological terms - and by using ‘theonomous’ reason.55
This, however, requires a reinterpretation of religion itself as an expression of the Unconditioned, the Ultimate, the Holy as it appears amidst the human experience in culture, language, symbols, and so on.56 As such, Tillich does not approach the question of ideology
directly. Ideology is more a generic name Tillich gives for the demonic character of modern ‘barbarism’, whereby abuses of rationality are marshaled by social groups to wreck
havoc on the human being, producing social conditions of alienation and dehumanization,
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rather than the promised emancipation. In his 1926 article “Kairos and Logos”, Tillich
57

works through a reconstruction of ideology critique along the lines set forth in his religious socialism and his reinterpretation of ‘religion.’58 If ideology is is “a designation of
thoughts that are used by a social group in order to justify its political and economic
power”, then the critique of ideology is “meant to question the objective truth of concepts.”59 This concerns Tillich, for without truth, there is no basis for critical reason other
than its selfsame claims to its own autonomy. Ideology critique á la Marx has the unwelcome effect of deflating the otherwise dynamic character of truth and reality by identifying it first and foremost with social structure.60 While recognizing that “the concept of
ideology was a weapon for demonic power for the purpose of destroying all the hallowed
truths of bourgeois and feudal culture”, Tillich found it too generic and overreaching for
his purposes, arguing that “the assertion of the ideological character of thinking must allow at least one exception, namely this assertion itself.”61
Tillich believed that religion could provide the critical backbone for socialist politics insofar as it rightly identifies the limits that finite freedom places on the human actor.
Religion, if reinterpreted, could provide the ‘depth of meaning’ and self-reflexive critique
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that socialism desperately needed for economic change and social reconstruction. Socialism also must be critically reinterpreted, however. It has retained the negative element
within bourgeois thinking that makes it “exclude the unconditional from the spheres of
thought and action.”62 This has led socialism to “deprive the spiritual and religions life of
its intrinsic value, considering it mere ideology”63, and so doing, had failed to recognize
the practical, political link between ‘the proletarian situation’ and the critique of idolatry,
or what Tillich called ‘the Protestant Principle.’64
Here, religion is not a separate sphere of human activity, but is a vector, a dimension of all aspects and all spheres of human activity, and so can be interpreted and seen
on display in ethics, aesthetics, social and political action, and indeed, in philosophy.
Theology, insofar it is properly ‘God-talk’, is the self-reflexive “depth” within religion,
the direction towards the Unconditional, the “ultimate concern” of human existence:
“God is the presupposition of every question…the eternal substance of the conditional
(which is not itself a thing) breaks through everything.” For Tillich, religion is “an aspect
of the human spirit”, and so is located within human existence as the “dimension of depth
in all of its functions”, “the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit.”65 By
depth, Tillich means “that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man’s spiritual
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life.” Interpreting religion through the metaphor of ‘depth’ makes it both political and
66

existential by identifying it with “ultimate concern”, defined as “that which determines
our being or not-being.”67 Since “the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately”,
this reconfiguration positions religion as “the all-determining ground and substance” of
human life, and not as a privatized and individuated option or institutional apparatus.
The aim of religious socialism, then, to afford critical thinking with theonomy, a
mediating position between individualistic isolation (autonomy) and unthinking collectivism (heteronomy). Tillich insists that “the spiritual situation in which this condition of
separation is overcome, in which reality again becomes a symbol of the divine ground of
meaning, where all spheres of life, even the economic, show this depth, where nothing is
fundamentally unholy, where holy knowledge and holy acts are one, this we call ‘theonomy’.”68 This theonomy is not the rigid assertion of the traditional onto-theology of religion, but rather the practical stance that follow the reinterpretation for theology in/as culture. Tillich argued that the reinterpretation of religion that religious socialism brings to
social and political struggles will breakthrough the current socialist limitations and shortcomings, notably its dependence on ‘scientific materialism’, ‘the loss of wholeness and
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meaning’, rigid determination, empty and flat ontology which short sells human identity
and destiny, and contributes to estrangement and dehumanization.69
This ‘theonomous’ reason is a central aspect of ideology critique, for it allows the
critical element of religion to see the political light of day. Here, Tillich insists that the
only way to achieve social and political freedom is to prehend the truly finite and contingent character of human existence. It is caught in the unbearable tension between radical
finitude and creative freedom, which imbues human life with severe and tragic limitations that are the cause of social alienation and dehumanization: the denial of the natural
right of the human person to actualize and achieve her natural creative freedom. These
limitations also fuel the predominant human mistake: ‘absolutization.’ This is particularly
true in theology, and so Tillich turns to idolatry as a way of interpreting ideology critique
as the act of unveiling all attempts to identify or replace finite realities or sets of symbols
with the Unconditional as false forms of consciousness that equate or replace being with
the ground of being.
Central to this argument is ‘the Protestant Principle’, the call to protest and criticism as the objective criterion of authentic faith. The ‘Protestant Principle’ was Tillich’s
way of using idolatry critique to frame ‘religion’ itself in service to ‘the proletarian situation’, and puts his equivocation of ideology and idolatry on full display. For Tillich, the
connections between ideology and idolatry are existential and symbolic in character.
They primarily affect the human being’s relation to itself, and are theologically important
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insofar as they preclude the human person from “the dynamism of faith,” the conduit to
the transcendence meaning of life itself as human being’s “ultimate concern.” Tillich
starts from the basic theological axiom that “Mankind universally is in the bondage of
self-estrangement. Man’s freedom is superseded by his servitude”.70 This idea serves as
“the guardian against the attempts of finite and conditioned to usurp the place of the unconditional in thinking and acting”, thereby brings to light the basic distortion of the human situation that materializes in ‘the perversion of the social order’ and ‘the demonic
splitting up of humanity in general’ by capitalism.71
The ‘Protestant Principle’ is also practical idea insofar as it issues a prophetic protest against every form of self-absolutizing expression, be it creedal, dogmatic, or ethical.72 While not overlooking the ideologies promoted and supported by Protestantism and
Protestant churches73, Tillich considered Protestantism itself to be an immanent form of
idolatry critique: “what makes Protestantism ‘Protestant’ is the fact that it transcends its
own religious and confessional character, that it cannot be identified wholly with any of
its particular historical forms.”74 ‘Protestantism’ as a critical term originated within a
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struggle against the ideologies of Catholicism (‘sacramentalism’) and humanism (‘optimistic individualism’), which were both ideological, in Tillich’s mind, because they tried
to overcome or ignore the distortions and limitations of human nature by concealing the
true situation of humanity.75 It was the reformer Martin Luther who infamously identified
idolatry criticism as the primary function of the biblical doctrine of justification by faith,
and as such, Protestantism has been a protest of ‘man-made gods’, even against itself. It
is its ready self-reflexivity - the ease of its self-referring character - that makes it effective
at unveiling and exposing the non-ideological state of things that resides in the ‘proletarian situation.’76
The ‘Protestant Principle’ is specifically an ideology critique because it “contains
the divine and human protest against any absolute claim made for a relative reality, even
if this claim is made by a Protestant church”, and so is able to act as “the judge of every
religious and cultural reality” - even itself.77 It is this critical element of ‘the Protestant
Principle’ that “vindicates” its relationship with Protestantism itself, but also the ‘proletarian situation’: “the proletarian situation, in forcing Protestantism to bring to the fore
the critical element of its own principle, creates the constant suspicion that Protestation
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has itself become an ideology, the worship of a man-made God. For this reason, the proletarian situation provides a fundamental vindication of the Protestant principle and the
most serious judgement of historical protestantism.”78 Lest we think Tillich is satisfied
with a correlation between Protestant Christianity and socialism, he clarifies what its relationship with the proletarian situation means for the critical character of Protestant theology: “The demand should not be made that Protestants subscribe unconditionally to socialism; rather the demand should be that Protestantism subject all its decisions and activities to the criterion of the Protestant principle in the face of the disturbing and transforming reality of the proletarian situation.”79
Ultimately, the aim and function of ideology critique and idolatry critique is the
same: “the individual Protestant should realize that, against his will, he transforms Protestantism, Christianity, and religion into an ideology; that he serves the man-made God of
his social group, class or nation when he does not take seriously the reality of the proletarian situation as decisive for the future development of Protestantism.”80 The interchangeableness of idolatry and ideology in Tillich can be seen clearly when he argues
that “Protestant orthodoxy and Protestant idealism represent the sacramental and humanistic forms of the old ideologies. In both forms, a ‘man-made God’ has been substituted
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for the true God, a God that is either inclosed in a set of doctrine or is believed to be accessible through morals and education.”81 This relationship is based on the identification
of the joint of essence of ideology and idolatry as an unconscious mistake whereby the
human person possesses false beliefs about the truth of reality that must be corrected by
the critical power of reason. Tillich links idolatry to ideology even more clearly about in
reference to religion’s critical character:
The creation of these ideologies, religiously speaking, idols, representing man’s
will to power, occurs unconsciously. It is not a conscious falsification or a political life. If this were the case, ideologies would not be very dangerous. But they
are dangerous precisely because they are unconscious and are therefore objects of
belief and fanaticism. To reveal these concrete ideologies is one of the most important function of the Protestant Principle, just as it was one of the main points in
the attacks of the prophets on the religious and social order of their time. Theology of course must provide general insight into human nature, into its distorted
character and its proneness to create ideologies. But that is not enough. A religious analysis of the creation situation must unveil concrete ideologies, as Luther
and the reformer did when they unveiled the all-powerful Lutheran ideology.82
In sum, Tillich was interested in idolatry as a theological category with which to
critique society for its immoral structures and practices. Defining idolatry as “nothing
else than the absolutizing of symbols of the Holy, and making them identical with the
Holy itself,”83 he finds a theological appraisal of ideology to be necessary in order to confront modern confusion and distortion of religious faith. His approach to the relationship
between ideology and idolatry is easily mapped onto his ‘method of correlation’ between
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theology and philosophy whereby theology answers cultural questions, expressed in primarily philosophical terms.84 Theology and philosophy are united in their interest in ultimacy as the foundation of reason itself, and as such, the root of all criticism, be it theological or political. As such, ideology and idolatry are two sides of the same coin; they
both express and problematize the absolutizing and technicalizing distortion of reason itself that objectifies human agency, precluding the collective participation and historical
praxis that makes human existence properly human. The human person’s authentic existence is lost in the depersonalizing forces of technical society, further alienating the human from its actuality, “the ultimate roots of human being.”85 A properly ontological theology resists this idolatry by explicating authentic faith as being of “ultimate concern” to
human persons: “that which concerns our being or non-being.”86
In this way, Tillich distinguished between idolatry and authentic faith. Rather than
identifying religion as ideology, Tillich considered authentic faith to be ideology critique:
“it is a wrong generalization, derived from a metaphysical materialism, to dismiss religion itself as ideology. The transformation of philosophy into critical theory does not imply such a consequence at all.”87 Instead, he posits a structural analogy between the pro-
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phetic element of authentic faith and the critical nature of Marxism, meaning that the discussion of ideology is central to all assessments of theological claims, not in terms of
their epistemological truth, but rather in terms of their self-assertions of being absolute,
unconditional, and ultimate. They attempt to set themselves up as the representation of
the unrepresentable. For Tillich, Marx is right to identify theology with ideology when
and only when its symbols function idolatrously as “expressions of its will-to-power”88:
“idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy, conditioned taken as unconditioned, something essentially partial is boosted into universality, finite is given ultimate significance.”89 The pitfall of idolatry is basically a matter of erroneous claims
made in and for religious symbols: an identification of a symbol with the thing itself that
effectively elevates a preliminary concern to ultimacy.90 By being absolutized, symbols
can become idolatrous formally, but this does not necessarily implicate their material referent. In fact, idolatry is best theologically defined as the confusion between the symbol
and that to which it points, leading to the distortions of inauthentic faith that constrain the
human being from the interface of value and meaning in the ultimate, “in which all criticism is necessarily rooted because reason itself is rooted therein.”91
Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism
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Reinhold Niebuhr was not interested in Marxism - in large part because he considered it to have fallen prey to the very critical insights it marshaled against its supposed
rivals. “A particularly significant aspect of intellectual pride is the inability of the agent
to recognize the same or similar intentions of perspective in himself which he has detected in others.”92 (196) The proud achievement of Marxism in discovering the intellectual pride and pretension of previous cultures therefore ends in a pitiful display of the
same sin.93 ‘Christian Realism’ attempts to respond with balance and approximation to
the indelible tensions that exist in our social and world: tensions between finite and freedom, between choice and necessity, between justice and self-interest. Reinhold Niebuhr
intended, by developing this position and securing its prominent place in Protestant political theology, to afford the social struggle ad political thinking with a dialectical tool that
would help subjects prevent the pitfalls of cynicism or utopianism, neither of which, in
his mind, properly account for the theological reality that undergirds our world, that
makes all our acts intelligible in history. This theological reality is not so much God and
God’s acts in history, but the nature of human being and acting. If we properly understand what the human is, and what it means for the human persons to act, this better position us to make realist political choices.
What does Niebuhr mean by ‘realist political choices’ and what is the link to idolatry and its critique? Reinhold Niebuhr’s interest in idolatry is characterized by an ethical
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concern for the renewed health of the social existence of human beings, brought solely by
justice within history.94 Social justice, which seeks the creative political action of liberation, requires a theological foundation, one that seeks to recognize the ambiguity of history and the limits of social achievement, both of which show the destructive, rather than
redemptive, possibilities of human power. Niebuhr theorizes modern human society as
structurally immoral95, which means human agents and the social realities they construct
are constitutively open to idolatry: the unholy substitution of God with that which is not
God, a move replicated by immoral societies and so responsible for much of the injustice,
chaos, and violence what befalls modern politics. Niebuhr takes a critical stance towards
a ‘developed’ liberal culture that claims to be morally advanced while also incubating
greed, inequality, oppressive power, viciousness, and cruelty, all of which are forms of
idolatry, all of which are a consequence of “elevating relative aspects of life to absolute
status.”96
This moral interest in idolatry originates within Niebuhr’s theology of human sin
and societal depravity, which Niebuhr called for as a return to theological discussions on
social forms of divine judgment. For Niebuhr, for example, idolatry occurs when we
“make some contingent and relative vitality into the unconditioned principle of meaning.’”97 This is interpreted theologically as the sin of pride, egoism, and pretension, all of
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which assert human ways of knowing and acting as primary and absolute, rather than understanding them in relation to the infinite and absolute. The identification of ideology as
idolatry rests in the way they are both essentially forms of dishonesty, self-deception, and
ignorance, and wreck havoc on political subjects as they try to be and act in the world.
The political danger here comes from the actions that human subjects take in these conditions of egoism, pride, and self-certainty, it makes them unchastened, uncritical, and selfassured, a very dangerous state of affairs in a world increasingly marked by complexity
that requires flexibility and nuance. Enthusiasm for change through political actions are
tempered by his deeply Calvinist sympathies: Niebuhr believes it is critical to focus on
the dark heart of humanity, her natural depravity, and capacity for self-delusion - all of
which are the cause of ideology in our world - if we are to understand the dangers of human power. Human nature then imbues all human acting and knowing: “All human
knowledge is tainted with an ‘ideological’ taint. It pretends to be more true than it is. It is
finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final and ultimate knowledge.”98
Niebuhr defines not just idolatry through this identification with ideology, but
also sin itself as “the vain imagination by which man [sic] hides the conditioned, contingent and dependent character of his [sic] existence and seeks to give It the appearance of
unconditioned reality.”99 He wants to interpret idolatry and sin so as to escape the limited
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classical applications of sin and judgment to moral behavior of single individuals in religious or spiritual wrongdoing, and so he can apply to the real political problem: collective egoism of group pride. And so he expresses idolatry in social terms as placing our ultimate faith in modern culture and its achievements to overcome the catastrophe of history and the corruption of society. The political effects of idolatry leave us complacent to
the corruption of human power and blind to injustice. When prideful self-love and selfconcern identifies itself as a political hierophany, it is idolatrous. Notably, he critiques
Marxism for engendering this kind of idolatry and pride, faulting Marxists for their philosophy of history and for placing their apocalyptic hope in the revolutionary efforts of
class struggle. The proletariat is just as prone to idolatry as the bourgeoisie.100
If ideology is “an attempt to obscure the known conditioned character of human
knowledge and the taint of self-interest in human truth”101, then idolatry is the theological
form that the ‘ideological taint’ takes when it attempts to ignore or hide ‘the intellectual
pride’ and ‘pretension’ from view - usually in the interest of aggrandizing one’s egoist interest or power. 102 Idolatry is ‘the ideological taint’, the primary defect in human life,
that presents itself “an occasion for man’s assertion of universal significance for his particular values”103, and shows itself most readily in the idolatry of the church and of the

100

Reinhold Niebuhr, “Ideology and the Scientific Method” in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected
Essays and Addresses. ed. Robert McAfee Brown (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 205-217.
101

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1., 195.

102

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 182.

103

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 35.

287
state, where the collective egoism (‘the pride of nations’) leverages the human tendency
towards ideology (“the tendency to hide egoistic interests behind ideals of supposed general validity”104) to “make unconditional claims for their conditional values.”105 In short,
“the nation pretends to be God.”106 And this is precisely where theology, namely that
which is expressed in and by prophetic religion, can and should be pressed into political
service: “Prophetic religion had its very inception in a conflict with national self-deification” where it “challenged the simple identification between God and the nation, or the
naive confidence of a nation in its exclusive relation to God.” The theological realism of
biblical Christianity affords contemporary political idolatry with a prophetic faith in
which “a voice of God is heard from beyond all human majesties and a divine power is
revealed in comparison with which the ‘nations are as a drop of a bucket’ (Is. 40:15).”107
Theology is shown here to have evaded the ‘false consciousness’ of ideology insofar as
Niebuhr is convinced that he has demonstrated its character as idolatry critique. “There is
true consciousness beyond the false consciousness”108, Niebuhr will argue, and that true
consciousness is found in the human self-understanding provided by the critical perspective of prophetic religion, and validated by “the adequacy of its answer for human problems which others have ignored or confused.”109
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Both Tillich and Niebuhr articulate a structural analogy between ideology and
idolatry that suggests that theological symbols function in relation to the human being in
a way similar to how philosophical concepts function in relation to social realities. Ideology is to philosophy what idolatry is to theology. They are correlated methodologically,
but the theological concept of idolatry is not brought to bear politically other than as a
theological metaphor (sin, pride) for the material cause (the failure to understand human
nature) of predominantly political problems (imperialism, exceptionalism, isolationism,
and so on). The theology of idolatry critique functions as a conceptual resource for criticizing ideologies in society, but this assumes that ideologies are homological to idols. IN
this way, both idols and ideologies are thought to be failures of proper theological selfunderstanding about the human as a social actor and political decision-maker, errors that
can only be rectified by developing better theologies that are closer to reality. Both Tillich and Niebuhr display the problematic inadequacies of the transcendental-existentialist
paradigm that Metz’s ‘new political theology’ is designed to confront in its turn to critical
theory and to the Frankfurt School.
Johann Baptist Metz: Critique as Interruption
Perhaps more than any other late modern theologian, the Catholic Johann Baptist
Metz’s theological project is stylized as an ideology critique, in dialogue with critical theory of the Frankfurt School, that directly confronted the practical-political relationship of
Christianity to modernity. Metz proposes a ‘new political theology’ whose primary objectives are two-fold: to offer a critical corrective of theologies whose systems left them

closed off to the contradictions of history and of social life
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, and to formulate the escha-

tological message of Christian faith under the present conditions of social life.111 This
‘new political theology’ was designed, in part, as a critique of modern bourgeois religion,
which he faulted for its existential-transcendental character, its historical reticence regarding human suffering, and for furthering the privatization of Christian faith in modern
society.112 This political theology also features an eschatological turn, a central element
in Metz’s ideology critique of the bourgeois Enlightenment subject, the product of instrumental reason and the cause of the theological crisis of modernity.113 All in all, the emergence (and assemblage) of this post-idealism theological paradigm is the most adequate
way to speak of God faithfully in the church while facing the new crises of the modern
era constructively.114
More specifically, his aim is to counter the ‘transcendental-idealist’ trends in theology with a praxis-oriented method that integrated the eschatological promise of biblical
religion with the social-historical dimension of knowledge, for the sake of both church
and society. One of the benefits of Metz’s approach here is that he takes up the question
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of ideology directly, rather than relating them through the concept of idolatry or its cognates. This due, in large part, to his direct engagement with Frankfurt School theorists
Adorno, Horkheimer, and their associates Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch.115 His understanding of critique is modeled from their engagement with the practical reasoning of
the Marxian critique of religion and bourgeoise modernity, rather than that of the biblical
critique of idolatry - although the ‘messianic religion of discipleship’ plays a substantial
formal role in the critical position of theology in society.116 And yet, his critique of the
Enlightenment is dialectical: influenced by Horkheimer and Adorno, Metz emphasizes
the dominative and exploitative aspects of its technical rationality, while also reminding
us that there is is a radically emancipatory drive for human freedom in modernity which
cannot be realized if left to address its immanent crises: of authority, of reason, of religion, and most importantly, of tradition.
For theology to respond liberatively to these crises, that is, if the critical advances
of the Enlightenment are to be saved from themselves, it will require “the primacy of a
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The interlocking catego-

ries of memory, linked with narrative and solidarity, act as critical elements that have an
inaugural and ruptural effect on theology, creating space for what Metz refers to “its critical position” of dangerous memory. How does theology account for the burden of responsibility that necessarily follows ‘dangerous memory’?118
The formal notion of critique in Metz can best be discerned in his assessment of
how theology has responded to and engaged with the Enlightenment. Theology has
largely forgotten how to be critical due to its long history of either outright defensive isolation or unqualified accommodation and adaptation. Modernity in the west learned the
character of critique from the Enlightenment, but under the pressure of its demands,
Christianity lost itself, thinking it either had to either oppose modern values (antimodernism, neo-scholasticism) or espouse them as the realization and fulfillment of its own positions (liberal Protestant, or post-conciliar theologies). This “triumph of the Enlightenment
over the Christianity of the church”119 is a theological ‘identity crisis’, and a casualty of
theology’s attempt to respond to what it discerns as the challenge of the Marxian critique
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of ideology. Metz is deeply concerned that, in the malaise of the technicalized and dominative ‘process-systems’ of modernity, Christianity and its churches have abandoned the
critical power that derives from their distinctive identity: who they are ought to be a
shock, an interruption, of the normal flow of a world structured by accumulation, individual interest, and technical reason. Modern theology has shown itself ineffective at
properly countering with its apocalyptic message of universal Christian hope the ideology
of emancipation opined by ‘enlightenment’ due in large part to the dearth of anamnestic
reasoning that highlights the facticity of victims in history and the normalization of suffering and oppression.
This eclipse of critical reason in theology generated a predominant privatizing
tendency in the twentieth-century, a consequence of its de facto embrace of bourgeois
subjectivity. The Enlightenment critique of religion, in an effort to liberate human persons from the authoritative dictates and strictures of ‘metaphysical reason’, only instated
a different ideology. Metz, speaking of Enlightenment critics of religion, writes: “what is
going on with the critique of metaphysical reason and the robust talk of ‘maturity’ and
the ‘subject’ is the self-assertion of a new elite. This was a new aristocracy: the mirror
image of precisely that against which they were struggling.” Metz’s diagnosis of the dissolution of the subject has to do with the inability to have genuine critical regard for the
suffering of the other, inaugurating a catastrophic potential for deep ethical crisis. The
consciousness of this ‘liberated majority’ is very self-oriented and very privatized.
Metz is concerned to root out this ‘privatization’ within theology, described in
various ways as a privileging of ‘individuation’ (personalist, intimate, private, personal,
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apolitical sphere) over the collective (social, public, political order). This ‘problematic
situation’ is the result of the loss that occurs between the rise of the enlightened, liberal
subject in modern philosophy and the fragmented, disparate self of postmodern thought.
Like its pre-critical engagement with ‘enlightenment’, modern theology has tried to resolve this by trying to eliminate the problem through accommodation, adaption, or
simply “jumped over it and through thus to be down with it.”120
Instead of addressing this problem through the dissemination of meaning via deconstruction (Derrida), genealogy/archeologies of the self (Foucault), pragmatic cynicism
(Rorty), or weak thought (Vattimo), Metz opts for something untimely: ideology critique.
Instead of the more common antimodernist or integralist approaches, Metz prefers ‘critique’ as a modality understood under the rubric of practical reason), inspired in part by
his direct engagement with the Marxist legacy represented by the Frankfurt school.121
Metz defines ideology as the conceptualization of reason as abstract, natural, or universal,
a political problem that detracts from the modern culture of freedom and threatens the
‘eschatological proviso’ of theology as the critical force against ideologies in society.122
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The critique of ideology affords the ‘new political theology’ with the “critique of critique” that it needs in order ‘think modernity against modernity.’ Metz aligns Frankfurtstyle critical reason and his own ‘apologetic-practical’ theology in this way:
A critical Enlightenment also actualizes itself by resisting the tendency to denounce as superstition everything in consciousness that is determined by memory
and tradition, together with whatever does not obey the calculus of scientific-technical reason, or alternatively by resisting the tendency to abandon all of this to the
realm of private whim, devoid of any binding character; or the tendency to expose
it to the suspicion of atheoretical subjectivity.123
Metz argued that the Enlightenment produced a new subject, the bourgeois person, as its formal principle. What is the bourgeois subject and what is its significance for
Metz’s theological form of ideology critique? More to Metz’s point, why is a ‘new political theology’ needed in order to critique the ideologies inherent in the identification of
this bourgeoisie subject with the religious subject of Christianity? The bourgeois subject
is considered ideologically problematic for a number of reasons. First, it effectively marginalized theology as a ‘private’ moral option, subsequent to the formation of the concrete identity of the person, rather than as “an expression of a primary need” which is
constitutive for how persons think and act in history or society.124 Second, it perpetuates
an assault on tradition (which Metz eventually recalibrates as memory) that trivializes
history to the impoverishment of society. Tradition is relativized by the exchange society
of the bourgeois subject because it does not submit itself to the values of the market; it
cannot be profitably instrumentalized. He aligns himself with the Frankfurt School on
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this point: “Just as the bourgeois individual turns religion into a service-providing religion to which he [sic] can turn in privacy, so does he [sic] make tradition into a value
which he [sic] makes use of privately. The culture industry is the subsequent expression
of this process.”125 Finally, it establishes a ‘new consensus community’ wherein the bourgeois subject is defined by its maturity and its willingness to abandon metaphysical reason as the legitimating force for ecclesial, religious, and political authorities, and to replace it with the natural and so universal, power of reason.
One can clearly see the influence of the Frankfurt school and its ideology critique
of modern society, which Metz translated into theologico-political terms here as the practical foundations of a fundamental theology of critique. His engagement with the critical
theory of the Frankfurt School (including a chief associate of the School, Walter Benjamin) was instrumental in his turn to eschatology and suffering in his ‘new political theology.’126 He understands “critical theory” as a critique of ‘enlightenment thinking’ that
stands in critical-constructive relation to the advances of modernity, the same relation
that he envisions for the relation between practical reasoning of messianic Christianity,
and the political engagement of the church in the occasionings of history.127 As such, in
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Metz’s view, at the center of the Enlightenment is a critique of theology, which is “already an ideology critique.”128 This must be preserved, absorbed into the practical-fundamental stance that political theology takes in the world, in both its negative and positive
aspects, a critical position that turns the practical reasoning of the church and modern society towards ‘God’s preferred ones’: the oppressed, the suffering, and the dead, whose
collective memories and cries make ongoing and incessant demands for justice, solidarity
and reparations.129
Metz believes that the Marxian critique of religion is homological with its critique
of bourgeois modernity; their joint core is a Kantian ‘post-metaphysical’ concern with
idealism that, when leveled against an elitist and ahistorical religion, generates the awareness of the social and historical conditions of knowledge requisite for any and all real political action. To counter this, Metz emphasized historical praxis as the apologetic-practical foundation for Christian theology, orienting it towards history and society through the
tripartite recovery of memory, narrative, and solidarity, all in service to what Lieven
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The effect of this material emphases is

a thorough interruption of theology and how and why it is done.131 This interruption is at
one, both a critique of ideology and a critique of religion, explicitly acknowledging that
the ideologies that most threaten to jeopardize the emancipatory potential of Christianity
come from within.132 These ideologies, many of which originate with the uneven and
non-dialectical reception of the Enlightenment critique, can only be properly overcome,
says Metz, by a theology that “describes and advocates a way of being a subject in solidarity that is for everyone, something that is possible only if religion does not come to the
scene subsequent to the social constitution of the subject.”133 It is by offering an alternative to the bourgeois subject of rational religion that theology becomes critical of (its
own) ideology and is able to contribute in a constructive way to the critical political discourse in society. In this way, attention to idolatry recedes as theology is recognizes its
“forgetfulness of God”, enacted in its avoidance or amnesia concerning the cries from the
innumerable victims of history, the living and the dead.
Juan Luis Segundo and Liberation Theology
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In its original and classic variation as a contextually Latin American discourse,
liberation theology took its point of departure largely from Marxian social analysis, a
matter that, although it is of historical and theological contention, continues to mark its
sociopolitical and economic trajectory today.134 This led early liberation thought to articulate a theo-political partiality towards oppressed and marginalized communities of poor,
developed in relation to several grassroots social movements. This interpretation of the
meaning of praxis within the immediate material conditions of Latin American life was
theologically legitimated in various ways, most commonly through a political hermeneutic that relied heavily on Marxist principles.135 The reception of Marxism, however, was
uneven from the start, and became a major sticking point as Vatican leaders and other
critics began their efforts to resistant the growth of liberation theology in Latin American
communities.136
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A primary example of this uneven reception and usage of Marxism by Liberation
theology is the concept of ideology critique. Even casual observers may note that ideology critique ought to be front and center of all liberation theological work, but seems to
be used in a generic, ad hoc, and unsystematic manner. This is odd, considering the importance role ideology critique has in the Marxist critique of capitalism, specifically the
bourgeois control over social relations and productive relation. Ideology critique gives
weight to liberation theology’s landmark characteristics: its prioritization of praxis, its
suspicion of institutional and structural elements in contemporary society and politics,
and finally, its desire to realize material conditions of freedom and responsibility for political subjects, notably the Latin American poor. And yet, the attention to ideology critique in the first generation of Liberation theologians is cursory at best.
One exception is the Uruguayan Jesuit Juan Luis Segundo. A major theme in Segundo’s The Liberation of Theology is a radical “reideologization” that seeks to properly
link faith to ideology for liberative purposes.137 But this strategy is not meant to liberate
authentic Christian faith from the clutches of ideology, but rather to argue for its necessity. The only way for a liberative Christian faith to realize itself effectively in history is
through ideology. It is through ideological means that human social actors gather under a
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common rubric to achieve collective goals. The realization of these goals (‘Christianity’)
is based on specific values (‘faith’), accomplish a set of effective means (‘ideology’). Segundo contends that the goal of liberation theology vis-à-vis Christian faith is not to divest itself of ideology, but rather to clarify how best to leverage its ideology against others, and to deploy its theological resources of its faith to create and sustain new ideologies that is capable of competing against the ones that are tantamount to domination and
exploitation. He defines ideology as “all systems of means…that are used to attain some
end or goal.”138 Ideology is neither false consciousness or illusion, nor an oppressive or
conspiratorial tool of class struggle. Ideology is the concrete means to achieve and actualize the basic system of goals and values, held by individuals and social groups alike.139
Without ideology, any real action in history would be impossible. For Segundo, in contradistinction to Marx (and Gutierrez for that matter140), the goal of ideology critique is not
to demolish or destruct ideology, but rather to understand it, to become more self-reflective about it in order to effectively challenge competing ideologies by creating alternatives. Within liberation theology, the aim of ideology critique is to think ideologically
better. Put differently, it is to think ideologically in more self-informed way, so as to use
ideology as a more generative and creative means of efficacy, of actualizing one’s values.
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If liberation theology seeks to generate radical and transformative social change, it must
become more ideological, rather than less.
Segundo connects his work to the Marxist legacy by building this theology of liberation on a general philosophical anthropology that emphasizes the natural, creative
freedoms of the human actor.141 When Segundo agrees with the Marxist axiom that religion is ideology, he does not mean this pejoratively (but, of course, as we learned from
chapter 1, neither does Marx necessarily).142 It is not a normative-based critique of religion, but a description of how faith partners with ideological means to achieve its goals.
A faith without ideology is dead. It cannot be actualized in history, and so cannot become
a force for change. It is impractical and in this sense, rendered impotent. This, says Segundo, is part of the problem with western theology that liberation theology rectifies, and
tries to do so by linking faith to ideology. The ultimate aim of Segundo’s thinking on
faith and ideology is to reconfigure their relationship in support of a Christianity that is
socially and politically mediated, the goal of which is historically immanent: the concrete
transformation of people’s lives through economic liberation. By uniting the values of the
biblical gospels (faith) with its action-oriented dimensions (ideology), Segundo seeks to
refashion theology as a critical social theory, with the theological commandment of
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neighborly love as its normative, ethical undercurrent. To do this, Segundo says, Christian faith must align itself with an ideology that is up to the task of efficaciously delivering this neighborly love into the Real.
Marcella Althaus-Reid and Queer Feminist Theology
Marcella Althaus-Reid is increasingly recognized as paradigmatic for the latest
generation of contextual theologies that bring queer, postcolonial, and postmodern theory
into conversation with Marxist liberation theologies. Her theology, designed as an ideologico-critical strategy, is queer, not only due to its interest in sexuality, but also because
of her presuppositional conviction that feminist and liberation theology must actively
take up the issues and questions of poverty and sexuality, not as add-ons to gender analysis, class interests, and the interrogation of race, but as central components of its search
for God in/as queer life. Althaus-Reid contends that the central weakness of Liberation
and Feminist theology is that they do not depart far enough from the orthodox consensus
of the Christian tradition.143 They remain primarily reformist movements that try to reconstruct the tradition, its language, and symbolic systems through its idolatry critique rather than more radical dismantling called for by the queer critique of ideology. In doing
so, they are actively “repeating the Law of the Father in their theological reflection, even
if using political or postcolonial or even gender analysis, by not disarticulating the relation between the construction of sexuality and systematic theology in depth.”144 This
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“disarticulation” is the job of queer theology, which acts as an immanent critique of ideology that is at the same time, political while also being self-reflexively theological. Althaus-Reid is of interest here because she introduces queer theory as a critical model that
takes negativity of immanent critique seriously, even if this might mean that theology
must put some distance between itself and normative claims that are aimed at promoting
specific plans or programs for social change.
She approaches theology with a Marxist class-consciousness and a Foucaultian
concern with knowledge as power, but is mostly concerned using invisible histories and
narratives of queer folks as a critical hermeneutics. Althaus-Reid is eager to dismantle the
social, ecclesial, and political hegemonies that are installed and justified by theological
means and enforced by theological boundaries. We must go beyond a theology for social
transformation and enact the disarticulation of the sexual ideology prevalent in the history
of Christian theology, a task that calls for a theological queering, that highlights indecency, perversion, and deviance at the heart of a libertine theological rationality.145 This
queer theo-logic rebels against the regulative strictures of heteronormativity and dissents
from the classical formulations for the sake of the Other, claiming to bring good news to
the marginalized: the queer, the displaced, the colonialized, the poor. Althaus-Reid names
“the Other side” as divine, as a political hierophant that appears and enacts itself in a resistant, insurrectionary, and so, non-ideological form:
The Other side is in reality a pervasive space made up of innumerable Queer religious and political diasporas, and a space to be considered when doing contextual
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Queer Theology. The Good News is that at that edge, still talking about the thousands of symbolic Nicaraguans present in every anti-capitalist demonstration, or
the voices of people who stand up to claim the right to live in an alternative economic and spiritual system to the totalitarian globalization which has pervaded
our lives, there is God…the God who has come out, tired perhaps of being pushed
to the edge by hegemonic sexual systems in theology, has made God’s sanctuary
on the Other side.146
Althaus-Reid finds both liberation and feminist theologies to be inadequately severe and insidiously self-aggrandizing, allowing theology to remain complicit while
championing its already privileged position as the object of the ‘preferential option’.
Surely, Liberation theology should not be abandoned, for it was among the first to teach
theology the political virtues of self-reflexivity:
Liberation theology has helped us unmask political interests masquerading as
‘God’s will” in theology. This is called ‘ideological suspicion’ in theology. To
this political suspicion we are adding now a combination of suspicions in the
making of theology: political, economical, racial, colonial, and also sexual.147
This characterization of critique as ‘suspicion’ comes from Marcella AlthausReid’s tutelage under Paul Ricoeur, for whom the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ affords Althaus-Reid the background upon which to build her case for queering theology as a form
of ideology critique. The primary ideology facing theology today is its sexual ideology,
not only patriarchy but also heterosexuality. She insists that “queering the Scriptures will
always be a project related to re-reading the patriarchs, for patriarchy is not a transcendental presence but has agents responsible for its order. To deconstruct the patriarchs
means to deconstruct their law, for justice requires the vigilant revision (new visions) of
146
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the ideological construction of the divine and the social….In this way deconstructing the
patriarchs becomes part of what we can call a non-essential project of the hermeneutical
circle of suspicion.”148
To counter the economic and political effects of this patriarchy, she calls upon
liberatine paths discerned within the margins of churchly traditions of the sexually dissident. She calls this ‘Indecent theology’, and its primary goal is to instigate immanent processes of sexual ideological disruption within theology, or a ‘theological queering.’ This
project requires a certain critical ‘style’, one that “outs” the theologian from positions
and postures of power and legitimacy, and so guides them and the church to the tender,
though impolite, demands of the periphery. The aim of this refusal of ecclesial authority
and traditional legitimacy is not to re-establish the marginal at the center, but questions
the idea of a normative center of theology at all. The problem with normativity is its idolatrous claims: it is “the praxis of specific heterosexual understandings elevated to a sacred level.” This idolatry cannot be remedied by simply incorporating under-priviledged
perspectives or marginalized sources into the normal flow of theological talk and acts.
She likens his strategy (associated most closely with first-generation Liberation and second-wave feminist theologies) to the development strategy of capitalism:
To try to espouse development according to the logic of capital expansion creates
the same confusion and contradictions as when theology tries to ‘incorporate’ a
gender (not even sexual) balance in its discourse. What is urgently required is not
the improvement of a current theology through some agenda such as gender and
sexual equality, but a theology with a serious Queer materialist revision of its
methods and doctrines…The aim of theological and economic reflection should
not be a new system of distribution, but a different system of production…This
148
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includes also consideration of the cost that such a theology must pay for the radical vision of its production.149
Althaus-Reid’s understands ideology critique to be a form of queer thought.
Queer thought subverts, ‘unshapes’, disrupts, and unveils Christianity’s sexual ideology,
which is the idea that theology supports and reflects the sacralization of heterosexual relations, which is then mapped and redistributed as a ‘whole political project.’ For this to
work, queer hermeneutics issue “the challenge of a theology where sexuality and loving
relationships are not only important theological issues but experiences which un-shape
Totalitarian Theology (T-Theology) while re-shaping the theologians.”150 ’T-Theology’
is her shorthand for “theology as ideology, that is, a totalitarian construction of what is
considered as ‘The One and Only Theology’ which does not admit discussion or challenges from different perspectives, especially in the area of sexual identity and its close
relationship with political and racial issues.”151 Theological queering displaces ’T-Theology’ from its tropic, corporate sites of economic exchange (the university, the church, academic marketplace, heavily policed peer-reviewed journals, et cetera) to the more vulgar, dirty, and non-civilized places of public, sexual life: bedrooms, bars, and alleyways.
Such a dislocation shows that the God of ’T-Theology’ is “the non-relational God which
does not survive well outside its ideological sites…Impurity may work here as an unveiling of sexual ideology in the construction of God.”
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Ultimately, the political goal of her theological hermeneutics is critical: to forget
the forgetting (this is Althaus-Reid’s preferred way to speak of memory, in order to emphasize how it negates amnesia) of the political acts of the theological symbols of Christianity which work so as to forget and ignore the sexual dissidents whose love and freedom
have been actively undermined by the ideological fences of the totalizing heteronormativity of the theological tradition. In order to break through into the policed boundaries of
T-Theological discourse, it requires a sort of guerrillera strategy, one that she terms the
“libertine hermeneutical circle”, whereby she interprets the queer meaning of theological
symbols, not by “adding queers and stir”, but rather by practicing intertextual readings
that bring queer texts, narratives, spaces, and histories to the theological foreground for
the sake of dialogical displacement, to transport readers to perverse spaces of love, freedom, and hope: dungeons, bedrooms, and other sexually unusual locations.
The point is not to merely revel in the sexual fun of it all, to fetishize experimentation, play, and transgression, but instead to unravel the edges of a christian god who
‘comes out’ from underneath the shadowy restrictions of the heterosexual parental imagery, and shows itself to be not only queer, but also libertine. In this way, the intertextual strategy of queering hermeneutics through dialogical displacement moves theology
into diasporic and exilic spaces, those marginal theological locales where “the libertine is
amongst us and is buried in us. The theological subjects cross all the sexual constraints of
ideal heterosexuality.”152 Althaus-Reid invites theological subjects to do what they are already doing: doing theology with rosaries in one hand and a condom in the other, telling
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the stories and biographies of sexual migrants, whose ‘walking’ brings them to the very
borders of love, pleasure, and struggle. To do theology indecently is to do theology critically and this is not limited to expressions of sexual identity, but rather is a particularly
queer way of understanding, a practice of interpretation, that repositions the queer and indecent Subject in theology (not by retaking the center, but by reclaiming the periphery)
through acts of deviance, dissidence, perversity, and promiscuity.
Althaus-Reid believes the criticality of theology against itself requires a certain
indecent style, both formally and otherwise: “that is the scandalous position of what I
have previously called Indecent Theology: a theology of liberation which, while exceeding the ideas of colonial liberation, surpasses the discourse of the correct God while
searching for a more equivocal theological reflection.”153 She disparages a shift in contemporary theology that celebrates the emancipatory impulse and contextual particularity
of liberation theology, but shows more interest in establishing differing norms than the
negativity of critique, a position incompatible with the queer ways of knowing she privileges.154 The goal of indecent theology is not constructive, but critical:
after all, even the God at the margins of many radical theologies has become only
a lateral shadow or God-mirror. But the aim of the corruption of the ideology of
normativity by sexual contamination, which informs our Queer theological path,
is to move objects and subjects of theology around, turning points of reference
and re-positioning bodies of knowledge and revelation in sometimes unsuitable
ways….The point is that we cannot think a Queer God without understanding different sexual ways of knowing.155
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Indecent theology is a critical theology, whose political mode is informed by fugitivity and peripherality, rather than re-centering or acting. Critique is an interpretative activity, not a directly actionist one. To queer theology is not to propose new theological
forms that ought to replace the dominant ones presently at hand, but to question whether
or not ‘correct’, ‘normative’, or ‘centered’ are properly theological qualities. We must resist the temptation to replace or supplanting the heteronormative ideology by instituting
the queer as a norming, centering, legitimating discursive regime, which only reinscribes
the theo-logic of the normal. We do not want to center or norm the queer, says AlthausReid. The only way we get to a truly indecent Christology is if we take up the displacement of marginality, in the “not-normal”. To be centered, to be legitimate, is to accept the
central authority of heterosexual patriarchalism: this marks the difference between a feminist strategy and a postcolonial one. Althaus-Reid seeks a theology of that is truly marginal that eschews authority, legitimacy, centeredness, and refuses to be co-opted by central discourses of theological power; “Normality… disenfranchises the real life experience of people by forcing them to adapt to an idealized discourse… theology becomes a
distorted praxis, which far from liberating, itself enslaves even more.”156
But what assures that queer theological thinking is exempt from being ideological,
in Althaus-Reid’s view? What is inherently non-ideological about the concepts of hybridity, diaspora, or the fetish, or the queer tactics of disruption, hyphenation, or the use of
autobiographical narratives? How can we be sure that the queer proclivity for deviance,
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subversion, and aberrancy does not slide into an ideological work of its own? What methodological provisions are put into place that restrict Althaus-Reid’s critical categories
from simply replacing or substituting themselves as ideologies within a queer theology of
God, of humanity, and of sexuality? Part of the problem with Althaus-Reid’s critique of
traditional or classical formations of theology is an unspecific, generic reference to ideology as if it was simply equivalent to “heteronormative”, “straight”, or “traditional.” This
kind of vague description given to theological form of ideology plagues most liberation
theologies, and is a significant matter of interest in this dissertation. Hopefully, by attending more specifically to philosophical treatments of ideology that give a thicker description, we can become more theologically precise about what it is that political theologies
claim to be doing in ideology critique – and whether they can do it legitimately at all,
specifically in reference to the identification and justification of social norms such as justice, recognition, or equality. These questions will be taken up in the final section where I
take a constructive position that identifies ideology critique in the Frankfurt School as a
useful method for thinking political theology in critical-theoretical perspective, even if it
raises some questions as to whether or not such a political theology can be normative at
all.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to clarify the relation of ideology to idolatry in theology. It
started from the perspective that theology has its own version of ideology critique, originating from the prophetic traditions in the Hebrew Bible. It recast these traditions as political discourses, rather than theological exhortations, aimed at redrawing and shoring up
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group boundaries in a way akin to contemporary identitarian politics. Upon closer examination, the critique of idolatry appears to be more different from ideology than initially
thought, both in terms of their political functions and theological meanings. We must be
careful when drawing too close a parallel between ideology critique and idolatry critique,
for it turns out that we need the former to fully understand the problems with the latter. I
have argued throughout this chapter that the parallel between idolatry and ideology does
not hold up well for political theology. In many ways, one can look at the way I have laid
out the theology and politics of idolatry critique (both in the Hebrew Bible and elsewhere) and say that idolatry critique is most certainly a supreme example of ‘political
theology’, a way of speaking of God that is, at the same time, a particular way of organizing and structuring the associations of human social life.
And so what do we gain with this short review through theological approaches to
ideology as idolatry? First, in terms of the biblical material, we consistently find what Jan
Assmann calls the ‘theologization’ of political into critiques of idolatry. Here political
differences are identified and analyzed through the categories of pride, individualization,
bourgeoise privatization, heteronormativity, and so on. As such, these are ‘false representations’ of the human, her affective attachments, and her social world that misconstrue reality and so forestall the proleptic arrival of God’s good future into the present. Second, it
is clear that late modern theology continues to depend rather strongly on the associative
link between ideology and ‘false consciousness’ and so theologically interpreted it as
idolatry, defined biblically as ‘false or strange worship.’ This homological arrangement
of ideology and idolatry, in my judgement, has led to a number of missed opportunities to
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make sense of the politics of idolatry critique. This leaves ‘cognative' relationship between ideology and idolatry relatively unchallenged, but always presumed. Theology is
presented as being critical of idolatry rather than representing it or generating it, as if theology itself (interpreted and understood differently, of course, by each of the discourses
or figures outlined) is distinctly unique in its ruptural and critical qualities. The critique
of ideology as idolatry is at times deployed as an immanent manner (most explicitly by
Metz and Althaus-Reid), but of course what is under review here are theological ideas
that act as modes of ‘false representation’, a conception of ideology that has been thoroughly undermined. I have argued so far that the problem with ideology is not that of
false representation; it is not an illusion that leads the subject to mistake appearance for
reality. Theological views of idolatry define it as ‘strange worship’ because it mistakes an
image, an object, for God, and so worships it “as if” it is God; these views miss the point
about what the social origins of the biblical critique of idolatry critique teach us about the
relation of theology and politics concerning proscription of images in the cultic practices
of Israel. From a strictly theological point of view, idolatry might be a problem of ‘false
representation,’ but to define ideology this way (through its relationship with idolatry) as
many late modern theologians have done, is to miss the whole political point, naming that
the problem with ideology and the impetus for its critique is its social impact and political
function on social conditions, and not due to a failure of representation.
The problem without how idolatry critique is treated by theologians as more or
less analogous to ideology critique overlooks its political roots as identity politics. Unless
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theology is able to provide additional critical analysis of the political dimension of idolatry critique as ideology, it risks becoming ideological itself, namely because it neither adequately responds to social conditions nor is it directly self-reflexive in its critique of its
own theological concepts, in this case the theology of idolatry. The prophetic understanding of critique becomes very important here as the one biblical candidate for the theological version of ideology critique because it sustains the dual negativity of immanent critique. However, both in the biblical account and in the work of modern and late modern
theologians, at least the ones analyzed here, idolatry critique is predominant, which
leaves the identity politics uninterrogated.
As such, the politics of idolatry critique are relatively unaddressed by theology.
As I argued in section 1, idolatry critique has a political history to it that gives us pause
about its presumed associative relationship with ideology critique. Idolatry critique generates a ‘theologization’ of politics that turns out to be rather different from what happens
in and with ideology itself. What then must theology do in order to properly take up the
practices of ideology critique? Are there any internal resources within political theology
with which to sketch a way forward? How might political theology integrate ideology critique and what is the relation of this enterprise with other attempts outlined briefly in this
chapter?
In this chapter, I examined the critique of idolatry as an argument for identity politics in order to argue that ideology and idolatry were not coterminous but that the immanence of ideology critique within theology turns against idolatry critique in a way, dis-
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tancing itself from it identitiarian politics, which its immanent critique names as ideology. Indeed, from the perspective of critical theology, it must be considered ideological
as one example of immanent critique. To address these and other question, in the next
chapter, I turn my attention to the concept of critique itself. I need clarify what is meant
by ‘critique,' and what difference such a notion makes, given the current political and ethical challenges we face in our time.
The call for enhanced attention to the negativity of critique as directed to theology’s own ideological presumptions recommends Metz and Althaus Reid for further consideration, namely because they are both the closest to the underutilized prophetic understanding of the theology of idolatry. For his part, Metz takes up the prophetic understanding of idolatry critique and directs it both towards a critical of social conditions and animmanent critique of bourgeois religion; theology is interruptive of the normal flow of
the economic and political apparatus held in place by injustice and that includes its own
concepts. Althaus-Reid’s queering of theology is fully immanent. She is so concerned
with the immanent critique of sexual ideologies in theology that her theology almost
lacks the sufficient attention to social conditions abstracted from their support in and by
the theological powers of the patriarchal magisterial authority.
The politics of the image have regained considerable attention as of late, in both
theoretical and political circles, due in large part to the vital role that religious objections
to media images and artistic depictions have played in rise of the so-called ‘image

wars.’
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In this way, theology has taken center stage as a critique of idolatry in contem-

porary politics. For many, the ferocious regulation and disciplining of images on theological grounds is a perfect example of theology as ideology, and so, claiming to be the defenders of western liberal values, they are pushing back against the post-secular attempt
to reframe the role of religion in the global civil society. For them, theology as idolatry
critique is ideological. As the argument goes, theology is iconoclastic to its core, and so
poses a threat to the freedom of expression and creativity that drives the critical process
and open dissent essential to democracy, not to mention the way that ‘things’, objects
themselves, are excluded from public discussion.158 Many have begun to question critique itself, including Bruno Latour who has recently taken up both idolatry critique and
secular critique in order to point out their shared problems.159 Perhaps it is theology’s
idolatry critique that discredits its political voice, as it apparently leads us into an iconoclastic violence, but secular critique has also been domesticated into a rote participant in
the political mainstream, degenerating into a liberal routine. It is not unreasonable to suggest that claims of unveiling veils, destroying idols, discrediting myths, and exposing fetishes generates an unwelcome rhetoric that indeed ought to make all those invested in the
notion of critique nervous.
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This critique of critique, with its double movement of negativity, sustains theological attention on both social conditions and its own theological concepts. Theology must
become self-reflective; that is, it must turn to its own ideological dimensions as a theological project, much in the same way that the prophetic consciousness does in reference
to the theology of idolatry. The features of this critical theology, as well as the character
of its general and particular agenda, need to be filled out, but the next chapter rather tries
to think constructively about what happens to both theology and the political when their
relation is configured critically, that is, in a modality of critique. Critique in this way is
configured to address the immanent relation of theory and praxis in political theology,
which interfaces in an important way with the function that major themes like justice, solidarity, and freedom have in securing for political theology a place alongside other discourses advocating for social transformation through emancipatory praxis.
For me, critical theology is indeed a way of being political in all the ways requisite for large scale, collective political struggle: it is negative, dialectical, exilic, immanent, interruptive, and prophetic. If the goal of political theology is action, critical theology opts instead for a restrictive pause, a provisional and discriminate suspension of immediate political activity, as to avoid the presumption that action and politics, even when
geared towards principles of justice, freedom, solidarity and the like, is exempt from being co-opted into a form of ‘acting out’ of the politics of urgency, fear, crisis, and catastrophe. Critical theology interrupts action by installing itself as a self-rupturing critique,
even if it means halting and problematizing its own political activity.
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If theology is to offer anything like ‘the New,' the alternative Event that promises
to generate and reproduce the resources from which to imagine, think, and act in the
world otherwise, it cannot do this if it takes the form of political theology that tries to
shape the world as a positive or constructive enterprise. The real political strength of theology is found in its immanently critical dynamic, the negative dialectical ‘Spirit’ at the
core of its double movement, at the same to social conditions as towards its own theological concepts. It proffers a critique of critique and through this, political theology can indeed contribute to “creative advance” towards an emancipatory global politics, not as a
political theology, but instead, as a critical one.160
To anticipate the argument of the next chapter, critical theology helps moderate
the relation of theory and praxis within political theology, making it clear to theology that
it may know less about justice, solidarity, reconciliation, and human happiness than it appears to believe it does. This is what I believe is important about immanent critique that
political theology learns from ideology critique; that it is the means of coming to terms
with the contradictions deficiencies within the object of critique, from the perspective of
object itself; that is, its standard of immanent critique belongs to and exists in the object
of its critique. For critical theology, the demand of praxis are the basis for the theological
critique of the use of justice, freedom, liberation, solidarity as the basis for political theol-

160

I am not interested so much in contrasting this (potential) form with other options: ’secular theology,'
‘radical political theology,' ‘postmodern theology,' and so on. In my mind, something like a ‘critical theology’ is cooperative, not competitive. With these other forms, though it has a significant impact on how theologies understand their immanent relation to theory and praxis.
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ogy. At this point, it is not clear what a ‘critical theology’ does or what its exact relationship is to political theology. Attending to the question of ideology critique raises cession
questions about the character of critique itself, leading us to examine the nature of immanent critique. To insert immanent critique into political theology is to reinterpret it as critical theology. In taking up political theology as its object, it modifies the posture it takes
as it prescribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theological commitments, or political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones.

CHAPTER FIVE
CRITIQUE AND THEOLOGY
Introduction
Allow me to recap the direction of the dissertation so far: it investigates the curious turn to theology from some unlikely corners of philosophy through the lens of ideology critique. This, of course, was puzzling, give the dominant narrative about religion
and theology as ideology, not as ideology critique. The preceding chapters have shown,
however, that key representatives of this turn only offer rather oblique and selective engagements with theology that prove to be insufficient from a philosophical point of view.
It is clear that theology can engage in this debate about the task of ideology critique - and
its political implications - only when it takes up itself – ‘theology’ – as self-reflexive
work of critique, the goal of which is the (self)alteration of its own values and norms, expressed in its varying and complex traditions. In order to do so, it needs to be informed
by its own object, a task that can only be performed by itself. Philosophy paves the way
and sets the parameters for ideology critique, but how to practice it within theology can
only be discerned and spelled out immanently. What should theology do with the 'issue'
of ideology critique, specially given the problems and limitations of its own idolatry critique? For this, we need more thorough theorization of critique within theology. That is
the subject of this final chapter.
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Up to now, the dissertation has concerned itself primarily with the relation between theology and ideology in modern and contemporary philosophy and theology. This
inquiry has foregrounded ideology’s character as an “essentially contested concept”,
prompting us to look closer at the character of critique itself, rather than to thick descriptions of ideology. The impetus for this study is the dearth of attention that ideology critique has received in political theology as of late, and the apparent ease with which it has
taken up themes of liberation, emancipation, utopia, and revolution as if they are ‘at
home’ with them. The eager positivity of political theology’s embrace of eschatological
themes of hope, utopia, and the inevitability of change has turned theology into a direct
and immediate form of practical activity, risking the eclipse of critique in theological
thought and study as well as in how relation of theology to politics is theorized within political theology itself. I take as axiomatic the emphasis of political theology on orthopraxis over orthodoxy, and indeed welcome the turn to the political within theology itself,
which in many ways has been more productive than the turn to theology with philosophy.
And yet this chapter goes farther to argue for a critical theology that questions political
theology in an immanent critique about the relation of theory and praxis. The effect that
critique has on political theology is admittedly equivocal, but in the very least, I argue for
the rupture of praxis for the sake of critique in order to provide an immanent ideology critique.
If the critical attitude originates from the critique of religion promulgated by
Marx’s ‘ruthless critique of everything existing’, it is important to reexamine Marx’s ac-

321
tual critique of religion as paradigm of ideology. Marx was not as concerned about theology as he was about theology’s social effects and its social function on the material conditions of repressed classes in bourgeois social life, and so left open the possibility of a
theology that undertook the task of the “criticism of religion as the premise of all criticism.” Eagleton takes this up in service to critical socialism, defending theology against
its liberal detractors who oppose religion in order to affirm capitalism. He argues that religion, especially Christianity, offers an alternative way of life that challenges the status
quo and opens up critical space to imagine the world otherwise. The theology Eagleton
proffers is rather straight-forward and selective, and while he is effective at exposing the
impoverished and imprecise interpretation of Christianity as offered by its so-called progressive, new atheist, and liberal critics, theology is presented as a critique of the social
world, rather than possessing a self-reflexive critical position towards itself. While Žižek
and Eagleton’s political goals may, at least in word, be similar, Žižek’s theology is quite
different - not only in style and substance, but also effect. He reverses Eagleton’s political
defense of theology as an emancipatory resource, and argues that theology’s greatest trait
is its willingness to admit to its own impotence: to not only announce the death of God,
but to instigate its social forms and promulgate the implications of its practical stance of
aggressive passivity: the “I prefer not to” in terms of social change or political activity.
Theology is not revolutionary or emancipatory, but rather anarchic in a “last resort” resistance against the ideologies of state-sponsored violence, liberal democracy, capitalism,
racism, or religious fundamentalism.
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It is not quite right to say that critique is theological (any more than it is not theological), nor is it sufficient to remind political theology to be critically aware of its own
ideologies. What I am after, it turns out, is ‘critical theology’ that theorizes and interprets
the critical position as a heuristic for theology’s self-understanding. What are the best
available candidates? At first glance, there seems to be a solid connection between the
critique of ideology and the critique of idolatry in the Hebrew Bible, a point made repeatedly by political theologians. However, it is clear that something more politically complicated is at stake in the invocation of idolatry critique, which in its appeals for social cohesion and collective belonging legitimate and justify a identity politics that generates exclusionary relations that at times result in violence. As such, the theological approach that
most approximates the idea of critique I seek, as it turns out, is not the critique of idolatry
that comes out of the Hebrew Bible, but rather the queer critique of the ideologies within
idolatry critique that legitimate themselves under the guise of critique. As I have explored
in the context of biblical concept of idolatry critique, it is an identitarian style of politics
that motivates the critique of idols, and so is a politics that results from a particular theology rather than how it is commonly referred to in theology itself: as a theology that results in a particular iconoclastic politics. In response to this pattern as ire creates itself
within political liberation and feminist theologies, the queer critique of theology turns itself 'inwards' and exposes the political dynamics within the theological.
The remedy for such a thing is a self-reflexive, immanent critique that interrogates theology on the basis of its own normative standards, while also critiquing these
very same standards. Where do we go to learn about such a notion of critique, especially
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when any discussion of critique is very hard to find in political theology at the moment?
Is critique even a properly theological attitude? What idea or concept of critique is able to
form theology in this way? We learn the answers not only by thinking theologically
through ideology critique (as we have done here), but also by paying closer attention to
the work of critique itself and its role in ethics and politics, in decision and action. The
point of all this is to determine whether or not we can speak of political theology as critical, to clarify what critique means in theological perspective, and to discern what significance these matters have for ‘political theology’ as a primary scene of address between
theology and critical theory today.1
As such, this chapter is about envisaging theology as a critical process. Much of
political theology (indeed, not only philosophy and sociology of religion, but also religious studies) today is based on the idea that religion has an emancipatory impulse immanent to itself that possesses radical potential for transforming political life - if properly interpreted and put into practice. In this dissertation, I have sought to problematize this thesis by turning to ideology critique as a resource to resist this trend and return to critique
as a practice of political theology.

1

Certainly this raises many questions about whether or not secular presumptions are necessary or essential
to the critical task after enlightenment, as least when Kant heads its genealogy.. The critique of ideology
has been more or less homologous with the critique of (divine) transcendence, which seems to aligns critique with a particularly secular form of materialism, politics, and society. In some ways, to call upon models of critique for the sake of a political theology calls into question the oft-assumed secular alignment with
critique, a project undertaken by Talal Asad, Judith Butler, and Stathis Gourgouris in ways that overlap
with my view here. See Talad Asad, ed, et al., Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013) and Stathis Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2013).
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Referring to the negativity of critique, I do not claim here that, in following the
concept of critique in early critical theory, critical theology leads theology to abandon
ethical commitments or political activity. Neither do I suggest that critical theology eschew, in light of critique, the concrete demands that human suffering amidst the structural and institutional dynamics of evil and power make on us. I make the much more
modest and restricted point that critical theology is immanent critique of the political
within theology, not operating as a distinct discipline or method in relation to political,
systematic, or practical theologies that acts upon them, but rather is an impulse within
and inherent to theology whose negativity sheds light, not what should be, but rather what
should not be. While this does chasten or restrict theology in relation to the posture it
holds in relation to the actionable solutions it offers as consequences of its various theological positions, it does not oppose practical solutions or social and political action; it is,
instead, minimalistic in that it provides the practical reasoning for the negation of the bad,
rather than for ideals, standard, actionable solutions towards the good.
Problems With the Ideology Concept
I have been making the general argument that political theology needs to return to
the ideology concept in order to revitalize its own forms of immanent critique. This is
necessary because there are elements within theology (and its relation to both ethics and
politics) that still require a critique of ideology. But also, as shown in the previous chapter, understandings of ideology and idolatry critique in theology have proven insufficient.
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And so, after exploring the relation of ideology to theology in both theology and philosophy, it is clear that ideology remains a critical-political problem within theology, rather
than a problem of theology within politics.
The question of ideology critique will often lead to current debates about the nature of ideologies themselves, offering various lists of their essential elements. It is common to mistake ideology for false beliefs or rather beliefs that are based on appearance
not reality, or beliefs that may or may not be true but nevertheless conceal their classbased or power-based interests. This list becomes the standard against which we practice
social criticism since ideologies are not merely errors, mistakes, illusions, or fantasies they have practical effects and so are thoroughly political. Ideologies constitute how political subjects relate to the world and also circumscribe and determine how these selfsame subjects interpret and so operate within their social conditions. They are the means
by which the social conditions are instilled and so absorb political subjects into the predominant situation, and so it is critique of ideology that is responsible for uncovering,
laying out for viewing the conditions that facilitate this domination. For an idea or belief
to become ideology, it must deceive (actively or by consequence) agents of their real and
true interests, thus limiting or harming their otherwise full capabilities as political subjects. It must functionally support and protect institutions that practice and legitimate repression, oppression, domination, and other dehumanizing forces, the same forces that
give rise to ideology’s power to persuade, deceive, and neutralize the political energy of
the potentially dissident.
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And yet, there are numerous difficulties with the critique of ideology itself, enumerated at greater length in previous chapters. For example, how does one know what
counts as “real and true” interests? On what basis might a critique of ideology indict an
institution for permitting oppression? How is one able to pinpoint the genetic origin of
ideology, especially when political subjects themselves are unable, by definition, to identify ideologies as ideologies? In the end, the theory of ideology comes down to an understanding of immanent critique, its normative basis, and its role in shaping praxis. And so,
for the sake of simplicity (though at the risk of oversimplification), we can identify three
prevailing difficulties with the ideology concept. First, ‘the truth problem’: truth is such
an essentially contested concept that it cannot provide the basis for any claims to unmasked reality that can serve as the point of reference against which to critique ideology.
Second, the ‘normative standards problem’: what supplies the standards of the critique of
ideology? Are they internal, sui generis, or must they be established ‘externally’? Third,
these two problems are synthesized into the over-arching ‘the practical problem’: what is
gained practically by the critique of ideology? In what way does critique have transformative, rather than hermeneutic or reconstructive intentions? What is critique and what
happens to the social conditions of the subject - and the subject itself - after critique?
What is ethically and/or politically gained and lost?
First, ‘the truth problem.’ The critique of ideology is not a matter of establishing
factual truths about reality, nor it is about discerning the difference between appearance
and reality. The negative, functionalist account of ideology maintains that ideologies are
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not merely errors in practice or mistakes in thought, but are always grounded in conditions of reality. In this way, the older Marxist position is updated so that ideologies are
seen not only as socially embedded but also “socially induced.”2 Critique is not a wholly
dismantling gesture, but rather is concerned with identifying the deficient realization of
the truth that devolves into ideology, but nevertheless remains hidden with it. This deficiency involves a false understanding of a social state or its situation and the condition of
this state or situation itself. Critique lays bare how and why the political subject has been
led to misunderstand something related to this social state or situation and also makes the
case why this social state or situation is wrong and so needs to be changed. It stops here,
however. Critique itself does not supply the norms and values that govern human acts or
beliefs, but rather tries to set into motion a practical process of transformation that is
open-ended and undecided - and as such, is consistently unpredictable and unstable. The
critique of ideology does not provide the political subject with a set guide for actions or a
positive list of what should be done now, but does supply minimal, negativistic guidance
as to how not to live, what should not be the case, As Ted Smith writes recently, in reference to Adorno’s idea of critique: “real hope comes not in our dreams of better worlds,
but through our shudders at the horrors of this one. It comes through determinate negation of concrete moments of damaged life.”3
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Rahel Jaeggi, “Rethinking Ideology,” New Waves in Political Philosophy, ed. Boudewijn de Bruin and
Christopher F. Zurn (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 68.
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Ted Smith, Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 160. While Smith goes on to insist that Adorno’s pessimism is “too complete”, and that
he “overstates the completeness of human depravity”, he does recognize what I think is a key element of
the critical theology I am proposing here: “the best responses to ‘wrong life’ involve not moral imperatives
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This leads us to the question of norms and values. It is unclear whether ideology
critique is able to name or justify its own standards by appealing to some non-ideological
norm. There are no external place, no site above and beyond ideology from which to declare certain states, ideas, structures, or conditions as ideological. Therefore any normative position that ideology critique must be immanent - it must proceed from the norms
provided by the object of critique. Jaeggi describes this problem through the paradox that
ideology critique claims to be ‘non-normative’ in character, while being ‘normatively significant’ in consequence.4 It does not say how something should be, but also does not
limit itself to asserting how things are. It considers the latter to have a negative bearing
on how the former is to be formulated, but at the same time, does not allow for a division
of labor, as if ideology critique does the descriptive analysis of the properties and conditions of social life and something else (pragmatic theory, foreign affairs, ethnography)
provides the norms. It cannot be critical otherwise.
This bleeds into the third point: the ‘practical problem.’ In what way can critique
be practically oriented through emancipatory practice? The work of critique is not prescriptive and is independent from an external set of standards, but this distinction does
not necessitate its separation from praxis. If, as a critical-theoretical formulation, ideology critique aims to contribute to transformative action, not by prescribing specific
guides for said action, but by surfacing and specifying the potentialities and obstructions

but philosophical histories of how things went wrong” so as to show us all how to avoid reiterating damaged life as theology has often done, even those forms committed to justice, liberation, and happiness. This
is the negative function of critical theology in relation to political theology.
4

Jaeggi, “Rethinking Ideology,” 70-71.

329
present in social reality, thought, and even theory, it is at its most practical when it articulates itself, not so much as in direct competition with other lines of thought and study, but
in negative confrontation of reality so that it may be transformed by practice. It is in this
way both normatively significant and non-prescriptive.
One of the enduring legacies of the Frankfurt School is their insistence that critical theory remain immanent; that is, rather than starting from an ideal set of practices or
principles, an idealized situation decided on ahead of time, immanent critique retrieves its
norms from social practices of its object(s) and then proceeds to critique the shortcomings, problems and contradictions of the present on the basis of the ideals contained there.
This is certainly a dominant feature of critical theory. For example, when Jaeggi maintains that “a critique cannot merely consist of stating what something is like; it must also
involve a position on how it should be or should not be. It is at the very least unclear what
can actually normatively follow from its analyses/decodings/exposures.”5, she is expressing why this lack of clarity is what makes critique helpful: as social critique, ideology critique wants to transform the way things are, but does so without relying on any external
standard or positive alternative. Instead, it proceeds immanently, that is by developing
standards based on the very situation it critiques. As an immanent critique, it generates
the standards it needs to in order to critique a given reality from the norms that issue from
that said reality.
While the immanent critique of ideology stands in a negative relation to ethical
imperatives or actionable political proposals for how to fully realize its object’s values or
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norms, it also calls for and undertakes a critique of the given situation and does so from
within the historical situation, culture, or context that has failed to live up to its standards.
The negativity of critique does not mean, however, that the norms and values immanent
to the given are not important, or that actions (or theologies) which are meant to realize
these values are not desirable; it only means that critique of ideology cannot generate
these values or norms itself, only the thick, concrete accounts of the ideologies that prevent their realization. It identifies ideologies as distortions, failures, or deficiencies
through ‘determinate negation’ of the concrete moments and historical situations of damaged life. If the task of ideology critique is to evaluate systems of social domination, it
does so, not in light of particular universal or objectified standards of, say, freedom, but
with the function of unmasking wrong rationalizations or justifications of domination,
both in history and of the present. In this way, the critique of ideology functions negatively by proposing normative ways for constructing a society of freedom and happiness
by clarifying what not to do, what should not be the case, how not to act, and so on. In
this way, the critique of ideology, for all its negativity, participates in praxis by its refusal
to reiterate damaged life and contributes to a transformed social world by elucidating the
horrors of factual reality, especially for those who are victims of historical catastrophe.
By creating an index of the horrors of false life, critique hopes to help theory and praxis
avoid reiterating and reflecting said horrors.
This rendering of the problems moves the argument forward by foregrounding
how critique is not a closed, procedural process with a clear endgame, namely because
the concept of ideology is itself a moving target. The whole point of ideology critique can
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easily be eclipsed or overlooked if the focus remains on ideology rather than critique, as
has been done most often in theology and philosophical treatments of the topic. It also
helps us understand why theology needs ideology critique: we do not need to rely on social theory, philosophy (of religion), critical sociology, or ethnography alone to provide
the concepts, norms, or frameworks which clarify the problems and contradictions that
political theology needs to address self-reflexively. A critical theology, informed by ideology critique, does not stand outside of theology, pointing out instances of delusion, distortion, or deficiency, but rather is part of its own self-reflexive interrogation that confronts its internal inconsistencies and contradictions.
What impact then might critique have on the use of theology for praxis and political action? So far the relationship between theology and ideology critique has been considered a boon for emancipatory political action. Both Eagleton and Žižek found something ‘radical’ or ‘perverse’ in Christianity that can serve as a resource for thinking politically amidst our present malaise precisely because theology in one way or another has a
critical attitude about it that can be applied towards ideology - with liberating effects on
political subjects. Take for instance, when Eagleton says that one of the effects of late
modern capitalism on thought itself is that even thinking must have a point; it must produce something of value to be exchanged. But this, Eagleton insists, is one of the many
things that is so radical and disruptive about the idea of God: “God” is utterly pointless
and so theology (as ‘God-talk’) issues a “perpetual critique of the instrumental reason”6
where everything has to have a point, it has make or do something, accomplish something
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actual, tangible, or measurable to have any meaning. The political appeal of Christianity
in this context is that its god is literally “good for nothing.” It does not serve any actual
purpose; it is only good-in-itself.7 This extends to divine creation, namely humanity: “to
say of the world that it is ‘created’ is for classical theology to say that it is pointless. Like
God, and like humanity, it exists purely for its own delight…Creation is a scandal to the
sharp-faced stockbrokers from whom everything must have a point.”8 Like jazz or literature, Eagleton says, God “needs no justification beyond its own existence” because “God,
too, is his (sic) own end, ground, origin, reason, and self-delight, and only by living this
way can human beings be said to share in this life.”9
Žižek also speaks about the value of ‘useless' theory in a context of austerity, cuts
to public funding of social welfare programs, and academia’s affair with vocational and
STEM subjects; theory that makes no claims to do anything is a significant moment of
dissent in an highly instrumental social world in which thought and activity are both
turned into practicalities that have to do something, that have to make points.10 For Eagleton, and perhaps even more for Žižek, theology has great political promise as critique be-
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cause, within a capitalist matrix that privileges success, it is an embarrassment, an aberration, for its apparent instrumental pointlessness. In this way too, the kinds of acts, the
style of praxis, that critique directs political theology towards are the types that share in,
make visible, and enunciate this same gratuity that promises to break open the instrumental system: acts that may or may not end up changing something but nevertheless take up
“the risk of elaborating a positive livable project.” 11 Arguably, the particularity of Christian ethics is far more striking and has a much higher bar. The demands are greater, the
costs higher, and the rewards fewer. Christian identity is predicated on taking upon oneself a vocation of compassion, solidarity, and accompaniment with and for suffering, one
modeled on Jesus Christ’s own way of being the suffering and dying one who charts a
path of resistance and justice. If critique is to play a role in Christian political theology, it
must contribute to the missional identity of Christianity which is justified on the basis of
its own immanent critique which, in turn, authorizes its norms and values. What practical
effect does critique have, then, on theology and why is such effect desirable, from a critique of ideology perspective? In what way does critique make way for political action
and ethical judgement and decision: the absolute necessity of praxis?
On Critique
In what follows, I will try to answer two important questions: (1) what does it
mean to be critical? and (2) why is it helpful for thinking through to critical theology and
its relation to political theology? To bring critique and political theology together here
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immediately foregrounds the relationship of theory to praxis, and the specific way that
critique mediates this relationship in early critical theory, and so, to critical theology. By
taking up the question of critique’s relationship to praxis with respect to theology, we are
able to foreground the nature of critique itself, giving us a better sense of what is politically gained - and lost - by envisaging and recasting political theology as critical theology.
I turn here to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who as early members of
the Frankfurt School, formulated theory in a way that sharpened its diagnostic and descriptive power of critique while refusing to allow theory to fall into the trap of what
Adorno called “pseudo-activity”: praxis disguised as liberalism, democracy, or protest, or
perhaps for our own time, morality, humanitarianism, philanthropy, liberation. and so on.
I cannot properly account all of the complexities of Adorno’s or Horkheimer’s thought
(much less their differences or the differences between them and other Frankfurt School
figures), but simply want to argue that there are aspects of their work on critique that I
find both insightful and instructive for thinking about critical theology, namely the concept of negative critique.
Max Horkheimer and the ‘Immanent Method’ of Critique
Up to this point, I have assumed, but not argued directly for, one of the original
theses of early generation of the Frankfurt School: what distinguishes critical theory from
other forms of theory is the primacy of the task of ideology critique. This ‘critical theory’
integrates a materialist social analysis, robust scientific inquiry (checked against a negative concept of truth pace ‘the sociology of knowledge’), and a profound moral interest.
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Marx Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, as the theorists of the Frankfurt School, along
with their Western Marxist associates, sought a new interdisciplinary form of social research capable of re-examining historical materialism and utilizing social psychology so
that the rational concept of society and its empirical reality could be studied, analyzed,
and duly critiqued.12 They developed a critical theory of society, designed so as to avoid
the positivist pitfalls of “traditional theories” and the perils of Marxist dogmatism, which
reduced itself to ‘scientific socialism’, opting instead for a negative and immanent
method with which to critique social practices for instrumentalizing and mechanizing reason itself as ideology.
In his 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, Horkheimer argued that the
problem with traditional theory was its non-reflexive assumptions about the role of the
subject in understandings of social knowledge and scientific explanation.13 As a result, its
conclusions uncritically mirror social reality, confirming the particulars whilst endorsing
knowledge as the neutral product of passive records and detached observations of objective and general reality.14 It is ideology insofar as it both naturalizes and legitimate the
conditions of things - what Žižek would have called ‘the normal flow’ - while also aiding
the powerful elite with technical information that helps it control and manipulate social
relations and productive forces. The knowledge generated by traditional theory is not
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neutral as it claims, but ideological in its affirmation of the status quo and its assistance to
the elite, ruling powers.15 The specific methods of critical theory emerged in contradistinction to what Max Horkheimer called ‘traditional scientific theories’ which substantialized the link between the wretched, dehumanizing reality of social life and “industrial
productive techniques” such as classification, calculation, and enforcement, the predominant categories of which were “better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable.”16
By contrast, the attitude of critical theology was thoroughly negative, designed to counter
the apologetic and pragmatic sensibilities of instrumentalized rationality.
For Horkheimer. traditional theory unquestioningly mobilizes and deploys reason
as a technique, divesting it of its critical character, pushing its ideologies beneath the surface of actuality, making them invisible and so unquestioned. The effect its that its dominating and classifying impulses are seen then as justified, legitimated as natural, scientific, neutral and so useful, turning reason and the knowledge it produces into “a reified,
ideological category.”17 Their primary objective is to flatten reality out in generic categories that can be studied, classified, and compartmentalized according to their usefulness
and their amenability to mechanization.
In contrast, “critical theory”, then, is interested in exposing both knowledge and
history as social, historical, and ‘interested’, rather than objective, blind, and universal.
The political effect of this is that subjects encounter their world and their conditions as
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something that can change, that can be otherwise. Once the subject sees that their activity
need not be reduced to “a possible object of planful decision and rational determination
of goals”18 and so locked into the determination of history or fate, it restores the ‘possibility’ into a social order whose irrationality, and dehumanization effectively has immobilizes any politically meaningful agency.
Whereas traditional theory effectively confirms and justifies the dominative system, in contrast, Horkheimer describes ‘critical theory’ as ideology critique; that is, it discerns within the ideas of social life the specific ways they function in relation to their social context to conceal their own social origins and underlying antagonisms. By disposing
and liquifying the false sense of inevitability and necessity of what is - the false sense that
what is cannot be otherwise - it then opens up genuinely new coordinates for how the political subject can think, act, and relate to the given conditions of her life.
Critical theory has no material accomplishments to show for itself. The change
which it seeks to bring about is not effected gradually, so that success even if slow
might be steady…. The first consequence of the theory which urges a transformation of society as a whole is only an intensification of the struggle with which
the theory is connected.19
Critical theory, then works to instigate this ‘intensification.’ It accomplishes this, not by
observation, descriptive analysis, or by gathering and explaining data, but by exposing
the inherent contradictions within cultural ideas that bourgeois society uses ideology to
suture and conceal. This method of critique is not just directed to social and historical re-
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ality, but also by this reality and its ‘thought-forms’. Critical theory is an ‘immanent’ critique, meaning that it proceeds not from external standards - rational or otherwise - but
from “an image of the future which springs indeed from a deep understanding of the present.”20 It does not make judgements about particular ideas based on their deviation from
universal, general ideals as if these particular albeit ideological ideas have no true content
themselves. Critical theory is critical insofar as it is instinctively self-reflexive; it is immanently critical in its eschewal of appeals to knowledge derived from necessary, universal, or invariant positions or orientations. Horkheimer acknowledges this, admitting that
there is no general criteria for judging the critical theory as a whole, for it is always based on the recurrence of events and thus on a self-reproducing totality.
Nor is there a social class by whose acceptance of the theory one could be guided.
It is possible for the consciousness of every social stratum today to be limited and
corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circumstances, it may be bent on
truth…. the critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for
the abolition of social injustice. This negative formulation, if we wish to express it
abstractly is the materialist content of the idealist concept of reason.21
Lacking external criteria, critique takes shape as an ‘immanentizing’ process that can
only be discerned though an self-reflexive method that challenges both the reifying and
totalizing gestures of reason. Horkheimer knew this would limit critical theory’s political
appeal, admitting that “the concepts which emerge under its influence are critical of the
present…Consequently, although critical theory at no point proceeds arbitrarily and in

20

Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 220.

21

Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 242.

339
chance fashion, it appears, to prevailing modes of thought, to be subjective and speculative, one-sided and useless…it appears to be biased and unjust.”22 The consolation of critique when faced with this “hostility to theory”23 is that it seeks the “transformation of society as a whole” through “a changing of history and the establishment of justice among
men (sic)”24, and so cannot be satisfied with the small “successes [which] may even
prove, later on, to have been only apparent victories and really blunders.”25
Adorno and Horkheimer: Critique of ‘Enlightenment’
Adorno and Horkheimer took the critique of ideology very seriously because, unlike other more orthodox Marxists of the time, they were not at all confident of the collapse of capitalism or the rise of an emancipated, and so revolutionary, class. They
strongly insisted that the hold of ideology in society, on reason, on thought itself, was
more strong, entrenched, and resilient than previously suspected.26 As such, critical theory must be developed in order to expose the inherent contradictions at the heart of the
current social order, enacted by instrumental reason through domination and mystification. It suppresses difference and heterogeneity and promotes productivity and efficiency
as the highest of values. ‘Mass culture’ kept any subversion, resistance, or protest of capi-
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talism, of racism, of cultural propaganda, at bay by distracting political subjects with bureaucracy, routine, and amusement, lulling them into indifference and passivity.27 With
this in mind, the goal of ideology critique was not to fully dismantle ideas, practices, or
institutions deemed to be ideological, but rather to find the truth, the emancipatory potential latent and hidden with them, and to preserve and protect it, so that it might be used to
drive a wedge between a repressive and dominative system or thought and the social
agents attached and determined by it.
This is both a historical argument and a moral one: the effect of the modern ideology in history has produced the real suffering of “damaged human life.” Critical theory
keeps open the possibility that the increasingly ‘barbaric’ world can become otherwise,
refusing to acquiesce to the inevitability of the present or the failure to recognize that it
should be otherwise. Given the conditions of ideology, the point was not to inaugurate
something revolutionary, but something much more radical and elementary at the same
time: a realistic and materialist assessment of ‘what is going on’, a task that could only be
accomplished by the interdisciplinary synthesis of empirical research, historical analysis,
and social scientific studies that came to characterize the methods of the Frankfurt
School’s stye of critique.
Horkheimer and Adorno set out to clarify the dialectical meaning of enlightenment so as to demystify its function within modern social life. They argued that human
happiness, which is possible only when justice and freedom are in play, is dependent on
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emancipation from social reality as it currently stands, a reality which itself claims ‘enlightenment’. Emancipation itself depends on enlightenment, a state of social maturity
that calls for and enacts a discontinuity, a radical break with a present diagnosed as
‘wrong’, ’damaged’ by the catastrophic tendencies of Western societies. For Adorno and
Horkheimer, this ‘enlightenment’ however is thoroughly dialectical; it has within it dominative tendencies that contribute to, rather than combat, the cultural values, social practices, and political institutions responsible for ‘damaged human life.’28 This assortment is
ideological in the sense that they do not represent human person’s best interests and so
are not to be trusted, but neither are the standards of rationality upon which the critique of
ideology is often grounded. It is the responsibility of ideology to maintain the conditions,
relations and forces that keep reification of social relations, the instrumentalization of
reason, and the industrialization of culture unchecked; but perhaps more important than
this, it is the function of ideology to implicate reason itself in this task.
There were many reasons for this pessimism, but paramount was the stern belief
that even reason itself had become implicated in ‘the total integration’, what Horkheimer
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called the ‘eclipse of reason’ itself. As Horkheimer and Adorno insist in Dialectic of Enlightenment, “reason serves as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly
purpose-directed and as calamitous as the precisely calculated operations of material production, the results of which for human beings escape all calculation.”29 With the spread
of administrative systems and commodifying processes, the social world has been
stripped of ends that are intrinsically valuable, in and of themselves worthwhile or beneficial for human freedom and happiness. Everything within the social world (cultural, intellectual, religious) exists for the sake of something else; it is instrumentalized into a ‘use’,
a ‘point’ - packaged and reified for the sake of controlling nature and self-preservation.30
Adorno calls this ‘universal fungibility’31 and argues that it extends all the way to reason
itself. If even reason could become co-opted and so be made uncritical, what hope might
there be to extend and expand the small glimpses of freedom and happiness seen at the
extreme edges of the modern social order?
This social emphasis on the dialectical self-betrayal of ‘enlightenment’ sharpened
the edge of critical theory, for its objectives became more negativistic and less overtly
political. One cannot hope to simply explain ‘what’s going on’ and then proceed from
there to articulate normative prescriptions of what ought to be, namely because social
facts themselves are ideologies: products of manipulation, propaganda, and social control, aimed that producing uniform and reliable political subjects programmed to desire
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and value according to the dictates of ‘mass culture.’ The ‘technicalization’ of reason,
Adorno and Horkheimer maintained, can be shown to be responsible for the emergence
and success of not only late advanced capitalism, namely its emergent technological
forms, but also facism and state socialism. Reason can produce irrationality when reductively practiced, an inverted dynamic that played a major role in maintaining dominative
and totalitarian patterns of thought and action and so can not be trusted or called upon to
provide emancipatory agendas. Rationality cannot be trusted to provide the standards
against which ideology are critiqued, and so on what basis can critique hope to declare
the best interests of the political subject when even the self-actualization of ‘enlightenment’ in modernity is actually its self-betrayal?
This deeply pessimistic appraisal of the prospects of critique in modern society,
grounded in Horkheimer and Adorno’s thesis about the totalitarian nature of instrumentalized reason - led to a negativistic and immanent theory of critique itself. But where is
critique to be found? Even as the late Adorno - and a lesser extent, the late Horkheimer
(who became more directly interested in religious themes) - eventually turned to the aesthetic imaginary as the incubator of critical remnants of reason, the expectations were
modest, timid even. Any conception of the good (that the critique might be thought to
serve) cannot be trusted in the context of a social world that is radically evil, the cause of
which resides in the form of rationality itself. There can be no right life within it, namely
because all the available options are caught up within the furtive and nefarious tactics of
internal and external domination and control. Whether by the good, Adorno means ‘redemption’, ‘freedom’ ‘happiness’, or ‘utopia’, it cannot be thought without ‘the concept’,
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the tool of identity-thinkings that constitution the object in the interests of controlling external nature. When read through Marx’s theory of value, to form a concept of the good is
to transform its intrinsic ‘use-value’ (what is good in and of itself, which has no point
outside itself) into that which is only good for something, which has a point for which it
labors, namely self preservation.
The work of critique in this instance is to expose the inhumanity and irrationality
of the social relations that produce and sustain these exploitative class interests, to bring
to light the aggregate negativity - the injustice, the exploitation, the domination, the
mechanization - of human life. In doing so, critique hopes to indirectly reveal the ‘mirrorimage’ of its opposite.32 This negative rendering of reality is practically significant,
though not directly actionable, in that by presenting the contradictions and antagonisms at
work against the vitality of human life, it both expressed the concrete historical state of
affairs, but also functioned as an immanent force that kept open the possibility of change,
even if it self-consciously refuses to offer idealist alternatives for what this may look like.
James Gordon Finlayson is right to argue that what “Adorno calls variously ‘emancipation’, ‘redemption’, ‘utopia’ and ‘reconciliation’ is a hidden good and so resides in what
is ineffable, i.e. in whatever cannot be thought by concepts.”33 Critique, in shielding the
ineffable ‘non-identity’ from the clutches of identity-thinking, aims ultimately at this hid-
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den, but inaccessible good. As such, the negativity of critique is the means by which philosophy shows how the non-identity of the object is made invisible by the concept in
identity-thinking. So, instead of bringing non-identity into clear view, critique actively
preserves its unnamed character, shielding it, in a way, from the violence of thought itself.
For instance, Patrice Haynes identifies two key ways that Adorno practices negative critique: ‘constellations’ and ‘naming’, both of which are negative and non-identifying in that they focus on identifying contradictions and fissures between what thought
claims to do and what it actually has done, affording the critic with an index, a cartographic rendering of “an ontology of the wrong state of things”; it is, as Haynes poignantly describes, “a testament to its own ruin and disenchantment by instrumental reason:
the terrible history sedimented with it…it manifests only darkness, namely, the object as
a text to its own suffering.”34 Critique, then, presents itself as negative image of the social
world that is as perpetually self-interrogative as it is self-indicting; that is, it affords an
incessant and interminable picture what has gone wrong with the world, and in doing so,
brings to light this negative state of affairs so that it can be be prehended by conscience
and inquiry. This is what I envision ‘critique’ doing for political theology: allowing it to
think with alongside itself, against itself for its own sake. This self-altering critique is
radically self-reflexive, and so immanent. But if theology itself also suffers ‘total integration’, the reifying effects of instrumental reason that identifies the object with the concept
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(identity-thinking), how could immanent critique be thought to be helpful and productive,
much less emancipatory? How can it hope to get outside itself enough to be able to offer
any substantive alterations without reinscribing the very problems that critique sets itself
against to begin with?
Adorno’s ethical and political vision endures, however, albeit in critical form. By
this, Adorno follows Horkheimer’s insistence that critical theory be “grounded on the
mystery of the present”, which stops short of telling what “the right conditions” of social
justice or economic freedom might look like, but offers us, through determine negation,
directions as to how to come to terms with the current state of affairs. By critiquing social
reality on the basis of the evils it produces, the dark effects it has human life, Adorno
hopes to contribute to a radical transformation that is as discontinuous with the values
and norms we currently subscribe to as it is with present, historical catastrophe. Modern
society inscribes political subjects to act in ways that only promise to repeat and deepen
the grave dangers of human life, and so critique labors to surface these forces and powers, clarifying what must be avoided and why. This critical, negative orientation is still a
practical and political one, in that Adorno tells us why one ought not to live in a certain
way. Speaking in strictly historical terms, Adorno suggests that the negativity of critique
is necessary if political subjects are to understand how: “to order their thought and actions such that Auschwitz never reoccur, nothing similar ever happen.”35 The negativity
of critique develops into an ethical and political perspective that wants to prevent the
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worst, where the worst is the repetition of Auschwitz. The practical criterium for cri36

tique is that it must help guide political acts in such a way that subjects are able to to
avoid, or minimize, reproducing ‘the wrong.’
Of interest to me at this juncture is the complex place that theology, inverted by
the immanence of critique, plays in Adorno’s negative critique. If critique clears the social space of ‘the bad’, so the way forward appears only in its absence, the negation of the
wrong or ‘the false thing’, theology seems related to this self-reflexivity, insofar as “it refuses to align itself with what exists, always seeking transcendence” through rigorous critique of itself. Of course, the traditional forms of theology - positive, apologetic, dogmatic, orthodox, doctrinally focused - are not capable of this, any more than any other
fungible cultural good that more or less ‘embellishes’ and confirms what is of this world,
even if it, in word, protests and opposes it. But as Brittain says well: “In the similar way
that Adorno’s injunction against writing becomes an imperative for the importance of
such poetry, one might add - albeit in a highly qualified sense - his injunction against employing theological language sublates into a recognition of the need for such language.”37
In summary, Horkheimer and Adorno’s work is important of framing the methods
of the Frankfurt school as a critical project, one designed to identify the distinction between genuinely transformative praxis (which Adorno strongly believed in) and ‘pseudoactivity’: the capitulated and resigned sloganeering of policies, procedures, and practice
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(that Adorno argued is often mistaken for really existing praxis). As such, the stated goal
of critical theory was thoroughly critical: to identify the social causes of evil, attested to
in the past and present cries of suffering persons who indict history and society: “damaged human life.” This is reflected in Horkheimer’s early statement of the object of critical theory in the 1937 essay, which captures the real benefit of critique for political theology as whole. Speaking of ‘the critical activity’ that is “an essential aspect of the dialectical theory of society”, Horkheimer insists that:
The aim of this activity is not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards such abuses as necessary connected with the way in which the usual structure is organized. Although it itself emerges form the social structure, its purpose
is not either in its conscious intention or in its objective significance. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable as these are understood in the present order and refuses to take
them as non-scientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing.38
It may appear that their own analysis of the totality of social reality makes it difficult to
see how such a critical perspective on the whole modern social structure can be gained.
And yet, this negativity and minimalism (how not to act, what not to do, what should not
be) must be understood in light of their broader utopian commitment, their hope that the
present conditions harbor the seeds of a transformed world, and that critique can be leveraged as a way to think against the current realities shaping human life.
In closing, why turn to early critical theory here? Why be concerned at all with
Horkheimer’s contrast of critical theory with traditional theory or with Adorno’s negative
theory of critique or his analysis of actionism and resignation? What does this method of
immanent critique mean for political theology? Alessandro Ferrara. (among others) has
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recently argued that immanent critique is unique in its ability to bring its object out beyond itself by attending to what lies within, or as Ferrara says, it brings the object “beyond its present state or predicate, turning it into something that projects a significance
that can be appraised by others who were not in the original circle of habits and critique.
Immanent critique offers its object a chance to become an embodiment of justice, of freedom, of human dignity or of some other similar value.”39 It is clear that immanent critique goes beyond demanding theology to be aware of its own faults, contradiction, and
inconsistencies. This relegation of critique to judgments of internal coherence make it
seem rather conventional and obvious, a common tactic of modern reason’s internal contradictions, and as such necessitates the full updating and reception of immanent ideology
critique into political theology in the form of a critical theology. It is, after all, critical
theory that foregrounds ideology critique as the central task of philosophy under the particular conditions of modernity. This objective can only be realized with the advent of
‘critical thinking’ and its immanent method, since both the thinking individual and her
society are predisposed to conformism in thought that is regulatively enclosed and so,
structurally self-affirming.
Praxis versus Actionism
In what follows, I will outline the impact of critique on political theology, so as to
mark out a distinct critical approach within political theology. I want to argue here that
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the effect of the turn to ideology critique is the taking up of the critical attitude in political theory, or if you will, the development and practice of a critical theology. The original
use of the term “ideology” to critique various critiques of religion was meant to help clarify the relation that Marx thought was a necessary condition of possibility for revolutionary praxis: namely the dissolution of the false dualism between theory and practice, between understanding and interpretation and change and action. The critique of religion as
ideology was designed in part to combat this, to bind thought and action together in a materialist reflection of history and of human activity.
The original political goal of ideology critique was to shift how political subjects
understand their relation to reality, not objectively, but as human activity, subjectively, as
praxis. Ideology critique then served the major critical thesis of materialism: that reality
is a subjective product of human labor (praxis) and sensory activity, not of pure thinking.
The materialist thesis (that material reality, and as such, history is neither fixed or stable,
but always in becoming) is politicized when it is joined to the principle of practical activity: that human beings are responsible for our conditions, that we imagine, create, and destroy the conditions of our own unhappiness and domination, and so much act collectively in efforts to shift the coordinates of possibility. Praxis is the means by which the
political subject actively imagines and creates the world, not merely through idealist categories but through actual material activity that transforms the world.
But what directs praxis? How do we avoid, given our alienated and reified status
in advanced modern societies, becoming ‘a plaything of alien forces’ that, in a sick twist
in the inner logic of capital, are themselves the product of human labor? Not all practical
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activity is authentic praxis, for human action is always under threat of being circumscribed and unwillfully conscripted by the limits established by the institutions of capitalism that come back to structure even our most subversive impulses and desires. The urge
to transcend this condition, to dismantle the irrationalities and contradictions that make it
possible, is one of the motivating and defining elements of praxis in the ideology critique
tradition, but it is important for the argument of this chapter to see that this notion of critique is both negative and immanent, and that adopting critique in this way has significant
implications for what it means for political theology to be practical.
A critical theology does not compete, replace, or oppose political theology, but
rather attempts to point out and correct what I will call ‘actionist’ tendencies within it. I
do not take this to mean that critique forestalls or occludes action or politics, but only that
introduces a negative perspective on its own ideological self-sufficiency, both its theological and it political presumptions. Critique is critical of action in order to create the space
to think otherwise than in the ideological system that we, as political subjects, are conscripted into. Being politically oriented - claims made by theology to be for justice and
against oppression, for freedom and against oppression, for equality and against heteronormativity, racism, and patriarchy, for planetary health and against practices of ecological denigration - does not secure for one’s self the vaunted security of an anti-ideological
position. To raise these questions, a critical theology introduces a an immanent critique of
“dual negativity” that points to both the negativity of the predominant social order in
which we live in and the negativity of theology’s own claims of presumptive self-suffi-
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ciency. To be clear: the immanent negativity of the relation of critical theology to political theology does not result in a dismissal of action or politics, but only insists that the
negative critique that political theology directs towards social and political problems also
be directed towards itself immanently, which will indeed impact how political theology
comports itself politically and theologically. What good is critique if everything stays the
same afterwards?
In the late 1960’s, Adorno explained his infamous refusal to endorse the student
protest movements in a defense of critique as that which stands between ‘actionism’ and
praxis. Historically speaking, Adorno’s critical statements about actionism was occasioned by his disagreement with and refusal to endorse the student and antiwar movements of the late 1960s, which he faulted for displaying what he thought as an unreflective “collective compulsion for positivity that allows its immediate translation into practice”40 despite the fact that so many of them were acting in response to his own work!
The critique of actionism also occurs along a long-standing fault line between Adorno
and other early critical theorists, most notably Herbert Marcuse, specially in terms of
their differing philosophies of history and how those differences play our in their political
expectations of liberation - and indeed, for revolution.41 I cannot lay out the complex historical and factual details that led up to this dispute or to the way it deeply divided early
critical theorists in regards to the late 1960’s student and antiwar movement in Germany,
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which has much to do with the struggles and shifts within the democratic state of Germany after the great war.42 All I intend to do here is lay out Adorno’s critical analysis of
actionism as example of critical impulse of ‘dual negativity’ that informs critical theology, and then to describe the impact that the critique of actionism has on the immanent
relation of theory and praxis in political theology.
. Adorno faulted the protestors, demonstrators, and organizers for taking actions
for ‘the sake of doing something’, an urgency that has more to do with sublimating their
frustration and anxiety about the condition of their social world and overcoming their experience of helplessness, weakness, and alienation in the face of anti-democratic technocratic and economic power taking control of both the university and the state. Too
quickly, Adorno said, theory was being mobilized for what was thought to be the revolution, without regard for the constraints of the historical situation or without consideration
of whether the activities were in fact discontinuous with the present system. This certainly makes the line between praxis and ‘actionism’: authentic praxis institutes and
brings into being a material reality discontinuous with the predominant system, something that Adorno did not see happening as a result of the student movement’s presumptions to have inaugurated such a break.
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Taking up Adorno’s distinction between mere actionism and revolutionary praxis
gives us an opportunity to clarify Adorno’s prospects for political action. Adorno’s reputation, outlined most famously by Perry Anderson, is that his the negative charger of his
theory is resigned to defeat and political isolation and despair. The idea there there is no
way to live rightly in the conditions of false life leaves no other option than the renunciation of politics and a retreat into abstraction and pessimism. Adorno’s theory of critique
then leads to nothing more than complicit dormancy.43 Andrew Feenberg makes a similar
argument about the role of critique Adorno’s grim views on prospects for social change,
determined in large part by his negative philosophy of history, leading him to eschew the
possibility of emancipation, progress, or revolution, the conditions of modernity being as
reified as they are. Instead, the goal of critique is thoroughly immanent to modernity, and
so abstains from formulating positive alternative or constructive responses to reification
of reason and relations in the capitalist social order.44 But neither Adorno nor the early
critical theorists were quietist, but rather utopian thinkers who are starkly committed to
remaking the world through materialist practices: that unity of theory and praxis. Admittedly this has as much to do with his philosophy of history, articulated in distinction to
both Marx and Hegel, as it does with critique, but it is nevertheless important to better
understand Adorno’s views on how critique restricted the prospects for political action.45
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Given Adorno’s views about the total integration of consciousness and rationality
into the dominative system, it is easy to see why he thought the conditions were not right
for genuine praxis, which required a dramatic, radical shift in the social order, not just
changes in the form of government or social values. In this context, authentic political action can morph into ‘pseudo-activities’ that actually help and perpetuate the existing system that is explicitly being opposed by protest, demonstration, and organization. Actionism distracts political subjects with the cathartic effects of struggle, helps feeling as if
they are doing something important and alleviates their own sense of complicity or powerlessness.
To flesh this out a bit more, I turn here to the essays ‘Critique’ and ‘Resignation',
both of which were radio addresses that take up directly the question of theory’s relation
to praxis with a situation of actionism. Adorno counters what he saw as “pseudo-activities” of student protest and demonstrations against the university system in Germany and
what they saw as the anti-democratic, authoritarian, and technocratic government. Far
from being the vestiges of revolution or conduits of serious, radical social change necessary for praxis to take hold in social order, Adorno considered actionist protest and resistance to be themselves byproducts of reified consciousness that only sustained and protected structures of domination rather than introduce the possibility of genuine human relations necessary for collective attachments and political arrangements that give rise to
freedom, happiness, and well-being. In some ways, this was not surprising to Adorno.
False life limits and restricts our political options and our struggle for praxis. The lack of
correct forms of life, of consciousness, circumscribes our political choices, leading to an
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existential anxiety, an urgency about our present uncertainty, that itself leads to a privileging of practical life and so to a resentment towards thinking in response to the demand
for a false clarity.
This is expanded by Adorno is his seminal essay, “Critique” where he distances
critical theory from the jargon of social change or abstract revolutionary rhetoric.46 While
he falls far short of offering anything like political perspective based on critique, he does
offer a minimalistic praxis that is guided by the negative image of the world provided by
immanent critique. Critique is political in the sense that it directs our us towards from
particular social forms, only for the sake of their negation: it gives us guidance about how
not to live, how not to think or act. Despite its negativity, this immanent critique of praxis
as actionism is indeed social criticism; its method lays out how we can best start to specify the relations and patterns of oppression in institutions, structures, and policies, by analyzing the situation and identifying the fundamental antagonisms at its base. This critical
work far precedes that of practical activity, and is itself a form of praxis. If political theology aims to take up and apply to itself the Marxian thesis that the point of philosophy is
to change the world, not only to interpret it, then it must come to terms with the way that
critique relates immanently to praxis by trying to make sense of the world. This is the
task of critique, and it is as far as we can go at this point in history.
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This position is further justified in the essay “Resignation”, in which he rebuffs
detractors who dismiss his critical perspective on the grounds that it is negative, pessimistic, and non-normative. He admits that the refusal to directly link critical theory to a specific program for political action has often led to him being charged with political passivity or resignation, as if “by leaving the conditions untouched, he condones them without
admitting it.”47 Adorno’s concern is that this obsession with activity is actionistic and so
precludes the full commitment to thought that authentic praxis requires: “the much invoked unity of theory and praxis has the tendency of slipping into the predominance of
praxis.”48 Adorno further defines actionism as “the repressive intolerance to the thought
that is not immediately accomplished by instructions for action””49 in contrast to praxis to
which theory is not merely a counterpart that was once helpful, but is now no longer
needed now that the revolution is in place.
For Adorno, the near immediate demand for practical activity was the most apathetic, the most resigned to the current configuration of political possibilities. Actionism,
despite its rowdy insistence otherwise, ended up merely endorsing “the pseudo-reality
within which actionism moves.”50 It displayed the inherent belief that the options before
us are the best or only ones that we could think of and that any suspension of action was
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not worth it; nothing really could ever change. The immediacy, the urgency, the unmediated rush to act - the ‘do it yourself’ slogan (‘be the change you want to see in the
world!’) stifles creativity and spontaneity, and its its disregard for the art of political patience, becomes moralized, sentimental theater with the positive in a starring role. For
Adorno, the problem with this is that “the craving for the positive is a screen-image of the
destructive instinct working under a thin veil. Those talking the most about the positive
are in agreement with destructive power. The collective compulsion for a positivity that
allows its immediate translation into practice… fits so smoothly into society’s prevailing
trend.”51
By concluding that “actionism is regressive [because] it refuses to reflect on its
own impotence”, Adorno notes his concern that political subjects who see themselves as
radical agitators of the dominating system actually end up living out the pragmatic empiricism of the dominant culture; in this way, “actionism fits so smoothly into society's prevailing trend.”52 The corrective antidote for this false and complicit positivity was the
negativity of immanent critique, not an critical abandonment of praxis. It is the responsibility of critique “not to accept the situation as final.”53 Just because Adorno’s sense was
that any serious prospects for political action were far off, a sensibility driven by his negative, immanent concept of critique, did not mean that his critique left his practical philosophy naturally opposed to any concrete, historical struggles.
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According to Adorno, ‘actionism’ is ideology because it discourages negative discussion of positive ideas or beliefs (justice, equality, reconciliation, solidarity), and so
stymies both thought and praxis with its preference for activities and tactics. It is averse
to any kind of thinking that may or may not necessarily produce something (which it
deems to ‘deconstructive’, ‘critical’, ‘negative’, or ‘abstract’), even if its direct practical
impact may still be far off. Their preference is, as Adorno notes, for thought that conveniently produces “ideologies for their own accommodation, like lucidity, objectivity and
precision.”54 “One clings to action for the sake of action”, quipped Adorno, and this only
produces a “forced primary of praxis” that devolves into a ‘pseudo-activity’: “action that
overdoes and aggravates itself for the sake of its own publicity.”55
The characteristics of actionism include a temperamental, defensive reflex, a hyper-pragmatism that favors gradualist, short-term change, rather that the dramatic systemic shifts favored by Adorno and the early Frankfurters, and hostility towards theory,
all of which justifies their activism through the moralization of orthopraxy. whereas the
one who acts is the most virtuous, the one most committed to the cause of justice, solidarity, emancipation and so on.’ It is precisely this kind of self-assurance and unreflexive
modesty that leads Adorno to resist the idea that immediate activity as a necessary, universal condition of praxis. Adorno insists that the critical work of understanding and
changing deep structures usually will not be resolved through reactionary policy changes,
public demonstrations, or protest movements, whose proclivities for were most likely to
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simply reinscribe the same irrational, dominative logics at heart of the dehumanizing and
authoritarian system they want to resist.
Given its immanent and negative character, does critique seal theory (and so, as it
concerns us here, theology) off from practical, ethical, social transformative praxis? Does
its negativity, its minimalist strategy of denunciation, preclude the judgement and decision requisite for ethics and politics? Adorno (and again, to a lesser extent, Horkheimer)
is often faulted for producing a social theory so critical that it was resigned to the givens
of modern social formulations, content to offer a negative image of the social world without proffering positive solutions or practical programs. As the charge goes, this interminable critique of domination, suffering, damage, and injustice does not deliver any real
transformation of the material conditions that produce them. The immanent context of
thinking prevents even discursive, practical reason from proffering anything trustworthy
other than inverted images of reality: ‘that which ought to be but is.’ Critique does not
proffer alternative visions of the world, ways that lead political subjects out of damaged
life, towards some ideal future, leaving us with no recourse but to interminably negate the
actual, or as Horkheimer would later complain, “All we can do is say ‘no’ to everything!”56
This does not mean that critique fully dispenses or divests itself from interest in
the direct activity of praxis. Adorno does not dismiss praxis in favor of critique, but ra-
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ther raises the threshold for praxis beyond that of the student protestors and demonstrators. When Adorno insisted that “critique is essential for all democracy”57, he was pointing to how its work is to resist the established positions, existing institutions, predominant frameworks of thought (unity, identity, harmony, authority), all of which that posits
itself as self-justified, natural, or university: in a word, it is to counter ideology. This is
the resistance, not of judgement, but of final decision that keeps open the possibility of
being wrong, of being misguided, of not quite having it all right. Adorno critiqued the
1960s student movements for being ‘actionists' because their efforts at protest and resistance lacked this self-reflexivity of critique; they considered themselves inoculated and
exempt on account of their vocal and active opposition to an exploitative, unjust and inhuman social system, and their commitments to democracy, equality, and liberation, as of
those concepts and ideals themselves are free from the same dialectical demons that possess ‘enlightenment.’
Adorno further insists that the most serious threat to critique is “the appeal to the
positive.”58 Adorno bemoans this fact, concerned about a sublation of critique by praxis
of ‘positivity’: “One continually finds the word critique, if it is tolerated at all, accompanied by the word constructive. The insinuation is that only someone can practice critique
who can propose something better than what is being criticized… By making the positive
a condition for it, critique is tamed from the very beginning and loses its vehemence.”59
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Adorno goes on to say that “it is by no means always possible to add to critique the immediate practical recommendation of something better, although in many cases critique
can proceed by way of confronting realities with the norms to which these realities appeal
following the norms would already by better.”60
It is clear that Adorno’s theory of the total integration of the social world with
radical evil overstated the completeness of damaged life. Ted Smith says it well, speaking
about the early Frankfurt School: “Their own arguments are the best arguments against
their understandings of the world, for they both do much more than trace the outlines of
the fractures of our lives, and they do so in ways that are not only intelligible but even
beautiful. The fact that they can think such thoughts at all is the best argument against the
totality of their despair.”61 To be sure, critique is necessary in order to get access to ‘the
damaged life’ that makes the way towards correct forms of life hard to discern; only after
disrupting these conditions will we be able to conceive ideas of truth, justice, and the
good, and so be able to articulate and put into practice what it would look like to live an
ethically and morally right form of life.
How is critique able to disclose the negative image of the existing order as an immanent method? What is revealed in the negative light of critique is not only greed,
alienation, unchecked selfishness, injustice, and systemic dehumanization for the sake of
profit and pleasure, but all the resultant pain, fear, suffering, and terror that the ideology
of mass-produced culture tries to hide and anesthetize, leaving political subjects with just

60

Adorno, “Critique,” 288.

61

Smith, Weird John Brown, 160.

363
enough amnesia and exhaustion to ensure that they do not pose a serious threat to the normal flow of things. This is how critical theology may contribute to political theology’s
privilege of praxis while its negativity always hedges against its actionism. Rather than
all too quick dismissal of action and politics, critical theology proceeds negativity in relation to political theology with the conviction that “the false, once determinately known
and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is right and better.”62
Praxis guided by critique is always motivated by what the Frankfurt School, and
political theology, and eventually feminist and liberationist theologies, called “negative
contrast experiences.”63 The experience of history as history of suffering, nonsense, and
misery is not enough to generate the kind of praxis necessary to overcome and counter it.
Critique insists that any and all outrage at what is and should not be, provided by these
selfsame negative contrast experiences, is not enough to give us knowledge of what
should be; it is not enough to convince us all to look beyond what it is and towards something new. Encountering really existing conditions of poverty, experiencing authentic
compassion and grief, and coming to terms one’s complicity in the capitalist system of
success, profit, and consumption that requires poverty is not enough to generate the kind
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of praxis that will dismantle its real social causes. And yet, the goal of much of liberationist and political theologies is precisely this: consciousness-raising, often times interpreted as co-terminus with ideology critique.
The double movement of immanent critique insists that any attempt to indicate
something determine as a result of critique is problematized by the false character of the
reality it is opposing. Elizabeth Pritchard explains it this way: “To elevate negativity into
an existing positive is to pretend that the longed-for reconciliation is an extension of the
status quo; alternately stated, it is to mistake critical insight for the achievement of lived
reconciliation.” Critical theology reminds political, in its second, self-reflective direction,
that being able to see that things should not be as they are does not thereby allow one to
produce a picture of the way things should be or will be. This would amount to a elevation of negativity into positivity, and this is precisely that which critical theology finds
problematic and troublesome. Critical theology is uncertain whether the better future is in
fact indicated in negative experiences of the world and surfaced by its ideology critique,
and so taking up political theology as its object, it modifies the posture it takes as it prescribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theological commitments, or
political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones. In this way, a critical theology is
tasked with moderating the relation of theory and praxis within political theology.
Critical theology’s most urgent or pressuring goal is not to put theology to work,
but to practice theology with a critical spirit of immanent, negative self-reflexivity, submitting itself and all the practices, policies, solutions, and proposals it suggests as a result
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of its own discourse to incessant immanent ideology critique, both towards social conditions and towards its own positivity. It does this not in order to forestall praxis, but tries
to ensure that political activities, with all their claims to subversive protest, revolutionary
resistance, and practical change, only play right into the hands of an oppressive and dominative system well skilled at converting opposition into fuel.64 It starts from the concrete,
historical situation of our lifeworld, and from there analyzes theology’s entanglement
within this world, especially the ways it cirucmscribes theology, determining the ethical,
social, and political choices available to it, the ways we think and consider this choices,
and how we configure our political subjectivity in relation to theological commitment.
When Raymond Geuss warned that, speaking about Adorno’s view of the total integration of the world with radical evil, all “demands that philosophy be connected with any
kind of injunction to perform specific actions are themselves both forms of repression
and an incitement to evil”65, he is referring to what I think should be political theology’s
critical relation to praxis.
The value of Adorno’s critique of actionism is that it articulates the difference between a critical position and an actionist position on the relation of theory to praxis. The
kind of theology sought for by a critical theology is not theory void of action, divorced
from any sort of transformative or ethical consideration, but rather the kind of thought
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that, again to quote Adorno, “remains loyal to itself by negating itself from these moments. That is the critical form of thought. Critical thought alone, not thought’s complacent agreement with itself, may help bring about change.”66 A critical theology, in relation to political theology, attempts to mark the trap laid by the politics of urgency and immediacy that does not take seriously the constraints of its own thought, that gets too
caught up in the frenzy of activity that it fails to account for its immanent contradictions
and antagonisms, its ideological presumptions that hide under its claims to being transformative, subversive, and the like. A critical theology based upon a critique of actionism
is not a critique of the practical solutions provided by political theology tout court, nor is
it an unequivocally strict restriction of how practical critical theology can be. The purpose for doing political theology through the prism of critique is to self-consciously practice an immanent critique of dual negativity both of its own false clarity and sham resistance, for fear of actually playing into the hands of a dominative system that has
proved itself to be adept at inoculating subversion and opposition, and of the social
world.
My point is not that there should be less activism, less practical action, less concrete struggle taken up by political theology. Nor am I suggesting that theology ought to
abandon the hard political work of struggling for and with those who suffer and die at the
hands of social injustice, economic inequality, authoritarian power, and the contradictions
of capital. The practical, transformative force of political theology is nothing without visible, disruptive, interruptive displays of protest, resistance, and indeed, praxis; political
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theology would cease to be either theological or political in this case, for it is clear to me,
at least from the Christian perspective, any theology that does not account for the demands placed upon it by God’s own prescribed solidarity with the unheard and unredeemed memories of the suffering and the dead is not indeed a theo-logos, but has become something else entirely. In closing, why turn to early critical theory here? Why be
concerned at all with Horkheimer’s contrast of critical theory with traditional theory or
with Adorno’s negative theory of critique or his analysis of actionism and resignation?
What does this method of immanent critique mean for political theology? Alessandro
Ferrara. (among others) has recently argued that immanent critique is unique in its ability
to bring its object out beyond itself by attending to what lies within, or as Ferrara says, it
brings the object “beyond its present state or predicate, turning it into something that projects a significance that can be appraised by others who were not in the original circle of
habits and critique. Immanent critique offers its object a chance to become an embodiment of justice, of freedom, of human dignity or of some other similar value.”67 It is clear
that immanent critique goes beyond demanding theology to be aware of its own faults,
contradiction, and inconsistencies. This relegation of critique to judgments of internal coherence make it seem rather conventional and obvious, a common tactic of modern reason’s internal contradictions, and as such necessitates the full updating and reception of
ideology critique. It is, after all, critical theory that foregrounds ideology critique as the
central task of philosophy under the particular conditions of modernity. This objective
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can only be realized with the advent of ‘critical thinking’ and its immanent method, since
both the thinking individual and her society are predisposed to conformism in thought
that is regulatively enclosed and so, structurally self-affirming.
Political Theology?
What I hope to avoid here is merely suggesting that what theology stands to learn
from ideology critique is that it needs to be more critically self-aware, conscientious, of
its own errors, mistakes, and short-sightedness. Nor do I want to integrate ideology critique into theology for the purpose of better positioning theology (and/or religious
thought) as “a conceptual resource for theoretical innovation.” This amounts to an instrumentalization of theology for the purpose of politics, whether they be critical, as in
Žižek’s case, or radical, as in Eagleton’s. I find these approaches to be insufficient responses to ideology critique within critical theory because neither of them take on ‘critique’ as their primary modality, but maintain an allegiance to a higher goal: the creative
appropriation and use of religious and theological ideas in the practical tropes of judgement, decision, and action. Instead of rushing to put religious and theological notions,
themes, and ideas to new uses, critique sobers the immanent relation between theology
and politics, but not because all use of theology for political reason is ideological. Indeed
this must happen, and yet what is needed is a dual negative perspective that applies critique to both the political and to the theological.
The main point of theorizing political theology as critique is not to develop a
methodology from which to derive what our social and/or political order ought to be like,
but rather to establish that there is always a potential for improvement immanent to, and
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contained within, our thoughts and practices. But the need for critique is not just a political demand made against theology so as to clear away the ever-present ‘ideological taint’,
but is instead what Adorno called ‘an immanent method’ that theology itself must learn to
practice, not something that is practiced against theology by philosophy, sociology, or
science. Critical theology is justified theologically - even though it is carried out for ethical grounds or political reasons. For political theology, critique is the political means to
its properly theological end.
What concerns me, however, about political theology is not so much that we lack
a comprehensive, rigorous definition for it (a troublesome situation that admittedly allows
for it to be used indiscriminately, leaving it wide open to confusion and abuse). Too often, the idea that “as there is no theology without political implications, there is no political theory without theological presuppositions” leads to a dangerous presumption that the
proper task of theology is to lead the world out of its damaged state, that theology paves
the way to the good through liberation and freedom. As a result, political theology all too
often sublimates political philosophy into itself on account of the immense practical force
it enjoys when it puts its theological ideas into political practice. By stylizing itself as
praxis, political theology awards itself all too quickly with a self-satisfaction about practical importance, relevance, and usefulness. This practical emphasis on the part of some
political theologies is often used to seal itself off against critique on the basis that it is the
position most committed to the social causes of justice, reconciliation, human rights, or
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liberation; the fact that action is being taken inoculates it from critique, and so it considers itself immunizes from an immanent critique of its own presumptive self-sufficiency
that betrays its interruptive and emancipatory reason.
In the absence of this dual perspective, political theology responds to the negativity of a present social conditions and so sublimates the critical, self-reflexive, and negative demands of praxis into ‘activities’, meaning that political theology is meaningful,
useful, and worthwhile only insofar as it has a point. And so, what critical theology challenges in political theology is not the practical impulse that drives the concern for social
change via transformative praxis, but the way that this impulse enforces a decidedly anticritical spirit that seemingly inoculates political theology’s stated commitment to opposing oppressive, dominating, and authoritarian orders from any need for self-reflexive examination, allowing itself to be applied straightaway.
The need for critical theology comes from a lack of confidence that Christian theology is quite as reliable or trustworthy as political theology seems to think it is - or that
our theologies are so unqualifiedly good for the world. These misgivings are supplied by
the negativity of immanent critique and should be folded into its own theological and political commitments. Critical theology helps political theology avoid becoming merely a
practiced rehearsal of well-worn scripts, a pattern, perhaps unconsciously, that is always
protected so as to avoid any kind of rupture and negativity.
Constructively, what critique offers to political theology is a shift in perspective
in terms of how it envisions how and why it is political; that is, that critical theory takes
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political theology as its own object, as an immanent critique. In doing so, political theology becomes a critical discourse about how to undertake concrete practices in the context
of a broken, damaged, social world in which political activity and practical programs can
often be inverted by dominative and alienating forces within the social order; when this
happens, truly political concerns, understood simply as the struggle to ascertain how best
to arrange ourselves in collective associations for human well-being and freedom, becomes sublated into ‘policy’ or the activities of ‘policing’, reduced to the struggle to possess and distribute power. Jacques Ranciere articulates upon the difference this way:
What is proper to politics is thus lost at the outset if politics is thought of as a
specific way of living. Politics is specifically opposed to the police. The police is
a 'partition of the sensible' [le partage du sensible] whose principle is the absence
of a void and of a supplement. The police is not a social function but a symbolic
constitution of the social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even
control over the living. Its essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensible. We will call 'partition of the sensible' a general law that defines the forms of
part-taking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed.
The partition of the sensible is the cutting-up of the world and of ‘world…68
The essence of politics, then, is radically disturbing in its insistence to bring to the
field of constitution that which the field itself has little room for. It introduces into this
‘partition' precisely what it was designed to keep out: “a part of the no-part.” In a milieu
saturated by sloganeering and calls to action, all of which appear to make very little impact on the normal flow of things, the work of critique is to interrupt this, to call forth the
possibility of the otherwise. It is to remind us that things should not be as they are, but
stops short of prescribing how things ought to be. It does this because of its eminently
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political interests and commitments, not because of an abandonment of social transformation, political activity, or concrete concerns. Any allergy critique may have to judgement and activity is a question of division of labor, rather than a principled objection.
Again, Ranciere echoes how it is that politics attempts to overcome the partitioning of
policy and the police from politics:
Political litigiousness/struggle is that which brings politics into being by separating it from the police that is, in turn, always attempting its disappearance either by
crudely denying it, or by subsuming that logic to its own. Politics is first and foremost an intervention upon the visible and the sayable.69
My interest in a critical theology stems from a desire to clarify exactly how and why the
theory of the political modifies the theological; it does this by seeing a homology between the “intervention upon the visible and the sayable” and the negativity of the immanently critical position in relation to the normativity of praxis. A critical theology explicates how it is that political theology itself leads directly neither to a specific ethics nor to
a politics, but is at its immanent best when it is ‘en-framed’, limited, by its own criticality; that is, when it disavows the dual temptations of technical (whereby it attempts to
find the best means to a given end) and/or practical reason (which determines whether a
prospective course of action is worth pursuing) even if the telos itself is desirable (nonstatist, anti-racist, feminist, anti-capitalist, and so on).
Political theology, then, is not against praxis, but rather approaches it critically,
that is, negatively with a minimalist attitude towards ethical and political action; in this
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way, it sides with praxis against what Adorno called ‘pseudo-activities’, which, when applied to political theology, can be discerned in the frequent appeals to ethical and political
categories of justice, liberation, reconciliation, resistance, consensus and so on, appeals
that show themselves to be as innocuous to the established order as they are commonplace in the culture of the literature of political theology. The appeals themselves are not
problematic; it is that these appeals and the commitments they necessitate are not held
critically; that is, they act as exemptions for further critical consideration. In this way, critique reshapes the immanent relation within political theology of theory to praxis through
a dual movement of negativity, directed at once at both
a thorough critique of social conditions (ad extra) immanent critique of theological concepts (intra).
This double movement is something more in line with Metz and Althaus-Reid
than with Tillich, Niebuhr, liberation theology, or even the biblical theology of idolatry,
namely because both Metz and Althaus-Reid clearly saw the need to establish theology in
a critical position both towards social conditions (e.g., heteronormativity, sexual violence) and in relation to theological concepts (e.g., theologies that authorize and justify
patriarchal ecclesial forces, privatization of theology, the bourgeois religious subject).
And yet even if this critical perspective do not reflexively turn, in an immanent way, to
itself, either to the new political theology or the indecent theologies they developed, respectively.
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This dual negativity critical theology further specifies what it means for theology
to be both critical and political; that is, committed to supporting and fostering transformative praxis, while also fostering an immanent critique of dual negativity, both of the present social order and its own self-sufficiency. In this way, critical theology is, as Mendieta suggests, “a cipher of negativity”: a deliberate attempt to think theologically with theology and also against it, to rescue praxis from theology for the sake of each other. The
goal of critical theology, in relation to political theology, to is produce theologies that act
as critical, negative elements with which to criticize a broken world replete with damage
life, and its own ideological presumptions to be on emancipatory praxis.
In this way, the longing inherent to critical theology is a yearning for the just society that is the condition of possibility for truth and reason. Critical theology is at the service of political theology as its immanent critique of ideology, and such converts itself
into a source of social and political critique that self-reflexively considers itself to both a
source of alienation and negation in the world, but also potentially of freedom, redemption and happiness that may, from within itself, instigate new forms of political possibilities. This dual perspective wants to make explicit the ways that theology and the political
are not at odds, and cannot become what they both need to be (according to the norms of
justice, equality, recognition, freedom and the like), and so explicitly takes up lines of argument that position theology critically in relation to itself and its social world.
That critical theology may only take an inverse or negative form is something we
learn from Adorno. By this, Adorno meant a theology that begins from, and does not ex-
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ceed beyond, the absence of God. “Negative theology” is not apophatic strategy of theological naming, but rather is a philosophy of history, one that understands progress, fulfillment and expectation not as triumphant, but rather as that ridden with calamity, and so
flashes back analeptically to the beginning,so as to bring the misery and the suffering of
the world into view. This negativity of critical theology, however, does not forestall redemption or hope but rather conditions the context in which Christianity, its theologies,
and its communities turn still to the impossibility of love, forgiveness, reparations,
memory, and perhaps, even utopia, but now sobered by the selfsame gesture of its immanent critique that uncovers its delusions, blind spots, and perhaps its errors.
In this way, the longing inherent to critical theology is a yearning for the just society that is the condition of possibility for truth and reason. Critical theology is at the service of political theology as its immanent critique of ideology, and such converts itself
into a source of social and political critique that self-reflexively considers itself to both a
source of alienation and negation in the world, but also potentially of freedom, redemption and happiness that may, from within itself, instigate new forms of political possibilities. This dual perspective wants to make explicit the ways that theology and the political
are not at odds, and cannot become what they both need to be (according to the norms of
justice, equality, recognition, freedom and the like), and so explicitly takes up lines of argument that position theology critically in relation to itself and its social world.
Critical Theology?
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I cannot be exhaustive or comprehensive in what follows, but I do hope to provide
some clarifying examples of the use of critique in theology that understands itself in differing ways as political theology. I do this in order to clarify where I think these perspectives fall short and how their shortcomings may be ameliorated by a return of sorts to the
conception of critique articulated by the early critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It is
fairly common in late modern discussions of theological method for theologians to propose multiple tasks for theology, criticism primary among them. Since the rise of modern
theology, criticism is seen as the negative or deconstructive element of a broader, more
comprehensive picture of theological labor, something that theologians do on the way to
something else, something more desirable. Criticism was often the posture that theology
is to take to its own history, its tradition, its own religious practices, institutions or beliefs; many theological reasons are given for this reflexivity, namely that insofar as the
most direct theological question is that of God, it is clear that divine love and grace points
us back to the human condition, calling us to consider human purposes and needs paramount to the vocation of theology as it performs specific functions in the course of human life. In this material, criticism was often paired with other more affirmative tasks,
such as constructive, contextualizing, or application. This task is often directed to the various forms of human experience, whether it be individual, social, political, scientific, aesthetic, linguistic, or moral, whereby theologians are to connect the traditions’s understanding of God to the various segments or aspects of contemporary human life. This secures for theology a claim to relevance, to public significance, to being meaningful beyond the specific confines of its particular community.
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This general pattern varies significantly from tradition to tradition not only between Protestant and Catholic traditions but within them. Liberal, narrative, public, radical, and practical theological approaches (along with some variants of Catholic modernists) will all stray at some point from this general structure, but it stands as a working rubric for how criticism has been woven into theological method but its critical impact was
not sustained but was taken over by instrumentalizing impulses to put theology to work.
My sense that critique, which is always self-reflexively interrogative, does in fact place
some significant limits on how and why theology can be used for praxis. Whether critique has ever been allowed to have this effect on theology, especially theologies that understand themselves to be directly political in nature, remains to be seen. To get a sense
of major trends, we will quickly look at a few examples as starting points for how critique ought to function in political theology moving forward.
We saw in the preceding chapters that the turn to theology for ideology critique
was politically motivated, in that they saw in Christianity a critical wedge to hold against
the powers of liberal democracy and the contradictions of capital. The politicalization of
theology for ideology critique, evinced in the work of Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek,
seemed to counter or reverse a long-held suspicion associated with the Marxist tradition
that theology, although it arose from the material struggles of human beings, precluded
transformative praxis because of its ideological status; that is, its social impact universalized and naturalized explanations of the world and of history and so shielded political
subjects from the reality of their oppression, making it harder for the processes of prole-
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tarianization to take effect. I have noted throughout the dissertation that one way to understand and identify ideology is to explore its social impact, the way it interfaces with
the collective lives of political subjects. Both Eagleton and Žižek mostly considered theology to be ‘false’ but happily employed it for political purposes so as to counter the ideologies of liberalism, capital, postmodernity, and so on. In the end, they instrumentalized
theology for their own purposes, turning Christianity into mere political site. It was the
politics of theology that attracted them; they found theology in this way to be useful, even
if in the end of the day, none of it was true. Žižek’s Christianity is a self-consciously
atheistic one, after all.
By and large, political theology has celebrated this turn to theology for ideology
critique, for it too considers itself an emancipatory resource for ethics and politics. It
looks to its traditions and sources and finds there enormous material upon which to think
about debt, labor, poverty, human dignity, divine solidarity with the poor, law, sacrifice,
theologies of suffering, challenges to authoritarianism, imperialism and nationalism, embodiment, critiques of violence, alternative theories of power and sovereignty, as well as
social issues such as racism and gender justice. As the recent interest in theological genealogies has shown, much of that has always trickled down into the most basic of democratic principles and liberal values: human rights, consensus, toleration, the sacred/secular distinction, and representational governance. In contrast to this, how does critical theology flesh out what theology should actually be about and how it should understand and
theorize its immanent relation to praxis?
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‘Critical theology’ is not a theological appropriation of critical theory that attempts to integrate or correlate its methods or analysis in order to ‘modernize’, update, or
otherwise correct problems within theology on ethical or political grounds.70 Marsha
Hewitt attempts this by correlating critical theory’s utopian ideals for human emancipation from dehumanizing and reifying structures of domination with feminist critiques of
patriarchy and gender injustice, as they appear in both the contemporary social world and
religious traditions. Her overall argument is that critical theory and feminist criticism
work in tandem in relation to society and religion to offer a holistic critique that also sustains utopic expectations for transformative praxis.71 Hewitt suggests this is prefigured in
how Horkheimer and Adorno (to a letter extent, admittedly) preserve a “kind of non-theistic religious longing” through a sustained negative confrontation with the world as it is,
without prescribing how the world ought to be, or how best to live as individuals in the
world.72 And yet, elsewhere Hewitt is dismissive of political theology (as well as liberation and public theology), and argues against the application of critical theory to political
theology, deeming them incompatible. She accuses political theologians of being “unable
to sustain or develop their critical impact”, evinced in their near universal commitment to
“the universal validity of Christian values and truth claims in their efforts to privilege
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Christian sensibility and political values in public, political life.” This makes them una73

ble to interface with complex modern societies in global, pluralistic, and multicultural
contexts. Though I share Hewitt’s concern that political theology can, at times, be too uncritical and unreflective about the applications of its theological values to public life, it is
not at all obvious that political theology cannot account for and respond to an ambiguous
and pluralist global context, or that all political theologies make these claims about the
universality of Christian truth claims. In fact, part of the benefit of political theology’s
diffusive character is its ability to engage various contexts and social worlds in meaningful and impactful ways; its undecidability leaves it flexible, malleable, and open to an increasingly pluralistic and global social order.
Hewitt also sets aside attempts to use notions of critique in critical theory rethink
the meaning and use of religion by critically relating to theological claims and religious
ideas to sociology.74 This general aim governs the “critical theory of religion” perspective
that seeks to integrate critical studies of religion (as sociological phenomena) into theological perspectives stylized as “critical social theology.” In the work of Charles Davis,
this amounts to more of an un-dialectical ‘theologization’ of society than a critique of the
social impact of theology, in my judgement. Integrating critical theory into theology
means studying the function of religion in society. The result is a ‘social’ theology that,
as a distinct form of social theory, takes its starting point from social and political life. In
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this view, critical theology is an effort to defend the present social function of religion,
and so dubiously develops Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality as the ground
and means of religious hope, rather than turning to Adorno and Horkheimer’s negative
critique.75
Likewise, Gregory Baum uses ‘critical theology’ “to designate a theology that
uses critical social theory to uncover the emancipatory meaning of the Christian gospel”,
and so is generally indistinguishable (by his own admission) to liberation theology in
Latin America or the new political theology in Germany.76 The fundamental goal of critical theology to defend the preferential option for the poor as a distinctly Catholic position, represented in and defended by Vatican documents and other ecclesiastic teachings;
it has a certain affinity for the critical ideas of early Frankfurt School, mostly notably in
its purported primacy of action and its commitment to the negation of structures that produce victims of history, which Baum interprets as a biblically grounded option for the
perspective of the victims. But it is also has shortcomings which theology can ameliorate.
It is elitist, lacks “a rich, value tradition” capable of forming social bonds, and failed to
take the retrieval of ethics seriously enough; in this way, critical theory is “unable to give
a reason for the hope that dwells within it” and so is forever hampered by its “secular humanistic beliefs.” What “critical theology" marks, then, in relation to critical theory is the
biblical, theological, and ecclesial supplement needed to realize critical theory’s desire to
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free humanity from ideologies’ even critical theory itself lacks the self-reflexivity it
sought to generate in other forms of thought and practice.77 In my view, this is a rather
triumphalist account of what critical theology is able to offer critical theory, and I think
overlooks the complexity which which the early critical theology engaged religion and
theology. It also rather unaware of how incompatible its embrace and endorsement of the
authority of the official church teachings is with critical theory’s ideology critique. The
demands of critique are is not limited to the idea that Christianity must admit that it too is
subject to ideology and that there is not innocence to its theological or political positions;
appealing to this admission as evidence of its critical posture of theology underestimates
how thoroughly dismantling and interruptive the demands of ideology critique are.
Related to this is the work of Michael Ott, Rudolf Siebert, and Warren Goldstein,
whose ‘Critical Theory of Society and Religion’ school contends that the Frankfurt
School’s critical social theory and religious thought are each other’s missing pieces.78 By
critically correlating religion to social theory, the specific role of religion in the struggle
of human emancipation is brought into clear relief in ways that were not clear to the original theorists, who were convinced of the total integration and reification of the world as
an effect of instrumantalized reason. While the future of religion is indeed as a critical
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theory of society, the future of critical theory is not ‘religious’ as much as it is a critical
theory of religious insight. This final position seems justified on the basis of how early
theorists of the Frankfurt School itself engaged religious and theological themes.79
Gordon Kaufman argues in his God, Mystery, and Diversity for a qualitative distinction between “authoritarian Christian theologies” and what he calls, “critical theology”, the latter of which is tasked with “the cultivation and development of the critical
potential of theological symbols and modes of reflection” so as to secure theology’s credibility as a contributing voice to major intellectual issues of modernity.80 For Kaufman
the distinction between authoritarian theologies “that refuse to take a critical stance towards their own religious beliefs - holding them, on dogmatic grounds, to be beyond
questioning- can play only a very limited role” in the life of modern society and critical
theology “that opens itself willingly to severe criticism from outside perspectives (as well
as from within).”81 The criterion for narrowing the field of what theologies ought to have
a role to play in adjudicating serious intellectual, moral, cultural and political questions of
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modern life and which ones should not is whether or not they possess a ‘critical consciousness’, presumably which means they are willing to find fault with themselves and
accept the fault-findings of others.
What authorizes the publicness of critical theology is “the most radical sort of
questioning of its own commitments”, allowing it to be “a contribution to a conversation
in which similar radical exploration and question of other living orientations of life…was
also being carried one.”82 It does not practice “the most penetrating scrutiny” for its own
sake, but rather “could in turn lead to the development of proposals for significant reconstruction of some (or all) of [its] perspectives.”83 Critical theology, then requires the commitment of faith, but this is not understood in an exclusive way, but in light of studies of
faith as a broad, universal human quality. As such, Kaufmann insists that critical theology
“is to be seen, rather, as a pluralist discipline that attempts to investigate and understand,
and to find ways of assessing and reconstructing, the actual orientational commitments to
which women and men today give themselves.”84 (211) What drives this critical activity
is praxis: it places an unbearable pressure of responsibility upon theology to exceed itself
and its orientations for the sake of broader values. Critical theology then is always pluralist, dialogical, and polysemic in terms of its own self-articulation - and this instability and
openness ensures its ongoing critical character. However, for Kaufmann, it is critique that
authorizes theology to submit its practices, concerns, and interests for consideration in
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political life, whereas for me, the effect of critique on theology may well the converse. In
my view, critical theology may in fact chose, because of its self-reflexive positions, to restrict itself from asserting its voice into political debate, whether at the official level of
legislative bodies/decision-making or that of practical reasoning of subjects in the public
sphere.
In contrast, Edmund Arens finds the shared concerns between critical theory and
political theology to be indexed in relation to their respective situation between modernity and postmodernity.85 Both the Frankfurt School and the early political theologians of
the post-war period in Germany, (but, as Arens, notes also in the U.S.) articulated their
shared critical concerns with to modern dynamics, but neither of them proposed postmodern answers. It is critique namely that critical theory and political theology share, not only
in terms of the objects of their critique (idealism, positivism, and capitalism), but the serious praxis concerns that center and ground their theoretical and theological work,
whether it be theologia crucis, divine solidarity with the suffering and the dead, and anamnestic reasoning, or the irrationality of reason, reification of social relations into culture, and utopian flashes of aesthetic experience.86
That this critique is immanent is often unrecognized, nor are its implications often
fully explored. The early critical theory (Horkheimer and Adorno) saw little chance,
given the destructive potential of modern irrationality, for modern societies to rescue
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themselves from their own domination, and yet also resisted ways of thinking that were
too optimistic. Nevertheless, the “standpoint of redemption” gave philosophy a base from
which to imagine and so create the world otherwise. This standpoint can only be a negative image of the present, giving praxis the historically concrete point from which to
work; this point is picked up and developed at great length in J.B. Metz’s notion of anamnestic reasoning.87 Here, remembering the stories and cries of the suffering and dead remind us all that the victims of history still demand to be vindicated, which can only happen if the universal values of justice, solidarity, and the recognition of the voice of the
other are realized first within Christianity, its theology, and the lives of its communities;
only then the apocalyptic-prophetic potential of its eschatological vision of hope can be
realized within modernity. Arens proposes that what political theology learns the most
from the emphasis on immanent critique by the early Frankfurt School is the fact that we
cannot simple escape the pitfalls and abuses of modernity instead of taking up ‘post-‘
forms of thinking, which only work to suture its fundamental contradictions and antagonisms. What it means for political theology to convert itself to a critical theology in
Arens’ view is to take up a fully dialectical posture in relation to dehumanizing structures
of power, authority, and domination, many of which are immanent to itself, instead of
trying to transgress them by appealing to a new era, postmodern, post-secular, or otherwise.88
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Eduardo Mendieta writes: “at the heart of the Frankfurt School critical theory we
find not just an incidental or ancillary attention to religion, but a central, deliberate, and
explicit confrontation with both religion and theology.”89 The objective of the Frankfurt
School concerning religion was not the same as the Enlightenment which oversaw the
victory of reason over theology by gerrymandering religion into subjectivity, effectively
privatizing it as one consoling and therapeutic option among many. The Frankfurt School
by and large saw that the way to secure religion, to protect it against itself, is by means of
the relentless critique of religion, or what Mendieta calls “a non-secular critique of religion for the sake of religion.”90 It is a critique that uses reason against religion, not as to
reject religion, for reason can no more do this than it can reject itself, but for the sake of
reason itself. This critique is animated by the urge to rescue religion for the sake of reason, for “theology is reason in search of itself by way of the demystification of social reality.” Religion then is a source of social critique that is freed to confront its own sources
with the same critical drive that that seeks “to rescue what makes the religious not just a
source of alienation and negation of the world, but also of remembrance, hope, redemptive, and utopia.”91 The way to the truth of religion is not through theology, but through
critique. This generates a theology that is always a negative theology; it starts not only
with the absence of God, a God that is not just hidden, but a God that is still on its way
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and so is yet to be. A critical theology then is “a cipher of dual negativity”: the negativity
of the present horror (society) and the negativity of its own ideological self-sufficiency,
its presumptions to be able to name God, much less, justice, freedom or happiness.92
There has been much discussion in recent years about Adorno, Horkheimer, and
the role of religion or theology in their critical social theory overall, with a specific interest in how theology figures into their ethical and political perspectives. New attention has
been paid to the unique way that Adorno especially blends and integrates theology (or in
the very least religious allusions and theological terms) into his concept of critique. What
I venture to say here is that we can discern in Adorno’s “use of theology” (not in what
Adorno thought of theology itself) as a model for a critical task that attends to the serious
human needs that make it necessary through negativity. For Adorno, theology articulates,
or perhaps more passively illustrates, the political point of critique’s negative vector: its
task is to struggle to achieve and to articulate an utopic position, supplied by the ‘standpoint of redemption’ that remains beyond reach.93
But lest Adorno’s critical negativity be mistaken as an instance of ‘negative theology’94, it is important to point out that Adorno was wary of this way of thinking as yet
another undialectical, affirmative tactic of identity-thinking that snuck in positive
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knowledge of God through the backdoor under guise of negation, losing all its validity.
He contrasted this approach with his own “‘inverse’ theology.” The metaphorical use of
‘inversion’, or ‘reversal’ is meant to illustrate the negative image of reality supplied by
the double movement of immanent critique. This stands in sharp contrast to the positivity
and affirmative tendencies inherent even within so-called “negative theologies”, theologies that try to gain affirmative, determinate knowledge of God through negation and so
bring God back in under the auspices of negativity and denial, as the positing of a third,
positive term in the Denysian negation of negation: “being, non-being, supra-being.” To
counter this, Adorno proposes that critique insists that while ‘perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world’, the ‘messianic light’ in which the world will
‘one day’ appear will not come from an outside stance, “a standpoint removed (…) from
the (…) sphere of existence.”95 A negativity of ‘inverse theology’ emphasizes the failure
of social reality to live up to the utopian expectations. It looks ‘beyond the immediate’ at
what-is-hoped-for: ‘the messianic standpoint of redemption.’ When it is inverse, dialectical, and negative, theology can be one such perspective.96
This helps explain the ‘critical’ promise of theology: namely, as negative critique
of oppression and injustice in present social existence that also resists the practicalities of
a ‘historical project’ or the immediacy of actionable solutions, is large part due to its
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utopic thinking. Critical thought resists system-building whose desire for totality and
completeness gives way to the conformism, exclusivity, and coherence of identity-thinking, all of which end up masking the antagonism that give rise to our present wretched
conditions of social life. Adorno sees in ‘inverse’ theology an illustration of the critical
approach to politics, in that it is a form of thought or rationality that sustains the negativity and immanence of critique: “certainly a ratio that does not wantonly absolute itself as
a rigid means of domination requires self-reflection, some of which is expressed in the
need for religion today.”97 Theology, in this way, is related to the immanent critique of
reason itself that keep its attention on the particulars of damaged human life, and away
from systems of thought and activity, easily reducible (in today’s culture) to the consolations of sentimentality.98 It supplies us with a sense that unjust social life should and can
be otherwise without telling us exactly what this otherwise ought to look like. It does this
by supplying an utopic vision that is both immanent and negative (and so critical), but
only as a result of its own ‘inversion.'
Adorno was ruthlessly critical of the positive claims made by Jewish and Christian religious traditions. Nevertheless, theology plays a surprising role in his articulation
of Marxist philosophy, both in terms of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ within modernity
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and the negative dialectics at work within his critical response to it. While Adorno re99

jects theological appeals to traditional notions of God, he nevertheless utilizes religion as
an element of his overall critique of our rationalized and technicalized world - and indeed
sees it as a part of the critical labor of the negative. There is something critical within the
theological, insofar as theology negatively invokes the divine transcendence of God as
the absolutely other, it installs a non-dialectical positivity that keeps social antimonies
from being exposed to thought. This non-dialectical positivity is responsible for reproducing the totalizing logic of integration and identity, which naturalizes and universalizes
the socio-historical processes that condition the relations between persons and between
persons and objects, and so to the extent to which theology can counter this as an immanent force within religion, it can be thought of as critical by revealing the subjugated of
thought and practice. By bringing the suppressed and occluded to the surface of what is,
one is able to negatively introduce the possibility of the world existing otherwise.
If the political task of critical theory is to keep rationality from closing in on itself,
remaining open to “suffering [as the] objectivity that weighs upon the subject”, then
Adorno assigns this task to the impulse of ‘dual negativity’ in theology, the inverse form
of which turns to both a critique of social conditions and to its own theological concepts.
‘Negative’ theology, in this way, reveals important insights on existing social conditions
by probing the wounds of human suffering, in order to reach beyond the ideology that the
99
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actuality is the real and instead articulates a utopic, but negative, hope for an alternative
possibility.100 The utopic, for Adorno, is the conviction that the world can be otherwise
than its currently wretched, damaged, corrupt state. Sustained attention to the fallenness
of the world is what is needed, however, not aspirational longings for an eschatological
futurity; this is the negativity of utopia, and of ‘inverted’ theology. The truth of this world
is elusive, and so Adorno calls for thought to ‘ruthless criticize itself’ in order to better
understand its fallen state.
This critical perspective nevertheless requires “the perspective of the redeemed”,
which is utopic (and so critical) in that it is not actualized, nor even possible, but always
already negative. Theology can become critical only through its own negation, metaphorically described by Adorno through the proscription, or ban, on divine images:
The materialist longing to conceive the thing wants the opposite: the complete object is to be thought only in the absence of images. Such an absence converges
with the theological ban on graven images. Materialism secularises it, by not permitting utopia to be pictured positively; that is the content of its negativity.101
Adorno’s use of theological concepts illustrates the reversal and negation necessary to
maintain the paradox: theology is inverted when it is developed from the “perspective of
the redeemed”, but also when it attends to unrealized possibilities while also eschewing
the seductions of immediacy and utility. This critical inversion extends beyond the idea
of God as theology’s proper object, but also shapes theology’s immanent relation to
praxis. Theological concepts from Judaism (and to a much lesser extent, Christianity),

100

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 3, 159-160.

101

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 207.

such as redemption, the messianic, and the Bilderverbot
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, confront and question society,

keeping open the potential for new insights into the current social order by resisting to acquiesce to the ideology of ‘what is current and possible’: the idolatry of naming the state,
the market, or ‘culture industry’ as total, absolute, or transcendent; in a word, divine.103
Adorno and Horkheimer write in the Dialectic of Enlightenment about the importance of
Jewish theologies of idolatry for understanding what theology should not be, relating it
directly to ideology critique as a critique of positivity, actuality, and identity-thinking.
For this, Adorno says, critique learns from “the absence of images” proscribed by the image ban, or the the Bilderverbot, which may be adapted into a potential inverse theology
of ideology critique:
The Jewish religion brooks no words which might bring solace to the despair of
all mortality. It places all hope in the prohibition against invoking falsity as God,
the finite as the infinite, the lie as the truth. The pledge of salvation lies in the rejection of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion.104
Theology’s “ban of images” aids critical theory as a dialectical form of negative
thinking. Theology is ideology critique in Adorno’s critical theory of society, but only in
its inverse form as an ‘empty- shell’ that resists ‘identity-thinking’ and the easy positivity
of political immediacy, both of which seek immediate practical solutions to political
problems. Critical theory turns to a negative concept of truth in order to hold open the
possibility of something between immediacy and pessimism. Take for example, Max
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Horkheimer, who finds in the theology of Jewish and Christian religions both a negative
concept of truth that keeps the world open for criticism and the moral longing for the
“wholly Other.” These are both vital for protecting theory from idealism, absolutism, and
positivism: simply put, ideology. In his essay “Thoughts on Religion”, Horkheimer contends there are aspects of theology, despite its metaphysical beliefs, that are invaluable
for critical theory:
[Humanity] loses religion as it moves through history, but the loss leaves its mark
behind. Part of the drives and desires which religious belief preserved and kept
alive are detached from the inhibiting religious form and become productive
forces in social practice...the concept of infinity is preserved in an awareness of
the finality of human life and of the inalterable aloneness of [human beings], and
it keeps society from indulging in a thoughtless optimism, an inflation of its own
knowledge into a new religion.105
The kind of negativity in theological thought resembles the struggles and goals of Marxist social theory, and so Horkheimer observes in theology “the image of a perfect justice”: a resilient (though not always consistent) moral vision for society and a commitment “to sustain, not to let reality stifle, the impulse for change.”106 Theology incubates
‘the longing for the Wholly Other’, meaning that “theology means here the awareness
that the world is appearance, that it is not the absolute truth, the last [word].” The ‘wholly
other’ for Horkheimer is the “most perfect justice”, which always already lies beyond the
actual in the potential which cannot be transcribed, blueprinted, and enacted.107 The

105

Horkheimer, “Thoughts on Religion,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. by M. O’Connell (New
York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1972), 131.
106
107

Horkheimer, Dawn & Decline, 163 and Horkheimer, “Thoughts on Religion,” 129.

Max Horkheimer, “Longing for the Wholly Other,” Gesammelte Schriften, vol 7, ed. Gunzelin Scmid
Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 389.

395
Christian theological idea of God as infinite alterity is paired with the Jewish critique of
idolatry, which prohibits the figurative naming or portrayal of the divine; as such the limits to political knowledge and action are the same in reference to theological knowledge
and action. One cannot know and speak authoritatively what justice is, only what injustice is. Idolatry, the theological critique of graven images, serves as a negative concept
that prevents reason from foreclosing itself into ideology, thereby preserving the critical
element of theory. This safeguards the substantive form of rationality sought by a negative dialectics and keeps it from becoming co-opted or compromised into an affirmation
of existing society and what is actual, rather what it ought to be, its possibility.
One place where the discussion about critique and praxis interfaces directly with
theological questions is utopia. Utopia is an important and challenging question for theology, namely because of the role that eschatological expectations has played in the concepts of the kingdom of God and the redemption of human beings from wretchedness,
both their own and that of the world. What ought Christians to expect, given their theological predilection for futurity over the present stage of history and society? Take for example, a discussion between Adorno and Ernst Bloch where Adorno argues, along with
Bloch, that the critical position is utopic while also remaining negative and immanent,
and that it receives this character from theology.108 Departing from deprecated and
shrinking misconception of utopia as “illusionary dreams”, “wishes for a better life” that
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would apparently link utopia more to ideology than to its critique, Adorno argues that
“one can actually talk about utopia in a negative way.”109 “Utopia refers to what is missing”, Adorno says, and so “what is essential about the concept of utopia is that it does not
consist of a certain, single selected category that changes itself, and from which everything constitutes itself.”110 He further links utopic thinking to critique by insisting that
“utopia is essentially in the determined negation, in the determined negation of what
which merely is and by concretizing itself as something false, it always points at the same
time to what should be”111; in this way, “the essential function of utopia is a critique of
what is present”112, aligning utopic politics with the ‘false thing’ that is both the ‘sign of
itself’ and “the correct”: index sui et veri113:
Utopia is the false thing…that means that the true thing determines itself via the
false thing, via that which makes itself falsely known. And insofar as we are not
allowed to cast the picture of utopia, insofar as we do not know what the correct
thing would be, we know exactly to be sure what the false thing is. That is actually the only form in which utopia is given to us at all.114
This critical negativity of utopia stands in sharp contrast to the ‘the wishful striving for
some impossible state of perfection and idealism’, a caricature supplied by those parties
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who have a very clear interest in making sure that the seemingly impossible remains so.
Adorno elaborates why it is that utopic thinking has deprecated into ideology:
what people have lost subjectively in regard to consciousness is very simply the
capability to imagine the totality as something that could be very different. That
people are sworn to the world as it is and have this blocked consciousness vis a
vis possibility, all this has a very deep cause, a cause that I would think is very
much connected exactly to the proximity of utopia…My thesis about this would
be that all humans deep down, whether they admit this or not, know that it would
be possible or it could be different.115
In this way, we can see how the messianic light (illustrated by inverse theology) is both
critical and negative, while also remaining thoroughly politically oriented. The ‘messianic light’ shines through the “cracks and deformations of the modern age” in order to
rouse considerations of world being imagined and so made to be otherwise.116 The messianic light is a negative light that does not supply redemption, freedom, happiness, or the
good, but rather “wrenches” reality apart” to reveal its depravity and its perversion. The
“refuse” of the world, what Eagleton calls the biblical anawim, is brought to our attention
by critique, and so it becomes ‘a reverse light’, what Adorno and Horkheimer called in
the Dialectic of Enlightenment, ‘the light of inversion.’117
The negative images supplied by ‘the messianic light’, when dialectically rendered, turn theological thought against itself: “Dialectics discloses (…) every image as
script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels its

115

Adorno and Bloch, “Something’s Missing,” 3-4.

116

Theodor Adorno, Prisms, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 259.

117

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 250.

118

power and hands it over to truth.”

398
For Adorno, this particular kind of reversal seems to

be “the position of ‘theology”. at least as it concerns how Adorno understands his rapprochement with Benjamin): “[their] agreement in philosophical fundamentals…could
indeed be called ‘inverse’ theology.”119 An ‘inverse theology’, then, illustrates how critique works; it entails and enacts a particular kind of reversal that is emblematic or representative of the ‘critical position’ or gesture, in that an inverse theology is an immanent
gesture that negates itself, supplying a view of itself that does not include redemption or
reconciliation, but rather the gnarled and monstrous effects of its wretchedness. The light
of inverted theology is a critical, and so, negative light, but is oriented toward praxis nevertheless. As Mendieta suggests, “in an age in which religion itself is continuously sequestered into the service of totalitarian ends, only that religion which is useless is true,
and if it is useful it is not true.”120
This exploration of critique in relation to political theology has returned us the
original questions of the dissertation: namely what is theology to do with ideology critique. Instead of sublimating or absorbing ideology critique in to itself (as Eagleton and
Žižek call for) or turning to its own tradition of idolatry critique (as we saw happen repeatedly in chapter 4). By coaxing political theology towards critique, I have tried to
show how important critique is as the key to emancipatory praxis, not in the sense that
critique provides practical solutions to be acted upon, but how essential critique is for

118

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 18.

119

Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940, trans. Nicholas
Walker, ed. Henri Lonitz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 66-67.
120

Mendieta, “Religion as Critique,” 11.

399
how political theology understands its immanent relation to praxis. The purpose here is to
help theology see and acknowledge that it may not possess the resources required to fulfill its own internally binding demands of praxis, and as such needs further theory, and so
critique, ideology critique especially.
Although this critique may call the practicality of theology into question, at least
provisionally, this is nevertheless thoroughly praxis in that critical theology is always
motivated by the unbearable and incessant demands made upon it by the memory of the
suffering and the dead: demands to heed their cries, to alleviate their injustice, to vindicate them by furthering happiness and freedom amidst the challenges of damaged life.
Careful attention to where theology has failed, a task of critical theology certainly, both
discloses what leads to shortcomings, and also highlights resources immanent to theology
that can offer more critical clarity, all the while potentially chastening current proposals
for action. As it was with Adorno, this kind of critique cannot mean, however, leaving
behind one’s theological traditions any more than it can mean an abandonment of praxis.
This kind of non-dialectical critical posture is as cheap and easy as it is socially and politically harmful. Rather, the more difficult critical posture to maintain (and to describe) is
self-reflexive; theology must be critiqued from within and as such, the results and the effects will always be equivocal, uncertain, and non-scripted. This is close to what Adorno
means when he insists that “one must have the tradition in oneself, to hate it properly.”121
Critique inhabits this sense of hating one’s tradition properly as the very thing that gives
it any life at all; only in showing to itself that it presently incapable of achieving its own
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, can theology point

beyond itself to anything just, free, or utopic; that is, can it become praxis.
By adopting an immanent and critical perspective, critical theology does not direct political theology to recommend solutions to social or political crises. The critical expression of theology, albeit in inverse and negative form, express its own relation to truth
and as such, is part of praxis’ struggle to end of human misery. It does not seek a theological justification for political projects, nor a theological justification for political endeavors. The emancipatory moment in critical theology, its anticipatory utopian character, reveals only a negative appraisal of its immanent relation to praxis, seeking to do justice to
the idea of God, the eschatological status of human person, the church’s relation to the
state, graced nature of divine love, and so on, from the starting point of negativity, that
starts from the grotesque facticity of our broken and depraved conditions.
Conclusion
The objective of this dissertation was to study ideology critique from the lens of
political theology, with the final goal of reinterpreting it via an immanent “dual negativity” that directed it both towards a critique of social conditions and an immanent critique
of theological concepts and their immanent relation to action and politics. For this, we
needed the Marx’s critique of religion as ideology at the outset, so as to position this
study within that tradition. I continued by exploring the turn to theology in philosophy,
done under the heading of ideology critique by both Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek, all
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in service to a radical and critical politics, respectively. What I have done here is to take
up theology and ideology critique as spelled out by significant representative voices in
the discussion in order to gain clarity about how might ideology critique be integrated
into political-theological work more thoroughly - and indeed, more critically. Philosophy
paves the way for ideology critique, but how to do it within theology can only be discerned and articulated immanently. Both Eagleton and Žižek mostly considered theology
to be ‘false’ but happily employed it for political purposes so as to counter the contemporary political ideologies and to defend their respective political responses, anti-capitalist
critique of social order, in the case of Eagleton, and an aggressively “unplugged” politics,
in the work of Žižek. However, it was the politics of theology that attracted them; they
found theology in this way to be useful, even if in the end of the day, none of it was true.
By 'instrumentalizing' theology for their own purposes, they made theology merely a political site, self-consciously emptying theology of its proper concepts and ideas.
From these previous chapters, we learned that the positive relation of theology to
ideology critique (‘theology as ideology critique’) is often motivated by the interest to put
theology to work for a specific program of politics, and as such, often slides into ideology, a propensity that Žižek is admittedly more prone to than Eagleton. This instrumentalization of theology leads to serious questions as to whether or not theology does the
same thing to itself and so is equally as ideological. Part of what motivates the turn to a
critique of critique here, as applied to the immanent relation of theory to praxis in political theology, is an attempt to avoid this particular problem. A critical theology reconfigures political theology so that it is not a practical theology but is still distinctly political,
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meaning that it works to create space to dismantle and transform an economic and political order structurally governed by injustice. It however insists that to do this requires a
return to thinking, indeed a recovery of deep theory, which may for a time, mean a ‘suspension of the ethical’ for the sake of political possibility. If the point of political theology is to change the world through action, the point of critical political theology is to
change the world by first critiquing itself (as it interfaces with its social conditions.
And yet, of course the turn to critique here does not abandon, or leave behind, the
theory of ideology anymore than it eschews consideration of emancipatory political objectives as part of what theology tries to achieve: justice, human freedom, happiness, well
being, and so on. What it means to employ ideology critique as a theological concept cannot be clarified by studying ideology alone, but calls for focused consideration of the critical position itself, especially with respect to what impact it has on the practices of political theology itself. I suggest here that the tendency to relegate critique as something auxiliary or a counterpart to praxis, as having to do with the luxury and privilege of theory,
and so which poses a threat to practical, actionable responses to the serious, concrete demands of the present speaks to the need for the dual negativity of immanent critique.
This negativity has a double movement. First, immanent critique concerns the relationship between theology and present social conditions, a dynamic with which political
theology, as well as its liberationist, feminist, and queer counterparts, is quite familiar. It
presents this relationship in a negative fashion that is distinct from, but not opposed to,
other ways of configuring this relationship in modern theology, whether it be correlative,
dialectical, or constructive. Its primary concern is to bring to the surface the negativity of
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the present horror in an ongoing critique of social conditions. Second, it directs the negativity of immanent critique towards own ideological self-sufficiency with regard to praxis
and political action. This concerns both its theological and political presumptions towards
justice, solidarity, freedom, antiracism, and the like, and as such, will have a critical impact on the ease with which political theology is accustomed to prescribing action, turning theology back to itself in an effort to return to theory, not as divorced from praxis (as
if true theory can ever be!), but a return to thinking. The dual negativity at work within
critical theology offers a way to uncover, according to its immanent norms and values,
the specific limitations and relative pitfalls of the assumed unity and univocity between
Christianity and liberation, freedom, happiness as well as specific social identity and
emancipatory movements like anti-racism, gender justice, and economic struggle of the
working class against wage labor, crushing debt, and other processes of subjection like
desire, consumption, and the privatization of common, public resources.123
I argue then that ideology critique places a certain limiting or restricting demand
on political activity; it places it under the double movement of negativity within immanent critique that brings together the critique of social conditions and immanent critique
of theological concepts under the rubric of political theology. In this way, critical theology remains political in that it considers the condition of possibility for intelligibility,
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recognition, and visibility in the present ordering of the world: the object-field of contestation in which subjectivity, agency, and action are made possible. Judith Butler, when
discussing Foucault’s view of critique, suggests that
not only is it necessary to isolate and identify the peculiar nexus of power and
knowledge that gives rise to the field of intelligible things, but also to track the
way in which that field meets its breaking point, the moments of its discontinuities, the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility for which it stands.
What this means is that one looks both for the conditions by which the object field
is constituted, but also for the limits of those conditions, the moments where they
point up their contingency and their transformability.124
Critique is a political practice in the sense that it aims to “offer a new practice of values”
that are possible precisely because such judgments are actively suspended for the sake of
something more politically fundamental, but difficult to always discern, to see, in the
context of already existing coordinates that condition and circumscribe human action.
Butler further argues that Adorno does something parallel: as a form of identity-thinking,
judgement precludes and overdetermines the critical gesture of exposure, effective separating critique from praxis in the name of ‘revolutionary activity.’ To counter this, critique seeks “to apprehend the ways in which categories are themselves instituted, how the
field of knowledge is ordered, and how what it suppresses returns, as it were, as its own
constitutive occlusion.”125 In this way, critique is not judgement, but an inquiry into the
conditions that make judgement possible. Critique is prior to judgement, but also places a
difficult burden on judgement and action. Politics, however, require not only judgement,
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but also decisions about what kind of arrangements and attachments we want to pursue,
what values we will struggle for, and what norms we will use and how we will use them.
Critique is not opposed to all this nor is not an operation separate from political action,
but an immanent, self-reflexive force within politics, interminably bringing itself into the
field of contestation.
I hope this adequately explains why I do not think that critique separates theory
from praxis, furcating it from its transformative, practical, or ethical role, even while it
raises certain difficult questions as whether our ideals, our commitments really are what
they claim to be. It may appear to be an abstract claim, but it is true to the instability and
undecided equivocation of praxis. Even though critical theory wishes to resist certain
claims made by political theology that justifies itself by linking itself to certain moral and
political claims, i.e., advocating for justice, participating in solidarity, struggling for the
good, opting for the marginal, and so on, the task of critique in relation to political theology is to point out “its breaking point, the moments of its discontinuities, the sites where
it fails to constitute the intelligibility for which it stands.” As it turns out, the unbearable
demands of praxis are the site of theology’s breaking point, the moment of its failure. The
immanent ideology critique in critical theology helps to correct this over-determination of
theology by activity and aids political theology by establishing for itself a critical position
that opens its own political commitment and theological concepts up to a reconfiguration
and assessment that is directed towards its socio-historical context and governed by its
own political impulse. In this way, critical theology concerns the immanent relation of
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theory and praxis within political theology, and in a gesture of dual negativity, takes up
immanent critique, applied both to the political and to theology.
It is here that political theology is able to become ideologico-critical; that is, actively engaged in serious questions and concrete analyzes concerning human well-being,
freedom, and happiness while also restricting itself from privileging action, spelling out
the theological grounds for the perfect social state, or recommending itself as the basis
for social renewal and political hope, all in light of its immanent theological and political
demands. Rather, seeing rupture as the dominant force of the theological, in reference to
both social conditions and its own concepts, the critical force is a practice of resistance, at
times even against actionism, but always for and on behalf of praxis. It always keeps the
Marxian accusation front and center: theology will always risk ideology, no matter how
attached or grounded it is to justice, freedom, solidarity and the like.
The concept of critique in ‘critical theology’ is not merely the inherent element of
self-interrogation that ideally catalyzes action and transformative change, nor is it the
correlative dynamic within theology per se that makes all theology political. In the view
of critique, political theology in this context means neither the contestation of sovereignty, theological genealogy of political ideas, justification of power, nor is it a postsecular attempt to supersede the modern secular-religious divide or acts of political self-definition (whether it be in the case of the various religious motivations of nationalism or of
the religious dimensions of the ‘secular’). It is rather concerned with explicating the various forces and factors (many of them as philosophical and political as they are religious
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and theology) involved in the turn of religion to politics and the use of theological reasoning and values in the course of collective political life and the everyday struggles of
public affairs, including its various practices, systems, and institutions.
A critical theology, as an immanent force within political theology, does not appeal directly to emancipation, progress, or revolution, but instead makes political theology (which does take up positions along these lines) its central object, submitting its ethical, moral, and political claims to immanent critique. In this way, Christianity is shown to
be an agent in promoting social and individual liberation and how faith and politics positively relate in contemporary society, but also needs the negative self-reflexivity necessary to regulate the equivocation of theory and praxis, effectively exempting itself on the
account of its stated emancipatory and progressive ethical and political agendas.
In this way, a critical theology is neither disinterested in practical activities nor is
it opposed to praxis, understood as transformative action in history by the material practices of political subjects, but rather considers the relation of theology and action with the
negativity of its double movement. This negative critical position is immanent to theology, not operating as a distinct discipline or method in relation to political, systematic, or
practical theologies that acts upon them, but rather is an impulse within and inherent to
theology whose negativity sheds light not what should be, but rather what should not be.
While this does chasten or restrict theology in relation to the actionable solutions it offers
as consequences of its various theological positions, it does not oppose practical solutions
or social and political action; it is, instead, minimalistic in that it provides the practical
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reasoning for the negation of the bad, rather than for ideals, standard, actionable solutions
towards the good.
To say more would require sketching out the more positive agenda of a critical
theology. What comes next for a critical theology that has determined, as a political theology, that the task of theology nows shifts away from spelling out the distinctions of nature/grace in ‘la nouvelle theologie,’ the state of gender in Barth’s doctrine of creation, or
responding to debates about ecological health by reciting the Thomistic virtues (as basic
examples)? It abdicates the work of charting out the parameters of perfect social order,
and for a moment perhaps, suspends efforts to prescribe sets of actions based on theological concepts. Indeed, further work is required to spell out the exact consequences of a
critical theology on political theology, especially its use of major concepts like justice,
reconciliation, compassion, and solidarity. It would require spelling out each of these
concepts, making use of the double movement of critical theology, and clarifying what
difference this makes for the overall agenda of political theology in relation to our social
world. This work lies ahead.
I do believe, however, that in taking up political theology as its object, critical
theology modifies the posture it takes as it prescribes actions and values, whether on the
basis of specific theological commitments, or political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones. A critical theology helps moderate the relation of theory and praxis within
political theology, making it clear to theology that it may know less about justice, solidarity, reconciliation, and human happiness than it appears to, or believe it does. This highlights again what is most important about the dual negativity of immanent critique, that it
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is the means of coming to terms with contradictions/deficiencies within the object of critique, from the perspective of object itself; that is, its standard of immanent critique belongs to and exists in the object of its critique. For critical theology, it is the relentless demand of praxis that becomes the basis for the theological critique of the use of justice,
freedom, liberation, solidarity, and the like as the basis for political theology.
This is what it means for the critical position of political theology, as Judith Butler, says “to look both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, but also
for the limits of those conditions, the moments where they point out their contingency
and their transformability.”126 As it turns out, praxis emerges at ‘the limits of the conditions’ in which theology is constituted; it is a moment by which theology’s ‘contingency
and transformability’ is made visible and for this, theology needs critique as much as it is
need praxis; or closer to the point, it needs to be critique in order to become praxis.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation began with a question: what does ideology critique have to do
with political theology? Since ideology critique originates from within modern philosophy, it is sensible, although not natural, to begin there; but more specifically, we begin
with the turn to theology in philosophy. This is itself an odd starting point, given the
complex way that philosophy has, from its side, positioned itself in relation to theology,
at least in modernity. A distinctive feature of modern philosophy’s indebtedness to the
Enlightenment tradition is its critique of religion. Karl Marx, one of the modern “masters
of suspicion,” encapsulates what has become the classic critique of religion as ideology,
and in turn, has fueled the secular critique of religion that it has become politically problematic and intellectually outdated. And so, when we encounter the turn to religion and to
theology that occurs within the postmodern intellectual shift in the late 1990s and early
2000s, we find that it is motivated in large part by a desire to undo the modern foreclosure of religion and its emancipatory potential, not only for thought but also for action:
that is, for both theory and praxis. In this way, theology has become interesting once
again for theorists and philosophers on the ‘left’; what is all the more surprising, after examining it more closely, is that this interest in theology is shown to be concurrent with a
return to ideology critique, both of which are motivated by political concerns. And so this
creates an opportunity for both philosophy and theology to reconsider their mutual relationship to ideology critique, and as such, their relationship to each other.
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This reconsideration has raised many questions, not only for political theology but
also for ideology critique. Can theology be ideology critique, especially considering the
long established tradition of the Marxist critique of religion as ideology? How is one able
to satisfactorily respond to Marx’s critique of religion as ideology in such a way as to position political theology, not only as learning from or being subject to ideology critique,
but also interpreted as ideology critique? Certainly, this must come from within theology’s own traditions and sources, otherwise political theology would simply become sublimated into ideology critique, and so lose intelligibility as a separate and distinct discipline. At the outset, it would seem as if the most likely candidate for this would be the analogue between ideology critique and biblical critique of idolatry, which is itself a critique of appearance and representation that directly concerns the material difference between that which appears to be and that which is.
After setting the stage in the first chapter which reviewed the relationship between
theology and ideology critique in Marx’s critique of religion, the first part of the dissertation proceeded to take up these questions in chapters on British Marxist literary critic
Terry Eagleton, and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, both of whom are devoted to
philosophies of ideology critique that turn to theology and interpret it as critique. In
Chapter 1, I argued that both the Marxian critique of religion and the critique of ideology
centered not so much on the material or substantive theological content of religion as ideology, but was far more concerned with the social impact of theology and its function in
and on the material reality of social conditions that shape the consciousness of political
subjects. Marx’s interest was not to abolish religion because it was ideological; rather he
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sought to abolish the conditions under which religion emerged a necessity for human beings whose experience of alienation and exploitation cut them off from their own practical activities. For instance, Marx’s critique of the fetish in religion serves as an analogy
for his critique of commodifies in the capitalist political economy; his intention is to use
religious metaphors and theological allusions to illustrate the social impact and function
of ideologies in society, not to identify religion as ideology tout court or calls for the end
of religion tout court as a necessary byproduct of and condition for revolutionary praxis.
Terry Eagleton also takes up a functionalist account of Christianity as ideology
critique, pointing to the way that traditional theological concepts such as sin, creation,
love, Christology, even the idea of God, preserves a way of thinking against the capitalist
grain, and so resists both the instrumentalization of thought and the commodification of
critique. Its normative commitments to justice, equality, and radical acts of other-regard
can also be counted on to generate an actionable alternative to the social injustice produced by neoliberal and postmodernist approaches to theory; its preference for the anawim, its practice of love, and its materialist consideration of human well-being (feeding
the hungry, caring for the sick, meeting the needs of the poor, valorizing self-sacrifice,
associating with scapegoats) all afford us an incessant ideology critique of a left-liberal
politics that shows little interest in any of these normative criteria, all of which are seen
by Eagleton as essential to any anti-capitalist alternative to the social order worthy of the
Marxist name. The critical answer, then, is not to marginalize theology, but rather to put
it to use as a Marxist ideology critique of social conditions, which is only but a single part
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of a larger, pragmatic, diverse, and pluralist strategy to contend with secularization, postmodernism, and an anemic left.
Radical politics is ‘a politics of the possible’ for Eagleton, and so the eschatological futurity of the Christian socio-political vision of the Jesuanic tradition energizes the
struggle of theology as ideology critique towards a better future. Slavoj Žižek, however,
is unsure whether such a future is possible or even desirable. Recalling the Marxist tradition that calls for, and seeks to bring into existence, the condition of possibility for the
revolutionary subject, Žižek turns to Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to contend with
the eclipse of ideology critique by politics in late modern philosophy. He blames the end
of thinking in politics on the ‘vuglarized’ Marxist preference for action that has produced
the hyper-pressurized kind of acts that effectively substantialize the void of the originary
trauma of becoming a subject. In this way, action becomes the symbolic force that covers
up the unbearable demands of the Real, and for Žižek, the task of critique in this context
is to tear open the ideological sutures and to expose once again the dark negativity that
lies beneath and behind all of our cherished political values and struggles, even democracy, freedom, love, equality, and justice. Christianity, it turns out, is particularly helpful
for this kind of work; its brash admission to God’s impotence and indeed God’s eventual
death in Jesus’ crucification, effectively renounces the sacred and unplugs itself from the
social order, and so can become a model for the kind of ideology critique captured in the
psychoanalytic slogan, “the big Other does not exist.”
In this way, theology is Eventful in its ruptural and inaugurative force. Its apocalyptic rupture, modeled on the divine death by the cross, is the condition of possibility for
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the authentic political Act that stands outside the coordinates of action laid out by ideology. This takes theological form in the divine resurrection of ‘the Spirit,’ the ‘unplugged’
community of believers who are not liberated to act, but freed from action, at least action
as we currently understand it; that is, they are freed to be passively resistant to the dictates of the social order, opting out of, rather than struggling against, the order. In all this,
Žižek shows us not only how ideologies are subject-forming realities (this argument was
made quite persuasively by Louis Althusser) or how theology is both complicit in and
also resistant to this malformation, but he goes further in taking yet another approach, albeit a more troublesome and complicated one, that sees Christianity not as ideology, but
interprets it as ideology critique. Žižek explicates a materialist understanding of Christianity’s social impact as a radical political alternative, not only to ideological practices
that masquerade as justice or freedom or multiculturalism, but to political theologies that
consider themselves to be resistant or subversive. The “death of God” theology that Žižek
adopts has a distinctive dual negativity attached to it: it is not only a critique of social
conditions, but also a critique of its own theological concepts: the truth of God must be a
negative concept, an inversion of false claims that keeps us from spelling out what ‘God’
may mean positively, much less politically. This was an important building block for the
dissertation as it turns to theology and ideology critique in search of what can only be
gestured towards here in the final part: critical theology.
As Christian theology has sought to respond to the modern critiques of religion, it
has attempted to heed Marx’s accusations, not always by integrating them into its rules,
language, and discourse, but by turning instead to the critique of idolatry as analogous to
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Marx’s ideology critique of the fetish. The biblical critique of idolatry, however, presents
a problem because, after consideration of major trajectories in the biblical scholarship
and the archaeological record, we find that it functions as a theological support for identity politics in the context of religious and political struggle in the ancient near east. Idolatry critique itself is not an analogy to ideology critique, but is caught within the ambit of
ideology itself. Furthermore, even when theologians take up the concept of idolatry critique as ideology critique, this gets lost, in large part due to the emerging and ongoing nature of the biblical scholarship that inform my reading of the biblical theology.
Take, for instance, the Protestants Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, both of
whom are eager to rescue theology from the Marxist critique, not by dismissing the critique, but by active responding to it by adjusting and repositioning theology so as to free
itself from the critique; this positions theology within social conditions (Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’) or ad extra in such a way that they are strategically positioned to be antagonistic, as is the case with Niebuhr’s Christian realism. In contrast, the Catholics Johann Baptist Metz and Marcella Althaus-Reid align themselves respectively with the dialectical lineage of prophetic dissent also present in the Hebrew bible; this argues that for
theology to be itself, namely for it to speak of God, it must be interruptive, both towards
itself (privatization of theology, the bourgeois subject, heteronormativity), and towards
social conditions (indifference towards suffering, historical amnesia, systemic injustice);
it maintains the dual movement of negativity that uniquely belongs to immanent ideology
critique but is lacking in idolatry critique, both in its original form in the biblical theology
and its use by political theologians. Even Metz and Althaus-Reid utilize and call upon
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theology of the biblical critique of idolatry, but so do without addressing or critiquing the
politics behind it.
What we have learned from this analysis is that ‘a critique of critique’ is needed
within political theology, one that is able to bring to the surface the social impact and political function of idolatry critique which feeds off the tension between the different concepts at odds with each other in the biblical theology, and sustains the negativity of the
critique of ethical and practical concept immanent to theology itself. For this, we turn, at
last, to the question of theory as critique of praxis, which I argue, may take theological
form as a critical theology whose negative ‘double movement’ may prove capable of
such a ‘critique of critique’ without falling to the trap of either the quietism of Žižek’s active passivity or the pseudo-activist pressure of fully praxis-oriented theologies.
The mutual engagement between critical theory and political theology has a long
history and is still on-going; from Johann Baptist Metz’s new political theology, to Marsha Hewitt’s feminist critical theory of religion to Gregory Baum’s critical social theology, political theology has long recognized in the shadow of critical theory a demand to
account for itself as ideology critique. But it has struggled to do this for a number of reasons. First, critical theory configures ideology critique as immanent critique and so calls
for a kind of negativity that is difficult to sustain by political theology’s own methods;
that is, it calls for a negative concept of truth but cannot become, as Adorno has convincingly argued, a “negative theology.” Second, attention to the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’
implicates theology directly as an agent and site of commodification that plagues modern
social conditions. It is clear that, as Adorno memorably phrased it, “religion is for sale,”
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and political theology seems unable to forestall its deleterious effect on theology. Third,
the appeal of political theology lies in its the invigoration of the practical impulse essential to the normative vision of Christianity’s political desire, much which is desirable in
our contemporary context because of its attention to suffering, its commitment to
memory, and its stubborn insistence upon that which appears to be impossible: forgiveness, reparations, non-violence, the end of authoritarian power, and the ethics of the
“grand reversal”: the elevation of ‘the least of these’ as God’s preferred ones.
And yet critical theory calls upon ideology critique to question and problematize,
not the norms inherent to this theolgico-political impulse per se, but the apparent immediate link between theological concepts, these norms, and praxis. A critical theology, which
adopts the dual negativity of immanent critique, is always a ruptural and inaugurative
thinking that interrogates “that which is” in order to bring into being “that which is currently not present” in our social conditions. Its project is not amelioration, but transformation; the Christian theological imagination is stubbornly utopic in this way, meaning
that it privileges both the directions of the negativity of critique because it recognizes that
only by negating ‘the false’ will ‘the true’ appear, whether ‘the false’ resides in social
conditions or within itself. It does not presume to be able to bring to being that which lies
beyond, but rather tries to fracture the present, and in this way, sustain the eschatological
expectation for something other than what currently is. In this way, critical theology
hopes to be a practice of resistance, but one that cannot offer prescriptive ways forward.
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This critical theology is presented as an immanent critique of political theology,
in that it takes up political theology as its object. This self-reflexivity completes the double movement of negativity that enables it to remain critique of ideologies, whether they
concern social conditions or the political functions of its own theological concepts. It cannot in this way be considered a practical theology, but rather focuses its work on naming
the problems as they exist in the normative orders and structures that govern human being
and acting. Political theology as critical theology can only do so however when it takes
itself as ideology; in this way, it is more Marxist that the ‘left’ philosophies of Eagleton
and Žižek whose political uses of Christianity conveniently skip over the critique of religion as ideology, effectively instrumentalizing theological concepts to fit their respective
political programs. Critical theology resists this, knowing full well that the work that lies
ahead of itself is only possible if and when it stays focused on its own propensity for ideology. It knows that it is not inoculated from ideology by its stated commitments to justice, equality, solidarity and the like, as long as the social conditions of the inverted world
remain in effect.

EPILOGUE
OPEN QUESTIONS, FURTHER DIRECTIONS
Projects such as this one present a significant challenge in that the questions they
raise and the directions they point to are not easily recognized or programmatically
sketched out. The work here in many ways to struggle, and admittedly stumble, towards a
formulation of a complex question, one that we may not know to ask quite yet. But, as an
attempt at a final word, I hope to say a bit more about where I hope this attempt at a critical theology might go in the future and how I expect my own research agenda to be
shaped by it.
Within the dissertation itself, there are many open questions. The interruptive
negativity of immanent critique plays such a dominant role in critical theology, and yet in
order for it to be theo-logical, it must have something to say about God, in the very least.
It is insufficient and perhaps even dangerous to follow Žižek completely and concede that
the crucified Christ is the final political-theological word and the divine, as a result of the
incarnation, has been fully sublimated into the revolutionary community of unplugged
subjects. In Žižek’s vision, the rupture here is complete; the Void it creates, or rather reveals from underneath the sutures of the Symbolic order, is total and so it remains to be
seen how critical theology can rely so heavily on the critical formula of dual negativity
while also still remaining a theology. Can critical theology sustain the heavy demands of

419

420
negativity before it breaks apart and is sublimated into a sociology of religion, or worse, a
philosophy of religion?
More work must also be done to distinguish between the two critical lines of
thought in the biblical theology of idolatry: the prophetic understanding and the critique
of idolatry. A more theologically grounded “critique of critique” will required to address
this tension and its implications for political theology. One possible way forward here is
further attention to whether this identity politics of idolatry critique endures in the New
Testament version, especially considering the central role that the theological and political theme of community plays in early Christian ecclesiology and soteriology. Žižek insists that the decentralized and diffused presence of the Spirit reveals itself in the life of a
community that, in light of the “death of God” as the big Other, is freed from ethical and
political constraints, and so is freed to act outside the social order and to resist it in ways
presently unknown and unthought. Eagleton opposes Žižek here, namely because the
Christian community is ideologico-critical precisely because of the norms it insists must
be in place for redemption, which is always social and universalist, to occur. How is the
Christian community to act out of its theological bearings if its effect on social reality, as
the ruptural Event, is precisely meant to foreclose the kind of acting it seems called to?
Further clarification on this matter might be reached through a stricter analysis of
the relationship of ideology critique and utopia, now from the perspective of what I have
been calling ‘critical theology.’ This would help widen the project to include more philosophical treatments of ideology critique with respective to theology from figures like Paul
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Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas, whose respective work on tradition, conviction, and communicative action would balance out the emphasis on negativity maintained here, concretize the argument with more political specifics, while also updating the conversation from
the 1970s and 1980s with respect to recent debates about religion, the secularization, and
post-secular politics.
Oddly enough, the long theoretical detour taken in this dissertation actually leads
back towards theology. For the theoretical questions to be answered, and their practical
implications to be fully understood, the theologian must return home to concepts within
the various Christian traditions in order to explore their potential as resources for this
dual negativity, and also to reshape said themes in accordance to the critical attitudes towards political action taken here. Certainly one could easily start with Marcella AlthausReid whose interaction with and movement in-between political, liberationist, queer, and
postcolonial theologies offers much to think about and work through in reference to the
relationships between critique, theory, praxis, and action. In this way, a critical theology
quickly becomes a queer theology, but one that resists the temptation to adopt the ‘preferential option for the queer’ as an ideology free perspective, one that is immunized in light
of its resistance to and struggle against heteronormative orders of normalization and legibility. It also reshapes entirely, in my view, the perspective on utopia and politics in political theology, which changes the discussion on dialectical ‘crisis’ theology and the theology of hope that followed it. What happens, for example, to apocalyptic theology and demythologization under the rubric of critical theology? Does it strengthen the critical perspective on action and politics that the dual negativity of critical theology insists upon,
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only now coming from the theological, rather than the theoretical, perspective? Or does it
raise questions about whether the strictures of critique placed on action and politics in
this vision are tenable as theological positions?
Perhaps the most important and pressing of the further directions for critical theology concern the pressure that critical theology places on the relationship between philosophy and theology. Correlation and dialogue have been productive metaphors for the relationship over the last half century, and yet the future of the relationship will largely depend on how they can help each other with accurate, timely, and productive political responses to the predominant social order. It is understandable that the turn to theology by
philosophy has been lauded by theologians who feel vindicated to be at the table once
again, and yet this dissertation gives several reasons why theology must find the courage
to assert its own resources and define itself and the critical parameters of its negativity.
Perhaps Christianity can find this courage in its utopic thinking, which is supplied by the
dual negativity of its immanent critique. When Christianity takes itself as the object of its
own ideology critique — that is, as a critical theology — the negative truth behind its
stubbornly utopic expectations is able to emerge. It is this negativity that fuels its critical
engagement with its social conditions and the relationship of its theologies to these conditions. It does this because it actually expects that a new world is possible, even if it may
not know what it looks like or how to bring it into being. Meanwhile, a critical theology
directs Christianity and Christian communities to seek to instigate the critical ruptures
necessary to see the world and ourselves differently.
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